能顯中邊慧日論 2.16

2.16

An opinion states: The Yogācārabhūmi says: "From what bījas do all supramundane dharmas arise? If one says that they arise from bījas that have dauṣṭhulya as their nature, that is illogical. Answer: All supramundane dharmas arise from the bīja whose ārambaṇapratyaya is tathatā; they do not arise from bījas accumulated through those vāsanās." In the Western region there are two explanations. First, Dharmapāla and others say: "This is the cognition that takes tathatā as its object; because it takes tathatā as its ārambaṇapratyaya, it is called 'the bīja whose ārambaṇapratyaya is tathatā'." Second, Nanda and others say: "It is the bījas of śrutavāsanā, which, arising from the Buddha's non-conceptual fundamental cognition, each serve as the bīja whose ārambaṇapratyaya is tathatā." Neither of these two explanations is correct. Why is that? The treatise says: "If they do not arise from bījas accumulated through vāsanās, for what reason are there established the persons of three kinds of gotra possessing the dharma of nirvāṇa, as well as the person who does not have the dharma of parinirvāṇa? What is the reason? Because all possess tathatā as an ārambaṇapratyaya." According to the intention of this objection: tathatā is possessed by all and has neither superiority nor inferiority; why then distinguish between the three vehicles' gotras and having versus not having gotra? It would be improper for the respondent to answer that not all possess the bījas of cognition. The objector poses the difficulty taking the premise that all possess tathatā, and the law of posing difficulties repeats and explicates the challenge, belonging to one and the same text. Furthermore, the treatise poses questions and answers by itself; one cannot say that the objector fails to grasp the intention of the answer. Thus we know that the respondent answered taking tathatā as the bīja, and the objector then said that there should not be differences of having or lacking it. Hence we know that tathatā is capable of serving as a bīja that produces, just like the Mahāprajñāpāramitā says: "Although tathatā produces all dharmas, tathatā does not produce." This too is not so. Why is that? If one takes tathatā as a bīja producing dharmas, the fault is as before, which was explained in the refutation of an unequal cause. As for stating that the two masters' explanations contradict the treatise, this too is not so; the explanations do not contradict the treatise. Why? The respondent's intention is that the bīja of the cognition that cognizes, which takes tathatā as its ārambaṇapratyaya, is the cause of supramundane dharmas. The objector's intention is that since tathatā is the object, and since it is omnipresent, the cognition that cognizes should also be attained by all; why then can one establish the distinction between having and lacking gotra? If tathatā itself were the bīja capable of producing, one should merely say that supramundane dharmas arise from the bīja of tathatā; why need one say "the productive cause that is the bīja whose ārambaṇapratyaya is tathatā"? Vasubandhu's Prajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "If tathatā really exists at all times and in all places, why do some people attain it while others cannot? The verse answers: 'Though it really exists at all times and places, / One does not attain tathatā: / Because the ignorant abide in dharmas, / While the others, being wise, attain it.'" The commentary says: "Why do they not attain it? Those ignorant persons abide in dharmas with their minds; because they are impure, [they do not attain it]. Because the wise do not abide in dharmas with their minds, they are therefore able to attain it." According to the intent of this treatise, it clarifies the objection concerning the omnipresence of tathatā. It brings up both cognition and hindrances to answer that difficulty, clearly knowing that by dharmatā gotra is lacking. If it were not so, one should only bring up abiding in dharmas; why would one need to speak of cognition? Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi divides the five distinct gotras on the basis of having bījas of perpetual hindrances and bījas that are anāsrava from beginningless time by dharmatā. In the Prajñāpāramitopadeśa, in response to the objection of tathatā's omnipresence, it answers by citing both cognition and hindrances; the Yogācārabhūmi, in response to the objection of tathatā's omnipresence, exclusively cites hindrances in reply. The intent is to reveal that the presence or absence of cognitive bījas is not identical, not that it is due to slandering the Dharma. If the establishment of distinct gotras were due to slandering the Dharma, then one should only establish having gotra, and lacking gotra should not be divided into four. Furthermore, as for slandering the Dharma, everywhere in the Mahāyāna it is permitted that one repents and becomes pure; how could Maitreya not know this, saying that it is perpetually impossible to sever? Furthermore, slandering the Dharma and committing the five heinous acts bring about the retribution of bad destinies, which is only the affliction hindrance (kleśāvaraṇa); how could it expand into the cognitive hindrance (jñeyāvaraṇa)? When it is said that bījas of perpetual cognitive hindrances reside in the basis without bījas of affliction hindrances, one portion of them establishes the śrāvaka-gotra, and one portion establishes the pratyekabuddha-gotra—how could the two vehicles be called agotraka on account of slandering the Dharma? If they hold that the two vehicles attain the fruit of aśaikṣa and then receive the transformation body, redirecting their minds toward the Great [Vehicle], how could the cognitive hindrance be perpetually impossible to sever? Furthermore, if slandering the two kinds of emptiness is the cutting off of all roots of goodness among the four temporal conditions in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, not a perpetual lack of cause, [we reply:] this is not so; apart from universally cutting off goodness, what heavier karma could there be that acts as a perpetual hindrance? Furthermore, if it is called impossible to sever on account of hindrances, one should state it explicitly; why separately speak of being perpetually without cause? Furthermore, if tathatā as a bīja directly produces supramundane dharmas, there are briefly four faults: First, the fault of self-contradiction between before and after: earlier, in the section on the original nature, it was stated that the anāsrava arises from the sāsrava mind; now one says that it arises from tathatā—which of the two doctrines is definitively correct? Second, the fault of contradicting sacred teachings: in the Yogācārabhūmi and Mahāyānasaṃgraha, regarding the meaning of bīja, both say that it perishes in a single kṣaṇa, because once arisen, it is destroyed without interval; there is no permanent dharma that can become a bīja, because at all times it is without distinction. One cannot object: "If the bījas of dharmatā do not correspond with and are not perfumed by an active perfumer, how can they be called bījas?" That is not so; the seven characteristics explain the meaning of bīja, and active perfumer and that which is perfumed explain the meaning of vāsanā. Moreover, upapattipratilambhika-bījas increase through perfuming, but are not said to be produced through perfuming; what is said to be produced through perfuming is abhinava-vāsanā. Third, the fault of contradicting one's own school: this contradicts the Buddhagotraśāstra's statement that what has substantial existence produces what lacks substantial existence. If one accepts that tathatā directly produces the supramundane, one should say that two existent substances produce an existent substance; why say only one? Fourth, the fault of progressive and regressive contradiction: if the anāsrava arises from the sāsrava, it further contradicts the fifty-second [fascicle], which does not state that it arises from bījas whose specific characteristic is dauṣṭhulya. There are still more faults, as analyzed above; the remaining meanings may be known by analogy to this.