能顯中邊慧日論 2.12.2

2.12.2

此處若心意識下，令依依他處觀真如理，除斷染法、理顯智圓，同《辨中邊論》頌「虛妄分別有，於此二都無。 此中唯有空，於彼亦有此。 乃至是則契中道。 」不知此義，執真如界有其種類內外所現相續流來。 又云：《涅槃》第八云「眾生佛性則不如是。 雖復處在陰入界中，即不同於陰入界也」者。 不同前文，《無上依經》言「有陰入界勝相種類，內外所現相續流來。 」此同陰入界相，《涅槃》言不同陰入界相，故事理別。 或約無漏與有漏別，云不同彼。 不爾，如何言雖復處在陰入界中。 何以故？ 真如遍一切，不可說言雖處在陰中。 佛性之言非唯目理，六度等行皆名佛性。 又云：〈勝天王〉分前後文別。 前云「如來法性在有情類蘊界處中，從無始來展轉相續，煩惱不染。 」此亦非證，此說行性。 行亦是法，法言通故。 若是理性，體性常住，何得云展轉相續？ 相續者，非常住義。 次言「清淨法性為諸法本，自性無本。 」此說真如出生諸法者為增上緣，非親因緣出生諸法。 然如不生，是增上緣生。 若一如生萬德，何有定異因？ 《攝大乘》、《莊嚴論》云「諸功德從鏡智起」，如既親生，何假智生？ 又云：《佛性論》云「佛日慧光令法身生隨意身、長法身」，即當本性，同《善戒經》法性自爾者。 此亦非證。 既說真如名為法性，即是法身，何能令生？ 《涅槃經》三十七品「波羅蜜等是名了因」，自行尚名為了，佛光豈即能生？ 又前自云：如雖生法，真如不生故。 又云：《起信論》中，體大即真如體，相大即是無量性功德相，用即能生世出世善因果者。 用大，有為行是如用故，能生一切者。 此亦不爾。 真如豈有作用？ 若有作用，同諸行故。 如增上用諸法得生，此理可爾，不為生用。 已下多文，意皆證如及第八體名性種性，即名正因生因； 餘六度等即為習性，緣因了因。 唯《佛性論》真如不生有餘體。 《攝論》賴耶非出世因。 《大莊嚴》第五云「六者無異無起，由真實性非有異體起故。 」如若親生諸法，有異體起。 第三云「即說一切種智為佛身體。 」又云「轉六波羅蜜等一切善法為佛體故。 」諸論皆說，轉八識成四智為佛身，不說真如生，不唯第八體。 准知餘文。 廣引煩釋，皆應遮止。 有義：《成唯識論》立五性別，有違理教。 言違理者，一切眾生同有理心，有何別因一分眾生無無漏種？ 設有無漏，何因復有三乘性分？ 有因即非法爾，亦無因不合不同者。 既執一切眾生同有理心為正因，既許理心一切平等，如何得有染淨善惡三界六道三乘性種？ 若有餘因，理心非本。 無別因起，何合不同。 若謂待緣，緣從如起。 如因既一緣，亦同亦緣，從何生有種種別？ 若一切生同有真如、共一正因，同數論等從一因起情非情等，體是常住，大等無常。 又自舉喻，理若虛空、心如法空界，有漏同暗、無漏同明，暗滅明生，由於虛空及由火等親生，豈可暗中先有明性作明親因者。 此亦不爾。 准喻自違。 理若虛空、心同空界，既說理心作物親因，即自能明，何須殊火？ 若由殊火，殊火自作明因，豈是虛空及於空界親生明也。 餘喻及文并皆自違，應自思察，煩不能舉。 又云：唯識違於正教，如《善戒經》性種性者，是理非事。 若言是事，有何文證者。 此亦不然。 彼妄引文，如前略指，行性文證如前已明。 又言：若本性有上中下量，違《優婆塞戒經》云「有上中下，非本性也。 」亦違《正法華》、《大集經》等，由緣因故，無三乘性。 若是無因法爾自得，即違《深密》有上中下，非無因也者。 此亦不爾。 若非本性各自差別，但由緣故根性不同者，豈上中下無自正因，但緣起因。 既自無種，緣何所為？ 《涅槃經》中唯說涅槃從了因得，不說有為但緣因生。 無種而生，違多聖教。

Here, if 'beneath citta, manas, and vijñāna' causes one to contemplate the principle of tathatā by relying on the paratantra, eliminating and severing defiled phenomena so that principle is revealed and wisdom is perfected, this is identical to the verse of the Madhyāntavibhāga: 'Unreal imagination exists; duality is entirely absent therein. In this there is only emptiness, and in that there is also this... Thus one accords with the Middle Way.' Without understanding this meaning, they cling to the realm of tathatā as possessing categories, manifesting internally and externally in a continuous stream. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: Chapter 8 of the Nirvāṇasūtra states, 'The buddhadhātu of sentient beings is not like this. Even though it is situated within the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, it is not identical to the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas.' This differs from the previous text, where the Anuttarāśrayasūtra says, 'There are categories of superior characteristics of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, manifesting internally and externally in a continuous stream.' This resembles the characteristics of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, whereas the Nirvāṇa[sūtra] says it is not like the characteristics of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas; hence principle and phenomena are distinct. Alternatively, in terms of the distinction between anāsrava and sāsrava, it is said not to be like that. Were it not so, how could it say 'even though it is situated within the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas'? Why is this? Tathatā is all-pervading; it cannot be spoken of as 'even though situated within the skandhas.' The term 'buddhadhātu' does not refer solely to principle; the practices of the six pāramitās and so forth are all called buddhadhātu. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: In the Pravaranṛpati[paripṛcchā], the earlier and later passages are distinct. The earlier states, 'The dharmatā of the Tathāgata resides within the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas of sentient beings, continuing in succession from beginningless time, unstained by defilements.' This is also not proof, for this speaks of the gotra of practice. Practice is also a dharma, because the word dharma is general. If it were the gotra of principle, its essential nature would be permanently abiding; how could it be said to 'continue in succession'? 'In succession' does not mean permanently abiding. Next it states, 'Pure dharmatā is the basis of all dharmas, but its own nature is without a basis.' This speaks of tathatā giving rise to all dharmas as an adhipati-pratyaya, not that it produces all dharmas as a sākṣāt-hetupratyaya. However, tathatā does not produce; it produces [merely] as an adhipati-pratyaya. If a single tathatā produced myriad virtues, how could there be fixed, distinct causes? The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra say, 'All virtues arise from mirror wisdom.' Since tathatā would directly produce [them], why rely on wisdom to produce them? Furthermore, [the opponent] says: The Buddhagotraśāstra states, 'The sunlight of the Buddha's wisdom causes the dharmakāya to generate the mind-made body and enhances the dharmakāya'; this corresponds to the primordial nature, identical to the Bodhisattvaśīlasūtra's 'dharmatā is naturally so.' This also is not proof. Since tathatā is called dharmatā, it is itself the dharmakāya; how could it cause production? Chapter 37 of the Nirvāṇasūtra says, 'The pāramitās and so forth are called jñāpaka-hetu.' One's own practice is still called a revealer; how could the Buddha's light directly be able to generate it? Moreover, previously you yourself said: although tathatā generates dharmas, tathatā does not produce. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: In the Awakening of Faith, the greatness of essence is the essence of tathatā; the greatness of characteristics is the characteristics of immeasurable intrinsic virtues; the greatness of function is that which can produce mundane and supramundane wholesome causes and effects. As for the greatness of function, because conditioned practices are the function of tathatā, they can produce all things. This too is not so. How could tathatā have active function? If it had active function, it would be identical to conditioned practices. If dharmas are able to arise through the adhipati function of tathatā, this principle is admissible, but it is not a generative function. The many passages below all intend to prove that tathatā and the essence of the eighth [consciousness] are called the prakṛtistha-gotra, meaning they are the pradhāna-hetu and janaka-hetu; whereas the remaining six pāramitās and so forth are the samudānīta-gotra, the pratyaya-hetu and jñāpaka-hetu. Only in the Buddhagotraśāstra is tathatā unproducing and lacking any other essence. In the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the ālaya is not a supramundane cause. Fascicle 5 of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says, 'Sixth is without difference and without arising, because true reality does not arise as a different substance.' If tathatā directly produced dharmas, there would be the arising of different substances. Fascicle 3 says, 'Sarvākārajñatā is said to be the Buddha's body.' It also says, 'Because transformed six pāramitās and all wholesome dharmas constitute the Buddha's body.' All treatises state that transforming the eight consciousnesses to accomplish the four wisdoms constitutes the Buddha's body; they do not say that tathatā produces it, nor is it merely the substance of the eighth. The remaining texts may be known accordingly. Extensive citations and tedious explanations should all be refuted. Another opinion holds: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi's establishment of the five distinct gotras contradicts reason and teaching. Regarding contradiction with reason: All sentient beings equally possess the mind of principle. By what distinct cause should one portion of sentient beings lack anāsrava bījas? Even granting there are anāsrava [bījas], by what cause are there again the three gotra divisions? If there is a cause, it is not natural (dharmatā); nor is it admissible that without a cause they should differ. [We reply:] Since you cling to all sentient beings equally possessing the mind of principle as the pradhāna-hetu, and since you accept that the mind of principle is completely equal, how could there exist the gotras of defiled, pure, good, evil, the three realms, the six destinies, and the triyāna? If there are other causes, the mind of principle is not the root. If they arise without distinct causes, how could they differ? If you claim they depend on conditions, conditions arise from tathatā. Since the cause of tathatā is one, conditions would also be identical; from what then could manifold distinctions arise? If all beings equally possess tathatā and share a single pradhāna-hetu, this would be identical to the Sāṃkhya and others [claiming] that sentient and insentient beings arise from a single cause, whose substance is permanent while the mahat and so forth are impermanent. Furthermore, you yourself offer an analogy: principle is like empty space, and the mind is like the realm of the emptiness of dharmas; sāsrava is like darkness, and anāsrava is like light; the destruction of darkness and the arising of light are directly produced by empty space and by fire, etc.—how could there previously exist a nature of light within darkness acting as the direct cause of light? This too is not so. By your analogy you contradict yourself. If principle is like empty space and the mind is like the realm of emptiness, since you say that the mind of principle is the direct cause of things, it would naturally be able to illuminate; why would it need separate fire? If it depends on separate fire, the separate fire itself acts as the cause of light; how could empty space and the realm of emptiness directly produce light? The remaining analogies and texts likewise all contradict themselves; you should reflect on them yourself, for it would be too tedious to cite them all. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: Vijñaptimātrata contradicts the correct teaching, as the prakṛtistha-gotra in the Bodhisattvaśīlasūtra is principle, not phenomenal fact. If you say it is phenomenal fact, what textual evidence is there? This too is not correct. Their arbitrary citations of texts have been briefly pointed out above, and the textual evidence for the gotra of practice has already been clarified previously. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: If the primordial nature has superior, middling, and inferior measures, this contradicts the Upāsakaśīlasūtra which says, 'Having superior, middling, and inferior is not the primordial nature.' It also contradicts the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the Mahāsaṃnipātasūtra, and others, [which show that] due to pratyaya-hetu, there is no triyāna gotra. If it were causeless and naturally obtained, it would contradict the Saṃdhinirmocana's having superior, middling, and inferior, not being causeless. This too is not so. If the primordial nature were not individually distinct, and the faculties and natures differed only due to conditions, how could superior, middling, and inferior lack their own pradhāna-hetu and have only condition-arisen causes? Since they themselves would have no seeds, what would conditions act upon? The Nirvāṇasūtra only states that nirvāṇa is attained from jñāpaka-hetu; it does not say that conditioned things are produced solely by pratyaya-hetu. That things are produced without seeds contradicts many sacred teachings.