大乘法苑義林章 4.22

4.22

辨別名相者，《瑜伽》第六、《顯揚》第九云「當知此中計前際者，謂或依下中上靜慮，起宿住隨念，不善緣起故，於過去諸行但唯憶念，不如實知，計過去世以為前際，發起常見。或依天眼，計現在世以為前際，於諸行剎那生滅流轉不如實知，又見諸識流轉相續，從此世間至彼世間無斷絕故，發起常見。」八十七云「宿住隨念俱行者，謂計前際，三常論中由下中上清淨差別。」今觀論意，由依靜慮宿住隨念有下中上，分成初三：一憶過去二十成壞劫、二憶四十成壞劫、三憶八十成壞劫。由宿住念有三品故，見有遠近。伊師迦者，僧佉喻名，說一切法皆悉是常，世間隱顯非為滅壞，故計為常。以說三品靜慮所見故，六十劫宿住不緣，故但有三。《瑜伽》第六等又云「或依天眼，計現在世以為前際。於諸行剎那生滅流轉不如實知，又見諸識流轉相續，從此世間至彼世間無斷絕故，發起常見。」此意即顯天眼見有情諸識流轉，死此生彼，而不實知諸行剎那生滅流轉，故執為常，是第四常見。總詳此意，初之三見雖同《阿含》，第四即非，彼捷疾智計一切常，非由天眼。八十七亦云「天眼俱行故。」此中前三，總是《婆沙》第一，此之第四即彼第三，彼餘二常此中無也。八十七說「此四常見皆依靜慮，不說散故。」然《婆沙》說「第一觀劫、第二觀生、第三觀現在死此生彼、第四依尋伺。」若有說言：此前三種，即《瑜伽》言依下中上三種靜慮。雖爾，即有違天眼過。《瑜伽》第六云「第四即依天眼所見，非尋伺故。」四一分常見論者，一從梵天沒來生此間，得宿住通，觀前來處作如是執：我等皆是梵王所化。梵王是常，不見初後故。我等無常，見今來此故。常論中言：或見梵王隨意成立，即此見也。二聞梵王有如是見，大種是常，心等無常。或復翻此。同彼忍者或住梵世，乃至或是展轉聞如是道理。我以梵王為量，信其所言，是故世間一分常住。常論中言：或見四大種變異，或見諸識變異。變異者，無常也，即是此見。三有先從戲忘天沒，來生此間，得通起執。在彼諸天不極戲等，在彼常住，我等無常。四有先從意憤恚天沒，來生此間，得通起執：在彼諸天不極憤恚，在彼常住，我等無常。此後二天，准依《瑜伽》第五自害非他而能死句，即唯欲界上四空天，下之二天他所害故。此之四見，八十七說「皆依靜慮知過去故，名為前際。」《婆沙》四種雖與此同，後二天別。彼有二說。一云：即住妙高層級。一云：即是三十三天。此四由執大梵、大種，或心、戲忘、憤恚而起。《阿含經》說，無此第二，餘三同此。更加捷疾世智，餘三所計半常無常。此雖有言，相仍難見。不但宗殊義別，亦乃甚難得意。二無因論者，一從無想天沒，來生此間，得宿住通，不能憶彼出心已前所有諸位，便執諸法本無而起諸法。如我亦應一切本無而生，便執我及世間無因而起。二由尋思不憶前身，作如是執，無因而起，乃至廣說。故《瑜伽》第七「無因論言，謂依靜慮及依尋思二種差別，見諸因緣空無果報，大風卒起忽然還靜，暴河彌漫欻成空竭，故作是執。」《阿含》等同。四有邊無邊論者，第七卷《瑜伽》、《顯揚》第九云「一者若依斷邊際求世邊時，若憶念壞劫，於世間起有邊想，以世界壞後臨空劫有邊限故。二若憶念成劫，則於世間起無邊想，去壞劫遠不見邊故。三若依方域周廣求世邊時，若下過無間更無所得，上過第四靜慮亦無所得，傍一切處不得邊際，則於上下起有邊想，於傍處所起無邊想。四若為治此執？但依異文，義無差別，則於世間起非有邊非無邊想。」初之二見緣過去起，後之二種緣現在起，待未來故，名為前際邊無邊論。說四皆依靜慮而起。八十七又說「宿住隨念俱行者，謂於四種邊無邊論，由彼憶念諸器世間成壞世間出現方便，若時憶念成劫分位，爾時便生四種妄想：一者若有一向憶念上下，下至無間捺落迦下，上至第四靜慮之上，憶念如是分量邊際，便於世間住有邊想。二者若有一向傍憶無際，便於世間住無邊想。三者若有憶念二種俱行，便於世間住二俱想。四者若時憶念壞劫分位，爾時便生非有邊非無邊想，諸器世間無所得故。」雖二文說兩種此見，由有是行相故，總名邊無邊論。《阿含經》說，此第四見依捷疾智。《瑜伽》四種，皆依靜慮宿住智起。然《毘婆沙》，一以天眼見下至地獄、上至初定，執我於中悉皆遍滿，便作是念：過此有我，我應可見。故知有邊。二傍見無邊為執，同前起無邊想。三依天眼及神境通，見下見上如初近遠，運身傍去不得邊際。於上下起有邊想，於傍起無邊想。四者返此。四皆緣現在，待未來故，名為前際。唯第四見與八十七別，餘三見同，然見於上亦有近遠。然《阿含經》總相而說，得定起執有邊無邊，不說緣何分齊起執。彼第三見與《婆沙》同。彼第四見依捷疾智而起此執，亦不說彼緣何境起，故不可依。四不死矯亂者，八十七云「淨天有二：一不善清淨、二善清淨。唯入俗定，名不善清淨，未了達諦故、心未解脫故。若證內法定，名善清淨，已了達諦故、心善解脫故。無亂亦二：一無相無分別、二有相有分別。初是善清淨天，後是不善清淨天。前清淨天，於自不死無亂而轉，故名不死無亂。後不清淨天，若有依於不死無亂有所詰問，便託餘事矯亂避之，於諦、無相心定不善巧故。先興心慮作是思惟：我等既稱不死無亂，復有所餘不死無亂，於諸聖諦、無想定已得善巧，彼所成德望我為勝。彼若於中詰問於我，我若記別，或為異記、或撥實有、或許非有。彼於記別見如是等諸過失已，作是思惟：我於一切所詰問中皆不應記。」觀此文意，即所事天名為不死，亦名無亂，應言不死無亂。言不死矯亂者，即一「不」字貫通二處，謂不死、不矯亂。或彼自稱：作此無亂答者生不死天。今毀責之，名為矯亂。又以聖者真是不死淨無亂天。此為能問。今答此天諸所詰問，名不死不矯亂天。八十七意，勿他由此鑒我無知，因則輕咲以為是答。又行諂者作是思惟：非我淨天一切隱密皆許記別，謂自所證及清淨道，故設矯言。又懷恐怖而無記別，勿我劣昧為他所知，由是因緣不能解脫，以此為室而自安處。即將恐怖及不解脫而為室故，以自安處。又有愚戇專修止行不能矯言，但作是思：諸有來問，我當返詰，隨彼所答，我當一切隨其無減而印順之。此言四者，一怖無知、二行諂曲、三懷恐怖不得解脫、四為愚戇。《十六異論》中言「彼諸外道，若有人來依最勝生道問善不善，依決定勝道問四聖諦。便自稱言不死無亂者，隨於處所，依不死淨天不亂詰問，即於彼所問以言矯亂，或託餘事方便避之，或但隨問者言辭而轉。」是中第一覺未開悟。彼第二復次云「怖畏妄語，及怖他人知其無智，故不分明答我無知。」此意即說：性雖有識，覺未開悟。若言我解，即為妄語。若言不解，即他知我都無所知，故矯亂答。是中第二，於所證法起增上慢。第二復次云「於自所證未得無畏，懼他詰問怖畏妄語，及畏邪見，故不分明說我有證。恐他問其所證，未無畏故不能實答，答成邪見，不答成妄語。」是中第三，覺已開悟而未決定。第二復次云「怖畏邪見及妄語故，懼他詰問故，不分明說我不決定。」此意即顯雖有少得，心未決定，答是邪見，不答妄語，已有知故便矯亂答。如是三種，假託餘事以言矯亂。是中第四羸劣愚鈍，第二復次云「唯懼他詰，於勝生道及定勝道皆不了達，於世文字亦不善知，而不分明說我愚鈍，但隨彼問隨言而轉。」此意由愚都無所了，故隨返問而答於前。此與《阿含》全有差別，彼依四問即為四別：一問世間有報無報耶、二問有無他世、三問善非善、四自愚鈍他問不知。《毘婆沙》言「一怖妄語、二怖邪見、三怖無知、四怖愚癡，故矯亂答成四別也。」上來五類是前際見。

Regarding distinguishing their specific names and characteristics: *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle 6, and *Xianyang*, fascicle 9, state: “It should be understood that here those who speculate on the pūrvānta either rely on the lower, intermediate, or higher dhyānas to give rise to the recollection of past abodes (pūrvenivāsānusmṛti); because they are not skilled in dependent origination, regarding past conditioned phenomena they merely remember them without knowing them as they truly are, and positing the past as the pūrvānta, they generate eternalism. Or, relying on the divine eye (divyacakṣus), they posit the present world as the pūrvānta; not knowing as it truly is the moment-by-moment arising, ceasing, and flux of conditioned phenomena, and seeing the flux and continuity of consciousnesses, without interruption from this world to that world, they generate eternalism.” Fascicle 87 states: “Those operating in association with the recollection of past abodes refers to those who, among the three theories of eternalism speculating on the pūrvānta, [arise] due to the distinctions of lower, intermediate, and higher purity.” Now observing the treatise’s intent, because the recollection of past abodes relying on dhyāna has lower, intermediate, and higher [degrees], it is divided into the first three: first, remembering twenty kalpas of cosmic formation and disintegration; second, remembering forty kalpas of cosmic formation and disintegration; third, remembering eighty kalpas of cosmic formation and disintegration. Because the recollection of past abodes has three grades, their views have near and far [ranges]. An *iṣīkā* is a Sāṃkhya metaphor, stating that all phenomena are eternal and that the world's hiding and manifesting are not its destruction; thus they posit it as eternal. Because it speaks of what is seen by the three grades of dhyāna, the recollection of past abodes does not take sixty kalpas as an object, and thus there are only three. *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle 6, etc., also states: “Or, relying on the divine eye, they posit the present world as the pūrvānta. Not knowing as it truly is the moment-by-moment arising, ceasing, and flux of conditioned phenomena, and seeing the flux and continuity of consciousnesses, without interruption from this world to that world, they generate eternalism.” The meaning here shows that the divine eye sees the flux of sentient beings’ consciousnesses dying here and being born there, yet without knowing truly the moment-by-moment arising, ceasing, and flux of conditioned phenomena, they cling to them as eternal; this is the fourth [form of] eternalism. Considering this meaning broadly, although the first three views agree with the *Āgama*, the fourth does not; there, agile intellect (javana-prajñā) posits all as eternal, not by means of the divine eye. Fascicle 87 also says: “Because it operates in association with the divine eye.” Here, the first three together correspond to the first in the *Vibhāṣā*; this fourth is its third; the remaining two [forms of] eternalism in that text are absent here. Fascicle 87 states: “These four [forms of] eternalism all rely on dhyāna, not on scattered [thought].” Yet the *Vibhāṣā* states: “The first observes kalpas; the second observes births; the third observes the present dying here and being born there; the fourth relies on vitarka and vicāra.” If someone were to say: these former three are precisely what the *Yogācārabhūmi* calls relying on the three kinds of dhyāna—lower, intermediate, and higher—even so, there would be the fault of contradicting [the mention of] the divine eye, for *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle 6, states: “The fourth relies on what is seen by the divine eye, not on vitarka and vicāra.” As for the four theories of partial eternalism: First, one dies from the Brahmā heaven and comes to be born here; obtaining the supernormal power of recollecting past abodes, one observes where one previously came from and forms this clinging: “We were all emanated by the Brahmā king. The Brahmā king is eternal, because his beginning and end are not seen. We are impermanent, because we see ourselves now coming here.” The statement in the theories of eternalism that “or seeing that the Brahmā king establishes things at will” refers precisely to this view. Second, one hears that the Brahmā king holds such a view: “The primary elements are eternal; mind and the like are impermanent,” or the reverse of this. Those sharing his tolerance may abide in the Brahmā realm, or hear such a principle through successive transmission. [They think:] “Taking the Brahmā king as authoritative, I believe what he says; therefore, one part of the world is eternal.” The statement in the theories of eternalism that “or seeing the transformation of the four primary elements, or seeing the transformation of the consciousnesses”—transformation meaning impermanence—refers precisely to this view. Third, there are those who previously died from the heaven of debauched by play (krīḍāpradūṣika) and came to be born here; obtaining supernormal powers, they generate the clinging: “Those devas there who did not over-indulge in play are eternal there; we are impermanent.” Fourth, there are those who previously died from the heaven of corrupted by mind (manaḥpradūṣika) and came to be born here; obtaining supernormal powers, they generate the clinging: “Those devas there who were not overly enraged are eternal there; we are impermanent.” According to *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle 5, on the phrase “can die by self-harm and not by others,” these latter two heavens belong only to the upper four heavens of the desire realm dwelling in empty space, because the lower two heavens can be harmed by others. Regarding these four views, fascicle 87 states: “Because they all rely on dhyāna to know the past, they are called [speculations on] the pūrvānta.” Although the four kinds in the *Vibhāṣā* are the same as these, the latter two heavens differ. That text has two explanations: one says they abide on the terraces of Mount Meru; the other says they are the Trāyastriṃśa heaven. These four arise from clinging to Great Brahmā, the primary elements, mind, debauched by play, or enraged mind. The *Āgama* text states that there is no second [view among these], the remaining three being the same as these; it adds the agile worldly intellect, and what is posited by the other three is half-eternal and [half-]impermanent. Although this is stated, its characteristics remain difficult to discern. Not only do the tenets differ and the meanings diverge, but it is also exceedingly difficult to grasp the idea. As for the two theories of causelessness: First, dying from the heaven of non-conception (asaṃjñisattva) and coming to be born here, one obtains the supernormal power of recollecting past abodes; unable to remember all the states prior to the emergence of mind there, one clings to the idea that phenomena arise originally without existing: “Just as I was originally non-existent and then born, so too must all phenomena originally be non-existent and arise.” One then clings to the view that self and the world arise without a cause. Second, due to reasoning, not remembering previous lives, one forms such a clinging: “They arise without a cause,” and so on at length. Therefore, *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle 7, states: “The theories of causelessness refer to the two distinctions of relying on dhyāna and relying on reasoning: seeing that causes and conditions are empty and devoid of karmic fruition—a great wind suddenly rises and then abruptly becomes calm again; a raging river floods and all at once dries up into emptiness—they thus form this clinging.” The *Āgama* and others agree. As for the four theories of the finite and the infinite: *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle 7, and *Xianyang*, fascicle 9, state: “First, if when seeking the limit of the world based on the cutting off of boundaries, one recollects the kalpa of disintegration, one gives rise to the conception of the world as finite, because after the world disintegrates, bordering on the empty kalpa, there is a boundary. Second, if one recollects the kalpa of formation, one gives rise to the conception of the world as infinite, because being far removed from the kalpa of disintegration, one sees no boundary. Third, if when seeking the limit of the world based on spatial extent, one finds nothing further below Avīci, and nothing further above the fourth dhyāna, yet finds no boundary in any transverse direction, one gives rise to the conception of finite above and below, and the conception of infinite in the transverse directions. Fourth, if to counter this clinging, merely relying on different phrasings without difference in meaning, one gives rise to the conception of the world as neither finite nor infinite.” The first two views arise by taking the past as an object; the latter two arise by taking the present as an object; in relation to the future, they are called theories of the finite and infinite of the pūrvānta. It states that all four arise relying on dhyāna. Fascicle 87 also states: “Operating in association with the recollection of past abodes means that in the four theories of the finite and infinite, by their recollecting the means of manifestation of the receptacle world and the worlds of formation and disintegration, when they recollect the phases of the kalpa of formation, they then generate four kinds of deluded conceptions: First, if one exclusively recollects vertically, down to the bottom of the Avīci hell and up to the top of the fourth dhyāna, recollecting such measured boundaries, one abides in the conception of the world as finite. Second, if one exclusively recollects transversely without boundary, one abides in the conception of the world as infinite. Third, if one recollects both operating together, one abides in the conception of the world as both [finite and infinite]. Fourth, when one recollects the phases of the kalpa of disintegration, one then generates the conception of neither finite nor infinite, because no receptacle world is to be found.” Although the two passages explain two varieties of these views, because they have these modes of apprehension, they are collectively called theories of the finite and infinite. The *Āgama* states that this fourth view relies on agile intellect. The four kinds in the *Yogācārabhūmi* all arise relying on the dhyāna-based knowledge of past abodes. However, in the *Vibhāṣā*: First, seeing with the divine eye down to the hells and up to the first dhyāna, one clings to the self as entirely pervading therein, and then reflects: “Beyond this, if there were a self, I should be able to see it; therefore I know it is finite.” Second, clinging to what is transversely seen as boundless, just as before, one gives rise to the conception of the infinite. Third, relying on the divine eye and the supernormal power of psychic manifestation, seeing below and above at the near and far distances as in the first [view], one projects one’s body transversely and finds no boundary; one gives rise to the conception of finite above and below, and infinite transversely. Fourth, the reverse of this. All four take the present as an object; in relation to the future, they are called [views of] the pūrvānta. Only the fourth view differs from fascicle 87, while the other three views agree; however, what is seen above also has near and far [distances]. Yet the *Āgama* speaks in general terms that, having obtained concentration, one gives rise to the clinging to the finite or infinite, without specifying the demarcations taken as objects to give rise to the clinging. Its third view agrees with the *Vibhāṣā*. Its fourth view gives rise to this clinging relying on agile intellect, and also does not state what object it arises from; hence it cannot be relied upon. As for the four theories of amarāvikkhepa: Fascicle 87 states: “Pure devas are of two kinds: first, not well-purified; second, well-purified. Entering only mundane concentration is called not well-purified, because one has not comprehended the truths and the mind is not liberated. If one realizes the concentration of internal phenomena, it is called well-purified, because one has comprehended the truths and the mind is well-liberated. Non-confusion is also twofold: first, signless and without discrimination; second, having signs and with discrimination. The former is a well-purified deva; the latter is a not well-purified deva. The former pure deva operates without confusion regarding its own deathless state, and is therefore called the deathless and unconfused. As for the latter unpurified deva, if someone questions it based on the deathless and unconfused, it will resort to other matters to evade with confusion, because it is not skilled in the concentration of mind regarding the truths and signlessness. Having first given rise to thought and considered: ‘Since we are called deathless and unconfused, there are also other deathless and unconfused ones who have already attained skill in the noble truths and the signless concentration, whose achieved virtues are superior to ours. If they question me regarding these, if I answer, I might answer erroneously, deny what truly exists, or affirm what does not exist.’ Having seen such faults in answering, they reflect: ‘I should not answer any question that is posed.’” Observing the intent of this text, the deva served is called deathless and also unconfused; it should be called “deathless and unconfused” (amarāvikkhepa). The phrasing “amarāvikkhepa” (deathless evasion / confusion) means the single negative particle applies across both words, meaning “deathless and not confused.” Alternatively, they claim of themselves: “One who gives this unconfused answer will be born in the heaven of the deathless.” Now, censuring them, it is called “confusion/evasion.” Furthermore, the noble ones are truly the deathless, pure, and unconfused devas. These serve as the questioners. Now, answering the inquiries of these devas is called [the practice of] the deathless and unconfused devas. The intent of fascicle 87 is that they do not want others to perceive their ignorance thereby, and consequently mock them, so they take this to be an answer. Moreover, those who practice deceit consider: “Not all secrets of our pure devas are permitted to be explained, namely, one’s own realization and the path of purity”; therefore they contrive evasive words. Moreover, harboring fear, they do not answer: “Lest my inferiority and dullness become known to others, and due to this condition I fail to attain liberation,” taking this as a chamber to settle themselves peacefully. That is, taking fear and non-liberation as their chamber, they settle themselves therein. Moreover, there are those who are foolish and dull, exclusively cultivating the practice of śamatha, who cannot speak evasively, but merely reflect: “Whenever someone comes to question me, I shall cross-examine them; whatever they answer, I shall endorse and conform to all of it without subtraction.” Here, the four are: first, fear of ignorance; second, practicing deceit; third, harboring fear of not attaining liberation; fourth, being foolish and dull. In the *Discussion of the Sixteen Heterodoxies*, it states: “When someone comes to those non-Buddhists to ask about the good and non-good based on the path to superior rebirth (abhyudaya), or to ask about the four noble truths based on the path to definitive excellence (niḥśreyasa), those who claim to be deathless and unconfused, in whatever place, when questioned without confusion based on the deathless pure devas, evade their questions with confusing words, resort to other matters as an expedient to avoid them, or merely shift according to the words of the questioner.” Among these, the first’s awareness is not yet awakened. Its second alternative explanation states: “Because they fear lying and fear that others will know of their lack of wisdom, they do not clearly answer: ‘I do not know.’” This means: though by nature possessing consciousness, their awareness is not yet awakened. If they say “I understand,” it is a lie. If they say “I do not understand,” others will know they know nothing at all; hence they answer with confusion. Among these, the second gives rise to excessive pride (adhimāna) regarding the teachings realized. The second alternative explanation states: “Having not yet attained fearlessness regarding their own realization, dreading being questioned by others, fearing lying, and fearing false views, they do not clearly say: ‘I have realization.’ Fearing that others will ask about their realization, because they lack fearlessness they cannot answer truly; answering would become a false view, while not answering would become a lie.” Among these, the third has an awakened awareness, but is not yet decisive. The second alternative explanation states: “Because they fear false views and lying, and dread being questioned by others, they do not clearly say: ‘I am not decisive.’” This shows that although they have attained a little, their mind is not decisive; answering would be a false view, and not answering would be a lie; since they already have some knowledge, they answer with confusion. These three kinds contrive other matters to speak with confusion. Among these, the fourth is frail, foolish, and dull. The second alternative explanation states: “Merely dreading being questioned by others, understanding neither the path to superior rebirth nor the path to definitive excellence, and not skilled even in mundane letters, yet not clearly saying: ‘I am foolish and dull,’ they merely shift along with the words of the questioner.” This means that due to foolishness they comprehend nothing at all, so they respond to the former by reversing the question. This differs entirely from the *Āgama*, where the four distinctions are made according to four questions: first, asking whether the world has retribution or not; second, asking whether there is an afterlife or not; third, asking about good and non-good; fourth, being oneself foolish and dull, not knowing when questioned by others. The *Vibhāṣā* states: “First, fear of lying; second, fear of false views; third, fear of ignorance; fourth, fear of foolishness; hence answering with confusion forms four distinctions.” The above five classes are views of the pūrvānta.