肇論疏 1.79

1.79

第三、引五經證成也。今引《維摩經》也。經云：色即是空，非色滅空。謂色性即是空，非謂滅色然後始空也。而云敗者，古經也。壞敗是毀敗，亦是滅義。以明夫聖人之於物也即萬物之自虛者，「以明」兩字，或可屬上、或可屬下，唯《莊子》應屬上，今此文意則將屬下也；後亦然。明聖人見萬物之性自空耳。豈待宰割以求通哉者，《小雅》云：宰，治也。割謂裁也。即色是空，不須宰割破壞然後方乃通於空也。是以寢疾有非真之談、超日有即空之稱者，前引一經，此引兩經，後更有兩經也。寢疾謂《維摩經》也。彼經云：菩薩病者，非真非有，眾生病亦非真非有也。超日者，《超日明經》也。彼經云：不有受、不保命，四大虛也。然則三藏殊文統之者一者也，三藏謂修多羅、毘曇、毘尼。雖言迹異端，以理統之，莫終不歸畢竟空也。故《放光》云第一真諦無成無得下，據第一義諦，無有成佛、無有得涅槃；世諦則有耳。夫有得則是無得之偽號下，諸本皆云「成得則是無得之偽號」，今依古本，「有得」為正也。准下無得句，義亦應然。實是無得，而云有得是假偽之名，無得反此也。真名故雖真而非有者，諸本皆云「雖得而非得」，今依古本「雖真而非有」也。准下偽號句，義亦應然也。雖曰真名，仍非是有，偽號反此也。是以言真未甞有者，覆前兩句也。二言未始一下，真偽兩言不一，而有無二理不殊也。故經云真諦俗諦謂有異耶下，此是《大品經》第二十二卷〈道樹品〉中問答也。此經直辨下，釋前經中問答意也。真諦明非有下，據真則非有，據俗則非無也。豈以二下，不以諦名有二，則謂法體有二也。

Third, quoting five scriptures to verify and establish [the doctrine]. Here, the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* is quoted. The scripture states: 'Form is itself emptiness, not that form is destroyed to become empty.' This means that the nature of form is itself empty; it does not mean that one destroys form and only then is it empty. As for the word *bai* (ruined/destroyed), that is [the wording of] the older scripture. *Huai-bai* means damaged and ruined, and it also carries the meaning of destruction. As for 'to clarify that for the sage regarding things, the myriad things are inherently empty in themselves,' the two words 'to clarify' could either belong to the text above or to the text below. Only in *Zhuangzi* should it belong above; here, the textual meaning intends it to belong below, and so it is later as well. It clarifies that the sage sees that the nature of the myriad things is inherently empty of itself. As for 'how could one wait for dissection and division in order to find access?,' the *Xiaoya* says: 'Dissection (*zai*) means ordering; division (*ge*) means cutting.' Form is itself empty; there is no need to dissect, cut, break, and destroy it before one then finds access to emptiness. As for 'Therefore, the discourse on non-truth was held during the illness, and the designation of being empty as such was made in the *Chaori*,' previously one scripture was cited, here two scriptures are cited, and later there are two more scriptures. 'Illness' refers to the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*. That scripture says: 'The illness of a bodhisattva is not real and not existent; the illness of sentient beings is also not real and not existent.' *Chaori* refers to the *Chaori ming jing*. That scripture says: 'One does not possess feeling, nor preserve life; the four great elements are empty.' 'Thus, though the three baskets have different texts, that which unifies them is one': the three baskets refer to sūtra, abhidharma, and vinaya. Although their traces of words present divergent points, when unified through principle, none fail ultimately to return to complete emptiness (atyanta-śūnyatā). 'Therefore, the *Fangguang* says that in the ultimate paramārtha-satya there is neither accomplishment nor attainment': in terms of the ultimate truth, there is no becoming a Buddha and no attaining nirvāṇa; it is only in conventional truth that such things exist. 'Now, having attainment is the artificial designation for non-attainment': all editions say, 'Accomplishment and attainment are the artificial designation for non-attainment,' but now, following the old edition, 'having attainment' is correct. In accordance with the clause on 'non-attainment' below, the meaning should also be so. In reality there is non-attainment, yet saying that there is attainment is a provisional, artificial name; non-attainment is the reverse of this. 'Because it is a real name, though it is real, it is not existent': all editions say, 'though attained, it is not attained,' but now, following the old edition, it is 'though it is real, it is not existent.' In accordance with the clause on 'artificial designation' below, the meaning should also be so. Though it is called a real name, it is still not existent; artificial designation is the reverse of this. 'Therefore, speaking of the real has never meant existence' reviews the preceding two clauses. 'The two expressions have never been one': the two expressions of real and artificial are not identical, yet the two principles of existence and non-existence are not different. 'Therefore the scripture says: Do you say that paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya are different?': this is a question and answer in chapter 22, the 'Chapter on the Bodhi-Tree', of the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*. 'This scripture directly explains': this explains the intention of the question and answer in the preceding scripture. 'Paramārtha-satya clarifies non-existence': from the standpoint of the ultimate, it is non-existent; from the standpoint of the conventional, it is not non-existent. 'How could it be that due to two...': it is not because the designations of the truths are two that one can say the essential nature of dharmas is two.