能顯中邊慧日論 2.16

2.16

有義：《瑜伽論》云「諸出世間法，從何種子生？若言麁重自性種子生，不應道理。答：諸出世間法，從真如所緣緣種子生，非彼習氣積集種子所生。」西方兩釋：一護法等云「此是緣真如智，以真如為所緣緣故，名真如所緣緣種子。」二難陀等云「是聞熏習種子，從佛正體智，各為真如所緣緣種子。」此二釋非。何以故？論云「若非習氣積集種子所生者，何因緣故建立三種涅槃法種性補特伽羅，及建立不般涅槃法補特伽羅。所以者何？一切皆有真如所緣緣故。」准此難意，真如皆有，無其勝劣，因何分三乘性及有無性？不合可答家以非一切皆有智種答。難家將一切皆有真如為難，為難之法牒釋難故、同一文故。又論自為問答，不可言難家不得答意，故知答家以真如為種答，難家即云不得有無不同，故知真如能為種生，同《大般若》「真如雖生諸法，真如不生」者。此亦不爾。所以者何？若以真如為種生法，過失如前，不平等因為妄中說。云二師釋與論相違者。此亦不爾，釋不違論。何以故？答意以真如為所緣緣之能緣之智種，為出世法因。難意既以真如為所緣，既遍有能緣，亦應一切皆成。何故得立有無性別？若即真如為種能生，應但云從真如種子生出世法，何須云真如所緣緣種子生因？天親《般若論》云「若一切時一切處實有真如，何故有人能得有不得者？頌答云『時及處實有，而不得真如。無智以住法，餘者有智得。』」釋云「何故不得？彼無智以心住法，彼以不清淨故。以有智者心不住法，是故能得。」准此論意，明如遍難。雙舉智障以答彼難，明知法爾種性無有。若不爾者，但應舉住法，何須說智耶？故《瑜伽論》以有畢竟障種子及法爾本有無漏種分五性別。《般若論》中以如遍難，舉智及障答。《瑜伽》以如遍難，偏舉障答。意顯智種有無不同，不由謗法。若由謗法立性不同，即應但立有性，無性不應分四。又復謗法，大乘處處皆許悔淨，豈慈氏不知，云畢竟不可斷？又復謗法造五逆業感惡道報，但煩惱障，何開所知？云有畢竟所知障種子附在所依非煩惱障種子者，於彼一分建立聲聞種性、一分建立獨覺種性，豈可二乘由為謗法名無種性？彼許二乘得無學果，即受變易迴心向大，豈可所知障畢竟不可斷？又若謗二空即《大莊嚴論》時邊四中普斷諸善根，非畢竟無因者。不爾，普斷善外，更何業重為畢竟障？又若由障名不可斷，即合明舉，何故別說畢竟無因？又若真如為種親生出世間法，略有四過：一前後相違過。自前本性門中，即說無漏從有漏心生。今說真如生，定從何是？二門相違。二聖教相違過。《瑜伽》、《攝論》種子義中皆云一剎那滅者，生已無間即滅壞故，無有常法得成種子，於一切時無差別故。不可難云：法爾種子不與能熏相應熏成，何得名種者。不爾，七義釋種子義，能熏所熏釋熏習義。又本有種由熏增長，不說熏生；說熏生者，是新熏種。三自宗相違過。違《佛性論》有體生無體。名許真如親生出世，即應云二有體生有體，何故說一？四進退相違過。若從有漏生無漏者，復違五十二不說麁重自相種生故。更有多過，如前已辨，所餘義准此知矣。

An opinion states: The Yogācārabhūmi says: "From what bījas do all supramundane dharmas arise? If one says that they arise from bījas that have dauṣṭhulya as their nature, that is illogical. Answer: All supramundane dharmas arise from the bīja whose ārambaṇapratyaya is tathatā; they do not arise from bījas accumulated through those vāsanās." In the Western region there are two explanations. First, Dharmapāla and others say: "This is the cognition that takes tathatā as its object; because it takes tathatā as its ārambaṇapratyaya, it is called 'the bīja whose ārambaṇapratyaya is tathatā'." Second, Nanda and others say: "It is the bījas of śrutavāsanā, which, arising from the Buddha's non-conceptual fundamental cognition, each serve as the bīja whose ārambaṇapratyaya is tathatā." Neither of these two explanations is correct. Why is that? The treatise says: "If they do not arise from bījas accumulated through vāsanās, for what reason are there established the persons of three kinds of gotra possessing the dharma of nirvāṇa, as well as the person who does not have the dharma of parinirvāṇa? What is the reason? Because all possess tathatā as an ārambaṇapratyaya." According to the intention of this objection: tathatā is possessed by all and has neither superiority nor inferiority; why then distinguish between the three vehicles' gotras and having versus not having gotra? It would be improper for the respondent to answer that not all possess the bījas of cognition. The objector poses the difficulty taking the premise that all possess tathatā, and the law of posing difficulties repeats and explicates the challenge, belonging to one and the same text. Furthermore, the treatise poses questions and answers by itself; one cannot say that the objector fails to grasp the intention of the answer. Thus we know that the respondent answered taking tathatā as the bīja, and the objector then said that there should not be differences of having or lacking it. Hence we know that tathatā is capable of serving as a bīja that produces, just like the Mahāprajñāpāramitā says: "Although tathatā produces all dharmas, tathatā does not produce." This too is not so. Why is that? If one takes tathatā as a bīja producing dharmas, the fault is as before, which was explained in the refutation of an unequal cause. As for stating that the two masters' explanations contradict the treatise, this too is not so; the explanations do not contradict the treatise. Why? The respondent's intention is that the bīja of the cognition that cognizes, which takes tathatā as its ārambaṇapratyaya, is the cause of supramundane dharmas. The objector's intention is that since tathatā is the object, and since it is omnipresent, the cognition that cognizes should also be attained by all; why then can one establish the distinction between having and lacking gotra? If tathatā itself were the bīja capable of producing, one should merely say that supramundane dharmas arise from the bīja of tathatā; why need one say "the productive cause that is the bīja whose ārambaṇapratyaya is tathatā"? Vasubandhu's Prajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "If tathatā really exists at all times and in all places, why do some people attain it while others cannot? The verse answers: 'Though it really exists at all times and places, / One does not attain tathatā: / Because the ignorant abide in dharmas, / While the others, being wise, attain it.'" The commentary says: "Why do they not attain it? Those ignorant persons abide in dharmas with their minds; because they are impure, [they do not attain it]. Because the wise do not abide in dharmas with their minds, they are therefore able to attain it." According to the intent of this treatise, it clarifies the objection concerning the omnipresence of tathatā. It brings up both cognition and hindrances to answer that difficulty, clearly knowing that by dharmatā gotra is lacking. If it were not so, one should only bring up abiding in dharmas; why would one need to speak of cognition? Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi divides the five distinct gotras on the basis of having bījas of perpetual hindrances and bījas that are anāsrava from beginningless time by dharmatā. In the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa, in response to the objection of tathatā's omnipresence, it answers by citing both cognition and hindrances; the Yogācārabhūmi, in response to the objection of tathatā's omnipresence, exclusively cites hindrances in reply. The intent is to reveal that the presence or absence of cognitive bījas is not identical, not that it is due to slandering the Dharma. If the establishment of distinct gotras were due to slandering the Dharma, then one should only establish having gotra, and lacking gotra should not be divided into four. Furthermore, as for slandering the Dharma, everywhere in the Mahāyāna it is permitted that one repents and becomes pure; how could Maitreya not know this, saying that it is perpetually impossible to sever? Furthermore, slandering the Dharma and committing the five heinous acts bring about the retribution of bad destinies, which is only the affliction hindrance (kleśāvaraṇa); how could it expand into the cognitive hindrance (jñeyāvaraṇa)? When it is said that bījas of perpetual cognitive hindrances reside in the basis without bījas of affliction hindrances, one portion of them establishes the śrāvaka-gotra, and one portion establishes the pratyekabuddha-gotra—how could the two vehicles be called agotraka on account of slandering the Dharma? If they hold that the two vehicles attain the fruit of aśaikṣa and then receive the transformation body, redirecting their minds toward the Great [Vehicle], how could the cognitive hindrance be perpetually impossible to sever? Furthermore, if slandering the two kinds of emptiness is the cutting off of all roots of goodness among the four temporal conditions in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, not a perpetual lack of cause, [we reply:] this is not so; apart from universally cutting off goodness, what heavier karma could there be that acts as a perpetual hindrance? Furthermore, if it is called impossible to sever on account of hindrances, one should state it explicitly; why separately speak of being perpetually without cause? Furthermore, if tathatā as a bīja directly produces supramundane dharmas, there are briefly four faults: First, the fault of self-contradiction between before and after: earlier, in the section on the original nature, it was stated that the anāsrava arises from the sāsrava mind; now one says that it arises from tathatā—which of the two doctrines is definitively correct? Second, the fault of contradicting sacred teachings: in the Yogācārabhūmi and Mahāyānasaṃgraha, regarding the meaning of bīja, both say that it perishes in a single kṣaṇa, because once arisen, it is destroyed without interval; there is no permanent dharma that can become a bīja, because at all times it is without distinction. One cannot object: "If the bījas of dharmatā do not correspond with and are not perfumed by an active perfumer, how can they be called bījas?" That is not so; the seven characteristics explain the meaning of bīja, and active perfumer and that which is perfumed explain the meaning of vāsanā. Moreover, upapattipratilambhika-bījas increase through perfuming, but are not said to be produced through perfuming; what is said to be produced through perfuming is abhinava-vāsanā. Third, the fault of contradicting one's own school: this contradicts the Buddhagotraśāstra's statement that what has substantial existence produces what lacks substantial existence. If one accepts that tathatā directly produces the supramundane, one should say that two existent substances produce an existent substance; why say only one? Fourth, the fault of progressive and regressive contradiction: if the anāsrava arises from the sāsrava, it further contradicts the fifty-second [fascicle], which does not state that it arises from bījas whose specific characteristic is dauṣṭhulya. There are still more faults, as analyzed above; the remaining meanings may be known by analogy to this.