肇論疏 2.63
English (machine translation) 2.63
- Language
- English
2.63
Third, rebuking conceptual clinging. "Discussants today" refers to those who engage in lectures and debates over time, and can also point to Master Liu. "Mostly determine the meaning directly from words" means grasping at the text to fix a determination. Regarding "seeking the great square and demanding its corners; harboring foreknowledge to mark the profound": the Laozi says: "The great square has no corners." It also says: "Foreknowledge is the flower of the Way." Marking the profound is intended, yet they speak of foreknowledge! Here it means that the ultimate principle is a great square without corners; why demand its corners? Foreknowledge is not the profound; why harbor foreknowledge to mark the profound? As for speaking of "foreknowledge," Heshanggong's commentary states: "Not knowing and yet claiming to know is foreknowledge." Regarding "retaining what one maintains as necessarily correct": retaining the dharma that one maintains, considering it necessarily in accord with principle. "What one maintains" refers to [the view that] the sage has a mind. Regarding "therefore, hearing that the sage has knowledge, they call it having a mind...": hearing "knowledge," they definitely call it knowledge, hence they regard knowledge as being; hearing "non-existence," they definitely call it non-existence, hence they regard non-existence as empty. Regarding "the realms of being and non-being are what extreme views maintain...": the two extremes of being and non-being are called extreme views; people of extreme views maintain this being and non-being. These two views of being and non-being are not the correct, non-dual Middle Way. Regarding "why is this? Although the myriad things are diverse, their nature is fundamentally ever one": "one" refers to animitta emptiness. Regarding "they cannot be made into things, yet they are not non-things": they cannot be taken as existing things, yet thereafter they are not non-things. Regarding "if one can thingify things, then names and characteristics are set forth differently...": one edition simply reads "if one can thingify, then names and characteristics are set forth differently," the principle of which is also unobjectionable; considering the parallel with the negative clause, the version "can thingify things" is the original. Taking things as things is called "being able to thingify things"; not taking things as things is called "not thingifying things." Setting forth names and characteristics refers to being; things being immediately true refers to emptiness. Regarding "therefore, the sage does not thingify things...": he does not take things as existing things, nor does he take things as non-existing things. Regarding "because they are not being, they are not grasped; because they are not non-being, they are not abandoned": Du Yu's commentary on the Chunqiu says: "She (捨) means to discard." Because they are not being, they cannot be grasped; because they are not non-being, they should not be abandoned. Regarding "because they are not abandoned, marvelously abiding, they are immediately true...": the Erya says: "Mi (靡) means none." Because they cannot be abandoned, they are immediately true emptiness; because they cannot be grasped, there is no cause for names and characteristics to exist. Regarding "hence the sūtra says: 'Prajñā neither grasps nor abandons any dharmas'...": this is from the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā. Regarding "this is beyond all mental clinging...": this is the ultimate principle beyond mental deliberation, and thus cannot be interrogated in terms of being and non-being.
Linked texts (1)
- 肇論疏 — Classical Chinese