能顯中邊慧日論 1.9

1.9

有義：《深密》前明、《涅槃》後說，三七日後四諦法輪別立教時。四十年後最大法輪，因何不許更立教時，又大乘異小乘，後說大乘立教時。一乘異三乘，後說一乘，因何不許別立教時？故依《深密》立初三，《法華》一乘為第四，《涅槃》佛性為第五時。此亦不然，有多過失。且轉四諦，後立教時，是佛世尊之所說。一乘第四、佛性第五，經中不判是誰說。若以義別立教五時，經經說義皆有意別。只如《無量壽經》勸往西方隨願往生，即隨何淨剎。彌勒上生，令生知足。或觀虛空藏、或復觀普賢等，即應教時有多，非三五時。即《涅槃經》，或於一時在恒河岸等，既非定時，故不可取。故說五時，非是佛教。又如《法華》第二〈信解品〉中廣立三時。初云「我等居僧之首，自謂已得涅槃。」初時教。又云「世尊往昔說法既久，我時在座，但念空無相，於菩薩法心無喜樂。」此第二時。「深自慶幸獲大善利，法王大寶不求自得。」此第三時。偈頌之中三時更顯，推同《深密》。如何違教別立五時？故為大過。又云？《無量義經》為小乘、中乘、大乘時別。此開出中乘，合大為一。此亦非理。所以者何？是《無量義經》初云「自從如來得道已來四十餘年，常為眾生演說諸法，乃至不出不沒。若有聞者，或得煗、頂、忍、世第一法、四果、辟支佛、發菩提心登於十地。」不分三乘。又云「我起樹王，詣波羅奈鹿野園中，為阿若拘隣等五人轉四諦，亦說諸法，乃至念念生滅。中間於此及以處處，為諸比丘并眾菩薩，說十二緣、六波羅蜜。」乃至云「今復於此演說大乘無量義經，乃至念念生滅。」不云中間唯為辟支佛，亦云為并眾菩薩故。後不說云今復於此唯為菩薩。又云「善男子！初說四諦，為求聲聞人，而八億諸天來下聽法，發菩提心。中於處處演說甚深十二因緣，為求辟支佛人，而無量眾生發菩提心，或住聲聞。次說方等十二部經《摩訶般若》、《華嚴》海空，演說菩薩歷劫修行，而百千比丘、萬億人天，無量眾生得須陀洹果，乃至得阿羅漢。」住辟支佛因緣法中，演說十二因緣，云為辟支，但有發菩提心或住聲聞，無發緣覺心及證緣覺果。次說方等，乃得聲聞果。及住辟支佛因緣法中，不云為菩薩。判云《無量義經》為小乘、中乘、大乘時別，開出中乘，合大乘為一。以此為三時，從何准定？若云既說大教，何非大乘？若爾，《深密》亦說大教，何云三乘？又縱為三，終無說五，亦不限定年月前後。又云：今就乘性說五時者，謂小乘大乘、三乘一乘一性。此五時教，後兼前義，前無兼後。然《法華經》立在《深密》後。《涅槃》更在《法華》後。說《深密》既在於前，如何預斷後教？故以淺深次第定為五時，第四第五時非《深密》教第三時攝。此亦不然。三七日後，方趣鹿園，說四諦教，始度五人。第二七日，即說《十地》，不起道樹，授提謂記當得作佛，號曰齊成。如何定判最先說小？又復一乘即是大乘，《勝鬘經》云「聲聞、緣覺乘皆入大乘，大乘者即是佛乘。是故三乘即是一乘，得一乘者得阿耨菩提。」於第二時判說大乘，一乘即大收，合在第二時，如何為第四？若云：《深密》是說三乘時者，為通三乘藏，攝名三乘教；為說有乘三，名三乘教時。若許《深密》通三乘攝，違於正理，今古共許是大乘藏。若云：說有三乘，名三乘時。《法華》亦爾，前後俱云「為求聲聞等」。若云不同，如前已非，故不可說《法華》一乘為第四時。《涅槃》亦云「於此經中，或說一乘、或說三乘。」又復一性即佛性，佛性即真如，《勝鬘經》、《如來藏經》、《不增不減經》、《法界體性經》、《如來智印經》、《聖善住天子所問經》、《諸法無行經》、《文殊師利問法身經》等，皆廣明如來藏、佛性、法身一切生有。如今者云第五時說於佛性，《勝鬘經》云「末利夫人信法未久」，明在於前。《如來藏經》准菩提流支云：「佛成道後第十年說。」《佛性論》、《寶性論》皆依此經。及《解深密》、《無上依經》廣明佛性，不依《涅槃》明佛性義。如何定判於涅槃時始明一切悉有佛性，將《勝鬘經》等及《佛性論》等為第五時。若以《涅槃》在《深密》後，不得預斷為第三時者，如何自引云「或有前經密說後義，如《智論》說。」又《華嚴》及在說四諦前，云何《無量義經》斷為第三時說？若云：據義類說，不據前後。《深密》亦爾，何獨不信？故約前後判為五時，但嬰兒慧，智者不許。又云：《法華》三時與《深密》別。此亦不爾。二經明時，義意不別。《法華》第二云「昔於波羅奈轉四諦法輪，今復轉最妙無上大法輪。」且對權實以說二時，隱第二時。〈信解品〉偈頌云「佛亦如是，知我樂小，未曾說言，汝等作佛。而說我等，得諸無漏，成就小乘，聲聞弟子。此聞有教，佛勅我等，說最上道。」乃至云「我等若聞，淨佛國土，教化眾生，都無欣樂。所以者何？一切諸法，皆悉空寂，無生無滅、無大無小」等，此聞空教。乃至云「我等今日，得未曾有。非先所望，而今自得。如彼窮子，得無量寶」等，此聞非空有教也。長行之中，經文亦具。又云：《深密》存二滅一，《法華》破二滅一，以此不同者。如前已破。《涅槃經》亦爾，如第二明醫師喻中，初總教服乳，喻有教；次教總斷，喻說空教；後有宜不宜服，喻非空有。此對外道執皆有我，為破此有令入人空，且密說人空，義顯為小，初說法有。次破法有，密說法空、涅槃會中方為顯說。除外道執有故說空，除聲聞執空故說有，以明佛性非妄。計我故非有，有常等故非空，合第三時，何名第五？又若《涅槃》明有佛性，五乘根性皆趣佛果，故第五時者。何故須跋陀羅聞一切眾生皆有佛性、齊得作佛，何不發大心，而取羅漢果？故如《深密》判屬第三，普為發趣一切乘者，為真了義。審細研尋，義更明顯。解此大綱，五門長掩，故不別門，別門對片。又云：教有五時，五門分辨：一次第有殊、二得名有異、三述益不等、四述時不同、五說法有別。言次第殊者，三乘在一乘前，佛性居一乘後。大意同前定前後失，故不重破。言得名異者，第四時教名一乘者，五乘歸佛性故；第五時教名佛性者，五性歸佛性故。此亦不爾。五乘歸一乘，故為第四時。《勝鬘》亦四果咸歸佛果，《深密》不定亦趣佛乘，應第四時。《法華》定性亦不歸一，應第三攝。上引佛性，多經說同，應第五時名佛性教，何但《涅槃》？若云：爾者，《勝鬘》如來藏，豈是四十年後耶？前已顯非，故言述益不等者，小乘說緣生之有法，為萬行之初基。故《十輪經》云「不學小乘者，無由學大乘。」此說依有教積集善根，非是先發小心後方學大。此說不爾，據不定性，初令學小，即《法華經》門外許與三車，鹿苑證於小果。若據頓悟，即初授提謂記，說《華嚴》等經，咸非小乘。又依大教不得積集善根，可須依小依大，依大得福過於小乘，何要依小？又《法華》學大，乃至不受餘經一偈，又不得親近小乘三藏學者。既許為了義，何故捨此而不依耶？又《瑜伽》等說「先學自乘，方學餘教。」若非不定，無斯小大三一次第。若是頓悟，非先學小。此判據何？《十輪經》意，非開先為說小令種善根，亦非先同無性後分五性，如前顯非。言說時別者，此乃同許《法華經》、《深密》前後，許亦無失。然說《深密》是說三乘，《法華》唯存一實。此理未可。《深密解脫》第二云「我說聲聞、緣覺、菩薩一清淨道，成就第一義。唯一清淨道，更無第二。我意依此，故說一乘。」如何得言說三乘教？若言許不定迴心、決定不迴，即存二滅，與《法華》別。此亦不爾。許不定迴趣，即破二滅。《法華》三草一地長殊，決定不記，猶存二滅。若言《法華》許定性趣大，違論釋經。又復經文所記聲聞，皆不定性及以變化，在文具顯。良為此會對此二類聲聞言無一不成佛。不爾，如何論釋但為利益二人恐損驚怖，不為決定說兩譬喻，令知乘別？豈天親菩薩不解《法華》，末世凡夫深得經意？若云：《深密》雖說一乘，許根性別，言唯一者，是密意說。此即會前，不會於後，以後未說，如何先會者。《法華》亦云「已說今說當說，而於其中，此《法華經》最在其上。」云何未說之經，此得云在於上？未說許說在上，未說先會許同，此有何失？又佛三明鎮朗、四智常明，會當未說之經何失？固執不許，又彼自引「或復前經密說後義，如《智度論》。」前密說後，彼既信之；前顯會後，何故不受？又復十義證《法華經》在《深密》後。一云：《深密》說有二滅，《法華》說無。此謬如前已顯。乃至第十，《深密》許不定性一分成佛，《法華》全無二滅，此謬准前。言《楞伽》乃至無性闡提當得涅槃，此亦謬取經意。何者？《楞伽》無性，即當時邊，非畢竟者。以後遇佛等，許得作佛故。若言彼說無性即是全無因者，菩薩起大悲，豈是全無性亦說為無性耶？又云：《涅槃經》說悉當成佛。此亦不爾。初約闡提說無佛性，此據行性。後說皆有，即約理性。不爾，如何前後二說？又云：須陀洹乃至羅漢皆得作佛，不解我意。又恒河七人，云那含果有中生槃等。此《涅槃經》是顯了說，豈是全無二滅？又云：此佛性教臨涅槃說，正因遠果、因深果遠，極難信故，所以後說。說《涅槃經》因深果遠，難信共成。云難信故最在後者，此判即謬。何者？《涅槃經》度須跋陀羅，豈是人勝？《遺教經》云「最後說法度須跋陀羅，所應度者皆已度訖。」方說《遺教》，豈更因深果遠極難信耶？又《大衍經》，涅槃後起，為母說法，豈更難信、更顯了耶？又既明佛為報母恩，涅槃復起，阿難問名。答云：「名母子相見經，宣示後世」等。此能詮所詮明報恩事，與前教別，應第六時。此不立時，彼云何爾？舉始括終，餘謬可悉。

A position holds: Saṃdhinirmocana was spoken earlier and the Mahāparinirvāṇa later; three weeks [after enlightenment] the wheel of the Four Noble Truths was set forth as a distinct teaching period; forty years later came the greatest wheel of Dharma—why then not allow that yet another period be established? Furthermore, the Mahāyāna is distinct from the Hīnayāna, so the later preaching of the Mahāyāna established a period. The ekayāna is distinct from the triyāna; when the ekayāna was taught later, why not allow a distinct period to be established? Therefore, following Saṃdhinirmocana, the first three periods are established, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka's ekayāna is the fourth, and the Mahāparinirvāṇa's buddhadhātu is the fifth period. This too is incorrect and entails many errors.
First, the turning of the Four Truths and subsequent establishment of teaching periods were stated by the Buddha, the World-Honoured One. That the ekayāna is fourth and buddhadhātu fifth—the sūtras nowhere determine this; who said so? If teaching periods are established as five based on differences in meaning, every sūtra differs in meaning according to intention. For instance, the Sukhāvatīvyūha urges rebirth in the West, going to whichever pure realm one vows, while Maitreya's ascent urges birth in Tuṣita; or contemplating Ākāśagarbha, or Samantabhadra, etc. If so, teaching periods would be exceedingly numerous, not just three or five. Moreover, in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, at one time [the Buddha] was on the banks of the Ganges, etc.; since these are not fixed times, they cannot be taken [as fixed periods]. Thus asserting five periods is not the Buddha's teaching.
Furthermore, in the second chapter, ‘Faith and Understanding,’ of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, three periods are extensively established. First it states: ‘We stood at the head of the Saṅgha and thought we had already attained nirvāṇa’—this is the teaching of the first period. It also says: ‘The World-Honoured One of old had long preached the Dharma; I was then in the assembly, but contemplated only emptiness, signlessness, and had no joy in the bodhisattva Dharma’—this is the second period. ‘We deeply rejoice in gaining great and beneficial goodness; the great jewel of the Dharma King was obtained without seeking’—this is the third period. In the verse section, the three periods are even clearer, which aligns with Saṃdhinirmocana. How can one defy the teaching to establish a separate five periods? This is a great error.
It is also claimed that the Anantanirdeśa-sūtra distinguishes periods for Hīnayāna, Madhyamayāna, and Mahāyāna, isolating the middle vehicle and combining the Mahāyāna into one. This too is irrational. Why? The Anantanirdeśa-sūtra begins by stating: ‘Since the Tathāgata attained the Way more than forty years ago, he has constantly expounded the dharmas for sentient beings, up to neither emerging nor vanishing. Those who heard it either attained warmth, summit, patience, the supreme worldly dharmas, the four fruits, pratyekabuddhahood, or generated the bodhicitta and mounted the ten stages’—not separating the three vehicles. It also says: ‘I arose from beneath the tree king, went to the Deer Park in Vārāṇasī, turned the Four Truths for the five people including Ājñātakauṇḍinya, and also taught dharmas up to moment-to-moment arising and ceasing. In between, here and elsewhere, for the monks and bodhisattvas, I expounded the twelve links and six pāramitās,’ up to, ‘Now again here I expound the Great Vehicle's Anantanirdeśa-sūtra, up to moment-to-moment arising and ceasing.’ It does not say that the middle period was exclusively for pratyekabuddhas, but says it was together with the bodhisattvas. Later it does not say that now here it is exclusively for bodhisattvas.
It also says: ‘Good son, when I first preached the Four Truths, it was for seekers of the śrāvaka vehicle, yet eight hundred million devas descended to hear the Dharma and generated bodhicitta. In the middle, throughout various places, I expounded the profound twelve causes and conditions for seekers of the pratyekabuddha vehicle, yet countless sentient beings generated bodhicitta or abode as śrāvakas. Next I preached the Vaipulya twelve-part scriptures, Mahāprajñā, and the Avataṃsaka's ocean-like emptiness, expounding bodhisattvas' kalpas of practice, yet hundreds of thousands of monks and myriad devas and humans, countless sentient beings, attained the fruit of srotāpanna up to arhat.’ In the method of causes and conditions for abiding pratyekabuddhas, preaching the twelve links was said to be for pratyekabuddhas, yet there was only generating bodhicitta or abiding as śrāvakas, with no generation of the pratyekabuddha mind or realization of the pratyekabuddha fruit. When next preaching the Vaipulya, śrāvaka fruits were attained. And in the method of causes and conditions for abiding pratyekabuddhas, it does not say it was for bodhisattvas. To judge that the Anantanirdeśa distinguishes periods of Hīnayāna, Madhyamayāna, and Mahāyāna, isolating the middle vehicle and combining the Mahāyāna into one, thereby making three periods—on what standard is this based? If it is said, ‘Since it speaks of the great teaching, why is it not the Mahāyāna?’ If so, Saṃdhinirmocana also speaks of the great teaching; why call it triyāna? Even granting three, it never teaches five, nor does it limit the chronological order of years and months.
It is further claimed: Now, distinguishing five periods based on vehicle and gotra refers to Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna, triyāna, ekayāna, and one nature. In these five periods, the later subsumes the earlier meaning, while the earlier does not subsume the later. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka was established after Saṃdhinirmocana, and the Mahāparinirvāṇa came after the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. Since Saṃdhinirmocana was spoken earlier, how could it anticipate and judge a later teaching? Thus, by grading from shallow to deep, five periods are established, and the fourth and fifth are not subsumed within the third period of Saṃdhinirmocana. This too is incorrect. Only after three weeks did he go to the Deer Park to preach the Four Truths and first deliver the five men. Yet in the second week, he preached the Daśabhūmika, and without rising from beneath the bodhi tree, gave Trapuṣa the prediction of future buddhahood under the name Qicheng. How can one definitively judge that the Hīnayāna was preached first?
Moreover, the ekayāna is the Mahāyāna. The Śrīmālādevī-sūtra states: ‘The śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha vehicles all enter the Mahāyāna; the Mahāyāna is the Buddha vehicle. Therefore, the triyāna is the ekayāna; one who attains the ekayāna attains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.’ In the second period, the Mahāyāna was judged to be taught; since ekayāna is subsumed under the Mahāyāna, it belongs to the second period; how could it be the fourth? If you say Saṃdhinirmocana is the period teaching the triyāna: does it encompass the triyāna piṭaka and so is called the triyāna teaching, or does it teach that there are three vehicles and is therefore called the triyāna period? If you allow that Saṃdhinirmocana encompasses the triyāna, that contradicts correct reason, for past and present agree it is a Mahāyāna piṭaka. If you say it teaches three vehicles and is therefore called the triyāna period, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka does the same, repeatedly stating ‘for those seeking the śrāvaka [vehicle],’ etc. If you say they are not identical, this was refuted above; hence one cannot say the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka's ekayāna is the fourth period. The Mahāparinirvāṇa also states: ‘In this sūtra, sometimes the ekayāna is taught, sometimes the triyāna.’
Furthermore, the ‘one nature’ is buddhadhātu, and buddhadhātu is tathatā. The Śrīmālādevī, Tathāgatagarbha, Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa, Dharmadhātuprakṛty-asaṃbhedanirdeśa, Tathāgatajñānamudrā, Suvikrāntacintādevaputra-paripṛcchā, Sarvadharmāpravṛtti, and Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā-dharmakāya sūtras all extensively explain that the tathāgatagarbha, buddhadhātu, and dharmakāya exist in all beings. If, as is claimed now, buddhadhātu was preached in the fifth period: the Śrīmālādevī says that Queen Mallikā had not long had faith in the Dharma, clearly placing it earlier. The Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra, according to Bodhiruci, was preached in the tenth year after the Buddha's enlightenment. Both the Buddhagotraśāstra and Ratnagotravibhāga rely on this sūtra. Saṃdhinirmocana and the Anuttarāśraya-sūtra also extensively clarify buddhadhātu without relying on the Mahāparinirvāṇa to elucidate the meaning of buddhadhātu. How can one definitively judge that only in the Mahāparinirvāṇa did he first clarify that all have buddhadhātu, relegating the Śrīmālādevī, Buddhagotraśāstra, and others to the fifth period?
If, because the Mahāparinirvāṇa came after Saṃdhinirmocana, it could not be anticipated as the third period, why did you yourself cite: ‘Certain earlier sūtras implicitly teach later meanings, as stated in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa’? Furthermore, the Avataṃsaka preceded the preaching of the Four Truths; why did the Anantanirdeśa-sūtra judge it as taught in the third period? If you say it speaks according to semantic categories and not chronological order, Saṃdhinirmocana is the same; why disbelieve this alone? Therefore, judging five periods based on chronological order is mere infant wisdom, rejected by the wise.
It is also said that the three periods of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka differ from those of Saṃdhinirmocana. This too is incorrect. The meaning and intent of the two sūtras in clarifying the periods do not differ. Saddharmapuṇḍarīka chapter 2 states: ‘Of old in Vārāṇasī I turned the wheel of the Four Noble Truths; now again I turn the most marvelous, unsurpassed great wheel of Dharma.’ It contrasts provisional and ultimate to speak of two periods, leaving the second period implicit. The verses in the ‘Faith and Understanding’ chapter state: ‘The Buddha, likewise, knowing we rejoiced in the lesser, never said: “You will become buddhas.” Instead, he said that we had attained the anāsrava and were accomplished in the lesser vehicle as śrāvaka disciples’—this is hearing the teaching of existence. ‘The Buddha instructed us to teach the supreme Way... When we heard of purifying buddha-lands and converting sentient beings, we had no joy at all. Why? All dharmas are empty and quiescent, without birth or extinction, neither great nor small...’—this is hearing the teaching of emptiness. Up to: ‘Today we have obtained what was never before had; what was not previously hoped for has now been naturally gained, like the poor son obtaining boundless jewels...’—this is hearing the teaching of neither emptiness nor existence. In the prose section, the sūtra text is likewise complete.
It is further said that Saṃdhinirmocana retains two cessations and eliminates one, while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka refutes two cessations and illuminates the one, and that they differ in this regard. This has already been refuted above. The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra is the same: in chapter 2's physician parable, first commanding all to drink milk illustrates the teaching of existence; next commanding total abstinence illustrates the teaching of emptiness; finally stating it is suitable or unsuitable to drink illustrates neither emptiness nor existence. This was directed at heterodox non-Buddhists who clung to all having a self: to break this existence and lead them into personal emptiness, he provisionally and implicitly taught personal emptiness; its meaning being overtly manifested as lesser, he first spoke of the existence of dharmas. Next, to break the existence of dharmas, he implicitly taught the emptiness of dharmas, which was only explicitly taught in the Mahāparinirvāṇa assembly. To eliminate heterodox clinging to existence he taught emptiness; to eliminate śrāvaka clinging to emptiness he taught existence, clarifying that buddhadhātu is not illusory. Not being a falsely conceived self, it is not existent; having permanence and so on, it is not empty. This matches the third period; why call it the fifth?
Furthermore, if the Mahāparinirvāṇa clarifies the existence of buddhadhātu such that the capacities of all five vehicles reach the fruit of buddhahood, thus constituting the fifth period, why did Subhadra, hearing that all sentient beings have buddhadhātu and equally become buddhas, not generate the great mind, but instead attained the fruit of arhatship? Thus, as Saṃdhinirmocana judges it, it belongs to the third period, universally for those setting out upon all vehicles, being truly definitive in meaning. Careful, detailed investigation makes this meaning even clearer. Understanding this grand outline, the five gates are forever closed, so I do not establish separate gates to counter each partial view.
It is also claimed: The teachings have five periods, differentiated by five gates: first, difference in sequence; second, difference in derivation of names; third, inequality in benefits described; fourth, difference in times described; fifth, distinction in the dharmas expounded. As for difference in sequence: the triyāna precedes the ekayāna, and buddhadhātu follows the ekayāna. The general sense is identical to the earlier error of determining chronological order, so it will not be refuted again. As for difference in names: the fourth period teaching is named ekayāna because the five vehicles return to buddhadhātu; the fifth period teaching is named buddhadhātu because the five natures return to buddhadhātu. This too is incorrect. If the five vehicles returning to ekayāna makes it the fourth period, then in the Śrīmālādevī the four fruits also all return to the Buddha fruit, and in Saṃdhinirmocana the indeterminate also advance to the Buddha vehicle, so they should be the fourth period. In the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the determinate gotra also does not return to the one, so it should be subsumed under the third. The many sūtras cited above on buddhadhātu teach identically; they should be the fifth period called the buddhadhātu teaching—why only the Mahāparinirvāṇa? If you say so, was the Śrīmālādevī's tathāgatagarbha really after forty years? The error has already been shown above.
As for the inequality in benefits described: the Hīnayāna speaks of the existent dharmas of conditioned arising as the initial foundation for myriad practices. Thus the Daśacakra-sūtra says: ‘One who does not study the Hīnayāna has no way to study the Mahāyāna.’ This means relying on the teaching of existence to accumulate wholesome roots, not that one first develops the lesser mind and only afterward studies the great. This claim is incorrect: in terms of the indeterminate gotra, they are initially made to study the lesser, which is the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka's promise of three carts outside the gate, and realizing the lesser fruit in the Deer Park. But in terms of sudden enlightenment, he immediately gave Trapuṣa the prediction and preached sūtras like the Avataṃsaka, none of which were Hīnayāna. Furthermore, could it be that one cannot accumulate wholesome roots by relying on the great teaching, so one must rely on the lesser? Relying on the great brings merit exceeding the Hīnayāna; why must one rely on the lesser? Moreover, in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka's study of the great, one does not even accept a single verse of other sūtras, nor may one be close to scholars of the Hīnayāna Tripiṭaka. Since you acknowledge it as definitive, why abandon this and not rely on it? Furthermore, the Yogācāra and others state: ‘First study one's own vehicle, and only then study other teachings.’ Unless one is of indeterminate gotra, there is no such sequence of lesser to greater or three to one. If one is suddenly enlightened, one does not first study the lesser. On what is this judgment based? The intent of the Daśacakra-sūtra is not to first preach the lesser to plant wholesome roots, nor is it that all are originally without gotra and later separated into five natures, as shown to be false above.
As for distinction in times described: this is agreeing that the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and Saṃdhinirmocana are earlier and later; accepting this is harmless. Yet saying Saṃdhinirmocana teaches the triyāna while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka retains only the one real—this principle is unacceptable. The second chapter of Saṃdhinirmocana states: ‘I teach the one pure path of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas, which accomplishes the paramārtha. There is only one pure path, no second. With this intention, I teach the ekayāna.’ How can one say it is a triyāna teaching? If you say it allows the indeterminate to convert while the determinate do not convert, thereby retaining two cessations, differing from the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka—this too is incorrect. Allowing the indeterminate to turn and advance refutes two cessations; while in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the three grasses and one ground remain permanently different, and the determinate are not given prediction, still retaining two cessations. If you say the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka allows those of determinate gotra to advance to the great, that contradicts the commentaries explaining the sūtra. Moreover, the śrāvakas predicted in the sūtra text are all indeterminate and transformed ones, as is fully clear in the text. It was precisely for these two kinds of śrāvakas in this assembly that it stated not one fails to become a buddha. Otherwise, why would the commentary explain that it was only for the benefit of these two persons and to prevent alarm and fear, and not for the determinate, that two parables were spoken to let them know the distinction of vehicles? Did Vasubandhu Bodhisattva fail to understand the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, while ordinary worldlings of the degenerate age grasp the sūtra's intent deeply?
If it is argued: Although Saṃdhinirmocana speaks of the ekayāna, it admits differences in gotra, so saying ‘only one’ is an intentional statement; this reconciles what came before, not what came after, for since the later was not yet spoken, how could it be reconciled beforehand? The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka also says: ‘Among those already spoken, now spoken, and to be spoken, this Saddharmapuṇḍarīka is foremost.’ How could it be said to be superior to sūtras not yet spoken? If an unspoken sūtra can be said to be surpassed, what fault is there in allowing that an unspoken sūtra was reconciled beforehand? Furthermore, the Buddha's three knowledges are ever brilliant and his four wisdoms eternally luminous; what fault is there in reconciling sūtras yet to be spoken? If you stubbornly disallow this, yet yourself cite: ‘Certain earlier sūtras implicitly teach later meanings, as in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa.’ If you believe an earlier text implicitly teaches a later meaning, why refuse to accept that an earlier text explicitly reconciles a later one?
Furthermore, ten arguments are adduced to prove the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka came after Saṃdhinirmocana. The first says: Saṃdhinirmocana teaches two cessations, while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka teaches none. This error was shown above. Up to the tenth: Saṃdhinirmocana allows a portion of the indeterminate gotra to attain buddhahood, while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka completely lacks two cessations. This error is just as above. As for the claim that the Laṅkāvatāra says even the agotraka icchantika will attain nirvāṇa: this also mistakenly takes the sūtra's intent. Why? The Laṅkāvatāra's lack of gotra is provisional for that time, not ultimate, because later, upon meeting a buddha, they are allowed to become buddhas. If you say that teaching agotraka means completely lacking the cause, when a bodhisattva gives rise to great compassion, does that lack all gotra just because he is also called agotraka? It is also said: The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says all will become buddhas. This too is incorrect. At first it says icchantikas lack buddhadhātu based on gotra as practice; later it says all have it based on gotra as principle. Otherwise, how could there be two statements, before and after? It is also said: Srotāpannas up to arhats all become buddhas, yet you do not understand my meaning. Also, among the seven persons in the Ganges, the anāgāmin fruit is said to include intermediate-birth nirvāṇa, etc. This Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra is an explicit teaching; how could it be completely without two cessations?
It is also claimed: This buddhadhātu teaching was spoken near nirvāṇa because the primary cause and distant fruit, the deep cause and distant fruit, are extremely difficult to believe, which is why it was spoken later. Saying the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra's cause is deep and fruit distant and hard to believe is generally accepted. But saying it was spoken last because it is hard to believe—this judgment is an error. Why? When the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra converts Subhadra, is he a superior person? The Bequeathed Teaching Sūtra says: ‘Lastly teaching the Dharma, he converted Subhadra; those who should be delivered have all been delivered.’ Only then was the Bequeathed Teaching spoken; could its cause be even deeper and its fruit more distant and harder to believe? Furthermore, in the Dayan Jing, rising after nirvāṇa to preach the Dharma for his mother, could that be even harder to believe and more explicit? Moreover, since it clarifies the Buddha repaying his mother's kindness by rising again after nirvāṇa, when Ānanda asked for the title, he answered: ‘It is named the Sūtra of Mother and Son Meeting, to be proclaimed to future generations,’ etc. This expressive and expressed teaching on repaying kindness differs from the earlier teachings and should be a sixth period. If that does not establish a period, how could yours do so? Taking the beginning to encompass the end, the remaining errors can all be known.