肇論疏 2.39

2.39

This is the second round. Prajñā is non-knowing—this is the non-being of noble wisdom; deluded cognition's nature is empty—this is the non-being of deluded cognition. Prajñā's non-knowing also has no arising and ceasing, and deluded cognition's nature being empty also has no arising and ceasing; how do the two kinds of non-being differ? The answer says: "The non-being of noble wisdom is non-knowing," and so forth: noble wisdom has no knowing, whereas deluded cognition has the essence of knowing, yet both have no distinction [as non-being]. What makes them "non-being" is the meaning. Although both are called "non-being," their meanings each differ. "Why? The noble mind is vacant and tranquil," and so forth: this means that the noble mind has no grasping or attachment. Having no knowing of grasping or attachment, its emptiness is spoken of. "It can be called non-knowing," and so forth: one may name this "non-knowing," but it cannot be named "knowing emptiness." "Deluded cognition has knowing," and so forth: this means that deluded cognition has grasping and attachment. Having this knowing of grasping and attachment, its emptiness is spoken of. "It can be called knowing non-being," and so forth: one may name this "knowing non-being," but it cannot be named "non-knowing." "Non-knowing is the non-being of prajñā," and so forth: because prajñā does not grasp characteristics, it is called "non-knowing"; because the essence and nature of deluded cognition is empty, it is called "knowing non-being"; knowing non-being is simply the dharmatā of paramārtha-satya. "Speaking of function, they are identical yet different," and so forth: discussing function, what is fundamentally identical becomes different; discussing quiescence, what is fundamentally different becomes identical. "Being identical, it has no mind toward this or that," and so forth: speaking in terms of identity, between this and that there is no distinction; speaking in terms of difference, this and that each have their distinctness. This means that prajñā has the power to illuminate the object, and paramārtha-satya has the efficacy of producing wisdom. It can also be said that regarding difference, prajñā has the efficacy of mirror-like illumination, whereas paramārtha-satya does not. "Therefore, one who discerns identity," and so forth: speaking of identity means taking different dharmas as identical; speaking of difference means taking identical dharmas as different. "Thus they cannot be grasped as different," and so forth: speaking definitively, they can neither be grasped as definitely different nor grasped as definitely identical. "Why? Internally there is the clarity of solitary reflection," and so forth: this explains the previous "identity in quiescence yet difference in function." "Internally there is the clarity of solitary reflection" is the function of prajñā; "externally there is the difference of the myriad dharmas" is the function of paramārtha-satya. "Although the myriad dharmas are different," and so forth: although there is ultimate reality, it requires prajñā's illumination for it to become manifest. "The internal and external interact with each other to accomplish its illuminating efficacy": because the external is seen by means of the internal, and the internal is prompted by means of the external, they are said to "interact with each other." "This is something that the sage cannot unify in function": this is the difference in function, which the sage cannot make identical. "Internally, though illuminating, there is no knowing," and so forth: illuminating without knowing is the quiescence of wisdom; real without characteristics is the quiescence of the object; the essence and nature of both dharmas are identical in that both are non-being. "The internal and external are quiescent and mutually together are non-being": both dharmas are quiescent and both are empty. "This is something whose quiescence the sage cannot make different": this is the identity in quiescence, which the sage cannot make different. "How could it be said that one grafts onto a duck [legs] or cuts a crane [legs]?" and so forth: this saying comes from the Zhuangzi. The chapter "Webbed Toes" in the Outer Chapters of the Zhuangzi says: "What is long is not considered surplus, and what is short is not considered deficient. Therefore, although the duck's legs are short, if one lengthens them, it brings distress; although the crane's legs are long, if one cuts them, it brings sorrow. Therefore, where the nature is long, length is not something to be cut off; where the nature is short, shortness is not something to be lengthened." Here these words are borrowed to clarify that although the object and wisdom are different, they are identical, not having to wait for unification before being identical. "Yi" means level. "Ying" means full. "Yue" means mountain. "Huo" means ravine. "Indeed, by taking non-difference within difference": this means taking what is non-different as different. "Therefore, although different, they are not different": since what is non-different is taken as different, the difference cannot be considered a real difference. In dharmas that are non-different, explaining the dharmas as different is taking all that is non-different as different. "Nor are they of a single characteristic," and so forth: neither one nor different means being neither identical nor different. The objection says: "The treatise says: 'Speaking of function, they are different,'" and so forth: the third round raises an objection specifically on function and quiescence. "It is not yet understood whether within prajñā there is a difference between function and quiescence": some texts read "whether within prajñā there is a difference between function and quiescence or not (fou)?" Some texts do not have the word "not (fou)"; here the word "not" is not used, simply asking how within prajñā there could also be a difference between function and quiescence. If it had the word "not," it would be the two extremes of being and non-being. The answer says: "Function is quiescence," and so forth: this further dissolves function and quiescence. "Quiescence and function are one in essence," and so forth: since quiescence and function are one in essence, both arising from principle, they nevertheless have different names. "There is no quiescence devoid of function that acts as the master over function": this does not mean that apart from function there is separately a quiescence that acts as the master over function. "Therefore, the dimmer the wisdom," and so forth: "mi" means all the more. "Yu" means exceeds. The dimmer the noble wisdom, the clearer its function; the quieter the noble spirit, the more active its response. "How could it be said that there is a difference between brightness and dimness, movement and stillness?" Although it speaks of brightness and dimness, movement and stillness, these are again dissolved into one. Therefore the Chengju [guangming dingyi jing] says: "To not act surpasses acting": non-action surpasses action. "Without mind and without consciousness," and so forth: without mind and without consciousness, it is profoundly aware and perceptive again. "This, then, exhausts spirit and fathoms wisdom," and so forth: this means that these two sūtras exhaust the spirit-like marvel and wisdom, reaching the limit in expressing discourse that lies beyond words and signs. "Approaching its clear text," and so forth: this generally refers to this Bore wuzhi lun. Through the clear text of this treatise, the noble mind's non-knowing can be seen in it. Alternatively, it can directly refer to the above two sūtras as "approaching its clear text."