能顯中邊慧日論 2.12

There is an opinion: The tathāgatagarbha and the storehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna) are possessed equally by all sentient beings. This is called the gotra as nature (prakṛtistha-gotra), and is also called the original nature. What is subsequently perfumed is called the adventitious nature. Due to new perfuming (abhinava-vāsanā), the gotras of the five vehicles differ, and this is not fundamentally existent. Because tathatā and the mūlavijñāna are equal in nature, there is no distinction among any [beings]. This statement is unreasonable, because the proposition is false. Why is this? The tathatā-dharmadhātu and the eighth consciousness are possessed equally by all sentient beings; the authentic texts of the sūtras and treatises say so, and both the foolish and the wise agree. As for taking these to be the gotra as nature, the wise do not do so. Why? If this tathatā and the eighth consciousness were called the gotra as nature, then since all equally possess them, how could it be called sublime? It is called sublime because there are naturally present (dharmatā) anāsrava seeds, whose differences across the three vehicles are distinguished from the lack of gotra. Therefore, the first [chapter] of the *Bhadramāyākāra-vyākaraṇa* (or *Bodhisattva-śīla-sūtra*) first clarifies the "Chapter on Gotra as Wholesome Conduct" and does not speak of a chapter on gotra as principle. It also says: "Cultivating holy conduct and walking the path to the wholesome fruit of bodhi, there are ten dharmas that can gather all wholesome dharmas." The *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra* are both similar to this: they first clarify the chapter on the original nature's arousal of the mind, and only below do they clarify the gotra acquired through practice (samudānīta-gotra). Clarifying the acquired gotra within the gotra as nature is merely an explanation by contrast, not the primary topic. It has already adopted the characteristics verified by the six pāramitās from the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra*, saying that bodhisattvas by nature delight in giving, and so forth. The *Yogācārabhūmi* says: "Furthermore, bodhisattvas have the characteristics of the gotra of the six pāramitās; due to these characteristics..." and so forth. Moreover, the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra* says: "Because a person without gotra lacks gotra, even if they arouse the mind and diligently cultivate vigor, they will definitely not achieve ultimate anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi." Nor can one say that lacking the acquired gotra [is meant here], for how could this very arousal of the mind and diligent cultivation of vigor not be the acquired nature, yet it says they will ultimately never attain it? From this we know that there must be naturally present anāsrava seeds for it to be called the acquired gotra. If there were no original gotra, how could the acquired gotra arise? The *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* says: "Although there are many conditions, without a seed it will not arise, hence it is not made by another." The *Śīla-sūtra* also says: "If one lacks the bodhisattva-gotra, one cannot attain bodhi." Nor can one say it refers to one lacking the acquired nature, for the sūtra says: "Therefore it should be known that the bodhisattva-gotra does not exist because of arousing the mind." Since this acquired gotra is caused by arousing the mind, how could it say that the bodhisattva-gotra does not exist because of arousing the mind? Again, the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra* says: "If one lacks the bodhisattva-gotra, even if one possesses all expedient practices, one will ultimately not achieve unsurpassed bodhi." The *Śīla-sūtra* says: "Even if one is fully endowed with these four matters, if one lacks the bodhisattva-gotra, that one could attain anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi is impossible." Furthermore, the fourth fascicle of the *Buddhagotraśāstra* says, "Five [dharmas] without a beginning and associated with wholesome nature serve as phenomena," and the commentary explains: "'Without a beginning' means that because prajñā, great compassion, dhyāna, and the dharmakāya obtained through nature are all fundamentally existent, it is said to be without a beginning. Essence and function have never been separated, so they are said to be associated. Saying 'obtained through nature' means precisely not through perfuming." Since it says they are fundamentally existent and without a beginning, it is clear that they are not newly arisen; one cannot say that this statement refers to the principle of tathatā. The treatise says: "Because prajñā, great compassion, dhyāna, and the dharmakāya are all fundamentally existent." If it were speaking collectively only of tathatā, what would it be "along with"? Moreover, earlier it said that afflictions, karma, and vipāka are all without a beginning, thus granting three distinctions; now it says that four dharmas are all without a beginning, so how could it refer merely to principle? Furthermore, if original anāsrava seeds were not called the gotra as nature, why would the *Śīla-sūtra* name it the "Chapter on Gotra as Wholesome Conduct"? In addition, the *Buddhagotraśāstra* only allows that the nature of tathatā is non-existent [of defilement] so as to cause afflictions to be extinguished, but does not allow that it exists as an active nature. In the seventy-fourth fascicle of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna) is also [distinguished], and the substance of the eighth mind is likewise not the gotra as nature. The gotra as nature is its anāsrava fundamentally existent seeds. Since the substance of the eighth mind is sāsrava, how could it be the pradhāna-hetu for anāsrava? Therefore, Asvabhāva's *Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana*, fascicle three, says: "One has never seen poison turn into amṛta. The ālayavijñāna is like poison; how could it produce the transcendent, amṛta-like, pure mind?" Also, the Liang translation of the treatise says: "Why did the Buddha, the World-Honoured One, state that from hearing sounds from another and from one's own proper contemplation, by these two causes right view is born?" The commentary explains: "These two causes are the adhipati-pratyaya for right view. The cause spoken of now is the general name of hetupratyaya, speaking of a condition as a cause." Since it says that śrutavāsanā is an adhipati-pratyaya, it is clear that right view fundamentally has its own cause. Below it says that because vāsanā serves as a seed, the transcendent mind can arise. The treatise had already reconciled this above, so it does not explain it further below, intending that all should infer this accordingly, not merely referring to what is directly present. Hearing the name opens up perfuming, and the original seed of right view is also called perfuming, because it increases. Therefore, the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra* and other treatises also call it a cause and call it increase. Since this vāsanā is not subsumed under the ālayavijñāna, and is its antidote, it is clear that one cannot take the substance of the eighth [consciousness] as the bodhisattva gotra as nature and call it an equal cause. If you grant that it is anāsrava, then being the antidote to suffering and origin, it cannot be the cause for defiled phenomena. Therefore, the Liang translation says: "Since it is established as the antidote to defilement and the cause of the transcendent mind, it should not later be called the cause of impurities." If you say, "I take the qualities upon consciousness," then due to the natural presence or absence of gotra distinctions, the fundamentally existent gotra of practice is authentically taught everywhere. Not knowing that these fundamentally existent seeds are called the gotra as nature, and falsely taking tathatā and the eighth consciousness to be the gotra as nature—should one not feel ashamed? Should one not feel benighted? Because the original intention of Asvabhāva's *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* commentary is identical, I do not cite it fully. All treatises state that the vāsanā of anāsrava seeds is the cause; they do not say that the substance of tathatā or of the eighth consciousness is the direct janaka-hetu. Furthermore, tathatā does not rely on any phenomena, hence the *Ratnagotravibhāga* says, "Space does not rely on earth," and so forth. It also says, "The mind naturally pure in nature does not abide in those phenomena." Authentic teachings everywhere say this, so I will not trouble to cite them all. Why must you bring up the intention of the six āyatanas and insist on taking that tathatā? Furthermore, [the opponent] says: "The *Anuttarāśrayasūtra* says: 'The tathāgata-dhātu is inconceivable. All sentient beings possess the sublime characteristics and categories of skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, manifested internally and externally, flowing continuously from beginningless time, naturally obtained (dharmatā-pratilabdha).' Based on this sūtra text, it is precisely the tathatā-dhātu that is called the gotra as nature." This too is not so, for you have cited the sūtra erroneously to save your position. Based on this sūtra text, it is precisely the beginningless, natural gotra of practice that is called the sublime characteristics and categories of skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, flowing continuously internally and externally, naturally obtained. "Naturally obtained" means precisely dharmatā.

Here, if 'beneath citta, manas, and vijñāna' causes one to contemplate the principle of tathatā by relying on the paratantra, eliminating and severing defiled phenomena so that principle is revealed and wisdom is perfected, this is identical to the verse of the Madhyāntavibhāga: 'Unreal imagination exists; duality is entirely absent therein. In this there is only emptiness, and in that there is also this... Thus one accords with the Middle Way.' Without understanding this meaning, they cling to the realm of tathatā as possessing categories, manifesting internally and externally in a continuous stream. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: Chapter 8 of the Nirvāṇasūtra states, 'The buddhadhātu of sentient beings is not like this. Even though it is situated within the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, it is not identical to the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas.' This differs from the previous text, where the Anuttarāśrayasūtra says, 'There are categories of superior characteristics of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, manifesting internally and externally in a continuous stream.' This resembles the characteristics of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, whereas the Nirvāṇa[sūtra] says it is not like the characteristics of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas; hence principle and phenomena are distinct. Alternatively, in terms of the distinction between anāsrava and sāsrava, it is said not to be like that. Were it not so, how could it say 'even though it is situated within the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas'? Why is this? Tathatā is all-pervading; it cannot be spoken of as 'even though situated within the skandhas.' The term 'buddhadhātu' does not refer solely to principle; the practices of the six pāramitās and so forth are all called buddhadhātu. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: In the Pravaranṛpati[paripṛcchā], the earlier and later passages are distinct. The earlier states, 'The dharmatā of the Tathāgata resides within the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas of sentient beings, continuing in succession from beginningless time, unstained by defilements.' This is also not proof, for this speaks of the gotra of practice. Practice is also a dharma, because the word dharma is general. If it were the gotra of principle, its essential nature would be permanently abiding; how could it be said to 'continue in succession'? 'In succession' does not mean permanently abiding. Next it states, 'Pure dharmatā is the basis of all dharmas, but its own nature is without a basis.' This speaks of tathatā giving rise to all dharmas as an adhipati-pratyaya, not that it produces all dharmas as a sākṣāt-hetupratyaya. However, tathatā does not produce; it produces [merely] as an adhipati-pratyaya. If a single tathatā produced myriad virtues, how could there be fixed, distinct causes? The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra say, 'All virtues arise from mirror wisdom.' Since tathatā would directly produce [them], why rely on wisdom to produce them? Furthermore, [the opponent] says: The Buddhagotraśāstra states, 'The sunlight of the Buddha's wisdom causes the dharmakāya to generate the mind-made body and enhances the dharmakāya'; this corresponds to the primordial nature, identical to the Bodhisattvaśīlasūtra's 'dharmatā is naturally so.' This also is not proof. Since tathatā is called dharmatā, it is itself the dharmakāya; how could it cause production? Chapter 37 of the Nirvāṇasūtra says, 'The pāramitās and so forth are called jñāpaka-hetu.' One's own practice is still called a revealer; how could the Buddha's light directly be able to generate it? Moreover, previously you yourself said: although tathatā generates dharmas, tathatā does not produce. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: In the Awakening of Faith, the greatness of essence is the essence of tathatā; the greatness of characteristics is the characteristics of immeasurable intrinsic virtues; the greatness of function is that which can produce mundane and supramundane wholesome causes and effects. As for the greatness of function, because conditioned practices are the function of tathatā, they can produce all things. This too is not so. How could tathatā have active function? If it had active function, it would be identical to conditioned practices. If dharmas are able to arise through the adhipati function of tathatā, this principle is admissible, but it is not a generative function. The many passages below all intend to prove that tathatā and the essence of the eighth [consciousness] are called the prakṛtistha-gotra, meaning they are the pradhāna-hetu and janaka-hetu; whereas the remaining six pāramitās and so forth are the samudānīta-gotra, the pratyaya-hetu and jñāpaka-hetu. Only in the Buddhagotraśāstra is tathatā unproducing and lacking any other essence. In the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the ālaya is not a supramundane cause. Fascicle 5 of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says, 'Sixth is without difference and without arising, because true reality does not arise as a different substance.' If tathatā directly produced dharmas, there would be the arising of different substances. Fascicle 3 says, 'Sarvākārajñatā is said to be the Buddha's body.' It also says, 'Because transformed six pāramitās and all wholesome dharmas constitute the Buddha's body.' All treatises state that transforming the eight consciousnesses to accomplish the four wisdoms constitutes the Buddha's body; they do not say that tathatā produces it, nor is it merely the substance of the eighth. The remaining texts may be known accordingly. Extensive citations and tedious explanations should all be refuted. Another opinion holds: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi's establishment of the five distinct gotras contradicts reason and teaching. Regarding contradiction with reason: All sentient beings equally possess the mind of principle. By what distinct cause should one portion of sentient beings lack anāsrava bījas? Even granting there are anāsrava [bījas], by what cause are there again the three gotra divisions? If there is a cause, it is not natural (dharmatā); nor is it admissible that without a cause they should differ. [We reply:] Since you cling to all sentient beings equally possessing the mind of principle as the pradhāna-hetu, and since you accept that the mind of principle is completely equal, how could there exist the gotras of defiled, pure, good, evil, the three realms, the six destinies, and the triyāna? If there are other causes, the mind of principle is not the root. If they arise without distinct causes, how could they differ? If you claim they depend on conditions, conditions arise from tathatā. Since the cause of tathatā is one, conditions would also be identical; from what then could manifold distinctions arise? If all beings equally possess tathatā and share a single pradhāna-hetu, this would be identical to the Sāṃkhya and others [claiming] that sentient and insentient beings arise from a single cause, whose substance is permanent while the mahat and so forth are impermanent. Furthermore, you yourself offer an analogy: principle is like empty space, and the mind is like the realm of the emptiness of dharmas; sāsrava is like darkness, and anāsrava is like light; the destruction of darkness and the arising of light are directly produced by empty space and by fire, etc.—how could there previously exist a nature of light within darkness acting as the direct cause of light? This too is not so. By your analogy you contradict yourself. If principle is like empty space and the mind is like the realm of emptiness, since you say that the mind of principle is the direct cause of things, it would naturally be able to illuminate; why would it need separate fire? If it depends on separate fire, the separate fire itself acts as the cause of light; how could empty space and the realm of emptiness directly produce light? The remaining analogies and texts likewise all contradict themselves; you should reflect on them yourself, for it would be too tedious to cite them all. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: Vijñaptimātrata contradicts the correct teaching, as the prakṛtistha-gotra in the Bodhisattvaśīlasūtra is principle, not phenomenal fact. If you say it is phenomenal fact, what textual evidence is there? This too is not correct. Their arbitrary citations of texts have been briefly pointed out above, and the textual evidence for the gotra of practice has already been clarified previously. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: If the primordial nature has superior, middling, and inferior measures, this contradicts the Upāsakaśīlasūtra which says, 'Having superior, middling, and inferior is not the primordial nature.' It also contradicts the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the Mahāsaṃnipātasūtra, and others, [which show that] due to pratyaya-hetu, there is no triyāna gotra. If it were causeless and naturally obtained, it would contradict the Saṃdhinirmocana's having superior, middling, and inferior, not being causeless. This too is not so. If the primordial nature were not individually distinct, and the faculties and natures differed only due to conditions, how could superior, middling, and inferior lack their own pradhāna-hetu and have only condition-arisen causes? Since they themselves would have no seeds, what would conditions act upon? The Nirvāṇasūtra only states that nirvāṇa is attained from jñāpaka-hetu; it does not say that conditioned things are produced solely by pratyaya-hetu. That things are produced without seeds contradicts many sacred teachings.

According to the "Chapter on the Nature of Wholesome Practice" in the Bodhisattva-śīla-sūtra, which says: "Regarding superior faculties: the fundamental nature of bodhisattva mahāsattvas is sharp and keen, while the nature of pratyekabuddhas is middling, and the nature of śrāvakas is dull." Since it says that their fundamental nature is sharp and keen, it is clear that this is not due to an adventitious nature. Furthermore, the first fascicle of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says: "'Owing to the differentiation of dhātu': sentient beings have various dhātus, immeasurable dhātus, and many dhātus; sūtras say that owing to the differentiation of dhātu, one should know the differentiation of the gotras of the triyāna. Up to, 'Where there is no differentiation among the four fruits': the bodhi of sentient beings has inferior, middling, and superior [degrees], because the cause (bīja) and fruit resemble each other. If there were no difference in gotra, there would be no difference in fruit." This agrees with the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, which says that having superior, middling, and inferior [degrees] definitely depends on hetupratyaya. What the Mahāsaṃnipāta and other texts say regarding being due to pratyaya-hetu is stated in terms of the adhipatipratyaya, because there are four pratyayas, and thus it does not contradict the earlier teaching stating that it is not the fundamental nature. What is meant by "not by virtue of nature" is that it is not solely due to the nature, but also relies upon the adhipati[pratyaya]. Furthermore, conditioned arising is articulated with reference to what is not tathatā. The passages on the ālambanapratyaya-bīja of tathatā will be properly demonstrated below. If you say that the mind of principle is the pradhāna-hetu, how could the principle of tathatā become superior, middling, or inferior on account of pratyaya-hetu? Moreover, if the mind of principle is called the prakṛtistha-gotra, why can one not say that it is called a bodhisattva by virtue of this nature? Since, [in your view,] by saying "by virtue of nature" you do not accept that the active nature (samudānīta-gotra) is fundamentally existing, so too by saying "not by virtue of nature" you should attest that the mind of principle does not exist. Since this is not so, how could that be the case? Furthermore, you yourself say: "The defiled produces the undefiled." Why then do you not accept that the undefiled tathatā produces the undefiled? This also contradicts the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, as cited before. Furthermore, you say: "Because when milk lacks curd, it is granted that it produces curd, one can challenge: Since there is no milk in curd, curd should produce milk. And because curd does not produce milk, one should not allow milk to produce curd." This challenge is incorrect. Stating that milk without curd produces curd is the meaning of the Nirvāṇasūtra in challenging the doctrine that the effect exists within the cause; it is not refusing to grant that milk is the cause of curd. If you examine that text closely, you will naturally understand. Therefore, the first fascicle of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says: "Furthermore, 'that exists' because the substance of the cause exists. 'Non-existence' because the substance of the fruit does not exist. Question: If so, why is it called 'gotra'? Answer: Because it signifies the substance of virtues; 'crossing over' signifies producing virtues. By this principle, it is therefore called 'gotra'." Moreover, you challenge: "An ārya does not have the principle of becoming an ordinary person; can you then not accept that an ordinary person lacks an ārya nature and yet becomes an ārya?" It is not so. Who says that an ordinary person lacks an ārya nature and yet becomes an ārya? According to our thesis: An ordinary person who lacks an ārya nature does not become an ārya. You hold that: An ordinary person who lacks an ārya nature can become an ārya. What principle could prevent an ārya, lacking the nature of an ordinary person, from becoming an ordinary person? Furthermore, you say: "If you challenge that the unconditioned, as their fundamental nature, produces the anāsrava, it would be identical to the non-Buddhists taking a permanent entity as cause." In the second fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra, Mahāmati asked, and the Buddha himself explained: "I teach the emptiness of dharmas as the tathāgatagarbha, which is not the same as the non-Buddhists." This defense refers to not being the same as the non-Buddhists who grasp a separate, real self and call it the Tathāgata. The World-Honoured One taught the emptiness of dharmas as the tathāgatagarbha, provisionally named the Tathāgata, not being the same as the non-Buddhists. You grasp the unconditioned as possessing an inherently existent, permanent substance capable of producing everything; how does that differ from the non-Buddhists' primordial matter (prakṛti) and so forth? If you grasp that an empty substance can produce everything, this is identical to the doctrine of causelessness (ahetuvāda). It is also the same as Zhuangzi and Laozi's "producing existence from non-existence". If you grasp a permanent dharma as arising dependently as a condition, this further contradicts the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā. In its fourth fascicle, clarifying the characteristics of conditioned arising, it says: "Conditioned arising is impermanent." The commentary explains: "'Because this arises, that arises' reveals the meaning of impermanent conditioned arising. It is not because an unarisen dharma serves as a cause that any arisen dharma can be established." Under the meaning of conditioned arising, it says: "Because the cause perishes in an instant and the fruit arises in an instant, and their duration is equal, this is the meaning of the uninterrupted succession of cause and fruit." Nor can you say that this is spoken in terms of sāsrava and adventitious nature. In that treatise's contemplation in direct and reverse order, it says: "One should contemplate the meaning of conditioned arising in this way: everything is conditioned arising, with the sole exception of a portion of unconditioned dharmas belonging to the realm of mental objects (dharmāyatana); it does not exclude the anāsrava." Furthermore, if tathatā could produce the anāsrava, this would also contradict that treatise's explanation of hetupratyaya. The treatise also says: "Hetupratyaya refers to the wholesome vāsanā of the ālayavijñāna serving respectively as hetupratyaya for sāsrava and anāsrava dharmas. It is not that the substance of the sāsrava eighth consciousness is the cause of the anāsrava." As for citing the Anantanirdeśasūtra's statement that all dharmas arise from one dharma, and that the one dharma is the signless, and the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra's statement that "Although tathatā produces all dharmas, tathatā does not arise," this has already been analyzed above. Furthermore, you say: "How could the virtue of the Self in the sūtras be identical to the self of the non-Buddhists?" This defense is also incorrect. The Mahāyāna sūtras provisionally establish the names of the four virtues with respect to the meanings of permanence, bliss, self, and purity. Since non-Buddhists do not have an actual entity of a permanent self and yet conceive it with regard to what is impermanent and not-self, this can be different from non-Buddhists who conceive a permanent entity as a cause or arising without a cause. When you grasp a permanent entity as a cause, or arising without a cause, how is it any different? Nor can you take the Nirvāṇasūtra's statement, "Originally non-existent, now existent; having existed, returning to non-existence," as proof. The meaning of that passage is different: it does not speak of causelessness when saying "originally non-existent, now existent." It means: distinct from original non-existence, it arises from causes, hence it is called "originally non-existent, now existent"; having arisen, it immediately perishes, hence it is called "returning to non-existence." If you cling to the literal words and say that non-existence means causelessness and that having existed it returns to perishing, how could you grant and cling to the permanence of the saṃbhogabuddha? Furthermore, you ask yourself: "If a permanent dharma produces impermanent dharmas, why did the Buddha say to the non-Buddhists in the Nirvāṇasūtra: 'Your cause is permanent, but the fruit is impermanent. My cause is impermanent, but the fruit is permanent'?" Answer: Causes have remote causes and proximate causes; fruits have proximate fruits and remote fruits. Non-Buddhists have only a permanent cause, but lack a permanent fruit. In the Buddha's Dharma, the remote cause is permanent, while the proximate cause is impermanent; the remote fruit is permanent, while the proximate fruit is impermanent. This answer is utterly perverse. According to the thirty-third chapter of the Nirvāṇasūtra: "All wholesome karma is the cause of nirvāṇa. Causes are twofold: first, proximate; second, remote. The proximate is the three gates of liberation; the remote is the wholesome dharmas cultivated over immeasurable lifetimes." If the remote cause were permanent, it would be the truth of cessation; one could only speak of realization, not of cultivation. The twenty-seventh chapter says: "The cause of nirvāṇa is called the buddhadhātu. The name buddhadhātu is general: it is not only tathatā; the six pāramitās and other dharmas are all called buddhadhātu." The twenty-second chapter says: "Before attaining anuttarā bodhi, because the buddhadhātu is a cause, it belongs to the past, present, and future. The fruit is not like this: some belong to the three periods of time, and some do not belong to the three periods of time.

According to the intention of this passage, the cause is merit and wisdom, and the fruit encompasses wisdom and cessation; therefore, the cause spans the three periods of time, while the fruit is both temporal and non-temporal. If you say that tathatā is the remote cause, then the cause would also span the temporal and non-temporal; how could it only say 'the three periods of time'? The thirty-third chapter says: 'The buddhadhātu of sentient beings is like empty space; because it does not belong to the three periods of time, and because the buddhadhātu is permanent, it is not included in the three periods of time.' Furthermore, the Buddha himself answered: 'My cause is impermanent, and the fruit is permanent. Within the cause there are remote and proximate, and the cause spans the three periods of time.' Now someone takes their own ordinary mind to overturn the Buddha's teaching, saying that the remote cause is permanent and [the proximate is] impermanent, falsely contrasting proximate and remote causes and fruits to divide permanence and impermanence. Moreover, since you yourself maintain that tathatā produces dharmas, why can it only produce remotely as a remote cause, but cannot produce proximately as a proximate cause? Since the principle of tathatā is permanent, if it cannot act as a proximate cause, its remote operation would also be void. Its essential nature is unmoving; if it could remotely act as a cause, it would also do so proximately, because its substance has no difference before and after. The Buddha stated that the janaka-hetu is impermanent, yet you contradict the Buddha's statement by calling it permanent. The Buddha taught the non-existence of gotra [in some], yet you violate the Ārya's teaching by asserting gotra [in all]. This is taking one's own intellectual view as correct while treating the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas as mistaken. How is this different from waiting for rabbit horns to strike Mount Meru, or plucking turtle hairs to fill the Bohai Sea? How could that ever be achieved? How can you not reflect on this!