能顯中邊慧日論 2.5

2.5

Another opinion states: If people are at the same time but of different capacities, real extinction and lack of gotra are taught first, and non-extinction and possession of gotra are taught later; if people are different but the time is the same, the sequence is not fixed. However, that one portion lacks gotra and that the dviyāna undergo real extinction is definitely the Hīnayāna; that all possess the buddhadhātu and the dviyāna have no extinction is the Mahāyāna teaching. This is not so; it errs regarding sequence. Why is this? If it is claimed that when people are at the same time but different, real extinction and lack of gotra are taught first, based on what kind of person is this said? If it is based on the bodhisattva, this is illogical. If it is based on the śrāvaka, what teaching comes first and what later? If the Hīnayāna teachings first taught real extinction and lack of gotra, the various Mahāyāna scriptures also teach real extinction and that one portion lacks gotra. If it concerns Mahāyāna sūtras, how can one determine which sūtras were first taught for the Hīnayāna and which were first taught for the Mahāyāna? If the Prajñāpāramitā, Saṃdhinirmocana, and so forth were first taught for the Hīnayāna: the Prajñāpāramitā extensively clarifies paramārtha-śūnyatā, the Saṃdhinirmocana extensively clarifies the six pāramitās and the three natures; the Prajñāpāramitā speaks of the emptiness of sentient beings, and the Saṃdhinirmocana speaks of emptiness, both resolving into the three natures, thus already clarifying that there is a gotra. How then can one say that lack of gotra was taught first, and possession of gotra was taught later? Furthermore, they themselves hold tathatā and the mind to be the nature of the pradhāna-hetu; could there be an earlier Mahāyāna teaching or Mahāyāna master establishing that tathatā and mind do not pervade sentient beings? If they claim it is based on the gotras of the pañcayāna, they also themselves hold that the five gotras exist later and are not fundamental dharmatā. Following this, prior to having established the five gotras, those stages would still be those of a portion lacking gotra. Since the earlier teaching is identical to this, why would it not be definitive? If they say: 'Although present in the later teaching, it is presently absent and will definitely be present in the future, and therefore it is not the same as the former': this is not so. As the Nirvāṇa Sūtra and the Upāsaka-śīla Sūtra say: 'There is no curd in milk, and no gold in rock'—is this saying that the cause is absent, or that the fruit does not exist? If the causal nature were absent, and yet could later serve as a cause, this would be illogical. It would also follow that everything could arise from everything, because what lacks a causal nature would be its cause. If they say the fruit is absent, both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna accept that the fruit is absent in the cause; what difference is there between before and after? Why alone say that the earlier teaching that one portion lacks gotra is Hīnayāna and does not definitively reveal the triyāna? One can understand this by looking at their delusion. Moreover, they say: that one portion lacks gotra and that the dviyāna undergo real extinction is definitely Hīnayāna; that all have buddhadhātu and the dviyāna have no extinction is the Mahāyāna doctrine. This is not so, because it mistakenly defines the Great and Lesser Vehicles. How so? If that one portion lacks gotra is called Hīnayāna, and that all possess the nature is called Mahāyāna, then the Vibhajyavādin hold that all have the buddhadhātu, and the Sautrāntika and Ekavyāvahārika generally maintain there is no real extinction—should they all be Mahāyāna? Furthermore, because the Hīnayāna speaks of real extinction and the lack of nature among living beings, and the Mahāyāna also speaks thus, they claim that according to the compliant Hīnayāna, it also speaks of all having the nature and the dviyāna having no extinction. Moreover, in the Buddhagotraśāstra, the Mahāsāṃghika hold that all have the buddhadhātu, which is paramārtha-śūnyatā; if the Mahāyāna is identical to them, it should be an accommodated teaching. Furthermore, that the Mahāyāna only teaches six consciousnesses is an accommodated teaching, and that the Nirvāṇa Sūtra also only teaches six is also an accommodated teaching. Since this is an accommodated teaching, all possessing the nature should also be accepted as an accommodated teaching; since this is not the case, how could that be so? Therefore, one knows that one cannot say that being identical to Hīnayāna makes them all accommodated teachings. As the Nyāyamukha says: 'Non-Buddhists also accept the six sense bases, objects, and consciousnesses; if the Buddha's Dharma is identical to them, is it thereby a false teaching?' Moreover, they say: 'Although the Great and Lesser Vehicles differ, neither speaks of having matured conditioned, genuine anāsrava [dharmas] prior to the path of seeing.' This too is not so. How could one not accept that the holy beings of the dviyāna turn their minds toward the Mahāyāna, and instead hold that they definitely do not mature conditioned anāsrava [dharmas] before the path of seeing? Furthermore, they say: 'In the Hīnayāna it is said that the initial anāsrava mind has no sabhāga-hetu, and is called a momentary dharma. Thus we know that the Great and Lesser Vehicles both teach that in the stage of an ordinary being, one has not yet matured conditioned, genuine anāsrava dharmas.' This too is not so. Why? In the Buddhagotraśāstra, the masters of the Vibhajyavādin do not believe in the absence of gotra; in the Samayabhedoparacanacakra, the masters of the Sautrāntika maintain that holy dharmas are achieved in the stage of an ordinary being; the Yogācārabhūmi states that beings in the hells achieve the three anāsrava indriyas; in the fourth fascicle of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, anāsrava impressions are not momentary dharmas; and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that they arise from sabhāga-hetu. Why do they solely believe the Sarvāstivādin masters who hold that the anāsrava mind has no sabhāga-hetu, while not believing the Sautrāntika, Vibhajyavādin, and the Yogācārabhūmi, which teach that anāsrava [dharmas] exist? However, when the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says that milk lacks the nature of curd, it is to refute their attachment to the fruit existing in the cause. Therefore that sūtra says: 'If an āmalaka seed possessed the nature of that tree, why do we not see a trunk of fifty feet standing?' The intent of the scripture from beginning to end is not found in just one place, and agrees with the Yogācārabhūmi and Prakaraṇāryavācā in refuting the doctrine that the effect exists within the cause. If this were not so, how could the sūtra say: 'If all sentient beings lacked the buddhadhātu, how could they attain anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi? It is because of the pradhāna-hetu that sentient beings are enabled to attain' anuttara[samyaksaṃbodhi], which is the so-called buddhadhātu? The earlier statement of lacking buddhadhātu referred to lacking the nature of the Buddha's fruit. That other statement of buddhadhātu as cause refers precisely to having the causal nature of a Buddha. If they say that prior to the path of seeing there are entirely no conditioned anāsrava bījas, is this not merely an offhand remark, unsupported by scriptures or treatises, which contradicts their own cited texts? If one drops a single drop of poqiu tree sap into milk, it immediately turns to curd. If curd were fundamentally present, why would it await conditions? The buddhadhātu of sentient beings is also like this. The meaning here is that just as milk is the cause, curd is the fruit. If curd already existed, why would milk await conditions? In the same way that the buddhadhātu of sentient beings is like this: if one were already a Buddha, what need would there be to cultivate causes? Since it awaits the cultivation of causes, it is clear that a Buddha does not yet exist, not that it rejects the causal nature of the buddhadhātu. If one carefully examines the text and understands the intent, this meaning becomes evident. Furthermore, citing the Bodhisattva-upāsaka-śīla Sūtra, which says: 'The three kinds of bodhi have no fixed nature, up to: if one says there is definitely a nature, this is called an outsider': this refutes literal adherence to a fixedly existing nature, which is the fruit existing in the cause. This accords with the Nirvāṇa Sūtra saying: 'It is not existent like empty space, nor does it say it is nonexistent like the horns of a hare.' Moreover, if following the words one were not to accept that there is a nature, then even after the path of seeing there should also be no nature. In stating that the three bodhis have no fixed nature, it does not distinguish cause from fruit; how then can this be used to deny the existence of anāsrava bījas in the stage of an ordinary being? The remaining passages can be understood by analogy with this.