肇論疏 2.35

2.35

第三、有四番境智難也，四番連環更不分別。今初番也。真諦謂無生真境，非般若妙智不能測知也。聖智之能在茲而顯者，般若有知真諦之功能也。真諦即般若之緣也者，般若所緣緣於真諦也。以緣求智智即知矣者，既有所知之緣，即有能知之智；所知之緣既有法，能知之智應有知也。答曰以緣求智智非知也下，答文有三：第一、直釋答；第二、相形答；第三、總結答。今初。先標，後釋。今言不得以緣求智令智有知也。何者下，釋所以也。《放光》云不緣色生識者，凡人皆緣色生識，所以有見，有見即有知。聖人不緣色而生識，即是無見，無見即無知也。又云五陰清淨下，五陰無相，故云清淨。般若無知，故云清淨也。般若即能知也，五陰即所知也。般若是能知之智，五陰是所知之境也。所知即緣也，即是所緣之法也。夫知與所知相與而有下，第二、相形答也。雙辨真俗二諦，惑解兩智。與者共也。相與而有，謂惑智惑境也；相與而無，謂真智真境也。以俗諦有相，故惑智有知，故云相與而有。以真諦無相，故真智無知，故云相與而無也。相與而無故物莫之有者，以真諦無相故真智無知，人莫能令其有知也。相與而有故物莫之無者，以俗諦有相故惑智有知，人莫能令其無知也。物莫之無故為緣之所起者，以人莫能令其無知，故即相因而起也。物莫之有故緣所不能生者，以人莫能令其有知，故即不相因而起也。緣所不能生故照緣而非知者，謂真智也，雖照真諦，不為真諦所生也。為緣之所起故知緣相因以生者，謂惑智也，境智相因而得生也。是以知與無知生於所知矣者，雙結惑解兩知兩境也。何者夫智以知所知取相故名知者，此謂惑智惑境也。真諦自無相真智何由知者，此謂真智真境也。所以然者下，覆前兩義。今從此下至不從因緣有故，即直明惑境惑智也。而言所知非所知所知生於知者，所知不自得所知名，以因能知，故得所知名也。所知既生知知亦生所知者，所知既因能知而得名，能知亦因所知而得名也。知所知既相生相生即緣法者，彼此迴互相因而生，即是因緣所生法也。緣法故非真者，以從緣生則非真也。非真故非真諦者，既從緣生，即是俗諦也。故《中觀》曰下，引《中論》意，非全文。此意明俗諦，言勢隨及真耳。今言真諦曰真下，從叱至不見有法無緣而生，明真智真諦也。真諦既名真，真故即不從因緣而生也。故經曰不見有法無緣而生者，有法皆從緣生，無有有法而非緣生，則明非緣生者是真諦也。《涅槃經》云：是諸外道，無有一法不從緣生。諸經之中通有此意，今泛引也。是以真智觀真諦下，第三、總結答也。智不取所知此智何所知者，以不取所知，故名無知也。智然非無知但真諦非故知所真智亦非知者，不同木石之無知，故云然非無知也。但以真諦非是有相之所知，故真智不取相，名為無知耳。而子欲以緣求智下，子者男子之通稱也。子以真諦所緣之法是有，而令般若有知也。緣緣自非緣於何求知者，真諦之緣自無其相，真智之法何得有知耶？難曰論云不取者下，第二番也。執前不取之言以為難耳。為無知故不取下，為無所知，故言不取？為先知然後忘取，故言不取耶？冥若夜遊者，無所知則同夜行，不辨黑白。知則異於不取者，知與不取異，則當知之時有取，然後忘知，始是不取耳。答曰非無知故不取者，雙排兩難也。當知之時即不取相，故言無知耳。難曰論云不取者下，第三番也。不物於物者，不以物為有物也。若以物為有物則是惑取，不以物為有物則無惑取也。無取則無是下，既無所取，何物是物？何物當聖人之心耶？既不當聖心，云何聖人無所不知乎？答曰然無是無當者，按成此語，實無可是、實無可當也。夫無當則物無不當者，無當乃當真理，無是乃是真理也。物無不是則是而無是者，是真理，雖是無所是；當真理，雖當無所當也。盡見諸法而無見者，盡見諸法，則有當、有是。而無見者，則無當、無是也。難曰聖心非不能是下，第四番也。非不能以萬物為是物，然以無物可是物，故聖人不以物為有物耳，雖是不是是。故當是於無是矣者，物非是有，故當是無，不以物為有物，應以物為無物也。誠以般若無有有相之知者，不同惑智有相知也。若以無相為無相又何異累於真諦者，不作有相知，但作無相知也。又不有有相知，但有無相知。如此有何患累耶？答曰聖人無相者，聖人以無相為心也。既以無相為心，不但無於有相，亦乃無於無相也。若以無相為無相下，若謂聖人以無相為相，有此無相之知，此則無相乃成相、無知乃是知也。捨有而之無譬猶逃峯而赴壑者，之，適也。峯謂山，壑謂水。避山而赴水，俱有害身之患也。處有不有下，處有不取有相，居無不取無相也。然亦不捨於有無者，即有為不有，非謂離有為不有；即無為不無，非謂離無為不無也。和光塵勞者，《老子》云：和者和其光、同其塵。今借此語，以明聖人和光同塵，在有同有、在無同無，同有不取有、同無不取無也。周旋者，往來也。寂然而往下，寂、泊俱是靜也。往即寂往，往無往矣。來即泊來，來無來矣。恬淡無為者，恬然淡然無所施為，雖無所為，而無所不為也。淡音去聲也。《莊子外篇．天道章》云：夫虛靜恬淡寂漠無為者，天地之本、道德之至也。

Third, there are four exchanges of objections regarding object and cognition; the four exchanges are linked cyclically without further distinction. Now comes the first exchange. "Paramārtha-satya" refers to the true object of the unarisen, which cannot be fathomed without the subtle cognition of prajñā. "Where the capacity of the sage's cognition is revealed here" means that prajñā has the capacity to know paramārtha-satya. "Paramārtha-satya is precisely the condition (ālambana) of prajñā" means that what prajñā conditions itself upon is paramārtha-satya. "If one seeks cognition by means of conditions, cognition is then knowing" means that since there is a condition that is known, there is cognition that is capable of knowing; since the condition that is known possesses phenomena, the cognition that is capable of knowing should possess knowing.

"The reply states: 'Seeking cognition by means of conditions, cognition is not knowing'" and so on: the text of the reply has three parts: first, a direct explanation in reply; second, a correlative reply; third, a summary conclusion in reply. Here is the first. It first indicates the premise, then explains it. It now says that one must not seek cognition by means of conditions so as to make cognition possess knowing. "Why is this?" and so on explains the reason. The Fangguang [jing] says, "Not conditioning upon form does consciousness arise": ordinary people all condition upon form to produce consciousness, which is why there is seeing, and where there is seeing, there is knowing. The sage does not condition upon form to produce consciousness; that is, there is no seeing, and where there is no seeing, there is no knowing. It also says, "The five aggregates are pure" and so on: the five aggregates are animitta, hence called pure. Prajñā is without knowing, hence called pure. Prajñā is that which is capable of knowing; the five aggregates are that which is known. Prajñā is the cognition that is capable of knowing; the five aggregates are the object that is known. That which is known is the condition, which is the conditioned phenomenon.

"Knowing and that which is known exist mutually" and so on is the second, correlative reply. It jointly distinguishes the two truths of paramārtha and saṃvṛti, and the two cognitions of delusion and awakening. "Mutually" (yu) means together. "Existing mutually" refers to deluded cognition and deluded objects; "not existing mutually" refers to true cognition and true objects. Because saṃvṛti-satya has characteristics, deluded cognition has knowing; thus it is said to "exist mutually." Because paramārtha-satya is animitta, true cognition is without knowing; thus it is said to "not exist mutually." "Not existing mutually, hence nothing can make it exist" means that because paramārtha-satya is animitta, true cognition is without knowing, and no one can make it possess knowing. "Existing mutually, hence nothing can make it not exist" means that because saṃvṛti-satya has characteristics, deluded cognition has knowing, and no one can make it without knowing. "Nothing can make it not exist, hence it is arisen from conditions" means that because no one can make it without knowing, they arise conditioned on each other. "Nothing can make it exist, hence conditions cannot generate it" means that because no one can make it possess knowing, they do not arise conditioned on each other. "Conditions cannot generate it, hence it illuminates conditions yet is not knowing" refers to true cognition: although it illuminates paramārtha-satya, it is not generated by paramārtha-satya. "Arisen from conditions, hence cognition and conditions arise conditioned on each other" refers to deluded cognition: object and cognition arise conditioned on each other. "Therefore, knowing and non-knowing arise from that which is known" jointly concludes the two knowings and two objects of delusion and awakening.

"Why is this? Cognition, through knowing that which is known, grasps characteristics and is therefore called knowing": this refers to deluded cognition and deluded objects. "Paramārtha-satya itself has no characteristics; through what could true cognition know?": this refers to true cognition and true objects. "Why this is so" and so on reviews the preceding two meanings. From here down to "does not exist through causes and conditions," it directly clarifies deluded objects and deluded cognition. When it says, "That which is known is not that which is known; that which is known arises from cognition," that which is known does not by itself attain the name of "that which is known"; because it depends on the capable knower, it attains the name of "that which is known." "Since that which is known gives rise to cognition, cognition also gives rise to that which is known" means that since that which is known attains its name depending on the capable knower, the capable knower also attains its name depending on that which is known. "Since cognition and that which is known mutually generate each other, what mutually generates is a conditioned phenomenon" means that mutually causing and generating each other, they are phenomena arisen through causes and conditions. "Being conditioned phenomena, they are not real" means that being arisen from conditions, they are not real. "Not being real, they are not paramārtha-satya" means that since they are arisen from conditions, they are saṃvṛti-satya.

"Therefore the Madhyamaka says" and so on cites the intent of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, not the full text. This intent is to clarify saṃvṛti-satya, while the momentum of the statement extends to the real. Now, "Paramārtha-satya is called 'real'" and so on down to "do not see any phenomenon that arises without conditions" clarifies true cognition and paramārtha-satya. Since paramārtha-satya is called "real," being real it does not arise from causes and conditions. "Therefore the sūtra says: 'We do not see any phenomenon that arises without conditions'" means that conditioned phenomena are all arisen from conditions, and there is no conditioned phenomenon that is not arisen from conditions; this clarifies that what is not arisen from conditions is paramārtha-satya. The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: "Among these heterodox practitioners, there is no phenomenon that does not arise from conditions." This intent is pervasive throughout the sūtras, and is cited generally here.

"Therefore, when true cognition contemplates paramārtha-satya" and so on is the third, summary conclusion in reply. "Cognition does not grasp that which is known; what does this cognition know?" means that because it does not grasp that which is known, it is named non-knowing. "Cognition is certainly not non-knowing, yet paramārtha-satya is not an object of knowing, so true cognition is also not knowing": it is not like the non-knowing of wood and stone, hence it says "certainly not non-knowing"; it is only that paramārtha-satya is not an object that possesses characteristics, so true cognition does not grasp characteristics, and is merely called non-knowing. "Yet you wish to seek cognition by means of conditions" and so on: "you" (zi) is a common address for a man. You treat the phenomenon conditioned by paramārtha-satya as existing, and thereby make prajñā possess knowing. "The condition conditioned upon is inherently non-conditioning; from what would one seek knowing?" means that the condition of paramārtha-satya inherently lacks characteristics, so how could the phenomenon of true cognition possess knowing?

"The objection states: 'The treatise says "does not grasp"'" and so on is the second exchange. It grasps the previous statement "does not grasp" to raise an objection. "Is it because of non-knowing that it does not grasp" and so on asks: is it because it has nothing it knows that it is said "not to grasp"? Or is it that it first knows and then forgets grasping, so it is said "not to grasp"? "Dark like wandering by night" means that having nothing it knows, it is like walking at night, not distinguishing black from white. "Knowing is distinct from non-grasping" means that if knowing is distinct from non-grasping, then at the time of knowing there is grasping, and only after forgetting knowing does it become non-grasping.

"The reply states: 'It is not because of non-knowing that it does not grasp'" rejects both horns of the objection. At the very time of knowing, it does not grasp characteristics; therefore it is merely called non-knowing.

"The objection states: 'The treatise says "does not grasp"'" and so on is the third exchange. "Not thinging things" means not taking things as existing things. If one takes things as existing things, that is deluded grasping; if one does not take things as existing things, there is no deluded grasping. "If there is no grasping, there is no affirmable (shi)" and so on asks: since there is nothing grasped, what thing is a thing? What thing corresponds to the sage's mind? Since nothing corresponds to the sage's mind, how is the sage without anything he does not know?

"The reply states: 'Indeed, there is no affirmable and no correspondent'" affirms this statement: there is truly nothing that can be affirmed, and truly nothing that can correspond. "When there is no correspondence, nothing fails to correspond" means that non-correspondence precisely corresponds to true principle, and non-affirmation precisely affirms true principle. "When nothing is not affirmed, this is an affirmation that is without affirmation" means that it affirms true principle, yet although affirming, there is nothing affirmed; it corresponds to true principle, yet although corresponding, there is nothing corresponded to. "Completely seeing all phenomena yet without seeing": completely seeing all phenomena entails having correspondence and having affirmation; yet "without seeing" entails having no correspondence and no affirmation.

"The objection states: 'The sage's mind is not incapable of affirming'" and so on is the fourth exchange. It is not incapable of taking the myriad things to be things, yet because there is no thing that can be a thing, the sage does not take things as existing things; although he affirms, he does not affirm [them as] existent. "Therefore, he must affirm them in non-affirmation" means that things are not existent, so they must be affirmed as non-existent; not taking things as existing things, one should take things as non-existing things. "Truly because prajñā lacks knowing with characteristics": unlike deluded cognition, which has knowing with characteristics. "If one takes animitta as animitta, how would this burden paramārtha-satya?" asks: not engaging in knowing with characteristics, one merely engages in knowing of animitta; also, not possessing knowing with characteristics, one merely possesses knowing of animitta—having this, what trouble or burden would there be?

"The reply states: 'The sage is animitta'" means the sage takes animitta as mind. Since he takes animitta as mind, he not only lacks characteristics of existence, but also lacks characteristics of non-existence. "If one takes animitta as animitta" and so on means: if one says that the sage takes animitta as a characteristic and possesses this cognition of animitta, then animitta becomes a characteristic, and non-knowing becomes knowing. "Abandoning existence and going to non-existence is like fleeing a peak and leaping into a chasm": zhi means to go to. "Peak" refers to mountains; "chasm" refers to water. Avoiding the mountain and rushing to the water both carry the hazard of harming one's body. "Dwelling in existence without being existent" and so on means dwelling in existence without grasping the characteristics of existence, and residing in non-existence without grasping the characteristics of non-existence. "Yet neither does he abandon existence and non-existence" means identifying existence with non-existence, not meaning leaving existence to become non-existence; and identifying non-existence with non-non-existence, not meaning leaving non-existence to become non-non-existence. "Harmonising his light with worldly dust": Laozi says, "He harmonises his light, unifies with his dust." This phrase is borrowed here to clarify that the sage harmonises his light and unifies with the dust: being in existence, he accords with existence; being in non-existence, he accords with non-existence; according with existence, he does not grasp existence; according with non-existence, he does not grasp non-existence. "Circulating" (zhouxuan) means coming and going. "Quiescently going" and so on: both ji and bo mean tranquility. Going is quiescent going, going without any going. Coming is placid coming, coming without any coming. "Tranquil and non-acting" means serenely and placidly having nothing he sets out to do; although doing nothing, there is nothing left undone. Dan is read in the falling tone. The "Way of Heaven" chapter of the outer chapters of the Zhuangzi says: "Emptiness, tranquility, placidity, indifference, and non-action are the root of Heaven and Earth and the apex of the Dao and virtue."