肇論疏 2.35

2.35

Third, there are four exchanges of objections regarding object and cognition; the four exchanges are linked cyclically without further distinction. Now comes the first exchange. "Paramārtha-satya" refers to the true object of the unarisen, which cannot be fathomed without the subtle cognition of prajñā. "Where the capacity of the sage's cognition is revealed here" means that prajñā has the capacity to know paramārtha-satya. "Paramārtha-satya is precisely the condition (ālambana) of prajñā" means that what prajñā conditions itself upon is paramārtha-satya. "If one seeks cognition by means of conditions, cognition is then knowing" means that since there is a condition that is known, there is cognition that is capable of knowing; since the condition that is known possesses phenomena, the cognition that is capable of knowing should possess knowing.

"The reply states: 'Seeking cognition by means of conditions, cognition is not knowing'" and so on: the text of the reply has three parts: first, a direct explanation in reply; second, a correlative reply; third, a summary conclusion in reply. Here is the first. It first indicates the premise, then explains it. It now says that one must not seek cognition by means of conditions so as to make cognition possess knowing. "Why is this?" and so on explains the reason. The Fangguang [jing] says, "Not conditioning upon form does consciousness arise": ordinary people all condition upon form to produce consciousness, which is why there is seeing, and where there is seeing, there is knowing. The sage does not condition upon form to produce consciousness; that is, there is no seeing, and where there is no seeing, there is no knowing. It also says, "The five aggregates are pure" and so on: the five aggregates are animitta, hence called pure. Prajñā is without knowing, hence called pure. Prajñā is that which is capable of knowing; the five aggregates are that which is known. Prajñā is the cognition that is capable of knowing; the five aggregates are the object that is known. That which is known is the condition, which is the conditioned phenomenon.

"Knowing and that which is known exist mutually" and so on is the second, correlative reply. It jointly distinguishes the two truths of paramārtha and saṃvṛti, and the two cognitions of delusion and awakening. "Mutually" (yu) means together. "Existing mutually" refers to deluded cognition and deluded objects; "not existing mutually" refers to true cognition and true objects. Because saṃvṛti-satya has characteristics, deluded cognition has knowing; thus it is said to "exist mutually." Because paramārtha-satya is animitta, true cognition is without knowing; thus it is said to "not exist mutually." "Not existing mutually, hence nothing can make it exist" means that because paramārtha-satya is animitta, true cognition is without knowing, and no one can make it possess knowing. "Existing mutually, hence nothing can make it not exist" means that because saṃvṛti-satya has characteristics, deluded cognition has knowing, and no one can make it without knowing. "Nothing can make it not exist, hence it is arisen from conditions" means that because no one can make it without knowing, they arise conditioned on each other. "Nothing can make it exist, hence conditions cannot generate it" means that because no one can make it possess knowing, they do not arise conditioned on each other. "Conditions cannot generate it, hence it illuminates conditions yet is not knowing" refers to true cognition: although it illuminates paramārtha-satya, it is not generated by paramārtha-satya. "Arisen from conditions, hence cognition and conditions arise conditioned on each other" refers to deluded cognition: object and cognition arise conditioned on each other. "Therefore, knowing and non-knowing arise from that which is known" jointly concludes the two knowings and two objects of delusion and awakening.

"Why is this? Cognition, through knowing that which is known, grasps characteristics and is therefore called knowing": this refers to deluded cognition and deluded objects. "Paramārtha-satya itself has no characteristics; through what could true cognition know?": this refers to true cognition and true objects. "Why this is so" and so on reviews the preceding two meanings. From here down to "does not exist through causes and conditions," it directly clarifies deluded objects and deluded cognition. When it says, "That which is known is not that which is known; that which is known arises from cognition," that which is known does not by itself attain the name of "that which is known"; because it depends on the capable knower, it attains the name of "that which is known." "Since that which is known gives rise to cognition, cognition also gives rise to that which is known" means that since that which is known attains its name depending on the capable knower, the capable knower also attains its name depending on that which is known. "Since cognition and that which is known mutually generate each other, what mutually generates is a conditioned phenomenon" means that mutually causing and generating each other, they are phenomena arisen through causes and conditions. "Being conditioned phenomena, they are not real" means that being arisen from conditions, they are not real. "Not being real, they are not paramārtha-satya" means that since they are arisen from conditions, they are saṃvṛti-satya.

"Therefore the Madhyamaka says" and so on cites the intent of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, not the full text. This intent is to clarify saṃvṛti-satya, while the momentum of the statement extends to the real. Now, "Paramārtha-satya is called 'real'" and so on down to "do not see any phenomenon that arises without conditions" clarifies true cognition and paramārtha-satya. Since paramārtha-satya is called "real," being real it does not arise from causes and conditions. "Therefore the sūtra says: 'We do not see any phenomenon that arises without conditions'" means that conditioned phenomena are all arisen from conditions, and there is no conditioned phenomenon that is not arisen from conditions; this clarifies that what is not arisen from conditions is paramārtha-satya. The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: "Among these heterodox practitioners, there is no phenomenon that does not arise from conditions." This intent is pervasive throughout the sūtras, and is cited generally here.

"Therefore, when true cognition contemplates paramārtha-satya" and so on is the third, summary conclusion in reply. "Cognition does not grasp that which is known; what does this cognition know?" means that because it does not grasp that which is known, it is named non-knowing. "Cognition is certainly not non-knowing, yet paramārtha-satya is not an object of knowing, so true cognition is also not knowing": it is not like the non-knowing of wood and stone, hence it says "certainly not non-knowing"; it is only that paramārtha-satya is not an object that possesses characteristics, so true cognition does not grasp characteristics, and is merely called non-knowing. "Yet you wish to seek cognition by means of conditions" and so on: "you" (zi) is a common address for a man. You treat the phenomenon conditioned by paramārtha-satya as existing, and thereby make prajñā possess knowing. "The condition conditioned upon is inherently non-conditioning; from what would one seek knowing?" means that the condition of paramārtha-satya inherently lacks characteristics, so how could the phenomenon of true cognition possess knowing?

"The objection states: 'The treatise says "does not grasp"'" and so on is the second exchange. It grasps the previous statement "does not grasp" to raise an objection. "Is it because of non-knowing that it does not grasp" and so on asks: is it because it has nothing it knows that it is said "not to grasp"? Or is it that it first knows and then forgets grasping, so it is said "not to grasp"? "Dark like wandering by night" means that having nothing it knows, it is like walking at night, not distinguishing black from white. "Knowing is distinct from non-grasping" means that if knowing is distinct from non-grasping, then at the time of knowing there is grasping, and only after forgetting knowing does it become non-grasping.

"The reply states: 'It is not because of non-knowing that it does not grasp'" rejects both horns of the objection. At the very time of knowing, it does not grasp characteristics; therefore it is merely called non-knowing.

"The objection states: 'The treatise says "does not grasp"'" and so on is the third exchange. "Not thinging things" means not taking things as existing things. If one takes things as existing things, that is deluded grasping; if one does not take things as existing things, there is no deluded grasping. "If there is no grasping, there is no affirmable (shi)" and so on asks: since there is nothing grasped, what thing is a thing? What thing corresponds to the sage's mind? Since nothing corresponds to the sage's mind, how is the sage without anything he does not know?

"The reply states: 'Indeed, there is no affirmable and no correspondent'" affirms this statement: there is truly nothing that can be affirmed, and truly nothing that can correspond. "When there is no correspondence, nothing fails to correspond" means that non-correspondence precisely corresponds to true principle, and non-affirmation precisely affirms true principle. "When nothing is not affirmed, this is an affirmation that is without affirmation" means that it affirms true principle, yet although affirming, there is nothing affirmed; it corresponds to true principle, yet although corresponding, there is nothing corresponded to. "Completely seeing all phenomena yet without seeing": completely seeing all phenomena entails having correspondence and having affirmation; yet "without seeing" entails having no correspondence and no affirmation.

"The objection states: 'The sage's mind is not incapable of affirming'" and so on is the fourth exchange. It is not incapable of taking the myriad things to be things, yet because there is no thing that can be a thing, the sage does not take things as existing things; although he affirms, he does not affirm [them as] existent. "Therefore, he must affirm them in non-affirmation" means that things are not existent, so they must be affirmed as non-existent; not taking things as existing things, one should take things as non-existing things. "Truly because prajñā lacks knowing with characteristics": unlike deluded cognition, which has knowing with characteristics. "If one takes animitta as animitta, how would this burden paramārtha-satya?" asks: not engaging in knowing with characteristics, one merely engages in knowing of animitta; also, not possessing knowing with characteristics, one merely possesses knowing of animitta—having this, what trouble or burden would there be?

"The reply states: 'The sage is animitta'" means the sage takes animitta as mind. Since he takes animitta as mind, he not only lacks characteristics of existence, but also lacks characteristics of non-existence. "If one takes animitta as animitta" and so on means: if one says that the sage takes animitta as a characteristic and possesses this cognition of animitta, then animitta becomes a characteristic, and non-knowing becomes knowing. "Abandoning existence and going to non-existence is like fleeing a peak and leaping into a chasm": zhi means to go to. "Peak" refers to mountains; "chasm" refers to water. Avoiding the mountain and rushing to the water both carry the hazard of harming one's body. "Dwelling in existence without being existent" and so on means dwelling in existence without grasping the characteristics of existence, and residing in non-existence without grasping the characteristics of non-existence. "Yet neither does he abandon existence and non-existence" means identifying existence with non-existence, not meaning leaving existence to become non-existence; and identifying non-existence with non-non-existence, not meaning leaving non-existence to become non-non-existence. "Harmonising his light with worldly dust": Laozi says, "He harmonises his light, unifies with his dust." This phrase is borrowed here to clarify that the sage harmonises his light and unifies with the dust: being in existence, he accords with existence; being in non-existence, he accords with non-existence; according with existence, he does not grasp existence; according with non-existence, he does not grasp non-existence. "Circulating" (zhouxuan) means coming and going. "Quiescently going" and so on: both ji and bo mean tranquility. Going is quiescent going, going without any going. Coming is placid coming, coming without any coming. "Tranquil and non-acting" means serenely and placidly having nothing he sets out to do; although doing nothing, there is nothing left undone. Dan is read in the falling tone. The "Way of Heaven" chapter of the outer chapters of the Zhuangzi says: "Emptiness, tranquility, placidity, indifference, and non-action are the root of Heaven and Earth and the apex of the Dao and virtue."