能顯中邊慧日論 3.8

3.8

An opinion states: Those who study Yogācāra erroneously reconcile the Laṅkāvatārasūtra and the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra by claiming that when it is said icchantikas become Buddhas, this refers to those lacking gotra temporarily (kālāntarāgotraka) in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, not those lacking gotra definitively (atyantāgotraka). This is incorrect. Why is that? First, "atyantika" is translated here as "definitive" and is included under the fifth gotra; icchantikas are not necessarily only the fifth gotra. When beings of the five gotras sever wholesome roots, they are called icchantikas: the severing of wholesome roots by the first four is called temporary, whereas the severing of wholesome roots by the fifth is called definitive. This too is unreasonable. Why is that? First of all, from what sūtra or treatise do five types of severing wholesome roots originate? If based on the Laṅkāvatāra, it only mentions five yānas, not five kinds of severing wholesome roots. If based on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, among those lacking gotra temporarily there are four gotras, and it also does not say that all of them sever wholesome roots. If based on the thirty-sixth fascicle of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, it speaks of seven kinds of persons in the river of saṃsāra, all of whom are said to sever wholesome roots. But as for their assertion of five kinds of severing wholesome roots, with the first four being temporary and the fifth definitive—on what sacred teaching do they rely? They ought to produce the text. Furthermore, they say that those who temporarily lack nirvāṇa: first, are not the fifth gotra; second, are not the ever-drowned; third, do not definitively lack the phenomena of nirvāṇa; and fourth, the preceding sūtra already said they will attain nirvāṇa. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra states that within the fifth gotra it reveals that after burning their wholesome roots they will subsequently attain nirvāṇa; and within the fifth gotra there is only the bodhisattva-icchantika, with no definitive [agotraka]. Therefore, one knows that when the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra speaks of definitively lacking gotra, it refers precisely to those who burn their wholesome roots in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. This too is not so. Why is that? Because the Laṅkāvatārasūtra states that they will attain nirvāṇa, clarifying that they are not the ever-drowned persons of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, nor the definitive ones of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra. How could the sūtra itself state that they will attain nirvāṇa, while Bodhisattva Asaṅga says they definitively lack nirvāṇa? If one says that burning all wholesome phenomena is called definitively lacking the phenomenon of nirvāṇa in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, whom then among those lacking gotra temporarily would it designate as completely severing all wholesome roots? Furthermore, in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra those definitively without cause, and in the Laṅkāvatāra those lacking gotra out of great compassion—could the latter completely lack gotra? Thus we know that those who lack the phenomenon of nirvāṇa and burn wholesome roots in the Laṅkāvatāra are subsumed under the temporary, and are not subsumed under the definitive of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra. Furthermore, if the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra spoke of five yānas identically with the Laṅkāvatāra, one might say that the definitive is precisely that fifth. But the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra only clarifies possessing gotra and lacking gotra; among those possessing gotra it speaks of the three yānas, and among those lacking gotra there are four kinds again—first, unlike the Laṅkāvatāra which speaks of having a fourth; second, unlike the Laṅkāvatāra which posits an agotraka vehicle as the fifth. Moreover, the expositions in various sūtras and treatises are diverse: the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra speaks sometimes of three kinds of sick persons and sometimes of seven who sever wholesome roots; the Śrīmālādevī speaks of four. These are manifold, each based on a distinct intent, and cannot be uniformly standardized. How can one definitively judge that the definitive lack of gotra in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra is precisely those who burn wholesome roots? Furthermore, if there were no definitive lack of gotra, why does fascicle thirty-two of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra state: "Good son! In the river of saṃsāra there are seven kinds of persons; the first person severs wholesome roots and is ever-drowned"? And the ninth fascicle states: "If one hears this Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, even though having committed the four grave offenses and the five unpardonable deeds (ānantarya), one is still able to produce causes and conditions for bodhi. Icchantikas are not like this: even though they receive and hear this wondrous classic, they cannot produce the causes of the path to bodhi." According to this sūtra, even though the five unpardonable deeds belong to the wrong determination (mithyāniyata), it says they can act as a cause; this is what is spoken of elsewhere as rescuing the wrongly determined. That "icchantikas are not like this" is what other sūtras speak of as abandoning the wrongly determined. Furthermore, speaking of "abandoning" means not converting them into Buddhas, not completely abandoning them, because they are caused to be born in heaven. Therefore, his earlier reconciliation claiming that the Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra agrees with other texts in not abandoning them is clearly false speech. Moreover, there are many similes: like dry wood that will never sprout; like a rocky mountain that retains no water; like a jewel in mud that cannot yet be clarified; like a scorched seed that will never sprout. It also says: "Even if all immeasurable sentient beings simultaneously achieved anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, these Tathāgatas would still not see those icchantikas attain bodhi." Fascicle seven also says: "Furthermore, there are monks who preach the profound scriptures of the Buddha's secret treasury, saying that all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu. Because of this dhātu, having severed immeasurable billions of fetters of defilement, they will attain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, except for icchantikas." If having the buddhadhātu means they must definitely be able to sever all defilement fetters, how could those icchantikas not eventually be able, such that they alone are excluded? If one claims: "Others are capable in the present, while icchantikas are capable in the future; it refers to the present, not the future"—this too is incorrect. Except for icchantikas, are all those in difficult realms of rebirth (akṣaṇa) capable in the present? Are all who fall into difficult realms icchantikas? The numerous passages above and below are too troublesome to cite in full. If one reconciles this using Vasubandhu's Buddhagotraśāstra, saying it was spoken for an immeasurable time for those who slander the Dharma and not that they truly lack gotra—why not believe it? In the Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra (Shan jie jing), the Tathāgata himself declared that non-gotra beings are such because they lack gotra. Bodhisattva Maitreya in the Śrāvakabhūmi, Bodhisattvabhūmi, and Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, as well as Bodhisattva Asaṅga in the Prakaraṇāryavācā and other works, all state there is a lack of gotra. In the Buddhabhūmyupadeśa, it is further reconciled: "Although the sūtras proclaim that all kinds of sentient beings possess buddhadhātu and all will become Buddhas, this was spoken expediently with reference to the tathatā-dharmakāya buddhadhātu, or with reference to a small portion of 'all sentient beings', in order to cause sentient beings of undetermined gotra to definitively and swiftly advance toward the fruit of unsurpassed right and complete bodhi." What is taught regarding the one vehicle in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa is entirely similar. Moreover, if all having buddhadhātu and all becoming Buddhas means only the one vehicle is the definitive meaning (nītārtha), why does the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra state: "I speak of one vehicle, one path, one practice, one condition... up to saying they do not understand my intention"? It also says: "In the sūtras, sometimes one vehicle is taught, sometimes three vehicles are taught." Furthermore, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra states: "Therefore, within it I spoke of one vehicle, not that there is no difference in the nature of sentient beings." The Laṅkāvatārasūtra also speaks of this as concealed (sandhāya). If so, since there is a lack of gotra, how are the texts of the Buddhagotraśāstra and the Ratnagotravibhāga to be reconciled? Answer: The Buddhabhūmyupadeśa has already explained this; now another explanation is offered. Sūtra passages stating that icchantikas definitively lack the nature of nirvāṇa have many different types. The Buddhagotraśāstra states: "Saying that icchantikas are definitively without it reconciles the fifth agotraka in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra. Those who sever wholesome roots merely lack manifest activity (samudācāra), not seeds (bīja)." The general statement that they definitively lack the phenomena of nirvāṇa is a teaching of provisional meaning (neyārtha), because the pure, undefiled seed of their intrinsic nature of mind is currently present. Alternatively, saying they definitively lack it means they merely lack the gotra of practice (ācāragotra), not that they lack the gotra of principle (dharmatāgotra). Now speaking of lacking it in a general manner is clearly not the definitive meaning. Hence the Ratnagotravibhāga states: "Because they truly possess the pure nature, one cannot say they are eternally and definitively without the pure nature." Moreover, the icchantika reconciled by both treatises based on the Anuttarāśrayasūtra is the second, not the first, among those attached to existence (bhavābhirati); the first refers to slandering liberation, not solely the Mahāyāna. The Buddhagotraśāstra reconciles: "Therefore the Buddha said that if one does not believe in the Mahāyāna, one is called an icchantika." The Ratnagotravibhāga states: "In order to turn around the mind of slandering the Mahāyāna." If interpreted in this way, there is no contradiction among the various teachings. Believing in one while discarding the rest is not complete faith. Furthermore, they say: to erroneously reconcile the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra by saying all sentient beings have buddhadhātu refers to a small portion of all having the gotra of practice—this is claimed not to be the sūtra's intention. How is this known? The sūtra states: "Although believing that buddhadhātu is possessed by sentient beings, if one does not believe that all possess buddhadhātu, this is called incomplete faith." This too is not so; the sūtra does not explicitly state that if one does not believe all sentient beings possess the practicing buddhadhātu, this is called incomplete faith. Moreover, if one concedes that all possess the gotra of practice, it contradicts their own assertion that prior to the path of seeing there is no undefiled dharmas. Furthermore, the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra states: "Buddhadhātu is not merely a single dharma; how could all defiled and pure beings possess it identically without distinction between noble and ordinary?" In terms of principle, this is not precluded, but the gotra of practice is not like this. Furthermore, if one takes greed and the like as the gotra of practice, since these are not wholesome dharmas, it contradicts the Mahāyānāvatāra. Thus the treatise states: "You are foolish and lack wisdom, taking afflictions to be buddhadhātu. Because the gotra of principle is all-pervading, not believing that all possess it is called incomplete faith." Now, conceding that the principle is all-pervading, our previous reconciliation was not false. Furthermore, they say: "All who possess mind shall become Buddhas"; and say: "Explaining buddhadhātu for the sake of what is not buddhadhātu: what is not buddhadhātu refers to insentient things like walls, tiles, and stones; being free from such insentient things is called buddhadhātu"—this is largely identical with the statement that all sentient beings shall become Buddhas. Why? Could "all sentient beings" speak of those without mind or take the insentient as sentient beings? Therefore, sharing "all" does not constitute definitive proof. What is more, the sūtra itself contains explanations of the word "all"; the two approaches of principle and practice must be understood together. When they do not accept primordial undefiled seeds as the gotra of the three yānas at all, they still do not consider it a contradiction; why then should taking the statement that all possess it as a partial possession be considered contrary to teaching? When the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts state that it is not all-pervading, does that refer to the mind of principle? Furthermore, using the five yānas taught in the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, they claim that those who do not abide in nirvāṇa and are attached to humans and devas are made causes of nirvāṇa, taking this as a definitive teaching. This too is not so. That text is based on acquired nature (vāsanāgotra), not the primordial seed gotra (prakṛtisthagotra). Moreover, if one accepts this as proof, it contradicts the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra's statement that all possess it. All contradictory texts that invert their erroneous reconciliations can be understood by analogy with the above. Furthermore, they say: the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra states "all sentient beings return to the one path," and the one path means jointly using the Buddha vehicle as the one vehicle, which is also the same as the Śrīmālādevī stating "the two vehicles enter the one vehicle, and the one vehicle is the Mahāyāna." This too is not so. He himself explained: "one path, one condition," and so forth were taught before forty years, whereas the Śrīmālādevī was classified by him as later. How can he now say they are the same? Contradicting oneself before and after is truly one's own clumsiness. Furthermore, there are more errors, as will be distinguished below in refuting his reconciliation of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra text. Why is it that, when two passages in a single sūtra are similar, he takes or leaves them according to his own preference and forcefully reconciles them as different? Therefore, we know that Vijñaptimātra conforms well to all sūtras, and the grand pattern of the treatises is profoundly worthy of emulation and study.