肇論疏 2.33

2.33

Second, there is a round of objection concerning name and referent (essence). Within the objection there are two parts: first, a general introduction to how names and referents summon one another, and next, the formal raising of the objection. Now, the first. The words "Now things cannot communicate themselves": things cannot of themselves call forth their own essences, so names must be established to designate things. A name can summon the essence of a thing, and hence it is called "communicating". From "Although a thing is not its name" onward: although a thing is not itself the name, yet there is a thing that corresponds to the name, and the name designates its essence. From "Therefore, seeking the thing by its name" onward: if one grasps the essence of a thing directly through the name of the thing, then the essence of the thing can be grasped and cannot hide away. From "Yet the treatise says that the sage's mind has no knowing" onward: second, the formal raising of the objection. Its meaning is that from "'non-knowing' has never meant 'knowing'" onward, it clarifies that the two names are distinct. From "These are indeed what nominal teachings communicate" onward: the two names "knowing" and "non-knowing" were originally established to designate the two essences of "knowing" and "non-knowing". From "Yet the author of the treatise wishes to unify them in the sage's mind" onward: the author says that knowing and non-knowing are just the single mind of the sage, yet the two names "knowing" and "non-knowing" are distinct. From "If one pursues the text to seek the reality" onward: if one seeks their two realities through the two names "knowing" and "non-knowing", they do not correspond. From "Why so?" onward: this explains why they do not correspond. If the sage's mind is knowing, then it is not non-knowing; hence it says "it knows nothing and distinguishes nothing." The next sentence is the inverse of this. In "If both cannot be attained, what attained could be discussed further?": if neither knowing nor non-knowing captures the sage's mind, then neither name corresponds to the reality, and hence there is no need to discuss them further. In "The reply states: The sūtra says" onward, within the text of the reply there are two parts: first, an introductory explanation of how prajñā is beyond words, and then the formal reply to his objection. Now, the first. From "This nameless phenomenon" onward: prajñā being like this, it is indeed a nameless phenomenon, and therefore cannot be spoken of through names and words. From "Although speech cannot speak [of it]" onward: although it cannot be spoken of, it is only through provisional speech that it communicates; without speech it cannot be transmitted. Therefore, the sage's "all day long knowing without knowing" does not mean that he truly has no knowing. It is because he wishes to make clear that the sage's wisdom grasps at nothing whatsoever that he says "non-knowing". Regarding "To distinguish characteristics does not make it non-existent; comprehensive penetration does not make it existent": if explained according to the former interpretation, because one distinguishes that the sage's wisdom comprehensively penetrates all phenomena, it is therefore not non-knowing; because it penetrates so that the sage's wisdom is without grasping, it is therefore not having knowing. If explained according to the latter interpretation, because one distinguishes characteristics, one says the sage's wisdom is non-knowing, yet in reality it is not non-knowing; because of its comprehensive penetration, one says the sage's wisdom is knowing, yet in reality it is not having knowing. From "Because it is not existent, though knowing it is non-knowing" onward: this reiterates the above. Because it is not existent, having knowing is just non-knowing; because it is not non-existent, non-knowing is just having knowing. From "Therefore knowing is just non-knowing" onward: this concludes the passage. "Do not, because the words are different, make the sage's mind different": do not, on account of the difference between the two words "knowing" and "non-knowing", claim that the sage's mind has the distinction of existence and non-existence.