能顯中邊慧日論 2.5

2.5

有義：若人同時異，先說實滅無性、後說不滅有性；若人異時同，先後不定。然一分無性、二乘實滅，定是小乘；悉有佛性、二乘無滅，是大乘義。此不應然，謬前後。所以者何？若云人同時異先說實滅無性等者，此據何人說？若據菩薩，不應道理。若據聲聞，何教先後？若小乘教先實滅無性，諸大乘中亦說實滅一分無性。若大乘經，定知何經先為小說？何經先為大說？若《般若》、《深密》等先為小說，《般若》廣明第一義空、《深密》廣明六度三性，《般若》說眾生空、《深密》說空，皆歸三性，已明有性。如何得言先說無性、後說有性？又彼自執真如及心為正因性，豈有已前大乘及大乘師立真如及心不遍有情耶？若云據五乘性，亦彼自執五性後有，非本法爾。准此，即有未成五性已前之位還是一分無性之者。前教同此，何非了義？若云：後教雖有，現無，皆悉當有，故不同前者。不爾，如《涅槃經》、《優婆塞經》等云「乳中無酪，石中無金」，為說因無？為果非有？若無因性，後能為因，不應道理。亦應從一切能生於一切，以無因性為彼因故。若云無果，大小因許因中無果，前後何殊？獨云前說一分無性小乘，非了三乘。准妄可悉。又云：一分無性二乘實滅定是小乘，悉有佛性二乘無滅是大乘義。此不應然，謬定大小故。何者？若一分無性名為小乘，一切有性皆名大乘，即分別部皆有佛性，經部、一說部總名無實滅，應皆大乘。又以小乘有說實滅及生無性，大乘亦說爾，即云隨轉小乘亦說一切有性二乘無滅。又《佛性論》中，大眾部執皆有佛性即第一義空，大乘同彼，應隨轉門。又大乘中但說六識是隨轉門，《涅槃經》中亦但說六，亦是隨轉。此既隨轉，一切有性應許隨轉；此既不爾，彼云何然？故知不可說同小乘皆為隨轉。如《理門》云「外道亦六根境識，佛法同彼，豈邪教耶？」又云「大小雖別，然皆不說見道已前成熟有為真無漏已。」此亦不爾，豈可不許二乘聖者回心向大，執見道前定不成熟有為無漏？又云：小乘中說，初無漏心無同類因，名剎那法。故知大小同說異生位中未成有為真無漏法者。此亦不爾。何以故？《佛性論》中分別部師不信有無性，《異部論》中經量部師異生位中成就聖法，《瑜伽論》說地獄成就三無漏根，《楞伽》第四無漏習氣非剎那法，《攝大乘論》從同類生。如何獨信薩婆多師無漏心無同類因，不信經部、分別部師及《瑜伽》等說有無漏？然《涅槃經》云乳中無酪性者，為破彼執因中有果，故彼經云「若菴摩羅子有彼樹性，云何不見立五丈之質？」上下經意非唯一處同《瑜伽》、《顯揚》破因中果果論。不爾，如何經云「若一切眾生無佛性者，云何而得阿耨菩提？以正因故，故令眾生得。」阿耨，所謂佛性。前言無佛性，無佛果性。彼云佛性為因，即是有佛因性。若云見道前總無有為無漏種者，豈不但是卒意所談，不依經論又自引文。若以一滴頗求樹汁投之乳中，即便成酪。若本有酪，何為待緣？眾生佛性亦復如是。此意如乳為因，酪即為果。若已有酪，乳何待緣？眾生佛性亦復如是者，若已成佛，何假修因？既待修因，明未有佛，非是不許有佛性因。審文解意，此義即顯。復引《菩薩優婆塞戒經》云「三種菩提無有定性，乃至若言定有性者，是名外道」者。此破如言執定有性，因中有果。同《涅槃經》云「非有如虛空，不說令無猶如兔角。」又若如言不許有性，至見道後亦應無性。說三菩提無有定性，不簡因果故，如何是撥異生位中無無漏種？餘文准此可以得知。

Another opinion states: If people are at the same time but of different capacities, real extinction and lack of gotra are taught first, and non-extinction and possession of gotra are taught later; if people are different but the time is the same, the sequence is not fixed. However, that one portion lacks gotra and that the dviyāna undergo real extinction is definitely the Hīnayāna; that all possess the buddhadhātu and the dviyāna have no extinction is the Mahāyāna teaching. This is not so; it errs regarding sequence. Why is this? If it is claimed that when people are at the same time but different, real extinction and lack of gotra are taught first, based on what kind of person is this said? If it is based on the bodhisattva, this is illogical. If it is based on the śrāvaka, what teaching comes first and what later? If the Hīnayāna teachings first taught real extinction and lack of gotra, the various Mahāyāna scriptures also teach real extinction and that one portion lacks gotra. If it concerns Mahāyāna sūtras, how can one determine which sūtras were first taught for the Hīnayāna and which were first taught for the Mahāyāna? If the Prajñāpāramitā, Saṃdhinirmocana, and so forth were first taught for the Hīnayāna: the Prajñāpāramitā extensively clarifies paramārtha-śūnyatā, the Saṃdhinirmocana extensively clarifies the six pāramitās and the three natures; the Prajñāpāramitā speaks of the emptiness of sentient beings, and the Saṃdhinirmocana speaks of emptiness, both resolving into the three natures, thus already clarifying that there is a gotra. How then can one say that lack of gotra was taught first, and possession of gotra was taught later? Furthermore, they themselves hold tathatā and the mind to be the nature of the pradhāna-hetu; could there be an earlier Mahāyāna teaching or Mahāyāna master establishing that tathatā and mind do not pervade sentient beings? If they claim it is based on the gotras of the pañcayāna, they also themselves hold that the five gotras exist later and are not fundamental dharmatā. Following this, prior to having established the five gotras, those stages would still be those of a portion lacking gotra. Since the earlier teaching is identical to this, why would it not be definitive? If they say: 'Although present in the later teaching, it is presently absent and will definitely be present in the future, and therefore it is not the same as the former': this is not so. As the Nirvāṇa Sūtra and the Upāsaka-śīla Sūtra say: 'There is no curd in milk, and no gold in rock'—is this saying that the cause is absent, or that the fruit does not exist? If the causal nature were absent, and yet could later serve as a cause, this would be illogical. It would also follow that everything could arise from everything, because what lacks a causal nature would be its cause. If they say the fruit is absent, both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna accept that the fruit is absent in the cause; what difference is there between before and after? Why alone say that the earlier teaching that one portion lacks gotra is Hīnayāna and does not definitively reveal the triyāna? One can understand this by looking at their delusion. Moreover, they say: that one portion lacks gotra and that the dviyāna undergo real extinction is definitely Hīnayāna; that all have buddhadhātu and the dviyāna have no extinction is the Mahāyāna doctrine. This is not so, because it mistakenly defines the Great and Lesser Vehicles. How so? If that one portion lacks gotra is called Hīnayāna, and that all possess the nature is called Mahāyāna, then the Vibhajyavādin hold that all have the buddhadhātu, and the Sautrāntika and Ekavyāvahārika generally maintain there is no real extinction—should they all be Mahāyāna? Furthermore, because the Hīnayāna speaks of real extinction and the lack of nature among living beings, and the Mahāyāna also speaks thus, they claim that according to the compliant Hīnayāna, it also speaks of all having the nature and the dviyāna having no extinction. Moreover, in the Buddhagotraśāstra, the Mahāsāṃghika hold that all have the buddhadhātu, which is paramārtha-śūnyatā; if the Mahāyāna is identical to them, it should be an accommodated teaching. Furthermore, that the Mahāyāna only teaches six consciousnesses is an accommodated teaching, and that the Nirvāṇa Sūtra also only teaches six is also an accommodated teaching. Since this is an accommodated teaching, all possessing the nature should also be accepted as an accommodated teaching; since this is not the case, how could that be so? Therefore, one knows that one cannot say that being identical to Hīnayāna makes them all accommodated teachings. As the Nyāyamukha says: 'Non-Buddhists also accept the six sense bases, objects, and consciousnesses; if the Buddha's Dharma is identical to them, is it thereby a false teaching?' Moreover, they say: 'Although the Great and Lesser Vehicles differ, neither speaks of having matured conditioned, genuine anāsrava [dharmas] prior to the path of seeing.' This too is not so. How could one not accept that the holy beings of the dviyāna turn their minds toward the Mahāyāna, and instead hold that they definitely do not mature conditioned anāsrava [dharmas] before the path of seeing? Furthermore, they say: 'In the Hīnayāna it is said that the initial anāsrava mind has no sabhāga-hetu, and is called a momentary dharma. Thus we know that the Great and Lesser Vehicles both teach that in the stage of an ordinary being, one has not yet matured conditioned, genuine anāsrava dharmas.' This too is not so. Why? In the Buddhagotraśāstra, the masters of the Vibhajyavādin do not believe in the absence of gotra; in the Samayabhedoparacanacakra, the masters of the Sautrāntika maintain that holy dharmas are achieved in the stage of an ordinary being; the Yogācārabhūmi states that beings in the hells achieve the three anāsrava indriyas; in the fourth fascicle of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, anāsrava impressions are not momentary dharmas; and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that they arise from sabhāga-hetu. Why do they solely believe the Sarvāstivādin masters who hold that the anāsrava mind has no sabhāga-hetu, while not believing the Sautrāntika, Vibhajyavādin, and the Yogācārabhūmi, which teach that anāsrava [dharmas] exist? However, when the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says that milk lacks the nature of curd, it is to refute their attachment to the fruit existing in the cause. Therefore that sūtra says: 'If an āmalaka seed possessed the nature of that tree, why do we not see a trunk of fifty feet standing?' The intent of the scripture from beginning to end is not found in just one place, and agrees with the Yogācārabhūmi and Prakaraṇāryavācā in refuting the doctrine that the effect exists within the cause. If this were not so, how could the sūtra say: 'If all sentient beings lacked the buddhadhātu, how could they attain anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi? It is because of the pradhāna-hetu that sentient beings are enabled to attain' anuttara[samyaksaṃbodhi], which is the so-called buddhadhātu? The earlier statement of lacking buddhadhātu referred to lacking the nature of the Buddha's fruit. That other statement of buddhadhātu as cause refers precisely to having the causal nature of a Buddha. If they say that prior to the path of seeing there are entirely no conditioned anāsrava bījas, is this not merely an offhand remark, unsupported by scriptures or treatises, which contradicts their own cited texts? If one drops a single drop of poqiu tree sap into milk, it immediately turns to curd. If curd were fundamentally present, why would it await conditions? The buddhadhātu of sentient beings is also like this. The meaning here is that just as milk is the cause, curd is the fruit. If curd already existed, why would milk await conditions? In the same way that the buddhadhātu of sentient beings is like this: if one were already a Buddha, what need would there be to cultivate causes? Since it awaits the cultivation of causes, it is clear that a Buddha does not yet exist, not that it rejects the causal nature of the buddhadhātu. If one carefully examines the text and understands the intent, this meaning becomes evident. Furthermore, citing the Bodhisattva-upāsaka-śīla Sūtra, which says: 'The three kinds of bodhi have no fixed nature, up to: if one says there is definitely a nature, this is called an outsider': this refutes literal adherence to a fixedly existing nature, which is the fruit existing in the cause. This accords with the Nirvāṇa Sūtra saying: 'It is not existent like empty space, nor does it say it is nonexistent like the horns of a hare.' Moreover, if following the words one were not to accept that there is a nature, then even after the path of seeing there should also be no nature. In stating that the three bodhis have no fixed nature, it does not distinguish cause from fruit; how then can this be used to deny the existence of anāsrava bījas in the stage of an ordinary being? The remaining passages can be understood by analogy with this.