能顯中邊慧日論 1.11

1.11

An opinion states: There are differing accounts across the sūtras and treatises, and there can never be two ultimate realities; one must certainly be provisional. Yet with respect to distinctions of principle, it is not utterly false. The Saṃdhinirmocana retains the two extinguishments and teaches the ekayāna, and some sūtras state that the icchantika utterly lacks the principle of nirvāṇa and so forth; these are provisional teachings. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka removes the two extinguishments and teaches the ekayāna, and the Nirvāṇa teaches that icchantikas all possess the buddhadhātu; these are real teachings. Therefore, the principles and models of provisional and real have six aspects: first, the difference in magnitude regarding the transgressions and merits of faith and slander; second, the difference in superiority and inferiority of the persons for whom it was spoken; third, the difference in shallowness and profundity between being difficult to understand and easy to understand; fourth, the difference between whether the Buddha himself harmonises and explains them or not; fifth, the difference in sequence between provisional and real facing each other; and sixth, the difference between the half and full, as in the difference between Great and Small. The two accounts—triyāna versus ekayāna, and five gotras versus buddhadhātu—also possess six characteristics when juxtaposed against each other; hence we know that the ekayāna and buddhadhātu are real, whereas the triyāna and five gotras are provisional.

That assertion is not correct; all six have faults.

First, as for the assertion that the distinctions among the five gotras originate from the Hīnayāna, that the sole one Buddha-vehicle is taught in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and so forth, where it is distinct and manifest that all shall become Buddhas, and that it is only within the two sūtras of the Nirvāṇa [and Saddharmapuṇḍarīka] where the comparison of transgressions and merits from faith and slander is extensively set forth, whereas there is no such discussion for the actual extinguishment of the dviyāna or the portion devoid of gotra—hence knowing that the teaching of the ekayāna and buddhadhātu is manifest and real, while the teaching of the triyāna and five gotras is provisional and hidden: If one speaks of the merits and transgressions of faith and slander regarding definitive and non-definitive sūtras having real distinctions, the Saṃdhinirmocana's comparison is indeed an established exposition; hence one knows that the Saṃdhinirmocana is not a non-definitive teaching. In judging it to be provisional, would that not contradict the sūtra? Furthermore, countless Mahāyāna sūtras do not extensively compare merits; could they all be provisional and esoteric? If so, then since the Śrīmālādevī, the Anuttarāśraya, and the Laṅkāvatāra do not compare [such merits], they ought to be provisional and non-definitive. Furthermore, the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra says: 'Just as an unmanageable and stubborn elephant or horse must have severe flogging inflicted until it penetrates to the bone before it is subdued,' and so forth, up to: 'With such harsh words and diligent admonition, they are then subdued and enter the true Dharma.' The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, for the sake of transforming dull-rooted śrāvakas, initiates the indeterminate to turn toward nirvāṇa, and to remove the four inverted views of the śrāvakas—who thought that the Buddha truly enters parinirvāṇa—it speaks of the Buddha's nature of reality, constantly maintaining urgent admonition to subdue those inferior people. Were it not so, could it be that before parinirvāṇa there were no sharp-rooted beings like Mañjuśrī for whom nirvāṇa could be taught, and only when arriving at nirvāṇa were there sharp-rooted beings like Kāśyapa for whom the real was finally spoken? Furthermore, even if one were to determine the provisional and the real based on the order of comparisons, this is also difficult to rely upon. Why? The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Nirvāṇa both extensively make comparisons, and are thereby determined to be real and definitive; yet the text of the Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā exceedingly compares the merit of faithful acceptance and so forth; the Suvikrāntavikrāmi-prajñāpāramitā states: 'One who slanders this sūtra slanders the mother of all Buddhas; though the great Avīci hells of the ten directions are destroyed, the retribution for his sin will not have ended'; and the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra everywhere makes comparisons, saying: 'By means of this sūtra, one swiftly attains Buddhahood and all merits,' and so forth, which are too numerous to cite in full. If one were to rely on these, they would be determined to be real and definitive, which not only contradicts one's own tenets, but also contradicts the scriptures. Now, we do not deny that sūtras like the Nirvāṇa are definitive and real, but one must not cling to comparisons as a definitive standard. Neither the Saṃdhinirmocana nor the Prajñāpāramitā permits the dviyāna of determinate nature to turn their minds toward the Great, and their comparisons are similar to that of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka; therefore, to judge the Saṃdhinirmocana and so forth as provisional and non-definitive on account of comparisons becomes an error. Moreover, the Saṃdhinirmocana itself uses definitive sūtras to compare against non-definitive ones; this was the Buddha's own teaching of them as definitive. If ordinary mortals of later generations judge them to be non-definitive, their wisdom would have to surpass that of the Buddha.

As for the fault regarding the superiority and inferiority of the persons for whom it was spoken: If one says that the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka says: 'During the confusion of the kalpa-defilement...' up to: '...because they have developed all unwholesome roots, he expediently teaches three for the one Buddha-vehicle,' and also says: 'The reason I did not teach it before is that the time to teach it had not yet arrived,' and also says: 'Among the bodhisattvas, I uprightly discard expedients'; and the Nirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'Because there were no sharp-rooted beings like Kāśyapa, I expediently revealed the triyāna according to capacity,' and also says: 'Such a great matter cannot be heard by these lowly and small persons. What is the great matter? It refers to the profound, secret treasury of all Buddhas, which is the buddhadhātu'—hence knowing that the ekayāna and buddhadhātu of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Nirvāṇa are definitive and real, whereas the triyāna and the portion devoid of gotra in the Saṃdhinirmocana and such sūtras are provisional and esoteric—this is unreasonable.

If one claims that the provisional or real, explicit or esoteric nature of a sūtra is determined by the superiority or inferiority of the persons for whom it was spoken, this might be admissible to a small degree; but to deduce that because sūtras like the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka were spoken later, they were for superior persons and are therefore real and definitive, and to judge that because the Saṃdhinirmocana and so forth were spoken earlier, they are provisional and esoteric, is exceedingly reckless. As the Avataṃsaka-sūtra, the Ratnagotravibhāga, and other texts all state: 'Just as when the sun rises, it first shines upon the high mountains, and next upon the streams and marshes; the Tathāgata is also like this: first for the bodhisattvas, and later for the dviyāna and others.' Seven days after attaining enlightenment, he preached the Daśabhūmika-sūtra; and the thirty-first fascicle of the Nirvāṇa-sūtra speaks of 'three sons, three fields, and three vessels' and so on; all of these place the superior first and the inferior later. Could it be that because the Dharma had not been preached for long earlier, it was later entirely for inferior persons with shallow teachings? Furthermore, at the verge of nirvāṇa, he spoke the Bequeathed Teachings (Yijiao jing) and so forth; could they both be profound teachings for superior persons? Moreover, countless Mahāyāna scriptures were spoken for bodhisattvas before the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, and were not shallow teachings for inferior persons. As for the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, the treatise says: 'For the sake of what was done for the śrāvakas, he addressed Śāriputra.' The second fascicle says: 'I now also wish to cause you to remember the path practiced according to your original vow; therefore, for the sake of the śrāvakas, I preach this Mahāyāna sūtra called the Lotus of the Wonderful Dharma.' This was for śrāvakas; how could they be superior to bodhisattvas? Again, the second fascicle says: 'Śāriputra! When that Buddha appeared, although it was not an evil age, because of his original vow he spoke the Dharma of the triyāna... up to... in that land, bodhisattvas were regarded as the great treasure.' Hence it was for inferior persons that he spoke the shallow, provisional teaching of the triyāna. Furthermore, the Saṃdhinirmocana and other sūtras were spoken for Maitreya and others; how could they be inferior to śrāvakas? If one says: 'I rely on the distinction of persons at one time, where the later are superior and the former inferior, the former provisional and the later real, which applies to Śāriputra and others turning their minds toward the Great,' then what is to prevent the distinction of persons at different times, where the former are superior and the later inferior, the former real and the later provisional? For Paramārthasamudgata and others, he spoke of determinate gotras and the portion devoid of gotra that does not sit at the bodhimaṇḍa; how can one one-sidedly cling to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Nirvāṇa as alone being explicit and real?

As for the fault regarding difficulty, ease, shallowness, and profundity: If one says that according to the second fascicle of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, which says: 'For those who had not planted roots of goodness, had not purified obstacles, etc., he spoke the Hīnayāna teaching, causing them to cultivate the five things without the supreme grade; the five things withdraw from great wisdom; possessing these supreme five things, upon hearing the Mahāyāna they do not slander it.' According to this, the Hīnayāna is easy to understand, while the Mahāyāna is difficult to understand. The twenty-seventh fascicle of the Nirvāṇa says: 'Bodhisattvas of the tenth abode do not know that all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu.' The second fascicle of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka says: 'There is only the one Buddha-vehicle. Even you, Śāriputra, entered this sūtra through faith.' The ninety-third fascicle of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'The attainment of Buddhahood by arhats is not known by the authors of treatises; only the Buddha can comprehend it.' For the actual extinguishment of the dviyāna and the portion devoid of gotra, there is no such statement. Therefore, the provisional is shallow and the real is profound; this principle is definite. This is also not so. Since the Saṃdhinirmocana was spoken for bodhisattvas such as Paramārthasamudgata, Avalokiteśvara, Dharmodgata, and Maitreya, they were endowed with the supreme five things. Hearing the Mahāyāna, they do not slander it, and make no other exposition; hence we definitely know it is profound and real. That it says the indeterminate gotra attains Buddhahood while the determinate gotra does not is something fully comprehended, because the Buddha himself spoke it. To cling to it as provisional and shallow—how is that not contradictory? Hence it is an error. The Anuttarāśraya-sūtra speaks of three grades of sentient beings: The first are those attached to existence. Attachment to existence has two types: the first turns its back on the path of nirvāṇa, lacks the nature of nirvāṇa, does not seek nirvāṇa, and rejoices in saṃsāra; the second, within my Dharma, does not generate thirst and longing, and slanders the Mahāyāna. These two kinds are distinct: the former is devoid of gotra; the latter possesses gotra, but slanders the Mahāyāna. The Buddhagotraśāstra and the Ratnagotravibhāga both harmonise the statement that they do not attain Buddhahood as being spoken with reference to slanderers; they do not harmonise away those lacking the cause. Those who are deluded do not understand, saying they are one. If they were one, why would the Buddha make two statements? Hence we know that the teaching of a portion lacking gotra is real and explicit, like the 'ever-drowned' in the river in the Nirvāṇa-sūtra; the ever-drowned are also two, and there is one for each of the seven persons. Furthermore, the ninth fascicle states: 'Even if all immeasurable sentient beings simultaneously attain bodhi, these Tathāgatas will still not see that icchantika attain bodhi.' It also says: 'Like dead wood, like scorched seeds,' and so forth. These are the explicit and esoteric teachings of the Nirvāṇa. Yet saying that the teaching of a portion lacking gotra is a provisional and esoteric teaching is a great error.

As for the fault regarding whether harmonising explanations exist or not: If one says that the Saṃdhinirmocana harmonises the previous two periods, while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and Nirvāṇa harmonise the earlier Saṃdhinirmocana, and there is no text harmonising the ekayāna of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka as an expedient; furthermore, the Nirvāṇa says: 'The icchantika obstructs the future, hence is called devoid of gotra,' and the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka says: 'Because it was spoken as an expedient'—these are cases where the sūtras and treatises themselves harmonise the five gotras and the triyāna, while there is no text that harmonises and explains the ekayāna and buddhadhātu—this statement is incorrect. The Śrīmālādevī-sūtra says: 'Bearing the four heavy burdens: Sentient beings who have not heard the Dharma are matured by means of the wholesome roots of humans and devas,' and so forth, thus teaching four vehicles. It also says: 'If the Tathāgata expediently speaks according to their desires, that is the Mahāyāna; there are no two vehicles. The two vehicles enter into the ekayāna, and the ekayāna is the vehicle of supreme meaning.' Since it states that the Tathāgata expediently speaks according to their desires, that is the Mahāyāna. Furthermore, the thirty-first fascicle of the Nirvāṇa says: 'One path, one taste,' and so on. The Nirvāṇa says: 'My disciples do not understand my intention and proclaim: The Tathāgata says that srotāpannas up to arhats all attain the Buddha path.' It has already harmonised this itself, agreeing with the Saṃdhinirmocana, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, and others which say: 'Only the one vehicle is the Buddha's esoteric intention,' which also harmonises the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. The treatise texts are clear; the Nirvāṇa has no text explicitly stating that the gotra of practice is all-pervading. The statement that 'obstructing the future is called devoid of gotra' is because it is temporary. The thirty-second fascicle of the Nirvāṇa says: 'Although I say that all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu, sentient beings do not understand such words of the Buddha.' Such words even bodhisattvas in their final rebirth cannot understand. And it says: 'If it is said that sentient beings all possess the buddhadhātu, this is called the Tathāgata speaking according to his own intention. When the Tathāgata speaks according to his own intention like this, how can sentient beings understand it exclusively in one way?' According to the meaning of this passage, if all sentient beings have the buddhadhātu, the Buddha explicitly taught that it exists; why would a bodhisattva in his final rebirth fail to understand it? Why could one not understand it exclusively in one way? From this we know: regarding the presence or absence of the gotra of practice, the principle of tathatā is all-pervading, so he speaks of all possessing it. This agrees with accepting the five meanings of the Buddhagotraśāstra, which is why it speaks of the buddhadhātu; the Ratnagotravibhāga speaks of pervasiveness according to three meanings, on account of the principle of tathatā. Furthermore, it says: 'If this contemplation could be accomplished without causes and conditions, an icchantika should possess this contemplation.' According to this, it accepts that there is no gotra of practice. How much more so since they themselves accept that, like the mind, it is originally existent, yet anāsrava is absent. Since it is originally absent, the anāsrava lacks a cause; how could it arise later? Hence we know that the single gotra and ekayāna are both harmonised by the sūtras and treatises themselves. To say that there is no harmonising explanation is therefore an error.

As for the fault regarding the sequence of provisional and real: If one says that when the provisional and real are juxtaposed, the provisional comes first and the real later, for which there are texts everywhere, whereas the real coming first and the provisional later has no sūtra teaching—this is also incorrect, for the principle is not fixed. In terms of the indeterminate gotra, where one category of śrāvakas arises from the small toward the great, first three and later one, it is acceptable that the provisional comes first and the real later. But in terms of the sudden awakening of the Great [Vehicle], it is Great from beginning to end; how could the provisional come first, and only the later be real? The classification in the Saṃdhinirmocana was spoken with reference to the indeterminate gotra and the gotra of gradual awakening. Furthermore, it does not determinately judge all Mahāyāna sūtras before the Saṃdhinirmocana to be hidden and esoteric. The four Āgamas and so forth esoterically teach the existence of dharmas to eliminate the external clinging to self. The Prajñāpāramitās and so forth esoterically teach that all is empty to eliminate the attachment to dharmas of the Hīnayāna. Only when non-emptiness and non-existence are both set forth does it become an explicit teaching. Thus, although the Avataṃsaka was spoken earlier, it belongs to the third period. Although the Bequeathed Teachings was delivered later, it can belong to the first period, because it does not distinctly teach emptiness and existence, but only speaks of the four truths, definitely without divergence. According to their classification, the Avataṃsaka ought to be provisional because it was spoken earlier, and the Bequeathed Teachings ought to be real because it was spoken later. Furthermore, with respect to the indeterminate, he also first taught the real; as with the śrāvakas saved in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, all of them first heard the Great and later generated small aspirations. Evaluating the present by the past, for the nature of a śrāvaka, the real comes first and the provisional later. How can one determinately judge the provisional to come first and the real later? 'After a long time, the Buddhas must preach the true reality.' Relying on indeterminate persons, the Vinaya first permits and the Nirvāṇa later prohibits, distinguishing the Great and Small. Since the Saṃdhinirmocana is not a Hīnayāna teaching and was not spoken exclusively for śrāvakas, how can it be erroneously judged as provisional or real? Furthermore, during the first seven days he spoke the Daśabhūmika, and after three seven-day periods he spoke the teaching of the four truths; could the earlier teaching be provisional and the later be real? Hence we know this is a great error.

As for the fault regarding the Great and Small, half and full: If one judges the Small to be half, being a provisional, esoteric teaching, this is acceptable when speaking of one category. But to include treatises like the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Yogācārabhūmi as being provisional and esoteric teachings conforming [to capacities] is a profound error. Why? The Buddha himself declared it to be a definitive teaching, yet they now judge it to be provisional and esoteric. Furthermore, they say that a portion lacking gotra is a Hīnayāna doctrine. According to the 'Chapter on Refuting the Hīnayāna' in the Buddhagotraśāstra: 'If one relies on the Vibhajyavāda, all ordinary beings, noble beings, and sentient beings have emptiness as their root, because all emerge from emptiness. Emptiness is the buddhadhātu, and the buddhadhātu is great nirvāṇa.' Relying on the Sarvāstivādins and others, all sentient beings have no innately acquired buddhadhātu, but only cultivate-acquired buddhadhātu. The reason the Yogācārabhumī explains its absence is that it relies on the teaching of the Sarvāstivāda, which the Buddhagotraśāstra refutes. If so, then when the Buddhagotraśāstra and the Nirvāṇa speak of possessing the buddhadhātu, they must also rely on the Vibhajyavāda, because the Nirvāṇa also speaks of the ultimate emptiness as the buddhadhātu, which is refuted by the Yogācārabhūmi. If that is accepted, how can one determinately cling to the statement in the Buddhagotraśāstra that there is buddhadhātu as being explicit and real, belonging to the fifth period? If one says that although the Buddhagotraśāstra refutes non-existence, it does not share the Vibhajyavāda's clinging to existence, and thus is not refuted by the Yogācārabhūmi, then likewise, although the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of a portion lacking it, it does not share the Sarvāstivāda's clinging to non-existence, and is not refuted by the Buddhagotraśāstra. Furthermore, the Buddhagotraśāstra clearly states itself that the Vibhajyavādins and others assert existence, while the Sarvāstivādins and others assert non-existence, thereby clarifying the buddhadhātu. Questioning those who cling to the absence of gotra, one immediately knows that it does not rely on the Great to refute that Small [Vehicle]. In the Yogācārabhūmi, there is no long debate on this; by what principle can one know that it establishes non-existence relying on the Small, or refutes the Small to assert existence? Moreover, the Sarvāstivāda establishes that there is no innately acquired [buddhadhātu], whereas the Buddhagotraśāstra and Yogācārabhūmi hold that where there is gotra, it is innately present, and where it is absent, it is innately absent; how could they agree with the Sarvāstivāda's claim that all require the Small? Hence this is a great error. Furthermore, they judge the Yogācārabhūmi and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha as merely interpreting provisional teachings. On what basis is this determined? The Jñānaprasthāna and the six pādas interpret Hīnayāna sūtras; the Madhyamakaśāstra, Śataśāstra, and so forth interpret the Prajñāpāramitā; these are all explicit texts of treatises, known to all. The Yogācārabhūmi, the Prakaraṇāryavācā, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, the Bodhisambhāraśāstra, and so forth do not permit the determinate nature to turn their minds, and state that a portion of sentient beings lacks the practice-buddhadhātu; to judge them as interpreting provisional teachings and not as Mahāyāna scriptures—relying on Devānāmpriya to understand this is not accepted by the wise. Furthermore, the Buddhagotraśāstra and the Ratnagotravibhāga are largely the same in intent and principle. The first chapter of the Ratnagotravibhāga explicitly interprets the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra. The fourth fascicle of the Buddhagotraśāstra cites the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Vimokṣa, and explains that its essence is none other than the three natures. Relying on the Saṃdhinirmocana, there are no words explicitly interpreting the Nirvāṇa; could it be that only the Nirvāṇa alone clarifies the buddhadhātu, while the Tathāgatagarbha and others are not the buddhadhātu? Do treatises such as the Buddhagotraśāstra interpret the teaching of the fifth period? Alas, how lamentable! The great Dharma-generals have all entered nirvāṇa, and ordinary mortals recklessly insult and transgress against the sacred teachings.