肇論疏 2
English (machine translation) 2
- Language
- English
2.1
Composed by Shi Yuankang.
2.2
Treatise on Prajñā Being Without Knowing
2.3
This is the third treatise, which clarifies the causes and conditions to unfold the teaching of prajñā. Stating 'prajñā' is Sanskrit; here it means wisdom. 'Without knowing' simply means having no cognition that grasps marks. Ordinary people all say that prajñā is knowledge and therefore possesses knowing; if it has knowing, then it has grasping and attachment; if it has grasping and attachment, it does not accord with non-arising. Now it is clarified that the true wisdom of prajñā has no grasping and no conditioning objects; although it realizes the ultimate truth, it does not grasp marks, and hence is called 'without knowing'.
2.4
Under 'Now, prajñā is empty and profound':
2.5
This treatise has three sections: first is the primary treatise itself; second is Duke Liu presenting questions; third is Master Sengzhao explaining in response. Now this is the first. Within the primary treatise, the text has three sections: first, it introduces the origins and causes of prajñā; second, it explicitly sets forth the fundamental thesis of non-knowing; third, question and answer analysis. Now, in the first introductory section, the text has four parts: first, setting forth the fundamental thesis; second, introducing Master Kumārajīva; third, praising the King of Qin; fourth, clarifying the treatise's purpose. Now this is the first. The Dharma of prajñā is empty because it is markless, and profound because it is subtle and hidden. 'Profound' (玄) means black; deep, obscure, and difficult to fathom, its meaning is like deep black. Heshang's commentary on the Laozi states: 'The profound is heaven.' This is also because heaven is distant and difficult to comprehend, its meaning being identical to dark and obscure. 'It is indeed the ultimate of the Three Vehicles, truly singular and without difference': 'indeed' (蓋) is a word of uncertainty, denoting that one considers it to be so but has not yet dared to affirm it conclusively; hence he says 'is indeed'. The Three Vehicles all have prajñā, all achieve the Way through prajñā, all take prajñā as their root foundation, and all take prajñā as their culmination; yet there are differences of depth and shallowness, hence there are distinctions of great and small. By virtue of this meaning, one truly believes that prajñā is a real, singular, and undifferentiated Dharma. Under 'Yet diverse and heterodox theories have long been in contention': the principle and nature of the Dharma of prajñā is without difference, but recently scholars in their explanations have had discrepancies; because they are unable to clarify the nature of prajñā, divergent explanations are not identical. This is just like what is stated in Master Huiyuan's Collection: 'Hearing that Master Dao'yi takes equalized knowledge (samata-jñāna) to be prajñā, my mind is truly dissatisfied.' This is precisely that matter. Why? Equalized knowledge is knowledge held in common, identical above and below. As the Nirvāṇa Sūtra states: 'All sentient beings have three kinds of equalized knowledge, namely lust, fear, and food and drink.' The Hīnayāna, relying on this, establishes equalized knowledge; this is coarse and mundane, not yet deep and wondrous—how could this knowledge be taken as prajñā? Master Daoyi did not understand, hence he said that this is prajñā. Now Master Sengzhao also refutes this view, hence he speaks thus. It may also be that ordinary people either say prajñā possesses knowing or say it lacks knowing, unable to discern the truth; now this is called heterodox.
2.6
Under 'There was an Indian śramaṇa':
2.7
Second, the preface concerning Master Kumārajīva. The Gaoseng zhuan states: Master [Kumāra]jīva's father was the son of the prime minister of an Indian state, named Kumārāyana. His grandfather was due to inherit the position, but he avoided the rank and did not accept it, traveling east to Kucha. The Kuchan king Po Chun had a sister who had a red mole on her body, destined to give birth to a wise son. Various kingdoms proposed marriage to her, but she refused to respond to any of them. Then, upon seeing [Kumārā]yana, she desired to marry him, whereupon the king compelled [Kumārā]yana to take her as his wife. [Kumārā]yana took her in marriage, and she gave birth to Master [Kumāra]jīva. After the Master left household life, he went again to India; therefore, he is called an Indian master. As for the name Kumārajīva, his original name was Kumārajīva, which is translated here as Tongshou ("Youth-Longevity"). His father's name was Kumārāyana and his mother's name was Jīvā; here, the names of both father and mother are combined to form his name, and this is why he is so called. After arriving here, because he excelled at understanding literature (shi), he was named Shi. This is an outline, drawing roughly on the intention of the biography, not its full text. This is what Master Huijiao said in composing the biography, but it is not seen elsewhere. Yet these words may perhaps be so, or perhaps not so. Why? If Master [Kumāra]jīva, upon arriving here, was called Luoshi because he excelled at understanding literature (wenshi), then in the Gaoseng zhuan there is also an Indian monk named Buddhayaśas (Fotoushi) [or Guṇabhadra/Buddhashi]—did he also understand literature before being named Shi? Since that is not the case for him, how could it uniquely be so for this one? Speaking from this, it is not necessarily so. Regarding "In his youth he trod the Great Square": Laozi says: "The great square has no corners." Here this expression is borrowed as a metaphor for the Mahāyāna teachings. Master [Kumāra]jīva left household life at the age of seven and first studied the various treatises of the Śrāvakayāna. When he was thirteen, he studied under Prince Sūryasoma of the military staff. There were two brothers Soma: the elder was named Sūryabhadra, and the younger was named Sūryasoma. Soma was peerless in talent and eloquence; his elder brother and all others studied under him. Soma expounded the Anavatapta-sūtra for [Kumāra]jīva. When [Kumāra]jīva heard that all dharmas of the aggregates and realms are empty and without marks, he was amazed and asked: "What further meaning does this sūtra have, that it destroys all dharmas entirely?" He replied: "Dharmas such as the eye are not truly existent." [Kumāra]jīva, having previously clung to the existence of sense-faculties, while the other relied on dependent origination to show their lack of true reality, investigated and examined the Greater and Lesser [Vehicles] back and forth for a prolonged time, until [Kumāra]jīva at last recognized where the principle truly converged, and subsequently devoted himself to the Vaipulya teachings. Thereupon he broadly sought essential teachings, receiving and reciting the Madhyamaka-kārikā, Śataka-śāstra, Dvādaśamukha-śāstra, and so forth; hence it says: "In his youth he trod the Great Square." Moreover, "Great Square" refers to the country of India. Although [Kumāra]jīva was born in Kucha, he went to India early on. Regarding "investigating the incipience of this purport": ji is the incipient capacity. The Yijing states: "To know the incipient signs (ji)—how divine is it!" It also says: "The incipient sign (ji) is the first subtle movement." The character differs from the present one, but their meanings may be the same, or perhaps not the same. If one says they are the same, the first subtle movement is also the mind. If one says they are not the same, the incipient capacity strictly refers to the mind, whereas the subtle movement broadly concerns all affairs. When Master [Kumāra]jīva was twenty, he received full ordination in the Kuchan royal palace and dwelt in the New Monastery. Furthermore, in an ancient palace beside the monastery, he first obtained the Fangguang jing. Just as he opened and read it, Māra came and obscured the text, so that he saw only blank paper. [Kumāra]jīva, recognizing Māra's deed, made his resolve even firmer; Māra departed, the characters reappeared, and he continued to study and recite it. Again he heard a voice in the sky saying: "You are a man of wisdom; why should you read this?" [Kumāra]jīva said: "You are a petty māra; you should depart at once! My mind is like the earth, immovable." Referring now to this event, it is thus stated. Regarding "preeminent beyond words and images": The Zhouyi has the "Wenyan" and the "Xiangci"; relying on the "Wenyan" and "Xiangci," the Dao of Changes is revealed. Wang Bi's Zhouyi lüeli, in the section on images, says: "Images are what bring out meaning; words are what clarify images. Nothing exhausts meaning like images; nothing exhausts images like words. Words arise from images, so one may follow words to observe images; images arise from meaning, so one may follow images to observe meaning. Meaning is exhausted by images, and images are made clear by words. Therefore, words are that by which images are clarified; grasping the image, one forgets the words. Images are that by which meaning is preserved; grasping the meaning, one forgets the images. For this reason, one who preserves words has not grasped the image; one who preserves images has not grasped the meaning. If images arise from meaning yet one preserves the images, then what is preserved is not the true image; if words arise from images yet one preserves the words, then what is preserved is not the true words. Thus, one who forgets images is one who grasps meaning; one who forgets words is one who grasps images." Here this language is borrowed. The words and images of the Yijing originally clarify the Dao of the Changes; Master [Kumāra]jīva profoundly awakened to prajñā without relying on words and images. Regarding "wonderfully attuning to the realm of the subtle and minute": Some editions have the word "attained" (de). "Attuning" (qi) means to accord with. The Shuowen says: "Qi means an agreement." By checking the tally, carving wood serves as an agreement. Tallies have male and female parts, modeled on man and woman; the male is the left tally and the female is the right tally. Laozi says: "Holding the left tally." This refers to that. Regarding "subtle and minute" (xiwei): Laozi says: "Looked at but not seen, it is called yi; listened to but not heard, it is called xi; grasped at but not obtained, it is called wei. These three cannot be scrutinized, so they blend into one." This phrase is borrowed here to illustrate that prajñā is soundless and formless, and that Master [Kumāra]jīva was able to wonderfully attune to it. Regarding "Equalizing heterodox traditions in Gayā (Jiayi)": "Equalizing" means putting in order. "Heterodox traditions" are the non-Buddhists. "Jiayi" is the name of a kingdom in Central India, which is translated here as the Kingdom of the Red Marsh. Stating "Jiayi" intends to say that he refuted non-Buddhists in the Western Regions, not necessarily restricted to Central India. As for this incident: in the kingdom of Wensu on the northern border of Kucha, there was a non-Buddhist endowed with divine eloquence and outstanding talent, whose name shook various countries. Beating the royal drum with his own hands, he vowed: "If anyone defeats me in debate, I shall cut off my head to apologize." Once Master [Kumāra]jīva arrived, he examined him on two principles; the non-Buddhist was utterly confused and confounded, prostrating in refuge. This refers to that event. Regarding "spreading the pure breeze to fan the East": "Breeze" refers to the breeze of prajñā wisdom, like a pure and gentle breeze. "Fanning the East" means fanning the breeze of prajñā into this eastern country. As for this matter: [Kumāra]jīva's mother had previously taken him to Northern India, where they met an arhat named Dharmaghoṣa. Seeing him, the arhat was amazed and said to his mother: "You should always protect him. If this novice does not break the precepts before reaching thirty-five, he will deliver countless people, like Upagupta. If he breaks the precepts, he will achieve nothing, becoming merely a master of worldly talent and intelligence." Thereupon he took [Kumāra]jīva back to his mother. Later, when she was going again to India, on the verge of departure she said to [Kumāra]jīva: "The profound teachings of the Vaipulya ought to be broadly proclaimed in China and transmitted to the eastern lands; this depends solely on your strength. Yet for yourself it will bring no benefit—what can be done?" [Kumāra]jīva said: "The path of a great being (mahāsattva) is to benefit others while forgetting one's own form. If the Great Transformation can surely be made to circulate and cleanse the delusions of worldly people, even if my later body should face the furnace and cauldron, I shall suffer without regret." Later he transmitted the Dharma and came here; hence it says "fanning the East." Regarding "Just as he was about to illuminate foreign regions, he hid his radiance in the Liang lands": jiang means "about to." yuan means "in" or "at." The Xiao Erya says: "yuan means change." zhu means "to illuminate." "Liang lands" refers to Liangzhou. Among the Liang states there were Five Liang: the Former Liang of Zhang Gui, the Later Liang of Lü Guang, the Southern Liang of the Xianbei Wugu, the Western Liang of Li Gao, and the one spoken of here, Juqu Mengxun [of the Northern Liang]. The Five Liang all had their capital at Guzang. That the Former and Later Liang both had their capital at Guzang is known. As for why Southern Liang, Western Liang, and Northern Liang also had their capital at Guzang: Southern Liang first had its capital at Wuwei and Xiping, later moved to the Eastern Capital, then again followed Guzang, and then returned to the Eastern Capital. Western Liang first had its capital at Guzang, and later moved to Jiuquan. Mengxun first had its capital at Zhangye, and later moved to Guzang. The Liang mentioned here is Mengxun's Liang. The statement that Master [Kumāra]jīva, just as he was about to illuminate this country, concealed his talent and wisdom in the Liang lands, has its reason. As for this incident: In the thirteenth year of the Jianyuan era of Fu Jian, ruler of the Former Qin, in the first month, the Grand Astrologer memorialized: "A star has appeared in the sector of foreign countries; a person of great virtue and wisdom will enter to assist the Central Kingdom." Fu Jian said: "I have heard that in the Western Regions there is Kumārajīva, and in Xiangyang there is Shi Dao'an. Could it not be them?" He immediately dispatched envoys to seek them. In the ninth month of the eighteenth year, Fu Jian dispatched General of Valiant Cavalry Lü Guang and General of the River Jiang Fei to lead an army of seventy thousand to campaign west against Kucha. On the verge of departure, Fu Jian held a farewell banquet for Lü Guang at the Jianzhang Palace, saying to Lü Guang: "Rulers govern in response to Heaven, taking love of the common people as their foundation; how could I attack their lands out of greed? It is solely because of the man who embodies the Way. I have heard that in the Western Regions there is Kumārajīva, who deeply understands the characteristics of dharmas; I think of him greatly. The worthy and wise are the great treasure of a state; if you overcome Kucha, dispatch an express courier to send [Kumāra]jīva." Lü Guang indeed overcame Kucha and returned eastward with [Kumāra]jīva. When they reached Liangzhou, he heard that Fu Jian had been killed by Yao Chang, so Lü Guang usurped the title outside the Pass. When Lü Guang died, his son Shao inherited the throne. Lü Guang's concubine-born son Zuan killed Shao and established himself. Lü Guang's nephew Chao killed Zuan and established his elder brother Long, lasting altogether eighteen years. Because Lü Guang, father and sons, did not propagate the correct path, [Kumāra]jīva harbored profound understanding with nowhere to preach and convert. This refers to this event. Therefore, regarding "Thus the Way does not respond in vain; its response surely has a cause": When Fu Jian died, this was without a cause; when Yao Xing arose, this is what is called having a cause. Below, "In the third year of the Hongshi era": Hongshi was the era name of Yao Xing of the Later Qin. Regarding "The year was in Xingji": The chou month is Xingji, and the chou year is Chifenruo. Here the name of the month is used to designate the year; hence it says Xingji. Why? The "Shiming" in the Erya says: The yin year is Shetigē, the mao year is Shan'è, the chen year is Zhichu, the si year is Dahuangluo, the wu year is Dunzang, the wei year is Xieqia, the shen year is Tuntan, the you year is Zuoe, the xu year is Yanmao, the hai year is Dayuanxian, the zi year is Kundun, and the chou year is the Chifenruo month. The first month is Ximu, the second month is Dahuǒ, the third month is Shouxing, the fourth month is Chunwei, the fifth month is Chunhuǒ, the sixth month is Chunshou, the seventh month is Shishen, the eighth month is Daliang, the ninth month is Jianglou, the tenth month is Juzi, the eleventh month is Xuanxiao, and the twelfth month is Xingji. Now, the third year of Hongshi corresponds exactly to a chou year, which belongs to Chifenruo. Here the name of the chou month is used in place of the name of the chou year; hence it says: "In the third year of the Hongshi era, the year was in Xingji." Some say: the twelve year names and twelve month names are interchangeable in sequence without any impediment, which is why the month name is used to designate the year. Regarding "Qin availed itself of the plan to enter the country and raised an army with the intent to bring him": Texts that read "eight countries" are mistaken. Relying now on the ancient text, "enter the country" is correct. The Sanshi guo chunqiu says: "Lü Long, fearing pressure from Southern Liang and Northern Liang, presented a memorial requesting to be received. Long moved to Qin, and Lü Guang's lineage was thus terminated." This means Lü Long entered the Qin state, not eight countries. The Gaoseng zhuan states: "In the third month of the third year of Hongshi, twin trees with interlinked branches grew in the ancestral temple courtyard, and scallions in the Xiaoyao Garden turned into shallots; this was considered an auspicious omen, indicating that an ultimate sage was about to enter the country. In the fifth month, Yao Xing dispatched Shuode, Duke of Longxi, on a western campaign against Lü Long; Long's army was severely defeated. In the ninth month, Long submitted a memorial of surrender, and only then was [Kumāra]jīva welcomed into the Pass." Hence it says "the plan to enter the country." "Army" means troops; raising an army was simply to bring Master [Kumāra]jīva. Regarding "It is presumed that the destiny of Northern India was naturally so": The preface to the "Rhapsody on the Lu Palace of Divine Brilliance" in the Wenxuan says: "From the Western Capital to Weiyang, all were seen ruined and collapsed, yet the Divine Brilliance alone remained intact. Can it be presumed that divine spirits supported it, so as to protect the House of Han?" This phrase is emulated here. It clarifies that when Fu Jian raised an army and marched to bring Master [Kumāra]jīva, he died before [Kumāra]jīva arrived; now when Yao Xing raised an army to bring him, he was able to return. This is the destiny of Northern India, a destined cycle that was meant to be so. As for mentioning Northern India: the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā states that after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, prajñā would travel south, next west, and then north, where it would flourish greatly in the north. The Dazhidu lun explains that "the north" means Northern India. Here it means that through the successive rotations of destiny in Northern India, it only then reached the eastern lands; therefore it says so.
2.8
"The Heavenly King of the Great Qin":
2.9
Part three praises the Qin king, Yao Xing. When Xing first succeeded his father, he improperly assumed the title of Emperor. Later, he relinquished the imperial title and referred to himself as the King of Qin, conferring elevated titles upon all his officials and changing the reign era to Hongshi. Here he is not called "Son of Heaven," but is instead called "Heavenly King."
From "His way accords with the foremost of the hundred kings" down [to "his virtue enriches the coming ages"]: His way stands preeminent among former kings, hence "the foremost of the hundred kings." His virtue moistens and enriches future generations, hence "a thousand years later."
"His blade moves freely through the myriad affairs": This refers to the blade of wisdom. The chapter "The Secret of Caring for Life" in the Inner Chapters of the *Zhuangzi* states: "Cook Ding was carving an ox for Lord Wenhui. At every touch of his hand, every lean of his shoulder, every tread of his foot, every drive of his knee, the flesh parted with a sound, and the knife slid through with a whisper, perfectly in rhythm—harmonizing with the 'Dance of the Mulberry Forest' and keeping time with the 'Jingshou' suite. Lord Wenhui said, 'Ah, how wonderful! Can skill indeed reach such heights?' Cook Ding laid down his knife and replied, 'What your servant loves is the Dao, which goes beyond mere skill. When I first began carving oxen, all I saw was the whole ox. After three years, I no longer saw a whole ox. And now, I encounter it with spirit rather than looking with my eyes. A good cook changes his knife once a year because he cuts; a common cook changes his knife once a month because he hacks. Now your servant's knife has been in use for nineteen years, having carved several thousand oxen, yet its blade is as keen as if fresh from the whetstone. The joints have spaces, and the edge of the blade has no thickness. Inserting that which has no thickness into that which has space—vast and spacious, there is surely more than enough room for the blade to move freely!'"
Regarding the "myriad affairs" (*wanji*): The "Counsel of Gao Yao" in the *Shangshu* states: "Be fearful and cautious; in one day, in two days, there are ten thousand occasions (*wanji*)." Kong's commentary says: "*Ji* means subtle; it means that one must be cautious and fearful regarding the subtleties of myriad matters." Here the character *ji* (機) is written, which is still the single character *ji*.
Saying this of the King of Qin means that outwardly he can wield the blade of wisdom to decide and resolve state affairs, while inwardly he can propagate the Buddha-Dao all day long.
From "Truly, he is what the common people of this degenerate age look up to as heaven": "Truly" means it is genuinely so. "Degenerate" (*ji*) refers to the order of birth or seasonal months (the first, second, and third months of a season, where *ji* is the last); *ji* means the end. It is true that the King of Qin is what the common people of this degenerate age look up to as heaven, and what Śākyamuni's bequeathed Dharma relies upon as a staff. It is also the staff of reliance; relying on him, the bequeathed Dharma flourishes. As for "common people" (*cangsheng*), *cang* is the color of the sky. The "Free and Easy Wandering" chapter of the *Zhuangzi* says: "Is azure (*cangcang*) the sky's true color?" Here it means "those born of heaven," hence "common people" (*cangsheng*), meaning all sentient beings.
From "Thereupon he assembled the śramaṇas versed in doctrine": At that time he gathered the monks. "Versed in doctrine" refers to those who study the teachings. During the Qin there was the Xiaoyao Garden, and within the garden was a belvedere, hence called the Xiaoyao Belvedere. Master Sengrui says: "The Western Bright Pavilion of the Xiaoyao Garden." A pavilion is also a belvedere. The Xiaoyao Garden was located north of the old city of the Western Capital, overlooking the Wei River.
Regarding "He personally held the Qin texts to collate and verify the vaipulya scriptures with Kumārajīva": Master Kumārajīva arrived in Chang'an on the twentieth day of the twelfth month of the third year of Hongshi; on the twenty-third day of the fourth month of the fifth year of Hongshi, he translated the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* in the Xiaoyao Garden. The King of Qin personally examined the older translations to verify their strengths and weaknesses. This passage speaks of that event.
From "That which he opened and entrusted": This clarifies the scriptures that the King of Qin requested to be translated. "Opening and entrusting the Dharma gates" not only brought benefit at that time, but also served as a bridge and ford for future generations. "For successive kalpas" conveys the intention of bringing benefit into the distant future.
2.10
"I, with my deficient and meager [abilities]":
2.11
Part four introduces the treatise's purpose. "Deficient" means deficient in learning; "meager" means meager in talent; "once" means having had the experience; "mingled" means mingled among others. "Auspicious" means good. It refers to having previously been included among the assembly of five hundred persons. "Deeming that my first hearing of the extraordinary essentials began at that time" means that at this time I first heard the extraordinary and essential Dharma.
From "Yet sacred wisdom is profound and subtle": The previous section explained that he had once heard prajñā; here it explains that prajñā is difficult to comprehend and cannot be expressed in words.
From "I attempt to capture in semblance what is embraced in my heart": In his heart he holds a semblance, yet it seems as though he has an understanding, and so he resorts to wild words to speak of it. As for the term "semblance" (*wangxiang*): The "Knowledge Wandered North" chapter in the Outer Chapters of the *Zhuangzi* says: "The Yellow Emperor wandered north of the Red Waters, climbed the hills of Kunlun, and gazed south; but he lost his Dark Pearl. He sent Knowledge to search for it, but Knowledge could not find it. He sent Li Zhu to search for it, but Li Zhu could not find it. He sent Qigou to search for it, but Qigou could not find it. Then he sent Wangxiang (Semblance), and Wangxiang found it. The Yellow Emperor said, 'Remarkable! Could it be that Wangxiang was able to find it?'" Guo Xiang's commentary says: "This shows that one who attains the real does not do so by using the mind; Semblance is identical with the real." Sengzhao borrows this expression here. Although the characters are slightly different, it fundamentally originates from the text of the *Zhuangzi*.
2.12
"The *Fangguang [jing]* says: 'Prajñā has no characteristic of existing'" down [to "'prajñā has no characteristic of arising'"]:
2.13
Section two properly sets forth the central thesis of the *Treatise on the Non-knowing of Prajñā* as the substance of the treatise. The text has five parts: first, stating the central thesis; second, discerning its characteristics; third, harmonizing them; fourth, clarifying its essence; fifth, a concluding summary. This is the first part.
Within this part there are three sections: first, properly stating the central thesis; next, explaining it; and last, citing proofs. Here in the first section, two sūtras are cited to establish the thesis of non-knowing.
Regarding "This distinguishes the function of wisdom's illumination and yet says it is without characteristics and without knowing": This is also an explanation, but not yet the main explanation. This sentence acts like a question: Since it is called prajñā, which directly clarifies the function of wisdom, it ought to be knowing; why then does it say "without characteristics and without knowing"? What is the reason for this?
"Truly, there is the illumination of knowing without characteristics and knowing without knowing, as is evident": This sentence functions as the answer. "Truly" means definitely. There is definitely a knowing without characteristics, which means there is no knowing that grasps at characteristics. Because there is no knowing that grasps at characteristics, it is clear that it is non-knowing.
2.14
"Why is this? That which knows something has something it does not know":
2.15
The second section is the explanation. "That which knows something" refers to knowing by grasping at characteristics. If there is knowing that grasps at characteristics, then there is no knowing without characteristics. Furthermore, when grasping at the characteristics of this, one forgets that; when knowing phenomena, one is deluded about the principle. Thus we know that whoever knows something has something they do not know. "Through the sacred mind's non-knowing, there is nothing it does not know": If one lacks this knowing that grasps at characteristics, then one possesses the knowing without characteristics. Furthermore, since grasping at characteristics leaves something unknown, not grasping at characteristics leaves nothing unknown; this is the necessity of principle. "The knowing of non-knowing is called all-knowing": Knowing the myriad things without the mind grasping at characteristics is indeed what is known by the sage's all-knowledge (*sarvajñatā*).
2.16
"The sūtra says: 'The sacred mind has no knowing'":
2.17
The third section cites proofs.
2.18
"Therefore the sage empties his mind and fills his illumination":
2.19
The second part discerns the characteristics. The "characteristics" spoken of here are not the characteristics of having characteristics, but the characteristics of being without characteristics. The *Laozi* says: "Empty their minds, fill their bellies, weaken their wills, strengthen their bones." Here this phrase is borrowed. "Empties his mind" means not grasping at characteristics. "Fills his illumination" means knowing all phenomena completely. Therefore, "he can silently shine and conceal his light": Because he does not grasp at characteristics, he can secretly illuminate the myriad phenomena. "Concealing his light" means hiding the light of wisdom without grasping at characteristics. "Emptying the mind" means the mind has no attachments. "Profound contemplation" means deep observation. "Closing wisdom" means not discriminating. "Blocking hearing" means not taking in sounds. Furthermore, shining without shining is called silent shining; giving light without light is called concealing light; being mindful without a mind is called an empty mind; observing without observing is called profound contemplation; knowing without knowing is called closing wisdom; and hearing without hearing is called blocking hearing. Although he closes wisdom and blocks hearing, he uniquely awakens to the principle of ultimate emptiness; hence it says, "he uniquely awakens to the obscure and dark." The expression "the obscure and dark" (*mingming*) comes from the *Zhuangzi*. The *Zhuangzi* says: "Luminosity is born from the obscure and dark; order is born from the formless." Here this phrase is borrowed to serve as a metaphor for ultimate emptiness.
2.20
"Thus wisdom has the contemplation that fathoms the profound, yet it is without knowing":
2.21
The third part is the harmonizing. Sacred wisdom fathoms the subtle without grasping at characteristics, hence it is called "non-knowing." The sacred spirit responds to circumstances without activating thoughts, hence it is called "without deliberation."
From "Because the spirit is without deliberation": This word "because" may be read with what precedes or with what follows; both are acceptable. Because the sacred spirit is without deliberation, it can remain unconstrained beyond the worldly realm—this is the meaning of unconstrained freedom. Because sacred wisdom is without knowing, it can profoundly awaken beyond external forms.
From "Although wisdom is beyond external affairs": Although it says sacred wisdom profoundly illuminates beyond external affairs, this means perceiving emptiness right within form; it does not mean there is emptiness apart from form. Although it says the sacred spirit is unconstrained beyond the worldly realm, this does not mean it does not transform sentient beings; all day long it responds and transforms within this realm.
From "Therefore, looking down or looking up, he accords with transformations": "Looking down" means lowering; "looking up" means raising. When it is fitting to show greatness, he manifests a boundless body—this is "looking up." When it is fitting to show smallness, he manifests a three-foot body—this is "looking down." Responding and transforming to receive and guide sentient beings, he never comes to an end.
Regarding "there is no subtlety he does not examine, yet he has no merit of illumination": "There is no subtlety he does not examine" means he examines everything. "He himself eliminates the merit of illumination" means non-knowing.
From "This is that which is known by non-knowing": This is the knowing of non-knowing, the responsive accord of the sage's spiritual wisdom.
2.22
"Yet its nature as a thing":
2.23
Part four clarifies the essence. In this text there are three sections: first, directly clarifying the essence; next, explaining it; and last, citing two sūtras to establish it. This is the first.
Regarding "its": This refers to sacred wisdom. "Thing" refers to the nature of this sacred wisdom as an entity; this is calling it a "thing" when it is not a thing. "Real yet not existing, empty yet not non-existing": Knowing that all phenomena are empty is called "real." Although it is called real, its essential nature is not an entity, so it is said to be "not existing." Its essential nature not being an entity is termed "empty"; having nothing it does not know, it is said to be "not non-existing." One may also say: because of non-knowing it is said to be "not existing," and because there is nothing it does not know it is said to be "not non-existing."
Regarding "Existing yet impossible to discuss—can it be only sacred wisdom?": Because this wisdom is not non-existent, it is said to "exist." Because its characteristics cannot be discussed as definitively existing or definitively non-existing, it is said to be "impossible to discuss." Only sacred wisdom alone is like this, hence it says "only."
2.24
"Why is this? If one wishes to say it exists, it is without shape and without name":
2.25
The second section is the explanation. "Without shape" means without appearance. "Without name" means without appellation. "The sage is spiritual through it": "through" means "uses." The sage uses this spiritual penetration so that there is nothing he does not know. "The sage is empty through it, so being empty, he does not lose illumination": Although empty, he does not lose the function of illuminating contemplation. "Being without shape and without name, his illumination does not lose emptiness": Although illuminating and knowing, he does not grasp at characteristics. "Blending without changing": *hun* means blending; *yu* means changing. This comes from Du Yu's commentary on the *Chunqiu*. Although blended together with the myriad phenomena, they each remain distinct and do not change. "Moving to engage the coarse": Making movements to respond to circumstances is called "engaging the coarse."
From "Therefore, the functioning of sacred wisdom": It always has function and is never interrupted even for a moment, yet seeking its form is never possible even for an instant.
2.26
"Therefore Ratnakūṭa said":
2.27
The third section cites two sūtras to establish the point. This is the verse spoken by the elder's son Ratnakūṭa in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*; the older translation reads thus. The current translation reads: "Without mind, intellect, or feeling, without action, / Unmoving in equal awakening, he establishes all dharmas." "Equal awakening" is prajñā. This means that sacred wisdom is unmoving and yet leaves nothing undone, hence it says, "he establishes sentient beings in the limit of reality." As for "Therefore, though the sage's traces are myriad, their ultimate import is one": His various manifestations are called "myriad"; because they are all the singular operation of prajñā, it is called "one."
2.28
"Therefore, prajñā may be empty and yet illuminate":
2.29
Fifth is the general conclusion. Although the wisdom of prajñā is without knowing, it can illuminate; although the principle of paramārtha-satya is devoid of characteristics, it can be seen and known. However, this character "forget" (忘) should in meaning be the "loss" (亡) of being lost; all editions write the character "forget" (忘). Truly, because paramārtha-satya cannot be grasped through characteristics, it is called "forgetting." From "The myriad movements may be approached and thereby stilled" downward: as the myriad things arise in movement, the very movement is without movement; the sage responds through non-action, yet there is nothing he does not do. From "This is precisely unknowing yet spontaneously knowing" downward: not forming a knowing of existent characteristics, it is spontaneously a knowing devoid of characteristics; not being equivalent to purposeful action, it is spontaneously action without purposeful mind. From "What more is there to know?" downward: knowing through not knowing, there is no fixed knowing; hence it says "what more is there to know?" Acting through non-action, there is no fixed action; hence it says "what more is there to do?"
2.30
From "The question says: 'The sage's true mind shines forth alone'" downward:
2.31
The third [section] is the examination through questions and answers. The text has nine turns, which nevertheless comprise four objections. First, there is one turn on the objection regarding subject and object (the capable and the object). Second, there is one turn on the objection regarding name and essence. Third, there are four turns on the objection regarding object and wisdom. Fourth, there are three turns on the objection regarding arising and ceasing. The first three objections all challenge non-knowing, while the last objection directly challenges arising and ceasing. Now for the first. The question is precisely the objection. The preceding treatise text stated: "Wisdom possesses the illumination that exhausts the profound yet is without knowing; the spirit possesses the function of responsive encountering yet is without deliberation." Non-knowing means having no wisdom, and non-deliberation means having no encounter. Now this objection addresses those words. The meaning is: if there is that which can know and that which can encounter, and there is that which is knowable and encounterable, then this constitutes having knowing and having encountering; how can one say there is "non-knowing"? Within the text there are two parts: first, tracing the previous [argument] to object; second, constructing a profound objection. Although there are two aspects, they both challenge the single doctrine, so they are combined as one objection. As for saying "the true mind shines forth alone": "shines forth" (朗) means clear and luminous. It means that the mind of prajñā is alone clearly awakened, and there is no thing it does not know; hence it says, "illuminating each and every thing." From "responding and meeting without fixed limit" downward: wherever there are conditions, it responds and meets them all, having no restriction or boundary; hence it is called "without fixed limit." Whatever it does is always in responsive encounter with capacities and conditions; hence it says, "movement conforms to affairs." As for "illuminating each and every thing, so that knowing leaves nothing out": because it knows all, nothing is omitted. Some editions have the character "wisdom" (智); although the meaning is identical, looking at what follows, it is not so. As for "movement conforms to affairs, so that the encounter does not miss the opportune moment": when there is a capacity, it encounters it, and thus does not miss it. As for "the encounter does not miss the opportune moment, so there is an encounter with what can be encountered": what can be encountered refers to sentient beings. As for "knowing leaves nothing out, so there is a knowing of what can be known": some editions read, "there must also be a knowing of what can be known"; this is cumbersome and lengthy, and although there is no loss of meaning, it is not as good as being concise. "What can be known" is the principle that is known. From "having a knowing of what can be known" downward, it unpacks the preceding line. From "since there is knowing and since there is encountering" downward: the sage does not know in vain, which is having knowing; the sage does not encounter in vain, which is having encountering; hence it says, "since there is knowing and since there is encountering." Since there are knowing and encountering, why say that wisdom possesses the illumination that exhausts the profound yet is without knowing, and that the spirit possesses the function of responsive encountering yet is without deliberation? From "If one forgets knowing and abandons encountering" downward is the second part, constructing a profound objection. Some editions say "if it is said that" (若云), which is also acceptable. If [one means that] although the sage has knowing and encountering, he does not say "I am capable of having knowing, I am capable of having encountering." This is "the sage being impartial regarding knowing and encountering in order to fulfill his private [end]": this means that the sage's mind does not personally generate an understanding of knowing and encountering, resting and forgetting his knowing and encountering; it does not mean there is no knowing and no encountering. As for saying "in order to fulfill his private [end]": the Outer Chapters of the Zhuangzi, in the "Tiandao" chapter, says: "Confucius cited benevolence and righteousness to persuade Lao Dan. Dan said: 'What is meant by benevolence and righteousness?' Confucius said: 'In one's innermost heart not to be complacent, and to love universally without partiality—this is the true character of benevolence.' Lao Dan said: 'To be without partiality is itself partial.'" Guo's commentary says: "What the world calls being without partiality means setting oneself aside to love others. Now, one who loves others also wishes that others love oneself. This is precisely his partiality; it is not forgetting the public to truly be public." Here these words are borrowed to clarify that although the sage has no mind to grasp knowing and encountering, this is nonetheless knowing and encountering, just as being without partiality is itself fulfilling partiality. As for "This can be called not taking oneself to possess knowing; how can it be deemed non-knowing?": if one says he forgets knowing and encountering on his own, this is merely that he does not personally assert that there are knowing and encountering; yet the essence of knowing and encountering is not non-existent. How could one say there is no knowing or encountering? From "The answer says: 'The sage's merit surpasses the Two Modes yet he is not benevolent'" downward is the reply. Although the preceding objection had two aspects, they both challenged knowing and encountering. Now, without making further distinctions, they are combined into a single reply. Within the text there are three parts: first, stating the fundamental doctrine; second, setting forth the intent of the objection; third, concluding the reply. Now for the first. "Merit surpasses the Two Modes yet he is not benevolent": the Two Modes refer to Heaven and Earth. Regarding "not benevolent," the Laozi says: "Heaven and Earth are not benevolent; they take the myriad things as straw dogs. The sage is not benevolent; he takes the common people as straw dogs." Here these words are borrowed. The sage's merit surpasses Heaven and Earth; this is indeed benevolence. Yet he does not boast of his ability; this is called being "not benevolent." The brilliance of prajñā wisdom exceeds the sun and moon; this is indeed brilliance. Yet he forgets his knowing; hence it says, "all the more dim." The Xiao Erya says: "Mi (彌) means increasingly; mi means long-lasting." Here we take the meaning of "increasingly." As for "How could it be that wood and stone stir his breast to be considered non-knowing?": the meaning is, regarding the sage's non-knowing, could his bosom be like wood and stone, so that this is named non-knowing? It is certainly not so. From "Truly, what is different from humans is the spiritual brilliance" downward: as for human spiritual brilliance, phenomena involve nimittodgrahaṇa, which is knowing. The sage's spiritual brilliance does not grasp the characteristics of phenomena, hence it is called non-knowing. Because it is non-knowing, it cannot be grasped through phenomenal characteristics. From "Your intention is to make..." downward is the second part, setting forth the intent of the objection. Within the text there are two parts: first, tracing the previous objection's intent; second, constructing the profound objection's intent. Now for the first. At the end of the previous objection it said: "The sage is impartial regarding knowing and encountering, and therefore it is named non-knowing"—this is incorrect. "Not taking oneself to possess knowing" means that he does not personally consider knowing and encountering to exist. "Yet never without knowing" means that knowing remains present. From "Does this not run counter to the sage's mind?" downward: "wu nai" (無乃) means "nai" (乃, indeed). As the Erya says: "wu ding" means "ding"; "wu ning" means "ning"; "bu xian" means "xian"; "bu cheng" means "cheng." It means that it indeed runs counter to the sage's mind and loses the purport of the texts. From "Why so? The sūtra says..." downward, it explains the sūtra's meaning and clarifies why it runs counter to the sage's mind and loses the purport of the texts. Regarding "without knowing and without seeing": preliminary understanding is knowing, while clear discernment is seeing. Alternatively, preliminary understanding is seeing, while clear discernment is knowing. As for "without acting and without conditioning": "acting" means initiating action, and "conditioning" means grasping at conditions. As for "This knowing is spontaneously non-knowing; how could it wait for reflective illumination and only then be non-knowing?": the sage's mind does not grasp at any characteristics, hence it is named non-knowing; it is not that there truly is knowing and he forgets his knowing on his own so that it is called non-knowing. From "If knowing has empty nature and is termed pure" downward is the second part, constructing the profound objection's intent. If one takes the sage to truly have the knowing of prajñā, but merely because its essential nature is empty it is called non-knowing, this is not the original meaning of non-knowing here. As for "then one cannot distinguish between delusion and wisdom": prajñā is also empty, and deluded cognition is also empty; both are empty, and both are equally non-knowing—thus there would be no distinction. From "The three poisons and the four inversions" downward: not only delusion and wisdom, but even the three poisons and so on are all likewise; they too are pure by having an empty nature. How would they differ from prajñā? Why uniquely praise prajñā as non-knowing? From "If one praises prajñā on account of what is known" downward: if, because the object known in paramārtha-satya is devoid of characteristics, one eulogizes the knowing wisdom as non-knowing, this is also incorrect. As for "what is known is naturally ever pure, while prajñā has never been pure": paramārtha-satya is naturally empty, while prajñā would not be empty. From "nor is there any condition to bring about purity" downward: paramārtha-satya is naturally empty and has nothing to do with prajñā; by what condition could prajñā be made identical to the emptiness of paramārtha-satya, such that one speaks of non-knowing? From "Yet the sūtra says..." downward, it explains the original meaning of the sūtra's clarification of prajñā's non-knowing. As for "Could it be because prajñā's essential nature is truly pure, originally devoid of the knowing of delusive grasping?": "jiang wu yi" (將無以, could it be because) means "because." Just as the Shishuo [xinyu] says "jiang wu tong" (could it be the same?), the meaning is "the same." Because the essential nature of prajñā does not grasp onto paramārtha-satya and is devoid of the knowing of delusive grasping, it is called non-knowing. As for "Being devoid of the knowing of delusive grasping, how could it be designated by the name 'knowing'?": from "Yet the sūtra says" down to this point, the textual flow is complete. Because it has no knowing of delusive grasping, it is called non-knowing. As for "How could it be that only lacking knowing is called non-knowing?": this also replies to the earlier "forgetting knowing and abandoning encountering." It is not that one forgets his knowing and encountering on his own and only then speaks of non-knowing; this very nature of knowing is spontaneously non-knowing, not waiting to be forgotten. From "Therefore, the sage..." downward is the third part, concluding the reply. From "Paramārtha-satya has no omissions like the hare or horse" downward: the sūtra speaks of three beasts—the elephant, the horse, and the hare—crossing a river, where there are differences in depth. The elephant reaches the very bottom of the river without omission, while the hare and the horse do not reach it and thus have omissions. Here it clarifies that when prajñā contemplates paramārtha-satya, paramārtha-satya has no omissions and is not like the hare or horse; hence it says "has no omissions like the hare or horse." The wisdom of prajñā illuminates exhaustively; hence it says "an inexhaustible illumination." From "Therefore, encountering without error..." downward: encountering capacities and conditions without error, matching the principle without grasping, tranquil and serene, without knowing it universally knows all phenomena.
2.32
From "The objection says: 'Now, things have no way to communicate themselves'" downward:
2.33
Second, there is a round of objection concerning name and referent (essence). Within the objection there are two parts: first, a general introduction to how names and referents summon one another, and next, the formal raising of the objection. Now, the first. The words "Now things cannot communicate themselves": things cannot of themselves call forth their own essences, so names must be established to designate things. A name can summon the essence of a thing, and hence it is called "communicating". From "Although a thing is not its name" onward: although a thing is not itself the name, yet there is a thing that corresponds to the name, and the name designates its essence. From "Therefore, seeking the thing by its name" onward: if one grasps the essence of a thing directly through the name of the thing, then the essence of the thing can be grasped and cannot hide away. From "Yet the treatise says that the sage's mind has no knowing" onward: second, the formal raising of the objection. Its meaning is that from "'non-knowing' has never meant 'knowing'" onward, it clarifies that the two names are distinct. From "These are indeed what nominal teachings communicate" onward: the two names "knowing" and "non-knowing" were originally established to designate the two essences of "knowing" and "non-knowing". From "Yet the author of the treatise wishes to unify them in the sage's mind" onward: the author says that knowing and non-knowing are just the single mind of the sage, yet the two names "knowing" and "non-knowing" are distinct. From "If one pursues the text to seek the reality" onward: if one seeks their two realities through the two names "knowing" and "non-knowing", they do not correspond. From "Why so?" onward: this explains why they do not correspond. If the sage's mind is knowing, then it is not non-knowing; hence it says "it knows nothing and distinguishes nothing." The next sentence is the inverse of this. In "If both cannot be attained, what attained could be discussed further?": if neither knowing nor non-knowing captures the sage's mind, then neither name corresponds to the reality, and hence there is no need to discuss them further. In "The reply states: The sūtra says" onward, within the text of the reply there are two parts: first, an introductory explanation of how prajñā is beyond words, and then the formal reply to his objection. Now, the first. From "This nameless phenomenon" onward: prajñā being like this, it is indeed a nameless phenomenon, and therefore cannot be spoken of through names and words. From "Although speech cannot speak [of it]" onward: although it cannot be spoken of, it is only through provisional speech that it communicates; without speech it cannot be transmitted. Therefore, the sage's "all day long knowing without knowing" does not mean that he truly has no knowing. It is because he wishes to make clear that the sage's wisdom grasps at nothing whatsoever that he says "non-knowing". Regarding "To distinguish characteristics does not make it non-existent; comprehensive penetration does not make it existent": if explained according to the former interpretation, because one distinguishes that the sage's wisdom comprehensively penetrates all phenomena, it is therefore not non-knowing; because it penetrates so that the sage's wisdom is without grasping, it is therefore not having knowing. If explained according to the latter interpretation, because one distinguishes characteristics, one says the sage's wisdom is non-knowing, yet in reality it is not non-knowing; because of its comprehensive penetration, one says the sage's wisdom is knowing, yet in reality it is not having knowing. From "Because it is not existent, though knowing it is non-knowing" onward: this reiterates the above. Because it is not existent, having knowing is just non-knowing; because it is not non-existent, non-knowing is just having knowing. From "Therefore knowing is just non-knowing" onward: this concludes the passage. "Do not, because the words are different, make the sage's mind different": do not, on account of the difference between the two words "knowing" and "non-knowing", claim that the sage's mind has the distinction of existence and non-existence.
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- 肇論疏 — Classical Chinese