能顯中邊慧日論 1.9

1.9

A position holds: Saṃdhinirmocana was spoken earlier and the Mahāparinirvāṇa later; three weeks [after enlightenment] the wheel of the Four Noble Truths was set forth as a distinct teaching period; forty years later came the greatest wheel of Dharma—why then not allow that yet another period be established? Furthermore, the Mahāyāna is distinct from the Hīnayāna, so the later preaching of the Mahāyāna established a period. The ekayāna is distinct from the triyāna; when the ekayāna was taught later, why not allow a distinct period to be established? Therefore, following Saṃdhinirmocana, the first three periods are established, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka's ekayāna is the fourth, and the Mahāparinirvāṇa's buddhadhātu is the fifth period. This too is incorrect and entails many errors.
First, the turning of the Four Truths and subsequent establishment of teaching periods were stated by the Buddha, the World-Honoured One. That the ekayāna is fourth and buddhadhātu fifth—the sūtras nowhere determine this; who said so? If teaching periods are established as five based on differences in meaning, every sūtra differs in meaning according to intention. For instance, the Sukhāvatīvyūha urges rebirth in the West, going to whichever pure realm one vows, while Maitreya's ascent urges birth in Tuṣita; or contemplating Ākāśagarbha, or Samantabhadra, etc. If so, teaching periods would be exceedingly numerous, not just three or five. Moreover, in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, at one time [the Buddha] was on the banks of the Ganges, etc.; since these are not fixed times, they cannot be taken [as fixed periods]. Thus asserting five periods is not the Buddha's teaching.
Furthermore, in the second chapter, ‘Faith and Understanding,’ of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, three periods are extensively established. First it states: ‘We stood at the head of the Saṅgha and thought we had already attained nirvāṇa’—this is the teaching of the first period. It also says: ‘The World-Honoured One of old had long preached the Dharma; I was then in the assembly, but contemplated only emptiness, signlessness, and had no joy in the bodhisattva Dharma’—this is the second period. ‘We deeply rejoice in gaining great and beneficial goodness; the great jewel of the Dharma King was obtained without seeking’—this is the third period. In the verse section, the three periods are even clearer, which aligns with Saṃdhinirmocana. How can one defy the teaching to establish a separate five periods? This is a great error.
It is also claimed that the Anantanirdeśa-sūtra distinguishes periods for Hīnayāna, Madhyamayāna, and Mahāyāna, isolating the middle vehicle and combining the Mahāyāna into one. This too is irrational. Why? The Anantanirdeśa-sūtra begins by stating: ‘Since the Tathāgata attained the Way more than forty years ago, he has constantly expounded the dharmas for sentient beings, up to neither emerging nor vanishing. Those who heard it either attained warmth, summit, patience, the supreme worldly dharmas, the four fruits, pratyekabuddhahood, or generated the bodhicitta and mounted the ten stages’—not separating the three vehicles. It also says: ‘I arose from beneath the tree king, went to the Deer Park in Vārāṇasī, turned the Four Truths for the five people including Ājñātakauṇḍinya, and also taught dharmas up to moment-to-moment arising and ceasing. In between, here and elsewhere, for the monks and bodhisattvas, I expounded the twelve links and six pāramitās,’ up to, ‘Now again here I expound the Great Vehicle's Anantanirdeśa-sūtra, up to moment-to-moment arising and ceasing.’ It does not say that the middle period was exclusively for pratyekabuddhas, but says it was together with the bodhisattvas. Later it does not say that now here it is exclusively for bodhisattvas.
It also says: ‘Good son, when I first preached the Four Truths, it was for seekers of the śrāvaka vehicle, yet eight hundred million devas descended to hear the Dharma and generated bodhicitta. In the middle, throughout various places, I expounded the profound twelve causes and conditions for seekers of the pratyekabuddha vehicle, yet countless sentient beings generated bodhicitta or abode as śrāvakas. Next I preached the Vaipulya twelve-part scriptures, Mahāprajñā, and the Avataṃsaka's ocean-like emptiness, expounding bodhisattvas' kalpas of practice, yet hundreds of thousands of monks and myriad devas and humans, countless sentient beings, attained the fruit of srotāpanna up to arhat.’ In the method of causes and conditions for abiding pratyekabuddhas, preaching the twelve links was said to be for pratyekabuddhas, yet there was only generating bodhicitta or abiding as śrāvakas, with no generation of the pratyekabuddha mind or realization of the pratyekabuddha fruit. When next preaching the Vaipulya, śrāvaka fruits were attained. And in the method of causes and conditions for abiding pratyekabuddhas, it does not say it was for bodhisattvas. To judge that the Anantanirdeśa distinguishes periods of Hīnayāna, Madhyamayāna, and Mahāyāna, isolating the middle vehicle and combining the Mahāyāna into one, thereby making three periods—on what standard is this based? If it is said, ‘Since it speaks of the great teaching, why is it not the Mahāyāna?’ If so, Saṃdhinirmocana also speaks of the great teaching; why call it triyāna? Even granting three, it never teaches five, nor does it limit the chronological order of years and months.
It is further claimed: Now, distinguishing five periods based on vehicle and gotra refers to Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna, triyāna, ekayāna, and one nature. In these five periods, the later subsumes the earlier meaning, while the earlier does not subsume the later. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka was established after Saṃdhinirmocana, and the Mahāparinirvāṇa came after the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. Since Saṃdhinirmocana was spoken earlier, how could it anticipate and judge a later teaching? Thus, by grading from shallow to deep, five periods are established, and the fourth and fifth are not subsumed within the third period of Saṃdhinirmocana. This too is incorrect. Only after three weeks did he go to the Deer Park to preach the Four Truths and first deliver the five men. Yet in the second week, he preached the Daśabhūmika, and without rising from beneath the bodhi tree, gave Trapuṣa the prediction of future buddhahood under the name Qicheng. How can one definitively judge that the Hīnayāna was preached first?
Moreover, the ekayāna is the Mahāyāna. The Śrīmālādevī-sūtra states: ‘The śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha vehicles all enter the Mahāyāna; the Mahāyāna is the Buddha vehicle. Therefore, the triyāna is the ekayāna; one who attains the ekayāna attains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.’ In the second period, the Mahāyāna was judged to be taught; since ekayāna is subsumed under the Mahāyāna, it belongs to the second period; how could it be the fourth? If you say Saṃdhinirmocana is the period teaching the triyāna: does it encompass the triyāna piṭaka and so is called the triyāna teaching, or does it teach that there are three vehicles and is therefore called the triyāna period? If you allow that Saṃdhinirmocana encompasses the triyāna, that contradicts correct reason, for past and present agree it is a Mahāyāna piṭaka. If you say it teaches three vehicles and is therefore called the triyāna period, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka does the same, repeatedly stating ‘for those seeking the śrāvaka [vehicle],’ etc. If you say they are not identical, this was refuted above; hence one cannot say the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka's ekayāna is the fourth period. The Mahāparinirvāṇa also states: ‘In this sūtra, sometimes the ekayāna is taught, sometimes the triyāna.’
Furthermore, the ‘one nature’ is buddhadhātu, and buddhadhātu is tathatā. The Śrīmālādevī, Tathāgatagarbha, Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa, Dharmadhātuprakṛty-asaṃbhedanirdeśa, Tathāgatajñānamudrā, Suvikrāntacintādevaputra-paripṛcchā, Sarvadharmāpravṛtti, and Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā-dharmakāya sūtras all extensively explain that the tathāgatagarbha, buddhadhātu, and dharmakāya exist in all beings. If, as is claimed now, buddhadhātu was preached in the fifth period: the Śrīmālādevī says that Queen Mallikā had not long had faith in the Dharma, clearly placing it earlier. The Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra, according to Bodhiruci, was preached in the tenth year after the Buddha's enlightenment. Both the Buddhagotraśāstra and Ratnagotravibhāga rely on this sūtra. Saṃdhinirmocana and the Anuttarāśraya-sūtra also extensively clarify buddhadhātu without relying on the Mahāparinirvāṇa to elucidate the meaning of buddhadhātu. How can one definitively judge that only in the Mahāparinirvāṇa did he first clarify that all have buddhadhātu, relegating the Śrīmālādevī, Buddhagotraśāstra, and others to the fifth period?
If, because the Mahāparinirvāṇa came after Saṃdhinirmocana, it could not be anticipated as the third period, why did you yourself cite: ‘Certain earlier sūtras implicitly teach later meanings, as stated in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa’? Furthermore, the Avataṃsaka preceded the preaching of the Four Truths; why did the Anantanirdeśa-sūtra judge it as taught in the third period? If you say it speaks according to semantic categories and not chronological order, Saṃdhinirmocana is the same; why disbelieve this alone? Therefore, judging five periods based on chronological order is mere infant wisdom, rejected by the wise.
It is also said that the three periods of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka differ from those of Saṃdhinirmocana. This too is incorrect. The meaning and intent of the two sūtras in clarifying the periods do not differ. Saddharmapuṇḍarīka chapter 2 states: ‘Of old in Vārāṇasī I turned the wheel of the Four Noble Truths; now again I turn the most marvelous, unsurpassed great wheel of Dharma.’ It contrasts provisional and ultimate to speak of two periods, leaving the second period implicit. The verses in the ‘Faith and Understanding’ chapter state: ‘The Buddha, likewise, knowing we rejoiced in the lesser, never said: “You will become buddhas.” Instead, he said that we had attained the anāsrava and were accomplished in the lesser vehicle as śrāvaka disciples’—this is hearing the teaching of existence. ‘The Buddha instructed us to teach the supreme Way... When we heard of purifying buddha-lands and converting sentient beings, we had no joy at all. Why? All dharmas are empty and quiescent, without birth or extinction, neither great nor small...’—this is hearing the teaching of emptiness. Up to: ‘Today we have obtained what was never before had; what was not previously hoped for has now been naturally gained, like the poor son obtaining boundless jewels...’—this is hearing the teaching of neither emptiness nor existence. In the prose section, the sūtra text is likewise complete.
It is further said that Saṃdhinirmocana retains two cessations and eliminates one, while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka refutes two cessations and illuminates the one, and that they differ in this regard. This has already been refuted above. The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra is the same: in chapter 2's physician parable, first commanding all to drink milk illustrates the teaching of existence; next commanding total abstinence illustrates the teaching of emptiness; finally stating it is suitable or unsuitable to drink illustrates neither emptiness nor existence. This was directed at heterodox non-Buddhists who clung to all having a self: to break this existence and lead them into personal emptiness, he provisionally and implicitly taught personal emptiness; its meaning being overtly manifested as lesser, he first spoke of the existence of dharmas. Next, to break the existence of dharmas, he implicitly taught the emptiness of dharmas, which was only explicitly taught in the Mahāparinirvāṇa assembly. To eliminate heterodox clinging to existence he taught emptiness; to eliminate śrāvaka clinging to emptiness he taught existence, clarifying that buddhadhātu is not illusory. Not being a falsely conceived self, it is not existent; having permanence and so on, it is not empty. This matches the third period; why call it the fifth?
Furthermore, if the Mahāparinirvāṇa clarifies the existence of buddhadhātu such that the capacities of all five vehicles reach the fruit of buddhahood, thus constituting the fifth period, why did Subhadra, hearing that all sentient beings have buddhadhātu and equally become buddhas, not generate the great mind, but instead attained the fruit of arhatship? Thus, as Saṃdhinirmocana judges it, it belongs to the third period, universally for those setting out upon all vehicles, being truly definitive in meaning. Careful, detailed investigation makes this meaning even clearer. Understanding this grand outline, the five gates are forever closed, so I do not establish separate gates to counter each partial view.
It is also claimed: The teachings have five periods, differentiated by five gates: first, difference in sequence; second, difference in derivation of names; third, inequality in benefits described; fourth, difference in times described; fifth, distinction in the dharmas expounded. As for difference in sequence: the triyāna precedes the ekayāna, and buddhadhātu follows the ekayāna. The general sense is identical to the earlier error of determining chronological order, so it will not be refuted again. As for difference in names: the fourth period teaching is named ekayāna because the five vehicles return to buddhadhātu; the fifth period teaching is named buddhadhātu because the five natures return to buddhadhātu. This too is incorrect. If the five vehicles returning to ekayāna makes it the fourth period, then in the Śrīmālādevī the four fruits also all return to the Buddha fruit, and in Saṃdhinirmocana the indeterminate also advance to the Buddha vehicle, so they should be the fourth period. In the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the determinate gotra also does not return to the one, so it should be subsumed under the third. The many sūtras cited above on buddhadhātu teach identically; they should be the fifth period called the buddhadhātu teaching—why only the Mahāparinirvāṇa? If you say so, was the Śrīmālādevī's tathāgatagarbha really after forty years? The error has already been shown above.
As for the inequality in benefits described: the Hīnayāna speaks of the existent dharmas of conditioned arising as the initial foundation for myriad practices. Thus the Daśacakra-sūtra says: ‘One who does not study the Hīnayāna has no way to study the Mahāyāna.’ This means relying on the teaching of existence to accumulate wholesome roots, not that one first develops the lesser mind and only afterward studies the great. This claim is incorrect: in terms of the indeterminate gotra, they are initially made to study the lesser, which is the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka's promise of three carts outside the gate, and realizing the lesser fruit in the Deer Park. But in terms of sudden enlightenment, he immediately gave Trapuṣa the prediction and preached sūtras like the Avataṃsaka, none of which were Hīnayāna. Furthermore, could it be that one cannot accumulate wholesome roots by relying on the great teaching, so one must rely on the lesser? Relying on the great brings merit exceeding the Hīnayāna; why must one rely on the lesser? Moreover, in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka's study of the great, one does not even accept a single verse of other sūtras, nor may one be close to scholars of the Hīnayāna Tripiṭaka. Since you acknowledge it as definitive, why abandon this and not rely on it? Furthermore, the Yogācāra and others state: ‘First study one's own vehicle, and only then study other teachings.’ Unless one is of indeterminate gotra, there is no such sequence of lesser to greater or three to one. If one is suddenly enlightened, one does not first study the lesser. On what is this judgment based? The intent of the Daśacakra-sūtra is not to first preach the lesser to plant wholesome roots, nor is it that all are originally without gotra and later separated into five natures, as shown to be false above.
As for distinction in times described: this is agreeing that the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and Saṃdhinirmocana are earlier and later; accepting this is harmless. Yet saying Saṃdhinirmocana teaches the triyāna while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka retains only the one real—this principle is unacceptable. The second chapter of Saṃdhinirmocana states: ‘I teach the one pure path of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas, which accomplishes the paramārtha. There is only one pure path, no second. With this intention, I teach the ekayāna.’ How can one say it is a triyāna teaching? If you say it allows the indeterminate to convert while the determinate do not convert, thereby retaining two cessations, differing from the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka—this too is incorrect. Allowing the indeterminate to turn and advance refutes two cessations; while in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the three grasses and one ground remain permanently different, and the determinate are not given prediction, still retaining two cessations. If you say the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka allows those of determinate gotra to advance to the great, that contradicts the commentaries explaining the sūtra. Moreover, the śrāvakas predicted in the sūtra text are all indeterminate and transformed ones, as is fully clear in the text. It was precisely for these two kinds of śrāvakas in this assembly that it stated not one fails to become a buddha. Otherwise, why would the commentary explain that it was only for the benefit of these two persons and to prevent alarm and fear, and not for the determinate, that two parables were spoken to let them know the distinction of vehicles? Did Vasubandhu Bodhisattva fail to understand the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, while ordinary worldlings of the degenerate age grasp the sūtra's intent deeply?
If it is argued: Although Saṃdhinirmocana speaks of the ekayāna, it admits differences in gotra, so saying ‘only one’ is an intentional statement; this reconciles what came before, not what came after, for since the later was not yet spoken, how could it be reconciled beforehand? The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka also says: ‘Among those already spoken, now spoken, and to be spoken, this Saddharmapuṇḍarīka is foremost.’ How could it be said to be superior to sūtras not yet spoken? If an unspoken sūtra can be said to be surpassed, what fault is there in allowing that an unspoken sūtra was reconciled beforehand? Furthermore, the Buddha's three knowledges are ever brilliant and his four wisdoms eternally luminous; what fault is there in reconciling sūtras yet to be spoken? If you stubbornly disallow this, yet yourself cite: ‘Certain earlier sūtras implicitly teach later meanings, as in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa.’ If you believe an earlier text implicitly teaches a later meaning, why refuse to accept that an earlier text explicitly reconciles a later one?
Furthermore, ten arguments are adduced to prove the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka came after Saṃdhinirmocana. The first says: Saṃdhinirmocana teaches two cessations, while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka teaches none. This error was shown above. Up to the tenth: Saṃdhinirmocana allows a portion of the indeterminate gotra to attain buddhahood, while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka completely lacks two cessations. This error is just as above. As for the claim that the Laṅkāvatāra says even the agotraka icchantika will attain nirvāṇa: this also mistakenly takes the sūtra's intent. Why? The Laṅkāvatāra's lack of gotra is provisional for that time, not ultimate, because later, upon meeting a buddha, they are allowed to become buddhas. If you say that teaching agotraka means completely lacking the cause, when a bodhisattva gives rise to great compassion, does that lack all gotra just because he is also called agotraka? It is also said: The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says all will become buddhas. This too is incorrect. At first it says icchantikas lack buddhadhātu based on gotra as practice; later it says all have it based on gotra as principle. Otherwise, how could there be two statements, before and after? It is also said: Srotāpannas up to arhats all become buddhas, yet you do not understand my meaning. Also, among the seven persons in the Ganges, the anāgāmin fruit is said to include intermediate-birth nirvāṇa, etc. This Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra is an explicit teaching; how could it be completely without two cessations?
It is also claimed: This buddhadhātu teaching was spoken near nirvāṇa because the primary cause and distant fruit, the deep cause and distant fruit, are extremely difficult to believe, which is why it was spoken later. Saying the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra's cause is deep and fruit distant and hard to believe is generally accepted. But saying it was spoken last because it is hard to believe—this judgment is an error. Why? When the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra converts Subhadra, is he a superior person? The Bequeathed Teaching Sūtra says: ‘Lastly teaching the Dharma, he converted Subhadra; those who should be delivered have all been delivered.’ Only then was the Bequeathed Teaching spoken; could its cause be even deeper and its fruit more distant and harder to believe? Furthermore, in the Dayan Jing, rising after nirvāṇa to preach the Dharma for his mother, could that be even harder to believe and more explicit? Moreover, since it clarifies the Buddha repaying his mother's kindness by rising again after nirvāṇa, when Ānanda asked for the title, he answered: ‘It is named the Sūtra of Mother and Son Meeting, to be proclaimed to future generations,’ etc. This expressive and expressed teaching on repaying kindness differs from the earlier teachings and should be a sixth period. If that does not establish a period, how could yours do so? Taking the beginning to encompass the end, the remaining errors can all be known.