肇論疏 2.63

2.63

第三、斥謂情也。今之談者，謂多時講論之人，亦可指劉公也。多即言以定旨，謂執文取定也。尋大方而徵隅懷前識以標玄者，《老子》云：大方無隅。又云：前識者道之華。以標玄也，而言前識。今言至理大方無隅，何以徵責其隅？前識非玄，何以懷前識以標玄也？而言前識者，河上注云：不知而言知，為前識也。存所存以必當者，存彼所存之法，以為必當理也。所存者，謂聖人有心也。是以聞聖有知謂之有心下，聞知定謂知，故謂知為有；聞無定謂無，故謂無為空也。有無之境邊見所存下，有無二邊名為邊見，邊見之人存此有無。此有無二見，不是中正不二之道也。何者萬物雖殊然性本常一者，一謂無相空也。不可而物然非不物者，不可為有物，然後非無物也。可物於物則名相異陳下，有本直云「可物則名相異陳」，理亦無爽；望不句例，則「可物於物」本是也。以物為物，故云可物於物；不以物為物，故云不物於物。名相為陳，謂有也；物而即真，謂空也。是以聖人不物於物下，不以物為有物，不以物為無物也。非有所以不取非無所以不捨者，杜預注《春秋》云：捨，置也。非有故不可取，非無故不應捨也。不捨故妙存即真下，《爾雅》云：靡，無也。以不可捨故，即是真空；以不可取故，無因有名相也。故經曰般若於諸法無取無捨下，《大品經》也。此攀緣之外下，此是思慮之外至理，故不可以有無詰責也。

Third, rebuking conceptual clinging. "Discussants today" refers to those who engage in lectures and debates over time, and can also point to Master Liu. "Mostly determine the meaning directly from words" means grasping at the text to fix a determination. Regarding "seeking the great square and demanding its corners; harboring foreknowledge to mark the profound": the Laozi says: "The great square has no corners." It also says: "Foreknowledge is the flower of the Way." Marking the profound is intended, yet they speak of foreknowledge! Here it means that the ultimate principle is a great square without corners; why demand its corners? Foreknowledge is not the profound; why harbor foreknowledge to mark the profound? As for speaking of "foreknowledge," Heshanggong's commentary states: "Not knowing and yet claiming to know is foreknowledge." Regarding "retaining what one maintains as necessarily correct": retaining the dharma that one maintains, considering it necessarily in accord with principle. "What one maintains" refers to [the view that] the sage has a mind. Regarding "therefore, hearing that the sage has knowledge, they call it having a mind...": hearing "knowledge," they definitely call it knowledge, hence they regard knowledge as being; hearing "non-existence," they definitely call it non-existence, hence they regard non-existence as empty. Regarding "the realms of being and non-being are what extreme views maintain...": the two extremes of being and non-being are called extreme views; people of extreme views maintain this being and non-being. These two views of being and non-being are not the correct, non-dual Middle Way. Regarding "why is this? Although the myriad things are diverse, their nature is fundamentally ever one": "one" refers to animitta emptiness. Regarding "they cannot be made into things, yet they are not non-things": they cannot be taken as existing things, yet thereafter they are not non-things. Regarding "if one can thingify things, then names and characteristics are set forth differently...": one edition simply reads "if one can thingify, then names and characteristics are set forth differently," the principle of which is also unobjectionable; considering the parallel with the negative clause, the version "can thingify things" is the original. Taking things as things is called "being able to thingify things"; not taking things as things is called "not thingifying things." Setting forth names and characteristics refers to being; things being immediately true refers to emptiness. Regarding "therefore, the sage does not thingify things...": he does not take things as existing things, nor does he take things as non-existing things. Regarding "because they are not being, they are not grasped; because they are not non-being, they are not abandoned": Du Yu's commentary on the Chunqiu says: "She (捨) means to discard." Because they are not being, they cannot be grasped; because they are not non-being, they should not be abandoned. Regarding "because they are not abandoned, marvelously abiding, they are immediately true...": the Erya says: "Mi (靡) means none." Because they cannot be abandoned, they are immediately true emptiness; because they cannot be grasped, there is no cause for names and characteristics to exist. Regarding "hence the sūtra says: 'Prajñā neither grasps nor abandons any dharmas'...": this is from the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā. Regarding "this is beyond all mental clinging...": this is the ultimate principle beyond mental deliberation, and thus cannot be interrogated in terms of being and non-being.