能顯中邊慧日論 2.12.3

2.12.3

准《善戒經．善行性品》云「言根勝者，菩薩摩訶薩本性猛利，緣覺性中聲聞性鈍。 」既云本性猛利，明非由客性。 又《大莊嚴論》第一云「由界差別者，眾生有種種界、無量界、多界，修多羅說由界差別故，應知三乘種性差別。 乃至無四果差別者，眾生菩提有下中上，子果相似故。 若無性差別，則無果差別。 」同《深密經》有上中下是定有因緣。 《大集》等說由緣因者，據增上說，有四緣故，不違前教言非本性也。 非以性故者，意云不唯由性，亦假增上。 又緣生約非如言詮。 真如所緣緣種子文，下當正示。 若云理心為其正因，豈可如理由緣因故成上中下？ 又復理心名性種性，何故不得云以性故名為菩薩？ 既以性故言不許行性本有，亦應不以性故言證理心非有。 此既不爾，彼云何然？ 又自云：漏生於無漏。 何故不許真如無漏生於無漏？ 又違《攝論》，如前已引。 又云：以乳無酪許生酪，即難酪中無乳應生酪。 以酪不生乳，即不許乳生酪者。 此難不爾。 云乳無酪而生酪者，《涅槃》經意，難因中有果論，不是不許乳為酪因。 細尋彼文，自當開曉。 故《大莊嚴》第一云「復次彼有者，因體有故。 非有者，果體非有故。 問：若爾，云何名性？ 答：功德體義故。 度者出生功德義故。 由此道理，是故名性。 」又難云：聖無作凡之理，豈不許凡無聖性而作聖者。 不爾。 誰言凡無聖性而作聖？ 如我立宗：凡無聖性不作聖。 汝立：凡無聖性得作聖。 何理能遮聖無凡性而作凡？ 又云：若難無為為其本性生無漏者，即同外道常法為因者。 《楞伽》第二，大慧為問，佛自釋云「我說法空為如來藏，不同外道」者，此救不同彼外道執別有實我名為如來。 世尊說法空為如來藏，假名如來，不同外道。 汝執無為有體常住能生一切，何異外道冥性等耶？ 若執體空能生一切，同無因論。 又同莊老從無生有。 若執常法為緣生起，復違《雜集》。 《雜集》第四辨緣生相中云「無常緣生故。 」釋云「此生故彼生者，顯無常緣生義。 非無生法為因故，少所生法而得成立。 」緣生義中云「因剎那滅、果剎那生，時分等故，是因果相續不斷義。 」亦不得云此據有漏及客性說。 彼論順逆觀中云「應如是觀緣生起義。 一切皆是緣生，唯除法處一分諸無為法，不除無漏故。 」又若真如能生無漏，復違彼論解因緣。 又論云「因緣者，謂阿賴耶識善習氣，與有漏無漏諸法，如其次第為因緣故。 非有漏第八識體為無漏因。 」引《無量義經》一切法從一法生一法者，所謂無相。 《大般若》云「真如雖生諸法，而真如不生」者，如前已辨。 又云：經中我德，豈即與彼外道我同者。 此救亦非。 諸大乘經於常樂我淨義假立四德名，外道無有常我等體，於非常我等計故，可不同外道計常法為因或無因起。 汝執常法為因，或無因起，如何有別？ 亦不得云《涅槃經》云「本無今有，有已還無。 」以此為證。 彼文意別，不說無因云本無今有。 云異本無，從因而起，云本無今有，起已即滅云還無。 若如文執言，無即無因，有已還滅，如何即許執報佛常住？ 又自問云：若常法生無常法者，何故《涅槃經》中佛語外道云：「汝因是常，果是無常。 我因無常，果是常」耶？ 答：因有遠因近因，果有近果遠果。 外道唯有常因，無其常果。 佛法遠因是常，近因無常； 遠果是常，近果無常。 此答令乖。 准《涅槃》三十三云「一切善業是涅槃因。 因有二：一近、二遠。 近即三解脫門，遠者無量世所修善法。 」若遠因常，即是滅諦，但可說證，不得說修。 二十七云「說涅槃因名為佛性。 佛性名通，非唯真如，六度等法并名佛性。 」二十二云「未得阿耨菩提時，佛性因故，是過去現世未來。 果則不爾，有是三世、有非三世。

According to the "Chapter on the Nature of Wholesome Practice" in the Bodhisattva-śīla-sūtra, which says: "Regarding superior faculties: the fundamental nature of bodhisattva mahāsattvas is sharp and keen, while the nature of pratyekabuddhas is middling, and the nature of śrāvakas is dull." Since it says that their fundamental nature is sharp and keen, it is clear that this is not due to an adventitious nature. Furthermore, the first fascicle of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says: "'Owing to the differentiation of dhātu': sentient beings have various dhātus, immeasurable dhātus, and many dhātus; sūtras say that owing to the differentiation of dhātu, one should know the differentiation of the gotras of the triyāna. Up to, 'Where there is no differentiation among the four fruits': the bodhi of sentient beings has inferior, middling, and superior [degrees], because the cause (bīja) and fruit resemble each other. If there were no difference in gotra, there would be no difference in fruit." This agrees with the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, which says that having superior, middling, and inferior [degrees] definitely depends on hetupratyaya. What the Mahāsaṃnipāta and other texts say regarding being due to pratyaya-hetu is stated in terms of the adhipatipratyaya, because there are four pratyayas, and thus it does not contradict the earlier teaching stating that it is not the fundamental nature. What is meant by "not by virtue of nature" is that it is not solely due to the nature, but also relies upon the adhipati[pratyaya]. Furthermore, conditioned arising is articulated with reference to what is not tathatā. The passages on the ālambanapratyaya-bīja of tathatā will be properly demonstrated below. If you say that the mind of principle is the pradhāna-hetu, how could the principle of tathatā become superior, middling, or inferior on account of pratyaya-hetu? Moreover, if the mind of principle is called the prakṛtistha-gotra, why can one not say that it is called a bodhisattva by virtue of this nature? Since, [in your view,] by saying "by virtue of nature" you do not accept that the active nature (samudānīta-gotra) is fundamentally existing, so too by saying "not by virtue of nature" you should attest that the mind of principle does not exist. Since this is not so, how could that be the case? Furthermore, you yourself say: "The defiled produces the undefiled." Why then do you not accept that the undefiled tathatā produces the undefiled? This also contradicts the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, as cited before. Furthermore, you say: "Because when milk lacks curd, it is granted that it produces curd, one can challenge: Since there is no milk in curd, curd should produce milk. And because curd does not produce milk, one should not allow milk to produce curd." This challenge is incorrect. Stating that milk without curd produces curd is the meaning of the Nirvāṇasūtra in challenging the doctrine that the effect exists within the cause; it is not refusing to grant that milk is the cause of curd. If you examine that text closely, you will naturally understand. Therefore, the first fascicle of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says: "Furthermore, 'that exists' because the substance of the cause exists. 'Non-existence' because the substance of the fruit does not exist. Question: If so, why is it called 'gotra'? Answer: Because it signifies the substance of virtues; 'crossing over' signifies producing virtues. By this principle, it is therefore called 'gotra'." Moreover, you challenge: "An ārya does not have the principle of becoming an ordinary person; can you then not accept that an ordinary person lacks an ārya nature and yet becomes an ārya?" It is not so. Who says that an ordinary person lacks an ārya nature and yet becomes an ārya? According to our thesis: An ordinary person who lacks an ārya nature does not become an ārya. You hold that: An ordinary person who lacks an ārya nature can become an ārya. What principle could prevent an ārya, lacking the nature of an ordinary person, from becoming an ordinary person? Furthermore, you say: "If you challenge that the unconditioned, as their fundamental nature, produces the anāsrava, it would be identical to the non-Buddhists taking a permanent entity as cause." In the second fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra, Mahāmati asked, and the Buddha himself explained: "I teach the emptiness of dharmas as the tathāgatagarbha, which is not the same as the non-Buddhists." This defense refers to not being the same as the non-Buddhists who grasp a separate, real self and call it the Tathāgata. The World-Honoured One taught the emptiness of dharmas as the tathāgatagarbha, provisionally named the Tathāgata, not being the same as the non-Buddhists. You grasp the unconditioned as possessing an inherently existent, permanent substance capable of producing everything; how does that differ from the non-Buddhists' primordial matter (prakṛti) and so forth? If you grasp that an empty substance can produce everything, this is identical to the doctrine of causelessness (ahetuvāda). It is also the same as Zhuangzi and Laozi's "producing existence from non-existence". If you grasp a permanent dharma as arising dependently as a condition, this further contradicts the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā. In its fourth fascicle, clarifying the characteristics of conditioned arising, it says: "Conditioned arising is impermanent." The commentary explains: "'Because this arises, that arises' reveals the meaning of impermanent conditioned arising. It is not because an unarisen dharma serves as a cause that any arisen dharma can be established." Under the meaning of conditioned arising, it says: "Because the cause perishes in an instant and the fruit arises in an instant, and their duration is equal, this is the meaning of the uninterrupted succession of cause and fruit." Nor can you say that this is spoken in terms of sāsrava and adventitious nature. In that treatise's contemplation in direct and reverse order, it says: "One should contemplate the meaning of conditioned arising in this way: everything is conditioned arising, with the sole exception of a portion of unconditioned dharmas belonging to the realm of mental objects (dharmāyatana); it does not exclude the anāsrava." Furthermore, if tathatā could produce the anāsrava, this would also contradict that treatise's explanation of hetupratyaya. The treatise also says: "Hetupratyaya refers to the wholesome vāsanā of the ālayavijñāna serving respectively as hetupratyaya for sāsrava and anāsrava dharmas. It is not that the substance of the sāsrava eighth consciousness is the cause of the anāsrava." As for citing the Anantanirdeśasūtra's statement that all dharmas arise from one dharma, and that the one dharma is the signless, and the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra's statement that "Although tathatā produces all dharmas, tathatā does not arise," this has already been analyzed above. Furthermore, you say: "How could the virtue of the Self in the sūtras be identical to the self of the non-Buddhists?" This defense is also incorrect. The Mahāyāna sūtras provisionally establish the names of the four virtues with respect to the meanings of permanence, bliss, self, and purity. Since non-Buddhists do not have an actual entity of a permanent self and yet conceive it with regard to what is impermanent and not-self, this can be different from non-Buddhists who conceive a permanent entity as a cause or arising without a cause. When you grasp a permanent entity as a cause, or arising without a cause, how is it any different? Nor can you take the Nirvāṇasūtra's statement, "Originally non-existent, now existent; having existed, returning to non-existence," as proof. The meaning of that passage is different: it does not speak of causelessness when saying "originally non-existent, now existent." It means: distinct from original non-existence, it arises from causes, hence it is called "originally non-existent, now existent"; having arisen, it immediately perishes, hence it is called "returning to non-existence." If you cling to the literal words and say that non-existence means causelessness and that having existed it returns to perishing, how could you grant and cling to the permanence of the saṃbhogabuddha? Furthermore, you ask yourself: "If a permanent dharma produces impermanent dharmas, why did the Buddha say to the non-Buddhists in the Nirvāṇasūtra: 'Your cause is permanent, but the fruit is impermanent. My cause is impermanent, but the fruit is permanent'?" Answer: Causes have remote causes and proximate causes; fruits have proximate fruits and remote fruits. Non-Buddhists have only a permanent cause, but lack a permanent fruit. In the Buddha's Dharma, the remote cause is permanent, while the proximate cause is impermanent; the remote fruit is permanent, while the proximate fruit is impermanent. This answer is utterly perverse. According to the thirty-third chapter of the Nirvāṇasūtra: "All wholesome karma is the cause of nirvāṇa. Causes are twofold: first, proximate; second, remote. The proximate is the three gates of liberation; the remote is the wholesome dharmas cultivated over immeasurable lifetimes." If the remote cause were permanent, it would be the truth of cessation; one could only speak of realization, not of cultivation. The twenty-seventh chapter says: "The cause of nirvāṇa is called the buddhadhātu. The name buddhadhātu is general: it is not only tathatā; the six pāramitās and other dharmas are all called buddhadhātu." The twenty-second chapter says: "Before attaining anuttarā bodhi, because the buddhadhātu is a cause, it belongs to the past, present, and future. The fruit is not like this: some belong to the three periods of time, and some do not belong to the three periods of time.