肇論疏 2.31

2.31

第三、問答料簡也。文有九番，然有四難。第一、有一番能所難；第二、有一番名體難；第三、有四番境智難；第四、有三番生滅難。前三難皆難無知，後一難直難生滅。今初。問即難也。前論文云：智有窮幽之鑒而無知焉，神有應會之用而無慮焉。無知即無智也，無慮即無會也。今難此語耳。意云，有能知能會、有可知可會，即是有知有會，何得言無知耶？文中有二：前躡前難，後玄搆難。雖有兩意，通難一義，合為一難也。而言真心獨朗者，朗，明也。謂般若之心獨自朗悟，無物無知，故云物物斯照也。應接無方下，有緣皆應皆接，無有齊限，故曰無方。有所云為皆與機緣應會，故云動與事會也。物物斯照故知無所遺者，皆知，故無遺漏也。有本作「智」字，義意雖同，望下不然也。動與事會故會不失機者，有機則會，故不失也。會不失機故有會於可會者，可會即眾生也。知無所遺故有知於可知者，有本云「必亦有知於可知」，煩長也，義雖無失，不如省要也。可知，即所知之理也。有知於可知下，覆疏上句也。既知既會下，聖不虛知，即是有知；聖不虛會，即是有會，故曰既知既會。既有知會，何故言智有窮幽之鑒而無知焉？神有應會之用而無慮焉耶？若夫忘知遺會下，第二、玄搆難也。有本言「若云」，亦得也。若以聖人雖有知會，而不言我能有知、我能有會也。即是聖人無私於知會以成其私者，此是聖人之心不私作知會解，息忘其知會，非謂無知無會也。而言以成其私者，《莊子外篇．天道章》云：孔子舉仁義以說老聃。聃曰：何謂仁義？孔子曰：忠心勿愷悌，兼愛無私，是謂仁之情也。老聃曰：無私焉乃私。郭注云：世所謂無私者，釋已而愛人。夫愛人者，亦欲人之愛已。此乃其私，非亡公而公者也。今借此語，明聖人雖無心取知會，乃是知會，如無私乃成私耳。斯可謂不自有其知安得無知哉者，若云自忘知會者，此乃自不謂有知會，然知會之體非無，何得言無知會乎？答曰夫聖人功高二義而不仁下，答也。前難中雖有兩意，同難知會。今更不分別，合作一答也。文中有三：第一、序本宗；第二、述難意；第三、結答。今初。功高二儀而不仁者，二儀謂天地也。不仁者，《老子》云：天地不仁，以萬物為芻狗。聖人不仁，以百姓為芻狗。今借此語也。聖人功高天地，是即仁矣；而不自矜其能，是謂不仁也。般若智明過於日月，是即明矣；而忘其知，故曰彌昏。《小爾雅》云：彌益也，彌久也。今取益義耳。豈曰木石鼓其懷其於無知者，意云聖人無知者，懷抱豈同木石，名此為無知乎？固不然也。誠以異於人者神明下，人者神明，法有取相，是即知矣。聖人神明不取法相，故曰無知。以無知故，不可作事相取也。子意欲令下，第二、述難意也。文中有二：前，躡前難意；後，玄搆難意。令初也。前難末云：聖人無私於知會，故名無知者，非也。不自有其知者，自不以知會為有也。而未嘗不有知者，有知在也。無乃乖於聖心下，無乃，乃也。如《爾雅》云：無定，定也。無寧，寧也。不顯，顯也。不承，承也。言乃乖聖心、失文旨也。何者經云下，釋經意，明所以乖聖心、失文旨也。無知無見者，一往為知，明了為見。亦可一往為見，明了為知也。無作無緣者，作謂起作，緣謂攀緣也。斯知自無知矣豈待反照然後無知哉者，聖心無所取相，故名無知；非是實有知自忘其知，名為無知也。若有知性空而稱淨下，第二、玄搆難意也。若以聖人實有般若之知，但以其體性是空，故曰無知者，非今無知之本意也。即不辨於惑智者，般若亦空、惑智亦空，二俱是空、同是無知，是則無別也。三毒四倒下，不但惑智，乃至三毒等皆爾，亦以性空為淨，與般若何異？何故獨稱般若無知乎？若以所知美般若下，若以真諦所知之境無相故，歎美能知之智為無知者，亦非也。所知自常淨般若未嘗淨者，真諦自空，般若非空也。亦無緣致淨下，真諦自空，不關般若，何緣令般若同真諦之空，而言無知乎？然經云下，釋經中明般若無知本意也。將無以般若體性真淨本無惑取之知者，將無以者，意言以也。如《世說》云：將無同。意言同也。以般若體性不取著於真諦、無惑取之知，故曰無知耳。無惑取之知不可以知名哉者，從然經云至此，文勢乃盡耳。以無有惑取之知，故言無知耳。豈唯無知名無知者，又答前忘知遺會也。非是自忘其知會然後言無知，只此知性自無知矣，不待忘也。是以聖人下，第三、結答也。真諦無兔馬之遺下，經說象、馬、兔三獸度河，淺深有異。象盡河底而無遺，兔、馬未盡故有遺。今明般若觀真諦，真諦無遺，不如兔馬，故云無兔馬之遺。般若之智鑒照窮盡，故云無窮之鑒也。所以會而不差下，會機緣不差失、當道理無取著，寂然泊然，無知而遍知諸法也。

The third [section] is the examination through questions and answers. The text has nine turns, which nevertheless comprise four objections. First, there is one turn on the objection regarding subject and object (the capable and the object). Second, there is one turn on the objection regarding name and essence. Third, there are four turns on the objection regarding object and wisdom. Fourth, there are three turns on the objection regarding arising and ceasing. The first three objections all challenge non-knowing, while the last objection directly challenges arising and ceasing. Now for the first. The question is precisely the objection. The preceding treatise text stated: "Wisdom possesses the illumination that exhausts the profound yet is without knowing; the spirit possesses the function of responsive encountering yet is without deliberation." Non-knowing means having no wisdom, and non-deliberation means having no encounter. Now this objection addresses those words. The meaning is: if there is that which can know and that which can encounter, and there is that which is knowable and encounterable, then this constitutes having knowing and having encountering; how can one say there is "non-knowing"? Within the text there are two parts: first, tracing the previous [argument] to object; second, constructing a profound objection. Although there are two aspects, they both challenge the single doctrine, so they are combined as one objection. As for saying "the true mind shines forth alone": "shines forth" (朗) means clear and luminous. It means that the mind of prajñā is alone clearly awakened, and there is no thing it does not know; hence it says, "illuminating each and every thing." From "responding and meeting without fixed limit" downward: wherever there are conditions, it responds and meets them all, having no restriction or boundary; hence it is called "without fixed limit." Whatever it does is always in responsive encounter with capacities and conditions; hence it says, "movement conforms to affairs." As for "illuminating each and every thing, so that knowing leaves nothing out": because it knows all, nothing is omitted. Some editions have the character "wisdom" (智); although the meaning is identical, looking at what follows, it is not so. As for "movement conforms to affairs, so that the encounter does not miss the opportune moment": when there is a capacity, it encounters it, and thus does not miss it. As for "the encounter does not miss the opportune moment, so there is an encounter with what can be encountered": what can be encountered refers to sentient beings. As for "knowing leaves nothing out, so there is a knowing of what can be known": some editions read, "there must also be a knowing of what can be known"; this is cumbersome and lengthy, and although there is no loss of meaning, it is not as good as being concise. "What can be known" is the principle that is known. From "having a knowing of what can be known" downward, it unpacks the preceding line. From "since there is knowing and since there is encountering" downward: the sage does not know in vain, which is having knowing; the sage does not encounter in vain, which is having encountering; hence it says, "since there is knowing and since there is encountering." Since there are knowing and encountering, why say that wisdom possesses the illumination that exhausts the profound yet is without knowing, and that the spirit possesses the function of responsive encountering yet is without deliberation? From "If one forgets knowing and abandons encountering" downward is the second part, constructing a profound objection. Some editions say "if it is said that" (若云), which is also acceptable. If [one means that] although the sage has knowing and encountering, he does not say "I am capable of having knowing, I am capable of having encountering." This is "the sage being impartial regarding knowing and encountering in order to fulfill his private [end]": this means that the sage's mind does not personally generate an understanding of knowing and encountering, resting and forgetting his knowing and encountering; it does not mean there is no knowing and no encountering. As for saying "in order to fulfill his private [end]": the Outer Chapters of the Zhuangzi, in the "Tiandao" chapter, says: "Confucius cited benevolence and righteousness to persuade Lao Dan. Dan said: 'What is meant by benevolence and righteousness?' Confucius said: 'In one's innermost heart not to be complacent, and to love universally without partiality—this is the true character of benevolence.' Lao Dan said: 'To be without partiality is itself partial.'" Guo's commentary says: "What the world calls being without partiality means setting oneself aside to love others. Now, one who loves others also wishes that others love oneself. This is precisely his partiality; it is not forgetting the public to truly be public." Here these words are borrowed to clarify that although the sage has no mind to grasp knowing and encountering, this is nonetheless knowing and encountering, just as being without partiality is itself fulfilling partiality. As for "This can be called not taking oneself to possess knowing; how can it be deemed non-knowing?": if one says he forgets knowing and encountering on his own, this is merely that he does not personally assert that there are knowing and encountering; yet the essence of knowing and encountering is not non-existent. How could one say there is no knowing or encountering? From "The answer says: 'The sage's merit surpasses the Two Modes yet he is not benevolent'" downward is the reply. Although the preceding objection had two aspects, they both challenged knowing and encountering. Now, without making further distinctions, they are combined into a single reply. Within the text there are three parts: first, stating the fundamental doctrine; second, setting forth the intent of the objection; third, concluding the reply. Now for the first. "Merit surpasses the Two Modes yet he is not benevolent": the Two Modes refer to Heaven and Earth. Regarding "not benevolent," the Laozi says: "Heaven and Earth are not benevolent; they take the myriad things as straw dogs. The sage is not benevolent; he takes the common people as straw dogs." Here these words are borrowed. The sage's merit surpasses Heaven and Earth; this is indeed benevolence. Yet he does not boast of his ability; this is called being "not benevolent." The brilliance of prajñā wisdom exceeds the sun and moon; this is indeed brilliance. Yet he forgets his knowing; hence it says, "all the more dim." The Xiao Erya says: "Mi (彌) means increasingly; mi means long-lasting." Here we take the meaning of "increasingly." As for "How could it be that wood and stone stir his breast to be considered non-knowing?": the meaning is, regarding the sage's non-knowing, could his bosom be like wood and stone, so that this is named non-knowing? It is certainly not so. From "Truly, what is different from humans is the spiritual brilliance" downward: as for human spiritual brilliance, phenomena involve nimittodgrahaṇa, which is knowing. The sage's spiritual brilliance does not grasp the characteristics of phenomena, hence it is called non-knowing. Because it is non-knowing, it cannot be grasped through phenomenal characteristics. From "Your intention is to make..." downward is the second part, setting forth the intent of the objection. Within the text there are two parts: first, tracing the previous objection's intent; second, constructing the profound objection's intent. Now for the first. At the end of the previous objection it said: "The sage is impartial regarding knowing and encountering, and therefore it is named non-knowing"—this is incorrect. "Not taking oneself to possess knowing" means that he does not personally consider knowing and encountering to exist. "Yet never without knowing" means that knowing remains present. From "Does this not run counter to the sage's mind?" downward: "wu nai" (無乃) means "nai" (乃, indeed). As the Erya says: "wu ding" means "ding"; "wu ning" means "ning"; "bu xian" means "xian"; "bu cheng" means "cheng." It means that it indeed runs counter to the sage's mind and loses the purport of the texts. From "Why so? The sūtra says..." downward, it explains the sūtra's meaning and clarifies why it runs counter to the sage's mind and loses the purport of the texts. Regarding "without knowing and without seeing": preliminary understanding is knowing, while clear discernment is seeing. Alternatively, preliminary understanding is seeing, while clear discernment is knowing. As for "without acting and without conditioning": "acting" means initiating action, and "conditioning" means grasping at conditions. As for "This knowing is spontaneously non-knowing; how could it wait for reflective illumination and only then be non-knowing?": the sage's mind does not grasp at any characteristics, hence it is named non-knowing; it is not that there truly is knowing and he forgets his knowing on his own so that it is called non-knowing. From "If knowing has empty nature and is termed pure" downward is the second part, constructing the profound objection's intent. If one takes the sage to truly have the knowing of prajñā, but merely because its essential nature is empty it is called non-knowing, this is not the original meaning of non-knowing here. As for "then one cannot distinguish between delusion and wisdom": prajñā is also empty, and deluded cognition is also empty; both are empty, and both are equally non-knowing—thus there would be no distinction. From "The three poisons and the four inversions" downward: not only delusion and wisdom, but even the three poisons and so on are all likewise; they too are pure by having an empty nature. How would they differ from prajñā? Why uniquely praise prajñā as non-knowing? From "If one praises prajñā on account of what is known" downward: if, because the object known in paramārtha-satya is devoid of characteristics, one eulogizes the knowing wisdom as non-knowing, this is also incorrect. As for "what is known is naturally ever pure, while prajñā has never been pure": paramārtha-satya is naturally empty, while prajñā would not be empty. From "nor is there any condition to bring about purity" downward: paramārtha-satya is naturally empty and has nothing to do with prajñā; by what condition could prajñā be made identical to the emptiness of paramārtha-satya, such that one speaks of non-knowing? From "Yet the sūtra says..." downward, it explains the original meaning of the sūtra's clarification of prajñā's non-knowing. As for "Could it be because prajñā's essential nature is truly pure, originally devoid of the knowing of delusive grasping?": "jiang wu yi" (將無以, could it be because) means "because." Just as the Shishuo [xinyu] says "jiang wu tong" (could it be the same?), the meaning is "the same." Because the essential nature of prajñā does not grasp onto paramārtha-satya and is devoid of the knowing of delusive grasping, it is called non-knowing. As for "Being devoid of the knowing of delusive grasping, how could it be designated by the name 'knowing'?": from "Yet the sūtra says" down to this point, the textual flow is complete. Because it has no knowing of delusive grasping, it is called non-knowing. As for "How could it be that only lacking knowing is called non-knowing?": this also replies to the earlier "forgetting knowing and abandoning encountering." It is not that one forgets his knowing and encountering on his own and only then speaks of non-knowing; this very nature of knowing is spontaneously non-knowing, not waiting to be forgotten. From "Therefore, the sage..." downward is the third part, concluding the reply. From "Paramārtha-satya has no omissions like the hare or horse" downward: the sūtra speaks of three beasts—the elephant, the horse, and the hare—crossing a river, where there are differences in depth. The elephant reaches the very bottom of the river without omission, while the hare and the horse do not reach it and thus have omissions. Here it clarifies that when prajñā contemplates paramārtha-satya, paramārtha-satya has no omissions and is not like the hare or horse; hence it says "has no omissions like the hare or horse." The wisdom of prajñā illuminates exhaustively; hence it says "an inexhaustible illumination." From "Therefore, encountering without error..." downward: encountering capacities and conditions without error, matching the principle without grasping, tranquil and serene, without knowing it universally knows all phenomena.