能顯中邊慧日論 2.8

2.8

Second is the fault of contradicting reason. The second [fascicle] of the Buddhagotraśāstra, explaining the three tathāgatagarbhas, explains the third, 'the capacity to contain as a womb/storehouse', saying: 'This refers to the stage of fruition. Because, at the time when the Tathāgata attains the nature [he is destined to] attain, it has completely encompassed all merits exceeding the number of sands of the Ganges. If it were only upon reaching the fruition that one were said to attain the nature, then this nature would be impermanent. Why is this? Because it would not be something attained from the beginning; therefore we know it is inherently existent, and for this reason it is called permanent.' This speaks of the svabhāva-dharmakāya. If it were the saṃbhogakāya, could it already have attained perfection at the time of the cause, so that it is said to have 'completely encompassed' them? By analogy one knows that, for the mind-category of the four knowledges, if the cause were already complete, it would not rely on further cultivating the cause; the great perfect mirror wisdom only arises upon reaching the fruition, which means it is newly attained, and therefore it is impermanent. Furthermore, the third [fascicle] says: 'It should be known that the transformation of the basis (āśrayaparavṛtti) has four characteristics: first, as the basis of arising; second, as the basis of cessation.' It further says: 'First, as the basis of arising, it is the continuous support for the Buddha's non-conceptual path. If one does not take this dharma as an object, the non-conceptual path cannot arise.' Since it says it is the continuous support for the non-conceptual path, it clearly is not like tathatā, which is frozen and permanently abiding. Furthermore, in resolving the objection concerning nirvāṇa, it says: 'Because it is not produced by the path, this dharma must be reached by relying on the path, but the path cannot produce it. Therefore, when it has not yet been cultivated, one cannot say it is non-existent.' Thus the meaning of non-arising is established. Because there is no posterior limit, it is attaining non-cessation; because in the intermediate phase there are no karma or defilements, there is no change. Because it lacks the three faults of arising, changing, and ceasing, it is spoken of as permanently abiding. Bodhi, however, is produced by the path: it does not exist when not yet cultivated, and is only obtained through cultivation; hence it differs from nirvāṇa and is not permanently abiding. It also says: 'Apart from nirvāṇa, there is not a single dharma that is permanently abiding. Because nirvāṇa lacks an anterior limit, etc., we know it is permanent. Bodhi has a beginning and an anterior limit; hence it is clearly not permanently abiding.' If one says that because the saṃbhogakāya is not separate from nirvāṇa it is therefore permanent, could the other-enjoyment body (parasaṃbhoga) and the transformation body (nirmāṇakāya) be separate from nirvāṇa? Furthermore, the Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, [chapter] fifteen, [adduces] six reasons proving that the enjoyment body (saṃbhogakāya) does not constitute the nature-body (svabhāvakāya). The intention here is that tathatā is the nature[-body], and the saṃbhogabuddha is called the enjoyment [body]. As for the six reasons, first: 'Because the form-body (rūpakāya) and mental-formations-body (saṃskārakāya) are manifested.' The commentary explains: 'The ten sense-bases are called the form-body; sensation and the rest are called the mental-formations-body. The Buddhas take the dharma of tathatā as their body; within the dharmakāya, form and mental formations cannot be found. The responsive body (saṃbhogakāya) is not like this. What does this mean? Although all the Tathāgata's merits exceeding the sands of the Ganges—such as omniscience, great samādhi, and great compassion—rely on the dharmakāya, when they are manifested they are not separate from the nirmāṇakāya. This nirmāṇakāya serves as the phenomenon of the responsive body by which the Buddha is distinct from all sentient beings. Form and mental formations exist in the responsive body, but do not exist in the dharmakāya; therefore the responsive body does not constitute the dharmakāya.' Sixth: 'Because the transformation of the basis of the ālayavijñāna and the arising consciousnesses is manifested, which would be illogical.' The commentary explains: 'The ālayavijñāna and the arising consciousnesses are indeed the enjoyment body; the transformation of the basis of these two consciousnesses is called the dharmakāya. If the nature-body were itself the enjoyment body, what body would be obtained after transforming the basis of the two consciousnesses? Because this would be illogical, the enjoyment body does not constitute the nature-body. If the enjoyment body were itself the nature-body, it would lack the multitude of merits such as great wisdom. Because it does not lack the multitude of merits, the nature-body does not constitute the enjoyment body.' However, the third [fascicle] of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says: 'The reason the great perfect mirror wisdom and the equality wisdom are called the dharmakāya is that the eighth consciousness holds the seeds of the two obscurations, and when the mirror wisdom is attained, it abandons the seeds of the two obscurations. The seventh consciousness constantly grasps [at a self], obscuring the principle of equality; free from grasping, it realizes tathatā. Because the dharmakāya is attained through these two wisdoms, these two wisdoms are called the dharmakāya. Furthermore, the principle of tathatā is the foundation on which merits rely, while the two wisdoms are the foundation from which merits are produced; hence they are called the dharmakāya. If one distinguishes the svabhāvakāya and the self-enjoyment body (svasaṃbhogakāya), all four wisdoms are the self-enjoyment body. Because the other-enjoyment and transformation bodies arise from the two [other] wisdoms, those two wisdoms are spoken of as those two bodies.' The third [fascicle] of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says that the observing wisdom and the accomplishing wisdom are the transformation body; because they arise from these two wisdoms, those two wisdoms are called those two bodies. This is not so. Both treatises were composed by Asaṅga; why would the Sūtrālaṅkāra speak of the two wisdoms as the dharmakāya, while the Mahāyānasaṃgraha does not allow the two wisdoms to be the dharmakāya? Furthermore, the eight consciousnesses are impermanent in the causal stage; why would there be a distinction between permanent and impermanent in the fruition stage? Since you accept a distinction between permanent and impermanent, you ought to accept distinctions between cognitive and non-cognitive, mind and non-mind, form and non-form, and so forth. Furthermore, both the responsive/transformation bodies and the forms/spots are manifested by the mirror wisdom; why would the transforming mind be permanently abiding, while the transformed wisdom-body is impermanent? You cannot object by saying: 'That which transforms is purely mind, while that which is transformed differs as mind and form. What prevents the transforming mind from being permanently abiding, while that which is transformed is impermanent?' Why is this? The seeds of what is transformed are each distinct, whereas that which transforms is solely mental; since both subject and object are mind and wisdom, how could one be permanent and the other impermanent? Furthermore, Vasubandhu's Prajñā[-pāramitā-sūtra]-śāstra says: 'Discriminative conditioned entities are not perfected by their characteristics; because the three characteristics have differing substances, that which is free from them is the Tathāgata.' This states that the dharmakāya is free from the conditioned; could the characteristics of the saṃbhogakāya be free from the conditioned? If you say it is not free from them, do you not concede that it arises? Having arisen, it persists for a time—is that not abiding? Since it possesses the three characteristics, how can it be called permanent? Furthermore, it says: 'The responsive and transformation bodies have coming and going; the dharma-Buddha has no coming and going.' Since the responsive and transformation bodies have coming and going, one clearly knows they are impermanent. Furthermore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Within the dharmakāya, form and mental formations cannot be found', which clarifies that in the saṃbhogakāya and so on, form and mental formations can be found. Since form and mental formations can be found in the saṃbhogakāya, it is therefore impermanent; nor can one say that although it has form and mental formations, its substance is permanent. As for the Nirvāṇa Sūtra saying, 'Abandoning impermanent form, one obtains permanent form, and sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness are also like this': since you accept that form and mental formations are permanent like tathatā and tranquil like tathatā, why does the Liang Mahāyānasaṃgraha say: 'If one takes the dharmakāya to be the responsive Buddha, there would be no activity of benefiting sentient beings. If one takes the responsive body to be the dharmakāya Buddha, there would be no meaning of present peace and joy, because it is constantly clamorous and active, separated from tranquility.' According to the intent of this treatise, because the dharmakāya is permanent, it cannot benefit beings. Since the saṃbhogakāya is permanent, would it not, like tathatā, be incapable of benefiting beings? Furthermore, if it were permanent, how could the objection run: 'If one takes the responsive body to be the dharmakāya Buddha, there would be no meaning of present peace and joy, because it is constantly clamorous and active, separated from tranquility'? If you accept that the saṃbhogakāya is permanent, how can it be said that 'it is constantly clamorous and active, separated from tranquility'? Furthermore, in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-upadeśa's explanation of the three bodies, only within the passage on the dharmakāya does it say 'neither false, nor such, nor different', commenting: 'This means free from the four characteristics; having the four characteristics means being impermanent.' It does not say that the saṃbhogabuddha is also free from the four characteristics.