大乘法苑義林章 4.21

4.21

第二辨名相者，《大智度論》說「身邊二見以為根本，有二十句我我所見，三世合數并本二見成六十二。」非此所宗。《阿含經》有許無色界有色身故。大眾部經非可全憑。《梵網六十二見經》與《舍利弗阿毘曇》同，是正量部，亦非所宗。《大毘婆沙》第一百九十九及第二百雖復廣明，是薩婆多，亦非依憑。以上皆非大乘之義，今竝不依。今依《瑜伽》第八十七、第六、第七、第八及五十八，《顯揚》第九、第十，《對法》第一，《成唯識》第六卷，上下諸文自廣解釋，既是自義，理應依憑。初列總名相、後辨別名相。列總名相者，八十七云「薩迦耶見以為根本，有六十二諸惡見趣，謂四遍常見論、四一分常見論、二無因論、四有邊無邊想論、四不死矯亂論，如是十八諸惡見趣，是計前際說我論者。又有十六有見想論、八無想論、八非有想非無想論、七斷見論、五現法涅槃論，此四十四諸惡見趣，是計後際說我論者。如是前際及於後際各有五故，總成十類。」前後際者，際謂際畔，時分之義。即《阿含》云「本劫本見、末劫末見。」八十七云「諸見依世者，謂依過去及現在世起分別故，名計前際；依未來世起分別故，名計後際。」此約多分二際道理。如四全常，第四常見，見死生故，現在名前。如是等類多分義故，非據實義。且如五現涅槃，論說為後際，然唯現在，故知現在通前後際。名前際者，未來前故、未來因故。或名後際，過去後故、過去果故。由是現在通前後際。辨總名相已。

Second, regarding explaining the names and characteristics: The Da zhidu lun states, "The two views of body and extremes are taken as the root; there are twenty propositions regarding the view of self and what belongs to the self, and when calculated across the three periods of time together with the two root views, they make sixty-two." This is not what is followed here, because that Āgama sūtra admits that there are material bodies in the formless realm. The sūtras of the Mahāsāṃghika school cannot be fully relied upon. The Fanwang liushier jian jing is the same as the Śāriputrābhidharma, belonging to the Saṃmatīya school, so it is not what is followed either. Although the Great Vibhāṣā extensively clarifies them in fascicles 199 and 200, it belongs to the Sarvāstivāda, so it is also not to be relied upon. The above are all not the doctrines of the Mahāyāna, and now none of them are followed. Now, we rely upon fascicles 87, 6, 7, 8, and 58 of the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicles 9 and 10 of the Xianyang shengjiao lun, fascicle 1 of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and fascicle 6 of the Cheng weishi lun; throughout their various texts, they extensively explain them themselves, and since this is our own doctrine, it ought by principle to be relied upon. First we list the general names and characteristics, and then explain the specific names and characteristics. As for listing the general names and characteristics, fascicle 87 states: "Taking satkāyadṛṣṭi as the root, there are sixty-two bad viewpoints, namely: four theories of universal eternalism, four theories of partial eternalism, two theories of causelessness, four theories of ideation regarding the finite and infinite, and four theories of amarāvikkhepa—these eighteen bad viewpoints are theorists who assert a self by speculating on the pūrvānta. Furthermore, there are sixteen theories of ideational views, eight theories of non-ideation, eight theories of neither-ideation-nor-non-ideation, seven theories of annihilationism, and five theories of nirvāṇa in the present life—these forty-four bad viewpoints are theorists who assert a self by speculating on the aparānta. As the pūrvānta and the aparānta each have five [types], they comprise ten categories in total." Regarding the prior and subsequent bounds (pūrvānta and aparānta), "bound" (anta) means limit or border, having the meaning of a division of time. That is what the Āgama refers to as "the primordial kalpas and primordial views, and the subsequent kalpas and subsequent views." Fascicle 87 states: "The views that rely on time: that is, giving rise to conceptual differentiation relying on the past and present periods of time is called speculating on the pūrvānta; giving rise to conceptual differentiation relying on the future period of time is called speculating on the aparānta." This is reasoned according to the majority aspect of the two bounds. For example, among the four [theories of] complete permanence, the fourth eternalism takes seeing death and rebirth [in the present] as its basis, so the present is designated as the prior. Because instances of this sort are based on the predominant meaning, it is not according to the actual absolute sense. Take, for instance, the five [theories of] nirvāṇa in the present: the treatise explains them as the aparānta, yet they are exclusively present; thus we know that the present extends to both the pūrvānta and the aparānta. It is named the pūrvānta because it is prior to the future and is the cause of the future. Or it is named the aparānta because it is subsequent to the past and is the effect of the past. For this reason, the present extends to both the prior and subsequent bounds. The explanation of the general names and characteristics is concluded.