能顯中邊慧日論 2.8

2.8

二違理失。《佛性論》第二解三如來藏，三能攝為藏，云謂果地。一切過恒沙數功德，如來應得性時攝之已盡故。若至果時方言得性者，此性便是無常。何以故？非始得故。故知本有，是故言常。此說自性法身。若是報身，豈應得因時已得圓滿，云攝已盡？准知四智心品，若因已滿，不假更修因，大圓鏡智至果方生，即是始得，故是無常。又第三云「轉依有四種相應知。一者為生依、二滅依。」乃至云「一生依者，佛無分別道相續依止。若不緣此法，無分別道即不得生。」既云無分別道相續依止，明不同如凝然常住。又解涅槃難中云「非道所生故，此法必須因道得至，非道能生。是故未修時不得言無。」是故無生義立，無後際故。是得無滅中際無業煩惱等，故無變易，以無生異滅等三失，故說常住。菩提既是道生，未修時無，因修方得，故異涅槃，非是常住。又云「若離涅槃，無有一法是常住故。涅槃前際等無故，故知常。菩提有始、有前際故，明非常住。」若云報身不離涅槃故是常者，豈他受變化離涅槃耶？又梁《攝論》十五，六因證受用身不成自性身。此意真如為自性，報佛名受用。六因者，一由色身及行身顯現故。釋云「十入名色身，受等名行身。諸佛以真如法為身，於法身中色行不可得。應身則不爾。此義云何？一切智大定大悲等恒伽沙等如來功德，雖依法身，若顯現時不離化身。此化身以佛異一切眾生為應身事相故。色行於應身有，於法身無，是故應身不成法身。」六阿梨耶識及生起識現轉依，非道理故。釋云「阿梨耶識及生起識即是受用身，此二識轉依名法身。若自性身即是受用身，轉二識依後得何身？由此非道理故，受用身不成自性身。若受用身即是自性身，則無大智等眾德。由不無眾德故，自性身不成受用身。」然《大莊嚴論》第三云「大圓鏡智、平等性智名法身者，以第八識持二障種，得鏡智時捨二障種。第七恒執障平等理，離執證如。因此二智得法身故，故說二智為法身。又真如理功德所依本，二智功德所生本，故名法身。若分自性身、自受用身，四智俱是自受用身。他受變化因二智起，即說二智為彼二身故。」《大莊嚴論》第三說「觀察智、成事智為化身，因二智起故，說二智為彼二身。」不爾。二論俱無著造，何故《莊嚴論》說二智為法身，《攝論》不許二智為法身。又復八識因位無常，何故果位常無常別？既許常無常別，應許慮非慮、心非心、色非色等別。又復應化及色點等俱鏡智現，何故能變之心是常住、所變智身是無常？不得難言：能變唯是心，所變心色別。何廢能變心常住、所變是無常。何以故？所變種各殊，能變唯心所，能所俱心智，何得常無常？又天親《般若論》云「分別有為體，非彼相成就，三相異體故，離彼是如來。」此說法身離有為，豈報身相離有為耶？若云不離者，豈不許生？生已經停，豈不是住？既有三相，何得名常？又云：應化有來去，法佛無來去。應化有來去，明知無常。又《攝大乘論》云「於法身中色行不可得」，明報身等色行可得。報身既色行可得，故是無常，亦不得云雖有色行而體是常。《涅槃經》云「捨無常色獲得常色，受想行識亦復如是」者。既許色行同真如常、同如寂靜，何故梁《攝論》云「若以法身為應身佛，無利益眾生事。若以應身為法身佛，無現世安樂義，以恒喧動離寂靜故。」准此論意，以法身常，無能利物。報身既常，豈不同如無能利物？又若是常，如何難云：若以應身為法身佛，無現世安樂義，以恒喧動離寂靜故。許報身常，如何得言以恒喧動離寂靜故。又《法華經論》釋三身中，唯法身文內云「非虛非如非異」，釋云「謂離四種相，有四種相者是無常故。」不言報佛亦離四相。

Second is the fault of contradicting reason. The second [fascicle] of the Buddhagotraśāstra, explaining the three tathāgatagarbhas, explains the third, 'the capacity to contain as a womb/storehouse', saying: 'This refers to the stage of fruition. Because, at the time when the Tathāgata attains the nature [he is destined to] attain, it has completely encompassed all merits exceeding the number of sands of the Ganges. If it were only upon reaching the fruition that one were said to attain the nature, then this nature would be impermanent. Why is this? Because it would not be something attained from the beginning; therefore we know it is inherently existent, and for this reason it is called permanent.' This speaks of the svabhāva-dharmakāya. If it were the saṃbhogakāya, could it already have attained perfection at the time of the cause, so that it is said to have 'completely encompassed' them? By analogy one knows that, for the mind-category of the four knowledges, if the cause were already complete, it would not rely on further cultivating the cause; the great perfect mirror wisdom only arises upon reaching the fruition, which means it is newly attained, and therefore it is impermanent. Furthermore, the third [fascicle] says: 'It should be known that the transformation of the basis (āśrayaparavṛtti) has four characteristics: first, as the basis of arising; second, as the basis of cessation.' It further says: 'First, as the basis of arising, it is the continuous support for the Buddha's non-conceptual path. If one does not take this dharma as an object, the non-conceptual path cannot arise.' Since it says it is the continuous support for the non-conceptual path, it clearly is not like tathatā, which is frozen and permanently abiding. Furthermore, in resolving the objection concerning nirvāṇa, it says: 'Because it is not produced by the path, this dharma must be reached by relying on the path, but the path cannot produce it. Therefore, when it has not yet been cultivated, one cannot say it is non-existent.' Thus the meaning of non-arising is established. Because there is no posterior limit, it is attaining non-cessation; because in the intermediate phase there are no karma or defilements, there is no change. Because it lacks the three faults of arising, changing, and ceasing, it is spoken of as permanently abiding. Bodhi, however, is produced by the path: it does not exist when not yet cultivated, and is only obtained through cultivation; hence it differs from nirvāṇa and is not permanently abiding. It also says: 'Apart from nirvāṇa, there is not a single dharma that is permanently abiding. Because nirvāṇa lacks an anterior limit, etc., we know it is permanent. Bodhi has a beginning and an anterior limit; hence it is clearly not permanently abiding.' If one says that because the saṃbhogakāya is not separate from nirvāṇa it is therefore permanent, could the other-enjoyment body (parasaṃbhoga) and the transformation body (nirmāṇakāya) be separate from nirvāṇa? Furthermore, the Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, [chapter] fifteen, [adduces] six reasons proving that the enjoyment body (saṃbhogakāya) does not constitute the nature-body (svabhāvakāya). The intention here is that tathatā is the nature[-body], and the saṃbhogabuddha is called the enjoyment [body]. As for the six reasons, first: 'Because the form-body (rūpakāya) and mental-formations-body (saṃskārakāya) are manifested.' The commentary explains: 'The ten sense-bases are called the form-body; sensation and the rest are called the mental-formations-body. The Buddhas take the dharma of tathatā as their body; within the dharmakāya, form and mental formations cannot be found. The responsive body (saṃbhogakāya) is not like this. What does this mean? Although all the Tathāgata's merits exceeding the sands of the Ganges—such as omniscience, great samādhi, and great compassion—rely on the dharmakāya, when they are manifested they are not separate from the nirmāṇakāya. This nirmāṇakāya serves as the phenomenon of the responsive body by which the Buddha is distinct from all sentient beings. Form and mental formations exist in the responsive body, but do not exist in the dharmakāya; therefore the responsive body does not constitute the dharmakāya.' Sixth: 'Because the transformation of the basis of the ālayavijñāna and the arising consciousnesses is manifested, which would be illogical.' The commentary explains: 'The ālayavijñāna and the arising consciousnesses are indeed the enjoyment body; the transformation of the basis of these two consciousnesses is called the dharmakāya. If the nature-body were itself the enjoyment body, what body would be obtained after transforming the basis of the two consciousnesses? Because this would be illogical, the enjoyment body does not constitute the nature-body. If the enjoyment body were itself the nature-body, it would lack the multitude of merits such as great wisdom. Because it does not lack the multitude of merits, the nature-body does not constitute the enjoyment body.' However, the third [fascicle] of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says: 'The reason the great perfect mirror wisdom and the equality wisdom are called the dharmakāya is that the eighth consciousness holds the seeds of the two obscurations, and when the mirror wisdom is attained, it abandons the seeds of the two obscurations. The seventh consciousness constantly grasps [at a self], obscuring the principle of equality; free from grasping, it realizes tathatā. Because the dharmakāya is attained through these two wisdoms, these two wisdoms are called the dharmakāya. Furthermore, the principle of tathatā is the foundation on which merits rely, while the two wisdoms are the foundation from which merits are produced; hence they are called the dharmakāya. If one distinguishes the svabhāvakāya and the self-enjoyment body (svasaṃbhogakāya), all four wisdoms are the self-enjoyment body. Because the other-enjoyment and transformation bodies arise from the two [other] wisdoms, those two wisdoms are spoken of as those two bodies.' The third [fascicle] of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says that the observing wisdom and the accomplishing wisdom are the transformation body; because they arise from these two wisdoms, those two wisdoms are called those two bodies. This is not so. Both treatises were composed by Asaṅga; why would the Sūtrālaṅkāra speak of the two wisdoms as the dharmakāya, while the Mahāyānasaṃgraha does not allow the two wisdoms to be the dharmakāya? Furthermore, the eight consciousnesses are impermanent in the causal stage; why would there be a distinction between permanent and impermanent in the fruition stage? Since you accept a distinction between permanent and impermanent, you ought to accept distinctions between cognitive and non-cognitive, mind and non-mind, form and non-form, and so forth. Furthermore, both the responsive/transformation bodies and the forms/spots are manifested by the mirror wisdom; why would the transforming mind be permanently abiding, while the transformed wisdom-body is impermanent? You cannot object by saying: 'That which transforms is purely mind, while that which is transformed differs as mind and form. What prevents the transforming mind from being permanently abiding, while that which is transformed is impermanent?' Why is this? The seeds of what is transformed are each distinct, whereas that which transforms is solely mental; since both subject and object are mind and wisdom, how could one be permanent and the other impermanent? Furthermore, Vasubandhu's Prajñā[-pāramitā-sūtra]-śāstra says: 'Discriminative conditioned entities are not perfected by their characteristics; because the three characteristics have differing substances, that which is free from them is the Tathāgata.' This states that the dharmakāya is free from the conditioned; could the characteristics of the saṃbhogakāya be free from the conditioned? If you say it is not free from them, do you not concede that it arises? Having arisen, it persists for a time—is that not abiding? Since it possesses the three characteristics, how can it be called permanent? Furthermore, it says: 'The responsive and transformation bodies have coming and going; the dharma-Buddha has no coming and going.' Since the responsive and transformation bodies have coming and going, one clearly knows they are impermanent. Furthermore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Within the dharmakāya, form and mental formations cannot be found', which clarifies that in the saṃbhogakāya and so on, form and mental formations can be found. Since form and mental formations can be found in the saṃbhogakāya, it is therefore impermanent; nor can one say that although it has form and mental formations, its substance is permanent. As for the Nirvāṇa Sūtra saying, 'Abandoning impermanent form, one obtains permanent form, and sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness are also like this': since you accept that form and mental formations are permanent like tathatā and tranquil like tathatā, why does the Liang Mahāyānasaṃgraha say: 'If one takes the dharmakāya to be the responsive Buddha, there would be no activity of benefiting sentient beings. If one takes the responsive body to be the dharmakāya Buddha, there would be no meaning of present peace and joy, because it is constantly clamorous and active, separated from tranquility.' According to the intent of this treatise, because the dharmakāya is permanent, it cannot benefit beings. Since the saṃbhogakāya is permanent, would it not, like tathatā, be incapable of benefiting beings? Furthermore, if it were permanent, how could the objection run: 'If one takes the responsive body to be the dharmakāya Buddha, there would be no meaning of present peace and joy, because it is constantly clamorous and active, separated from tranquility'? If you accept that the saṃbhogakāya is permanent, how can it be said that 'it is constantly clamorous and active, separated from tranquility'? Furthermore, in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-upadeśa's explanation of the three bodies, only within the passage on the dharmakāya does it say 'neither false, nor such, nor different', commenting: 'This means free from the four characteristics; having the four characteristics means being impermanent.' It does not say that the saṃbhogabuddha is also free from the four characteristics.