肇論疏 2.33

2.33

第二、有一番名體難也。難中有二：先且泛序名體相召，然後正致難。今初。言物無以自通者，物不能自呼召得物體，故須立名以詺物。名能召物體，故名為通也。物雖非名下，物雖非是名，而有物當名，名詺得物體也。是以即名求物下，即以物名取物體，則物體可取，不能隱避也。而論云聖心無知下，第二、正致難也。意謂無知未甞知下，明兩名別也。斯即名教之所通下，立知、無知兩名，本詺知、無知兩體也。然論者欲一於聖心下，論主云知無知只是一聖心，而知無知兩名別也。尋文求實下，以知、無知兩名求其兩實，不相當也。何者下，釋所以不當之意也。若聖心是知，即非是無知，故云無所知、無所辦。下句反此。若二俱無得無所得復論者，若知無知俱不得聖心，即兩名皆不當實，故不須復論也。答曰經云下，答文中有二：先且序般若絕言之意，後正答其所難。今初也。斯無名之法下，般若如此，乃是無名之法，故不可以名言言之也。言雖不能言下，雖不可言，假言方通；非言不傳也，是以聖人終日智無知者，非實無知也。欲明聖智無所取著，故言無知耳。辨相不為無通鑒不為有者，若依前釋，以辨聖智能通知諸法，故非無知也；以通聖智無有執著，故非有知也。若依後釋以辨相故言聖智無知，其實非無知也；以通鑒故言聖智有知，其實非有知也。非有故知而無知下，覆上也。以非有故，有知即無知；以非無故，無知即有知也。是以知即無知下，結也。無以言異而異於聖心者，莫以知、無知兩言有異，謂聖心有有無之別也。

Second, there is a round of objection concerning name and referent (essence). Within the objection there are two parts: first, a general introduction to how names and referents summon one another, and next, the formal raising of the objection. Now, the first. The words "Now things cannot communicate themselves": things cannot of themselves call forth their own essences, so names must be established to designate things. A name can summon the essence of a thing, and hence it is called "communicating". From "Although a thing is not its name" onward: although a thing is not itself the name, yet there is a thing that corresponds to the name, and the name designates its essence. From "Therefore, seeking the thing by its name" onward: if one grasps the essence of a thing directly through the name of the thing, then the essence of the thing can be grasped and cannot hide away. From "Yet the treatise says that the sage's mind has no knowing" onward: second, the formal raising of the objection. Its meaning is that from "'non-knowing' has never meant 'knowing'" onward, it clarifies that the two names are distinct. From "These are indeed what nominal teachings communicate" onward: the two names "knowing" and "non-knowing" were originally established to designate the two essences of "knowing" and "non-knowing". From "Yet the author of the treatise wishes to unify them in the sage's mind" onward: the author says that knowing and non-knowing are just the single mind of the sage, yet the two names "knowing" and "non-knowing" are distinct. From "If one pursues the text to seek the reality" onward: if one seeks their two realities through the two names "knowing" and "non-knowing", they do not correspond. From "Why so?" onward: this explains why they do not correspond. If the sage's mind is knowing, then it is not non-knowing; hence it says "it knows nothing and distinguishes nothing." The next sentence is the inverse of this. In "If both cannot be attained, what attained could be discussed further?": if neither knowing nor non-knowing captures the sage's mind, then neither name corresponds to the reality, and hence there is no need to discuss them further. In "The reply states: The sūtra says" onward, within the text of the reply there are two parts: first, an introductory explanation of how prajñā is beyond words, and then the formal reply to his objection. Now, the first. From "This nameless phenomenon" onward: prajñā being like this, it is indeed a nameless phenomenon, and therefore cannot be spoken of through names and words. From "Although speech cannot speak [of it]" onward: although it cannot be spoken of, it is only through provisional speech that it communicates; without speech it cannot be transmitted. Therefore, the sage's "all day long knowing without knowing" does not mean that he truly has no knowing. It is because he wishes to make clear that the sage's wisdom grasps at nothing whatsoever that he says "non-knowing". Regarding "To distinguish characteristics does not make it non-existent; comprehensive penetration does not make it existent": if explained according to the former interpretation, because one distinguishes that the sage's wisdom comprehensively penetrates all phenomena, it is therefore not non-knowing; because it penetrates so that the sage's wisdom is without grasping, it is therefore not having knowing. If explained according to the latter interpretation, because one distinguishes characteristics, one says the sage's wisdom is non-knowing, yet in reality it is not non-knowing; because of its comprehensive penetration, one says the sage's wisdom is knowing, yet in reality it is not having knowing. From "Because it is not existent, though knowing it is non-knowing" onward: this reiterates the above. Because it is not existent, having knowing is just non-knowing; because it is not non-existent, non-knowing is just having knowing. From "Therefore knowing is just non-knowing" onward: this concludes the passage. "Do not, because the words are different, make the sage's mind different": do not, on account of the difference between the two words "knowing" and "non-knowing", claim that the sage's mind has the distinction of existence and non-existence.