肇論疏 2.31

2.31

The third [section] is the examination through questions and answers. The text has nine turns, which nevertheless comprise four objections. First, there is one turn on the objection regarding subject and object (the capable and the object). Second, there is one turn on the objection regarding name and essence. Third, there are four turns on the objection regarding object and wisdom. Fourth, there are three turns on the objection regarding arising and ceasing. The first three objections all challenge non-knowing, while the last objection directly challenges arising and ceasing. Now for the first. The question is precisely the objection. The preceding treatise text stated: "Wisdom possesses the illumination that exhausts the profound yet is without knowing; the spirit possesses the function of responsive encountering yet is without deliberation." Non-knowing means having no wisdom, and non-deliberation means having no encounter. Now this objection addresses those words. The meaning is: if there is that which can know and that which can encounter, and there is that which is knowable and encounterable, then this constitutes having knowing and having encountering; how can one say there is "non-knowing"? Within the text there are two parts: first, tracing the previous [argument] to object; second, constructing a profound objection. Although there are two aspects, they both challenge the single doctrine, so they are combined as one objection. As for saying "the true mind shines forth alone": "shines forth" (朗) means clear and luminous. It means that the mind of prajñā is alone clearly awakened, and there is no thing it does not know; hence it says, "illuminating each and every thing." From "responding and meeting without fixed limit" downward: wherever there are conditions, it responds and meets them all, having no restriction or boundary; hence it is called "without fixed limit." Whatever it does is always in responsive encounter with capacities and conditions; hence it says, "movement conforms to affairs." As for "illuminating each and every thing, so that knowing leaves nothing out": because it knows all, nothing is omitted. Some editions have the character "wisdom" (智); although the meaning is identical, looking at what follows, it is not so. As for "movement conforms to affairs, so that the encounter does not miss the opportune moment": when there is a capacity, it encounters it, and thus does not miss it. As for "the encounter does not miss the opportune moment, so there is an encounter with what can be encountered": what can be encountered refers to sentient beings. As for "knowing leaves nothing out, so there is a knowing of what can be known": some editions read, "there must also be a knowing of what can be known"; this is cumbersome and lengthy, and although there is no loss of meaning, it is not as good as being concise. "What can be known" is the principle that is known. From "having a knowing of what can be known" downward, it unpacks the preceding line. From "since there is knowing and since there is encountering" downward: the sage does not know in vain, which is having knowing; the sage does not encounter in vain, which is having encountering; hence it says, "since there is knowing and since there is encountering." Since there are knowing and encountering, why say that wisdom possesses the illumination that exhausts the profound yet is without knowing, and that the spirit possesses the function of responsive encountering yet is without deliberation? From "If one forgets knowing and abandons encountering" downward is the second part, constructing a profound objection. Some editions say "if it is said that" (若云), which is also acceptable. If [one means that] although the sage has knowing and encountering, he does not say "I am capable of having knowing, I am capable of having encountering." This is "the sage being impartial regarding knowing and encountering in order to fulfill his private [end]": this means that the sage's mind does not personally generate an understanding of knowing and encountering, resting and forgetting his knowing and encountering; it does not mean there is no knowing and no encountering. As for saying "in order to fulfill his private [end]": the Outer Chapters of the Zhuangzi, in the "Tiandao" chapter, says: "Confucius cited benevolence and righteousness to persuade Lao Dan. Dan said: 'What is meant by benevolence and righteousness?' Confucius said: 'In one's innermost heart not to be complacent, and to love universally without partiality—this is the true character of benevolence.' Lao Dan said: 'To be without partiality is itself partial.'" Guo's commentary says: "What the world calls being without partiality means setting oneself aside to love others. Now, one who loves others also wishes that others love oneself. This is precisely his partiality; it is not forgetting the public to truly be public." Here these words are borrowed to clarify that although the sage has no mind to grasp knowing and encountering, this is nonetheless knowing and encountering, just as being without partiality is itself fulfilling partiality. As for "This can be called not taking oneself to possess knowing; how can it be deemed non-knowing?": if one says he forgets knowing and encountering on his own, this is merely that he does not personally assert that there are knowing and encountering; yet the essence of knowing and encountering is not non-existent. How could one say there is no knowing or encountering? From "The answer says: 'The sage's merit surpasses the Two Modes yet he is not benevolent'" downward is the reply. Although the preceding objection had two aspects, they both challenged knowing and encountering. Now, without making further distinctions, they are combined into a single reply. Within the text there are three parts: first, stating the fundamental doctrine; second, setting forth the intent of the objection; third, concluding the reply. Now for the first. "Merit surpasses the Two Modes yet he is not benevolent": the Two Modes refer to Heaven and Earth. Regarding "not benevolent," the Laozi says: "Heaven and Earth are not benevolent; they take the myriad things as straw dogs. The sage is not benevolent; he takes the common people as straw dogs." Here these words are borrowed. The sage's merit surpasses Heaven and Earth; this is indeed benevolence. Yet he does not boast of his ability; this is called being "not benevolent." The brilliance of prajñā wisdom exceeds the sun and moon; this is indeed brilliance. Yet he forgets his knowing; hence it says, "all the more dim." The Xiao Erya says: "Mi (彌) means increasingly; mi means long-lasting." Here we take the meaning of "increasingly." As for "How could it be that wood and stone stir his breast to be considered non-knowing?": the meaning is, regarding the sage's non-knowing, could his bosom be like wood and stone, so that this is named non-knowing? It is certainly not so. From "Truly, what is different from humans is the spiritual brilliance" downward: as for human spiritual brilliance, phenomena involve nimittodgrahaṇa, which is knowing. The sage's spiritual brilliance does not grasp the characteristics of phenomena, hence it is called non-knowing. Because it is non-knowing, it cannot be grasped through phenomenal characteristics. From "Your intention is to make..." downward is the second part, setting forth the intent of the objection. Within the text there are two parts: first, tracing the previous objection's intent; second, constructing the profound objection's intent. Now for the first. At the end of the previous objection it said: "The sage is impartial regarding knowing and encountering, and therefore it is named non-knowing"—this is incorrect. "Not taking oneself to possess knowing" means that he does not personally consider knowing and encountering to exist. "Yet never without knowing" means that knowing remains present. From "Does this not run counter to the sage's mind?" downward: "wu nai" (無乃) means "nai" (乃, indeed). As the Erya says: "wu ding" means "ding"; "wu ning" means "ning"; "bu xian" means "xian"; "bu cheng" means "cheng." It means that it indeed runs counter to the sage's mind and loses the purport of the texts. From "Why so? The sūtra says..." downward, it explains the sūtra's meaning and clarifies why it runs counter to the sage's mind and loses the purport of the texts. Regarding "without knowing and without seeing": preliminary understanding is knowing, while clear discernment is seeing. Alternatively, preliminary understanding is seeing, while clear discernment is knowing. As for "without acting and without conditioning": "acting" means initiating action, and "conditioning" means grasping at conditions. As for "This knowing is spontaneously non-knowing; how could it wait for reflective illumination and only then be non-knowing?": the sage's mind does not grasp at any characteristics, hence it is named non-knowing; it is not that there truly is knowing and he forgets his knowing on his own so that it is called non-knowing. From "If knowing has empty nature and is termed pure" downward is the second part, constructing the profound objection's intent. If one takes the sage to truly have the knowing of prajñā, but merely because its essential nature is empty it is called non-knowing, this is not the original meaning of non-knowing here. As for "then one cannot distinguish between delusion and wisdom": prajñā is also empty, and deluded cognition is also empty; both are empty, and both are equally non-knowing—thus there would be no distinction. From "The three poisons and the four inversions" downward: not only delusion and wisdom, but even the three poisons and so on are all likewise; they too are pure by having an empty nature. How would they differ from prajñā? Why uniquely praise prajñā as non-knowing? From "If one praises prajñā on account of what is known" downward: if, because the object known in paramārtha-satya is devoid of characteristics, one eulogizes the knowing wisdom as non-knowing, this is also incorrect. As for "what is known is naturally ever pure, while prajñā has never been pure": paramārtha-satya is naturally empty, while prajñā would not be empty. From "nor is there any condition to bring about purity" downward: paramārtha-satya is naturally empty and has nothing to do with prajñā; by what condition could prajñā be made identical to the emptiness of paramārtha-satya, such that one speaks of non-knowing? From "Yet the sūtra says..." downward, it explains the original meaning of the sūtra's clarification of prajñā's non-knowing. As for "Could it be because prajñā's essential nature is truly pure, originally devoid of the knowing of delusive grasping?": "jiang wu yi" (將無以, could it be because) means "because." Just as the Shishuo [xinyu] says "jiang wu tong" (could it be the same?), the meaning is "the same." Because the essential nature of prajñā does not grasp onto paramārtha-satya and is devoid of the knowing of delusive grasping, it is called non-knowing. As for "Being devoid of the knowing of delusive grasping, how could it be designated by the name 'knowing'?": from "Yet the sūtra says" down to this point, the textual flow is complete. Because it has no knowing of delusive grasping, it is called non-knowing. As for "How could it be that only lacking knowing is called non-knowing?": this also replies to the earlier "forgetting knowing and abandoning encountering." It is not that one forgets his knowing and encountering on his own and only then speaks of non-knowing; this very nature of knowing is spontaneously non-knowing, not waiting to be forgotten. From "Therefore, the sage..." downward is the third part, concluding the reply. From "Paramārtha-satya has no omissions like the hare or horse" downward: the sūtra speaks of three beasts—the elephant, the horse, and the hare—crossing a river, where there are differences in depth. The elephant reaches the very bottom of the river without omission, while the hare and the horse do not reach it and thus have omissions. Here it clarifies that when prajñā contemplates paramārtha-satya, paramārtha-satya has no omissions and is not like the hare or horse; hence it says "has no omissions like the hare or horse." The wisdom of prajñā illuminates exhaustively; hence it says "an inexhaustible illumination." From "Therefore, encountering without error..." downward: encountering capacities and conditions without error, matching the principle without grasping, tranquil and serene, without knowing it universally knows all phenomena.