能顯中邊慧日論 3.8

3.8

有義：學瑜伽者，妄通《楞伽》、《涅槃經》說一闡提成佛者，是《莊嚴論》時邊無性，非畢竟無性者。不然。何者？且阿顛帝迦此云畢竟，第五性收，一闡提人非定第五。五性斷善名一闡提，前四斷善名為暫時，第五斷善名為畢竟。此亦非理。所以者何？且五斷善出何經論？若准《楞伽》，但說五乘，不說五種斷善。若准《莊嚴論》，時邊中有四種性，亦不說皆斷善。若依《涅槃》第三十六，即說生死河中有七種人，皆說斷善。彼說五斷善，前四為暫時、第五為畢竟。憑何聖教，應為出文。又云：暫時無涅槃者，一非第五性、二非常沒、三非決定無涅槃法、四前經已說當得涅槃。《楞伽經》說第五性中顯燃善根後當涅槃。第五性中唯有菩薩闡提，更無畢竟。故知《莊嚴論》說畢竟無性，即《楞伽經》中燒善根者。此亦不爾。何者？《楞伽經》說當得涅槃，明彼非是《涅槃經》中常沒之人，亦非《莊嚴》畢竟之者。豈經中自說當得涅槃，無著菩薩說為畢竟無涅槃者？若說燒燃一切善法，《莊嚴論》中名為畢竟無涅槃法。於時邊中，復更說誰為普斷諸善根。又《莊嚴論》畢竟無因、《楞伽》無性大悲，亦彼豈全無性？故知《楞伽》無涅槃法燒善根者是時邊收，非是《莊嚴》畢竟所攝。又《莊嚴》說有五乘同《楞伽》者，可云畢竟即彼第五。《莊嚴論》中但明有性無性，於有性中即說三乘、無性之中復有四種，一不同《楞伽》說有第四、二不同《楞伽》說無性乘為其第五。又諸經論所說不同，《涅槃》或云三種病人、或七斷善，《勝鬘》說四，此等非一，各據別義，非定一准，如何定判《莊嚴論》中畢竟無性即彼燒燃諸善根者？又若無畢竟無性，如何《涅槃》第三十二云「善男子！生死河中有七種人，第一人者斷善常沒」，又第九言「若得聞是《大涅槃經》，雖犯四禁及五無間，猶故能生菩提因緣。一闡提輩則不如是，雖得聽受是妙經典，而不能生菩提道因。」准此經，五無間業雖是邪定，說能作因，即餘處說救邪定。是一闡提輩則不如是者，即餘經說捨邪定者。又言捨者，不化作佛，非全捨之，令生天故。故彼前會《菩薩藏經》同餘不捨，明為妄說。又復多喻，如枯木必不生、如石山不停水、如淤泥珠未能清、如燋種必不生。又云「假使一切無量眾生一時成就阿耨菩提已，此諸如來亦復不見彼一闡提得成菩提。」又第七云「復有比丘說佛密藏甚深經典，一切眾生皆有佛性。以是性故，斷無量億諸煩惱結，即得阿耨菩提，除一闡提。」若以悉有佛性必當得斷諸煩惱結，彼一闡提豈不當能而獨除耶？若云：餘者現能、闡提當能，說現非當者。此亦不然。除闡提，諸難處等皆現能耶？豈墮難者皆闡提耶？上下多文，煩不具引。若以世親《佛性論》會，為謗法者說無量時，非實無性。如何不信？《善戒經》中如來自說，非種性人無種性故。彌勒菩薩於〈聲聞地〉及〈菩經地〉并〈決擇分〉，無著菩薩《顯揚論》等，皆說無性。《佛地論》中又復會云「雖經宣說一切有情之類皆有佛性、皆當作佛。然就真如法身佛性、或就小分一切有情方便而說，為令不定種性有情決定速趣無上正等菩提果故。」《攝大乘論》及《法華論》所說一乘義皆相似，又復悉有佛性皆當作佛，即唯一乘而為了義。何故《涅槃》云「說一乘一道一行一緣，乃至云不解我意。」又云「於經中或說一乘、或說三乘。」又《解深密經》云「故於其中說一乘，非有情性無差別。」《楞伽經》中亦云隱密。若爾，既有無性，《佛性論》文及《寶性論》如何會釋？答：《佛地論》中已為解說，今更一釋。有經文說闡提決定無涅槃性者，有多種不同。《佛性論》云「說闡提決定無者，會《楞伽經》第五無性。彼斷善者但無現行，非無種子。」總云決定無涅槃法者，是非了義說，現有清淨無漏自性心種子故。或言決定無者，但無行性非無理性。今總相說無，明非了義。故《寶性論》云「以彼實有清淨性故，不得說言彼常畢竟無清淨性。」又復二論依《無上依經》所會闡提，是樂有中第二非初，初者謗解脫不唯大乘。《佛性論》會云「故佛說若不信大乘，名一闡提。」《寶性論》云「為欲回轉誹謗大乘心」。若如是解，諸教無違。信一棄餘，信非具足。又云：妄通涅槃說一切眾生悉有佛性。若說行性少分一切者，云此非經意。何以得知？經云「雖信佛性是眾生有，不信一切悉有佛性，名信不具足。」此亦不爾，經不明說若不信一切眾生悉有行佛性者，名信不具足。又若許悉有行性，違彼所執見道已前無無漏故。又復《涅槃》說「佛性者非唯一法，豈可染淨一切同有、無聖凡別。」約理不遮，行性不爾。又若以貪等為行性者，非善法故，違《入大乘論》。故論云「汝癡無智，謂煩惱為佛性。以理性遍，不信皆有，名信不具足。」今許理遍，前通非妄。又云：凡有心者皆當作佛。及云：為非佛性說於佛性。非佛性者，牆壁瓦石無情之物，離如是等無情之物是名佛性者，與一切眾生皆當作佛，文皆大同。何者？一切眾生豈說無心，及以非情為眾生耶？故同一切，不為定證。況復經中自有釋一切言，理行二門應須通解。彼全不許本無漏種為三乘性尚不為違，一切有言如何分有即為違教？《瑜伽》等云不遍者，說理心耶？又以《智論》所說五乘，云不住涅槃者著人天中作涅槃因，以為定說。此亦不爾。彼據習性，非性種。又許為證，便違《涅槃》一切有言。所有違文反彼妄通，准前可悉。又云：《涅槃》說「一切眾生皆歸一道」，一道者同用佛乘為一乘也者，亦同《勝鬘》云「二乘入一乘，一乘即大乘」者。此亦不爾。彼自解云：一道一緣等四十年前，《勝鬘》彼判在後。如何今復說同？前後相違，實為自拙。又更有過，如下破會《涅槃》文辨。何故一經二文相似，自情取捨強會不同。故知《唯識》善順諸經，眾論宏摸深可儀習。

An opinion states: Those who study Yogācāra erroneously reconcile the Laṅkāvatārasūtra and the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra by claiming that when it is said icchantikas become Buddhas, this refers to those lacking gotra temporarily (kālāntarāgotraka) in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, not those lacking gotra definitively (atyantāgotraka). This is incorrect. Why is that? First, "atyantika" is translated here as "definitive" and is included under the fifth gotra; icchantikas are not necessarily only the fifth gotra. When beings of the five gotras sever wholesome roots, they are called icchantikas: the severing of wholesome roots by the first four is called temporary, whereas the severing of wholesome roots by the fifth is called definitive. This too is unreasonable. Why is that? First of all, from what sūtra or treatise do five types of severing wholesome roots originate? If based on the Laṅkāvatāra, it only mentions five yānas, not five kinds of severing wholesome roots. If based on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, among those lacking gotra temporarily there are four gotras, and it also does not say that all of them sever wholesome roots. If based on the thirty-sixth fascicle of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, it speaks of seven kinds of persons in the river of saṃsāra, all of whom are said to sever wholesome roots. But as for their assertion of five kinds of severing wholesome roots, with the first four being temporary and the fifth definitive—on what sacred teaching do they rely? They ought to produce the text. Furthermore, they say that those who temporarily lack nirvāṇa: first, are not the fifth gotra; second, are not the ever-drowned; third, do not definitively lack the phenomena of nirvāṇa; and fourth, the preceding sūtra already said they will attain nirvāṇa. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra states that within the fifth gotra it reveals that after burning their wholesome roots they will subsequently attain nirvāṇa; and within the fifth gotra there is only the bodhisattva-icchantika, with no definitive [agotraka]. Therefore, one knows that when the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra speaks of definitively lacking gotra, it refers precisely to those who burn their wholesome roots in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. This too is not so. Why is that? Because the Laṅkāvatārasūtra states that they will attain nirvāṇa, clarifying that they are not the ever-drowned persons of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, nor the definitive ones of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra. How could the sūtra itself state that they will attain nirvāṇa, while Bodhisattva Asaṅga says they definitively lack nirvāṇa? If one says that burning all wholesome phenomena is called definitively lacking the phenomenon of nirvāṇa in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, whom then among those lacking gotra temporarily would it designate as completely severing all wholesome roots? Furthermore, in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra those definitively without cause, and in the Laṅkāvatāra those lacking gotra out of great compassion—could the latter completely lack gotra? Thus we know that those who lack the phenomenon of nirvāṇa and burn wholesome roots in the Laṅkāvatāra are subsumed under the temporary, and are not subsumed under the definitive of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra. Furthermore, if the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra spoke of five yānas identically with the Laṅkāvatāra, one might say that the definitive is precisely that fifth. But the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra only clarifies possessing gotra and lacking gotra; among those possessing gotra it speaks of the three yānas, and among those lacking gotra there are four kinds again—first, unlike the Laṅkāvatāra which speaks of having a fourth; second, unlike the Laṅkāvatāra which posits an agotraka vehicle as the fifth. Moreover, the expositions in various sūtras and treatises are diverse: the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra speaks sometimes of three kinds of sick persons and sometimes of seven who sever wholesome roots; the Śrīmālādevī speaks of four. These are manifold, each based on a distinct intent, and cannot be uniformly standardized. How can one definitively judge that the definitive lack of gotra in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra is precisely those who burn wholesome roots? Furthermore, if there were no definitive lack of gotra, why does fascicle thirty-two of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra state: "Good son! In the river of saṃsāra there are seven kinds of persons; the first person severs wholesome roots and is ever-drowned"? And the ninth fascicle states: "If one hears this Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, even though having committed the four grave offenses and the five unpardonable deeds (ānantarya), one is still able to produce causes and conditions for bodhi. Icchantikas are not like this: even though they receive and hear this wondrous classic, they cannot produce the causes of the path to bodhi." According to this sūtra, even though the five unpardonable deeds belong to the wrong determination (mithyāniyata), it says they can act as a cause; this is what is spoken of elsewhere as rescuing the wrongly determined. That "icchantikas are not like this" is what other sūtras speak of as abandoning the wrongly determined. Furthermore, speaking of "abandoning" means not converting them into Buddhas, not completely abandoning them, because they are caused to be born in heaven. Therefore, his earlier reconciliation claiming that the Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra agrees with other texts in not abandoning them is clearly false speech. Moreover, there are many similes: like dry wood that will never sprout; like a rocky mountain that retains no water; like a jewel in mud that cannot yet be clarified; like a scorched seed that will never sprout. It also says: "Even if all immeasurable sentient beings simultaneously achieved anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, these Tathāgatas would still not see those icchantikas attain bodhi." Fascicle seven also says: "Furthermore, there are monks who preach the profound scriptures of the Buddha's secret treasury, saying that all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu. Because of this dhātu, having severed immeasurable billions of fetters of defilement, they will attain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, except for icchantikas." If having the buddhadhātu means they must definitely be able to sever all defilement fetters, how could those icchantikas not eventually be able, such that they alone are excluded? If one claims: "Others are capable in the present, while icchantikas are capable in the future; it refers to the present, not the future"—this too is incorrect. Except for icchantikas, are all those in difficult realms of rebirth (akṣaṇa) capable in the present? Are all who fall into difficult realms icchantikas? The numerous passages above and below are too troublesome to cite in full. If one reconciles this using Vasubandhu's Buddhagotraśāstra, saying it was spoken for an immeasurable time for those who slander the Dharma and not that they truly lack gotra—why not believe it? In the Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra (Shan jie jing), the Tathāgata himself declared that non-gotra beings are such because they lack gotra. Bodhisattva Maitreya in the Śrāvakabhūmi, Bodhisattvabhūmi, and Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, as well as Bodhisattva Asaṅga in the Prakaraṇāryavācā and other works, all state there is a lack of gotra. In the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, it is further reconciled: "Although the sūtras proclaim that all kinds of sentient beings possess buddhadhātu and all will become Buddhas, this was spoken expediently with reference to the tathatā-dharmakāya buddhadhātu, or with reference to a small portion of 'all sentient beings', in order to cause sentient beings of undetermined gotra to definitively and swiftly advance toward the fruit of unsurpassed right and complete bodhi." What is taught regarding the one vehicle in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa is entirely similar. Moreover, if all having buddhadhātu and all becoming Buddhas means only the one vehicle is the definitive meaning (nītārtha), why does the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra state: "I speak of one vehicle, one path, one practice, one condition... up to saying they do not understand my intention"? It also says: "In the sūtras, sometimes one vehicle is taught, sometimes three vehicles are taught." Furthermore, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra states: "Therefore, within it I spoke of one vehicle, not that there is no difference in the nature of sentient beings." The Laṅkāvatārasūtra also speaks of this as concealed (sandhāya). If so, since there is a lack of gotra, how are the texts of the Buddhagotraśāstra and the Ratnagotravibhāga to be reconciled? Answer: The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa has already explained this; now another explanation is offered. Sūtra passages stating that icchantikas definitively lack the nature of nirvāṇa have many different types. The Buddhagotraśāstra states: "Saying that icchantikas are definitively without it reconciles the fifth agotraka in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. Those who sever wholesome roots merely lack manifest activity (samudācāra), not seeds (bīja)." The general statement that they definitively lack the phenomena of nirvāṇa is a teaching of provisional meaning (neyārtha), because the pure, undefiled seed of their intrinsic nature of mind is currently present. Alternatively, saying they definitively lack it means they merely lack the gotra of practice (ācāragotra), not that they lack the gotra of principle (dharmatāgotra). Now speaking of lacking it in a general manner is clearly not the definitive meaning. Hence the Ratnagotravibhāga states: "Because they truly possess the pure nature, one cannot say they are eternally and definitively without the pure nature." Moreover, the icchantika reconciled by both treatises based on the Anuttarāśrayasūtra is the second, not the first, among those attached to existence (bhavābhirati); the first refers to slandering liberation, not solely the Mahāyāna. The Buddhagotraśāstra reconciles: "Therefore the Buddha said that if one does not believe in the Mahāyāna, one is called an icchantika." The Ratnagotravibhāga states: "In order to turn around the mind of slandering the Mahāyāna." If interpreted in this way, there is no contradiction among the various teachings. Believing in one while discarding the rest is not complete faith. Furthermore, they say: to erroneously reconcile the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra by saying all sentient beings have buddhadhātu refers to a small portion of all having the gotra of practice—this is claimed not to be the sūtra's intention. How is this known? The sūtra states: "Although believing that buddhadhātu is possessed by sentient beings, if one does not believe that all possess buddhadhātu, this is called incomplete faith." This too is not so; the sūtra does not explicitly state that if one does not believe all sentient beings possess the practicing buddhadhātu, this is called incomplete faith. Moreover, if one concedes that all possess the gotra of practice, it contradicts their own assertion that prior to the path of seeing there is no undefiled dharmas. Furthermore, the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra states: "Buddhadhātu is not merely a single dharma; how could all defiled and pure beings possess it identically without distinction between noble and ordinary?" In terms of principle, this is not precluded, but the gotra of practice is not like this. Furthermore, if one takes greed and the like as the gotra of practice, since these are not wholesome dharmas, it contradicts the Mahāyānāvatāra. Thus the treatise states: "You are foolish and lack wisdom, taking afflictions to be buddhadhātu. Because the gotra of principle is all-pervading, not believing that all possess it is called incomplete faith." Now, conceding that the principle is all-pervading, our previous reconciliation was not false. Furthermore, they say: "All who possess mind shall become Buddhas"; and say: "Explaining buddhadhātu for the sake of what is not buddhadhātu: what is not buddhadhātu refers to insentient things like walls, tiles, and stones; being free from such insentient things is called buddhadhātu"—this is largely identical with the statement that all sentient beings shall become Buddhas. Why? Could "all sentient beings" speak of those without mind or take the insentient as sentient beings? Therefore, sharing "all" does not constitute definitive proof. What is more, the sūtra itself contains explanations of the word "all"; the two approaches of principle and practice must be understood together. When they do not accept primordial undefiled seeds as the gotra of the three yānas at all, they still do not consider it a contradiction; why then should taking the statement that all possess it as a partial possession be considered contrary to teaching? When the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts state that it is not all-pervading, does that refer to the mind of principle? Furthermore, using the five yānas taught in the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, they claim that those who do not abide in nirvāṇa and are attached to humans and devas are made causes of nirvāṇa, taking this as a definitive teaching. This too is not so. That text is based on acquired nature (vāsanāgotra), not the primordial seed gotra (prakṛtisthagotra). Moreover, if one accepts this as proof, it contradicts the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra's statement that all possess it. All contradictory texts that invert their erroneous reconciliations can be understood by analogy with the above. Furthermore, they say: the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra states "all sentient beings return to the one path," and the one path means jointly using the Buddha vehicle as the one vehicle, which is also the same as the Śrīmālādevī stating "the two vehicles enter the one vehicle, and the one vehicle is the Mahāyāna." This too is not so. He himself explained: "one path, one condition," and so forth were taught before forty years, whereas the Śrīmālādevī was classified by him as later. How can he now say they are the same? Contradicting oneself before and after is truly one's own clumsiness. Furthermore, there are more errors, as will be distinguished below in refuting his reconciliation of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra text. Why is it that, when two passages in a single sūtra are similar, he takes or leaves them according to his own preference and forcefully reconciles them as different? Therefore, we know that Vijñaptimātra conforms well to all sūtras, and the grand pattern of the treatises is profoundly worthy of emulation and study.