English (machine translation)
Translation of 能顯中邊慧日論
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- pramana-mt · Machine translation by Gemini 3.8 Flash (2026-10-21) of in.bauddha.taisho.1863 · Machine output without human authorship: no copyright is claimed (CC0 1.0). The original text keeps its own…
Contents
Text
1.1
Composed by the monk Huizhao of Dayun Monastery in Zizhou.
1.2
The Great Sage and Hero endowed with the ten powers and five eyes,
Sought the Dharma for sentient beings throughout boundless kalpas.
His eighty-four thousand wondrous treasure-stores of teachings
All tally with that true, supreme other shore.
Revealing and showing them in accord with capacities to bring each to understanding,
He is therefore named the Munificent One, the Dharma King.
When the Buddha-sun expediently set behind the mountain of nirvāṇa,
The correct teaching accordingly went hidden and the eye of wisdom was extinguished.
The holy assemblies of the ten stages and the three ranks of the worthy,
Pitying sentient beings and protecting the Dharma, commented upon the profound sūtras.
In the degenerate age, life, mindfulness, and the practice of wisdom are faint;
Most people follow their personal sentiments and are confused about the holy intention.
Explicating the correct teaching one-sidedly according to their own views,
They delude themselves and others, obstructing the flow of the Dharma.
Now, gathering sūtras and treatises to harmonize these diverse texts,
I elucidate the Dharma to deliver living beings and bring them to correct understanding.
Therefore, bowing my head, I take refuge in the Three Jewels,
Praying only that out of compassion they bestow their protection.
1.3
Now, the paramārtha is without differentiation; hence sūtras and treatises set forth discourses on equality. The saṃvṛtisatya has distinctions; hence the holy ones disseminate discussions of the four and the one [vehicles]. Conforming to characteristics, principle and wisdom are divided like stars; returning to nature, mind and speech are both cut off. Either true or conventional, now real, now expedient—they measure the causes shown to adapt to sentient beings, and tally with capacities in leading to the fruits. Although the principle is one, receptive faculties are truly manifold; hence the twelve profound gates are further made to express identity and distinction, and the profound purports of the Tripiṭaka are elucidated either comprehensively or separately. Some grasp at tathatā to make it the janaka-hetu, or take the substance of the mind as the seed of all phenomena; blindly clinging to a single passage, they permit no distinction at all, and when encountering distinctions that are difficult to reconcile, they immediately designate them as Hīnayāna or expedient; they do not know that the Tathāgata possesses the powers of knowing faculties, natures, and so forth, and that sentient beings possess various realms (dhātus) and so on. Others stubbornly hold to separate elucidations, making everything non-uniform; whenever there is a discrepancy, they immediately claim it conforms to the nominal or conforms to the person; they do not know that the World-Honoured One possesses the intention of identical body (samam uccārayatīty abhiprāyaḥ), and that in reliance on tathatā there are aniyata-gotras and the like. Therefore, the śrāvaka was cross-examined because he did not recognize differences in capacity; the bodhisattva was reproved because he did not rely on the unity of principle. If one says that tathatā and the buddhadhātu are one, that all equally attain buddhahood, and that gotras are not distinct, then the parables of the four burdens and the three herbs would not hold. If one says that icchantikas and dviyāna followers entirely do not attain buddhahood and that each gotra is distinct, then the metaphors of the three carts and the two cities would not be established. Therefore, regarding the presence or absence of gotra in the realm of sentient beings: in terms of principle, it is pervasive, and all that have consciousness possess it; according to phenomenal distinctions, among those that have consciousness some have it and some do not; furthermore, among those that possess the gotra, there is the distinction between niyata and aniyata; among those without the gotra, there is also the difference between the temporary and the ultimate. For this reason, śrāvakas are spoken of as being of many types, and icchantikas are further expounded as being ever-drowned. Because of this, the vehicles are divided into one, two, three, or five, and the fruits are distinguished into ordinary, holy, expedient, or real; either it is said that all have the buddhadhātu and all will attain buddhahood, or it is said that there are those with and without the gotra, and not all will attain buddhahood. Furthermore, since the causes of buddhahood differ as conditioned and unconditioned, the fruit of buddhahood is also divided into eternal and impermanent; the name 'permanently abiding' is designated based on three meanings, and the title 'unconditioned' is established based on presence or absence. Some are confused about this wondrous purport and say that the three bodies of the Buddha are altogether motionless and unchanging; seeing the mention of 'unconditioned', they take the catvāri jñānāni to be without arising and ceasing. They do not know that these are all taught by the Samyaksaṃbuddha, relying on the fourfold saṃdhi and fourfold abhiprāya, whether according with himself or according with others. In the twelve divisions of teachings, the Buddha himself harmonized them; scattered throughout the various sūtras, they are generally difficult to fully investigate. Bodhisattva Maitreya extensively composed the Yogācārabhūmi to explain them, stating: 'There is no principle not investigated, no phenomenon not exhausted, no text not explained, no meaning not expounded, no clinging not refuted, no doubt not dispelled, no practice not cultivated, and no fruit not realized. It is specifically for bodhisattvas, so that they may attain skillfulness regarding the objects, practices, and fruits of all vehicles, diligently cultivate the great practice, realize great bodhi, and extensively teach sentient beings constantly and without error; it is concurrently for the other vehicles, so that they may cultivate their own shares of practice in reliance on their own dharmas and attain their own realizations of the fruits.' Masters such as Asaṅga either separately commented on a single work or comprehensively clarified the great intent, so that teachings and principles matched brilliantly, the fundamental and the secondary illuminating each other in turn. However, sentient beings are blind to the hidden intent, wishing to pour the great ocean into a small puddle; their minds are obscured regarding the jewel in the garment, lifting defiled food to cast into a precious vessel. They do not distinguish between the city-worth gem and a fish's eye, or between flowering plants and trees; they fail to differentiate between poison and clarified butter, or between sweet basil and stinkweed; relying on the light of a firefly, they point at the sun and moon; challenging a precious sword, they brandish a lead blade. Tāras are arbitrarily fixed in order, and the Dharma is rashly divided into revealed and esoteric. If these were to illuminate each other, the meaning would be grasped and the texts complied with; but when one truly clings to them as absolute truth, the words contradict and the principle is ruined. Though I am not clever, I have drunk from the waves of the ocean of Dharma; contemplating doubts concerning the splendid path, I harbor uncertainty about the southward-pointing compass that crosses the precipice. Having encountered these high discourses, I grasp my brush and step forward: gathering the subtle essences of the Tripiṭaka and drawing up the profound purports of the five vehicles, I reveal their hidden intents to tally with the grand path, briefly setting forth three chapters to open the minds of those not yet awakened. Although the text is not ornate, the principle is truly worthy of contemplation. I hope that those of profound discernment will scrutinize its import as in a mirror.
1.4
Chapter 1: Relying on the True to Refute Clinging.
1.5
1. Refuting fixed periods for causes; 2. Refuting fixed periods for teachings; 3. Refuting fixed expedient and real; 4. Refuting false harmonization of sūtras; 5. Refuting fixed revealed and esoteric; 6. Refuting conditioned and fundamental buddhadhātu.
1.6
1. Refuting Fixed Periods for Causes.
1.7
Some say: 'Within the sūtras and treatises, there are instances where terms are identical but the meanings differ. For instance, the Saṃdhinirmocana and other texts speak of the ekayāna, and the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and other texts speak of the ekayāna; although these share the same name, the Saṃdhinirmocana preserves the three while clarifying the one, whereas the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka refutes the two while clarifying the one, and thus their meanings differ. Why so? The Saṃdhinirmocana preserves the two nirvāṇas, stating that those of the niyata-gotra in the dviyāna do not sit at the bodhimaṇḍa. The verse says, "Therefore within it the ekayāna is established, / It is not that there is no distinction among the natures of sentient beings." This preserves the three while clarifying the one. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and other texts say, "Whether śrāvakas or bodhisattvas, / Hearing the Dharma I have preached, / Even down to a single verse, / All will attain buddhahood without doubt. / Only this one fact is real, / The other two are not true." Abandoning the goat and deer carts to extinguish the conjured city, refuting the two nirvāṇas to return to the jewel repository; therefore their meanings differ.'
This explanation is unreasonable. Why so? In all teachings on the ekayāna, name and meaning do not differ. We may briefly point out the agreement between the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Saṃdhinirmocana. Furthermore, concerning the ekayāna of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and that of the Saṃdhinirmocana and other texts, since the Mahāyānasaṃgraha cites the prediction given to Śāriputra in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka assembly as being among the ten meanings, how could one say that the teachings of the ekayāna prior to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka were different? [If one claims that] the Mahāyānasaṃgraha only explains the ekayāna prior to it and does not explain the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, since what is explained is the same, one clearly knows they are not different.
Moreover, there are no persons of fixed nature who are revealed and taught as attaining buddhahood. When Mahāmati asked in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, the Buddha answered, "Those who formerly made the vow for bodhi are not determinate," and so forth. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra-śāstra states: "Because the faculties of the determinate persons are not yet mature, the Bodhisattva confers predictions on them to cause them to generate the aspiration." Since the wording is general, it also refers to past matters. If one says that by refuting the two nirvāṇas the ekayāna is explicitly revealed, then one must definitively state that all [followers of] the dviyāna will attain buddhahood; why then exclude the determinate? Moreover, the third parable is for those who exclusively seek the Mahāyāna, thinking that apart from the Mahāyāna there are no distinct dviyānas, so that they may know the diversity of the distinct yānas; therefore the rain parable was spoken. Thus it accords with the Saṃdhinirmocana that those of the śamāyana-gotra do not sit at the bodhimaṇḍa. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka only preaches the ekayāna across three cycles for those who retrogressed from the bodhicitta and for transformation-śrāvakas; all the śrāvakas to whom predictions were conferred are solely these two. The sūtras and treatises agree that there are entirely none of the śamāyana [who receive predictions]; this is fully revealed in the texts. Thus it accords with the Saṃdhinirmocana that those of the aniyata-gotra can advance to right enlightenment. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra says, "Desiring to reveal the Buddha's knowledge and vision to sentient beings"; the treatise commentary explains this same meaning, saying: "What is identical is that the dharmakāyas of the triyāna are equal. As for the dharmakāyas of the triyāna being equal, it is because there is no distinction between the buddhadhātu and the dharmakāya." This accords with the Saṃdhinirmocana's reliance on the ultimate naturelessness among the three kinds of naturelessness, and so forth. It is also like the Liang translation of the [Mahāyānasaṃgraha-]śāstra stating that the ekayāna is taught based on the equality of phenomena as tathatā. In the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra, the four great śrāvakas themselves speak the parable: at first being a vile hired laborer removing dung; midway being entrusted with the wealth while having no hope of taking it oneself; and at the end, having assembled the multitude and announced it, only then conceiving comprehension. This accords with the third-period teaching of the Saṃdhinirmocana, and also accords with the single category of the selflessness of phenomena subsumed by the various treatises. Both the Liang and Tang translations of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha fully reveal this, and say that they do not fail to explain the ekayāna of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. Therefore, assertions of identity or difference are mere deluded conceptualisations.
Again, some say: 'Or there are instances where the names differ but the substance is the same. The substance of the buddhadhātu in the Nirvāṇa[sūtra] is precisely tathatā. In the Buddhagotraśāstra it is named "attainable" (prāpya). Since it is acknowledged that the nature of principle pervades sentient beings, not believing that the attainable will definitively attain buddhahood is also unreasonable.' This too is unreasonable. Although there are the causes and conditions of what is attainable, yet because it is acknowledged that the great compassionate bodhisattvas together with [sentient beings] possess the causes of preparatory practice, because sentient beings' realm is exhausted, they constantly do not attain buddhahood. What prevents sentient beings, though possessing the cause of what is attainable, from constantly not attaining buddhahood because they lack the cause of preparatory practice? If you say, 'I acknowledge they will attain it,' that directly contradicts the sūtras. The presence or absence of preparatory practice will be extensively distinguished below in the section 'Revealing the Correct.'
There is another view: 'Causes consist of the auxiliary and the primary; fruits consist of the near and the far. The auxiliary refers to associated wholesome factors and so forth; the primary refers to the tathāgatagarbha nature of the eight consciousnesses. When the eight consciousnesses are equally perfected and tathatā is pervasive, even if one lacks the auxiliary cause, it will come to exist through cultivation. Not believing in the primary cause—how could that not be delusion?' That adherence is not so. Now, regarding tathatā being taken as the primary cause: is it called primary with respect to generating the fruit, or is it primary on the basis of being the support for delusion and awakening? If being able to generate the fruit is called the primary cause, this universally contradicts the sūtras and treatises, for the permanent is never a generating cause. The fourth chapter of the Bodhisattvabhūmisūtra, fascicle 38 of the Yogācārabhūmi, and fascicle 30 of the Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra speak of permanent phenomena among the causes that lack the four conditions. If permanent phenomena were the direct causes and conditions, the meaning of seeds in the Yogācārabhūmi and Mahāyānasaṃgraha would also be entirely contradicted. If you say that it combines with the auxiliary cause and does not directly produce the fruit, this contradicts various sūtras and treatises, leading to a great error. Moreover, do you not acknowledge that the saṃbhogabuddha's body is endowed with the five skandhas? If it is endowed with the five skandhas, while the cause is not even subsumed under the skandhas, how could it be the cause of the skandhas? Furthermore, the Buddhagotraśāstra does not acknowledge that the real can generate existence; therefore, although the eight consciousnesses are the primary cause, this is not spoken with reference to beginningless manifest consciousnesses. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: "Endowed with the perfumed dharma of the anāsrava, it is therefore called the non-empty tathāgatagarbha." If one takes the beginningless manifest consciousness as the primary cause of buddhahood, then the primary cause of buddhahood—the anāsrava—would be constantly manifest; how then could there be ordinary beings? If you say it is sāsrava, how then could it be the primary cause? That would contradict the Mahāyānasaṃgraha's statement that poison is taken as amṛta. Moreover, how could the mind and mental factors not be the primary cause of the saṃbhogabuddha? If they are not the primary cause of the saṃbhogabuddha, this contradicts the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, and so forth, which state that the state of mind associated with the four wisdoms is called the saṃbhogakāya, acknowledging it to be the saṃbhogabuddha. To say that associated wholesome factors and so forth are auxiliary causes—how excessively rash! If one takes tathatā as the primary cause of the dharmakāya, it does not exceed two, namely the generative (janaka) and the revelatory (jñāpaka). With respect to the dharmakāya, tathatā is not subsumed under either the generative or revelatory cause; how then can it be called the primary cause? One can only acknowledge that the stages of cause and fruit differ: the causal stage is named tathāgatagarbha, and the fruitional stage is named dharmakāya. Tathatā does not generate tathatā, nor does it manifest itself. Since it is neither generative nor revelatory, we do not know by what principle it could be the primary cause. Because its substance does not change across the two stages, distinguishing cause and fruit, auxiliary and primary, is falsely applied. The primary causes of the three bodies will be extensively distinguished below in the section 'Revealing the Correct.'
There is another view: 'Those who have long cultivated bodhisattva practices become competent to uphold them, abide in the nature of their own yāna, and will definitively attain buddhahood. Before reaching this stage, they are said not to attain buddhahood. Those who are deluded about not being competent in the bodhisattva's own yāna-gotra, because their initial generation of the aspiration is not yet competent to uphold it, call it "having no gotra," and thereupon claim that they are ultimately without gotra and cannot attain buddhahood.' That too is unreasonable. Why so? The Bodhisattvabhūmisūtra says, "By virtue of the initial generation of the aspiration, one definitively attains anuttarā bodhi." The Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra says: "What is called upholding? The bodhisattva's own gotra, the initial generation of the aspiration, and all dharmas conducive to bodhi are called upholding. Why so? Because relying on the gotra, the bodhisattva is definitively competent for anuttarā bodhi; therefore the gotra is called definitive upholding." Down to saying: "Therefore the initial generation of the aspiration is called the expedient upholding of the bodhisattva's practice; relying on the practice's expedients, the bodhisattva fulfills anuttarā bodhi." Since it states that therefore the initial generation of the aspiration is called the expedient upholding of the bodhisattva's practice, and that relying on the practice's expedients one fulfills bodhi, how could one say that it is only through long cultivation that it is named upholding, or named having the gotra? Furthermore, the Bodhisattvabhūmisūtra says: "If one lacks the bodhisattva gotra, although one may generate the aspiration and diligently cultivate vigorous practice, in the end one cannot attain anuttarā bodhi. Therefore one should know that it is not because of generating the aspiration and diligently cultivating vigorous practice that one has the bodhisattva gotra." If long cultivation reaching competence in upholding were called having the gotra, why would the sūtra state that it is not because of generating the aspiration that one has the bodhisattva gotra? Furthermore, the Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra-śāstra states: "Because a person without gotra lacks the gotra, even though they generate the aspiration and diligently cultivate vigorous practice, they will definitively not culminate in anuttarā bodhi. Therefore one should know that even if one does not generate the aspiration and does not cultivate practice and expedients, one is still called upholding the gotra." Since it states that even without generating the aspiration one is called upholding the gotra, why trouble oneself to falsely divide the beginning and the end?
Some say: 'Seeing the text on the five gotras in the Hīnayāna, one immediately claims that the triyāna is an innate (dharmatā) distinction. Or, seeing [texts on] lacking the cause of nirvāṇa and being ultimately without gotra, one claims that the atyantika lacks the innate seed; not knowing that although one ultimately lacks the gotra and lacks the cause for generating the aspiration, later on there are still the distinctions of the five yānas, and all gotras are newly perfumed into existence, while the text of the Śrāvakabhūmi is not definitive proof.' This statement is entirely wrong. Why so? The Yogācārabhūmi was composed by Maitreya Bodhisattva, yet they say it is not definitive proof. The Śrīmālādevī[siṃhanādasūtra] and the Śīlasaṃyuktasūtra were proclaimed by Śākyamuni the World-Honoured One, yet they regard them as Hīnayāna teachings. Such outrageous defiance—who would dare speak with them! Now, regarding the claim that one who is ultimately without gotra and lacks the cause for generating the aspiration will later on still come to have them, we now ask them: does the later cause for generating the aspiration arise from a seed, or is it produced without a cause? If originally without a cause the mind arises naturally, one is not a son of Śākya. Therefore, the first fascicle of the four-fascicle Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: "Mahāmati, if one further asserts that without seeds there are three kinds of consciousness produced by the combination of three conditions, then turtles should grow hair and sand should yield oil. Your doctrine would be destroyed, contradicting definitive tenets." Moreover, if one does not acknowledge that the five yānas are distinguished by beginningless innate natures, but [claims] that all are identical in the one tathatā and all will attain buddhahood, and that the five gotras are newly perfumed and not fundamentally existent, why did the World-Honoured One cause them to perfume the five gotras instead of exclusively preaching the Mahāyāna to cause them to equally perfume the buddha-seed? The Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra says, "They have no wound of their own; do not wound them," and so forth. How could the Great Master, the Tamer of Men, not have known that there is the primary attainable cause, such that he would wound them with the Hīnayāna? If you say it is due to differences in faculties and natures, then the five gotras are fundamentally existent; how could they only be newly perfumed? Furthermore, the Bodhisattvabhūmisūtra says, "It is not because of generating the aspiration and diligently cultivating vigorous practice that one has the bodhisattva gotra." Therefore, we know that the five gotras are all fundamentally existent. From the fundamentally existent seeds, manifest activities repeatedly arise, and the perfumed seeds are called the acquired gotra (samudānīta-gotra). Furthermore, the Śīlasaṃyuktasūtra and other texts explain the causes of definitive distinction, saying: "Possessing the śrāvaka gotra, through the śrāvaka-yāna one enters parinirvāṇa," and so forth. Therefore, we know that distinction of gotra is not due to new perfuming. If it only began to exist through new perfuming, then one should say: "Previously lacking the śrāvaka gotra, one is caused to give rise to the śrāvaka-yāna gotra and rely on the śrāvaka-yāna," and so forth. Since it does not state this, it is clear that they are neither newly produced nor Hīnayāna teachings. Therefore, to hold that they are solely newly arisen contradicts both reason and doctrine. However, where the Mahāsaṃnipāta and other sūtras speak of being perfumed into existence, this is spoken with reference to the acquired gotra, not the natural gotra (prakṛtistha-gotra). If one speaks of the natural gotra, it is the principle of tathatā. That it is not the active gotra will be revealed below. Having briefly dispelled four delusions, the rest may be inferred by analogy.
1.8
Refuting the Assertion of the Period of the Teaching, Part Two
1.9
A position holds: Saṃdhinirmocana was spoken earlier and the Mahāparinirvāṇa later; three weeks [after enlightenment] the wheel of the Four Noble Truths was set forth as a distinct teaching period; forty years later came the greatest wheel of Dharma—why then not allow that yet another period be established? Furthermore, the Mahāyāna is distinct from the Hīnayāna, so the later preaching of the Mahāyāna established a period. The ekayāna is distinct from the triyāna; when the ekayāna was taught later, why not allow a distinct period to be established? Therefore, following Saṃdhinirmocana, the first three periods are established, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka's ekayāna is the fourth, and the Mahāparinirvāṇa's buddhadhātu is the fifth period. This too is incorrect and entails many errors.
First, the turning of the Four Truths and subsequent establishment of teaching periods were stated by the Buddha, the World-Honoured One. That the ekayāna is fourth and buddhadhātu fifth—the sūtras nowhere determine this; who said so? If teaching periods are established as five based on differences in meaning, every sūtra differs in meaning according to intention. For instance, the Sukhāvatīvyūha urges rebirth in the West, going to whichever pure realm one vows, while Maitreya's ascent urges birth in Tuṣita; or contemplating Ākāśagarbha, or Samantabhadra, etc. If so, teaching periods would be exceedingly numerous, not just three or five. Moreover, in the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, at one time [the Buddha] was on the banks of the Ganges, etc.; since these are not fixed times, they cannot be taken [as fixed periods]. Thus asserting five periods is not the Buddha's teaching.
Furthermore, in the second chapter, ‘Faith and Understanding,’ of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, three periods are extensively established. First it states: ‘We stood at the head of the Saṅgha and thought we had already attained nirvāṇa’—this is the teaching of the first period. It also says: ‘The World-Honoured One of old had long preached the Dharma; I was then in the assembly, but contemplated only emptiness, signlessness, and had no joy in the bodhisattva Dharma’—this is the second period. ‘We deeply rejoice in gaining great and beneficial goodness; the great jewel of the Dharma King was obtained without seeking’—this is the third period. In the verse section, the three periods are even clearer, which aligns with Saṃdhinirmocana. How can one defy the teaching to establish a separate five periods? This is a great error.
It is also claimed that the Anantanirdeśa-sūtra distinguishes periods for Hīnayāna, Madhyamayāna, and Mahāyāna, isolating the middle vehicle and combining the Mahāyāna into one. This too is irrational. Why? The Anantanirdeśa-sūtra begins by stating: ‘Since the Tathāgata attained the Way more than forty years ago, he has constantly expounded the dharmas for sentient beings, up to neither emerging nor vanishing. Those who heard it either attained warmth, summit, patience, the supreme worldly dharmas, the four fruits, pratyekabuddhahood, or generated the bodhicitta and mounted the ten stages’—not separating the three vehicles. It also says: ‘I arose from beneath the tree king, went to the Deer Park in Vārāṇasī, turned the Four Truths for the five people including Ājñātakauṇḍinya, and also taught dharmas up to moment-to-moment arising and ceasing. In between, here and elsewhere, for the monks and bodhisattvas, I expounded the twelve links and six pāramitās,’ up to, ‘Now again here I expound the Great Vehicle's Anantanirdeśa-sūtra, up to moment-to-moment arising and ceasing.’ It does not say that the middle period was exclusively for pratyekabuddhas, but says it was together with the bodhisattvas. Later it does not say that now here it is exclusively for bodhisattvas.
It also says: ‘Good son, when I first preached the Four Truths, it was for seekers of the śrāvaka vehicle, yet eight hundred million devas descended to hear the Dharma and generated bodhicitta. In the middle, throughout various places, I expounded the profound twelve causes and conditions for seekers of the pratyekabuddha vehicle, yet countless sentient beings generated bodhicitta or abode as śrāvakas. Next I preached the Vaipulya twelve-part scriptures, Mahāprajñā, and the Avataṃsaka's ocean-like emptiness, expounding bodhisattvas' kalpas of practice, yet hundreds of thousands of monks and myriad devas and humans, countless sentient beings, attained the fruit of srotāpanna up to arhat.’ In the method of causes and conditions for abiding pratyekabuddhas, preaching the twelve links was said to be for pratyekabuddhas, yet there was only generating bodhicitta or abiding as śrāvakas, with no generation of the pratyekabuddha mind or realization of the pratyekabuddha fruit. When next preaching the Vaipulya, śrāvaka fruits were attained. And in the method of causes and conditions for abiding pratyekabuddhas, it does not say it was for bodhisattvas. To judge that the Anantanirdeśa distinguishes periods of Hīnayāna, Madhyamayāna, and Mahāyāna, isolating the middle vehicle and combining the Mahāyāna into one, thereby making three periods—on what standard is this based? If it is said, ‘Since it speaks of the great teaching, why is it not the Mahāyāna?’ If so, Saṃdhinirmocana also speaks of the great teaching; why call it triyāna? Even granting three, it never teaches five, nor does it limit the chronological order of years and months.
It is further claimed: Now, distinguishing five periods based on vehicle and gotra refers to Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna, triyāna, ekayāna, and one nature. In these five periods, the later subsumes the earlier meaning, while the earlier does not subsume the later. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka was established after Saṃdhinirmocana, and the Mahāparinirvāṇa came after the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. Since Saṃdhinirmocana was spoken earlier, how could it anticipate and judge a later teaching? Thus, by grading from shallow to deep, five periods are established, and the fourth and fifth are not subsumed within the third period of Saṃdhinirmocana. This too is incorrect. Only after three weeks did he go to the Deer Park to preach the Four Truths and first deliver the five men. Yet in the second week, he preached the Daśabhūmika, and without rising from beneath the bodhi tree, gave Trapuṣa the prediction of future buddhahood under the name Qicheng. How can one definitively judge that the Hīnayāna was preached first?
Moreover, the ekayāna is the Mahāyāna. The Śrīmālādevī-sūtra states: ‘The śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha vehicles all enter the Mahāyāna; the Mahāyāna is the Buddha vehicle. Therefore, the triyāna is the ekayāna; one who attains the ekayāna attains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.’ In the second period, the Mahāyāna was judged to be taught; since ekayāna is subsumed under the Mahāyāna, it belongs to the second period; how could it be the fourth? If you say Saṃdhinirmocana is the period teaching the triyāna: does it encompass the triyāna piṭaka and so is called the triyāna teaching, or does it teach that there are three vehicles and is therefore called the triyāna period? If you allow that Saṃdhinirmocana encompasses the triyāna, that contradicts correct reason, for past and present agree it is a Mahāyāna piṭaka. If you say it teaches three vehicles and is therefore called the triyāna period, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka does the same, repeatedly stating ‘for those seeking the śrāvaka [vehicle],’ etc. If you say they are not identical, this was refuted above; hence one cannot say the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka's ekayāna is the fourth period. The Mahāparinirvāṇa also states: ‘In this sūtra, sometimes the ekayāna is taught, sometimes the triyāna.’
Furthermore, the ‘one nature’ is buddhadhātu, and buddhadhātu is tathatā. The Śrīmālādevī, Tathāgatagarbha, Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa, Dharmadhātuprakṛty-asaṃbhedanirdeśa, Tathāgatajñānamudrā, Suvikrāntacintādevaputra-paripṛcchā, Sarvadharmāpravṛtti, and Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā-dharmakāya sūtras all extensively explain that the tathāgatagarbha, buddhadhātu, and dharmakāya exist in all beings. If, as is claimed now, buddhadhātu was preached in the fifth period: the Śrīmālādevī says that Queen Mallikā had not long had faith in the Dharma, clearly placing it earlier. The Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra, according to Bodhiruci, was preached in the tenth year after the Buddha's enlightenment. Both the Buddhagotraśāstra and Ratnagotravibhāga rely on this sūtra. Saṃdhinirmocana and the Anuttarāśraya-sūtra also extensively clarify buddhadhātu without relying on the Mahāparinirvāṇa to elucidate the meaning of buddhadhātu. How can one definitively judge that only in the Mahāparinirvāṇa did he first clarify that all have buddhadhātu, relegating the Śrīmālādevī, Buddhagotraśāstra, and others to the fifth period?
If, because the Mahāparinirvāṇa came after Saṃdhinirmocana, it could not be anticipated as the third period, why did you yourself cite: ‘Certain earlier sūtras implicitly teach later meanings, as stated in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa’? Furthermore, the Avataṃsaka preceded the preaching of the Four Truths; why did the Anantanirdeśa-sūtra judge it as taught in the third period? If you say it speaks according to semantic categories and not chronological order, Saṃdhinirmocana is the same; why disbelieve this alone? Therefore, judging five periods based on chronological order is mere infant wisdom, rejected by the wise.
It is also said that the three periods of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka differ from those of Saṃdhinirmocana. This too is incorrect. The meaning and intent of the two sūtras in clarifying the periods do not differ. Saddharmapuṇḍarīka chapter 2 states: ‘Of old in Vārāṇasī I turned the wheel of the Four Noble Truths; now again I turn the most marvelous, unsurpassed great wheel of Dharma.’ It contrasts provisional and ultimate to speak of two periods, leaving the second period implicit. The verses in the ‘Faith and Understanding’ chapter state: ‘The Buddha, likewise, knowing we rejoiced in the lesser, never said: “You will become buddhas.” Instead, he said that we had attained the anāsrava and were accomplished in the lesser vehicle as śrāvaka disciples’—this is hearing the teaching of existence. ‘The Buddha instructed us to teach the supreme Way... When we heard of purifying buddha-lands and converting sentient beings, we had no joy at all. Why? All dharmas are empty and quiescent, without birth or extinction, neither great nor small...’—this is hearing the teaching of emptiness. Up to: ‘Today we have obtained what was never before had; what was not previously hoped for has now been naturally gained, like the poor son obtaining boundless jewels...’—this is hearing the teaching of neither emptiness nor existence. In the prose section, the sūtra text is likewise complete.
It is further said that Saṃdhinirmocana retains two cessations and eliminates one, while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka refutes two cessations and illuminates the one, and that they differ in this regard. This has already been refuted above. The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra is the same: in chapter 2's physician parable, first commanding all to drink milk illustrates the teaching of existence; next commanding total abstinence illustrates the teaching of emptiness; finally stating it is suitable or unsuitable to drink illustrates neither emptiness nor existence. This was directed at heterodox non-Buddhists who clung to all having a self: to break this existence and lead them into personal emptiness, he provisionally and implicitly taught personal emptiness; its meaning being overtly manifested as lesser, he first spoke of the existence of dharmas. Next, to break the existence of dharmas, he implicitly taught the emptiness of dharmas, which was only explicitly taught in the Mahāparinirvāṇa assembly. To eliminate heterodox clinging to existence he taught emptiness; to eliminate śrāvaka clinging to emptiness he taught existence, clarifying that buddhadhātu is not illusory. Not being a falsely conceived self, it is not existent; having permanence and so on, it is not empty. This matches the third period; why call it the fifth?
Furthermore, if the Mahāparinirvāṇa clarifies the existence of buddhadhātu such that the capacities of all five vehicles reach the fruit of buddhahood, thus constituting the fifth period, why did Subhadra, hearing that all sentient beings have buddhadhātu and equally become buddhas, not generate the great mind, but instead attained the fruit of arhatship? Thus, as Saṃdhinirmocana judges it, it belongs to the third period, universally for those setting out upon all vehicles, being truly definitive in meaning. Careful, detailed investigation makes this meaning even clearer. Understanding this grand outline, the five gates are forever closed, so I do not establish separate gates to counter each partial view.
It is also claimed: The teachings have five periods, differentiated by five gates: first, difference in sequence; second, difference in derivation of names; third, inequality in benefits described; fourth, difference in times described; fifth, distinction in the dharmas expounded. As for difference in sequence: the triyāna precedes the ekayāna, and buddhadhātu follows the ekayāna. The general sense is identical to the earlier error of determining chronological order, so it will not be refuted again. As for difference in names: the fourth period teaching is named ekayāna because the five vehicles return to buddhadhātu; the fifth period teaching is named buddhadhātu because the five natures return to buddhadhātu. This too is incorrect. If the five vehicles returning to ekayāna makes it the fourth period, then in the Śrīmālādevī the four fruits also all return to the Buddha fruit, and in Saṃdhinirmocana the indeterminate also advance to the Buddha vehicle, so they should be the fourth period. In the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the determinate gotra also does not return to the one, so it should be subsumed under the third. The many sūtras cited above on buddhadhātu teach identically; they should be the fifth period called the buddhadhātu teaching—why only the Mahāparinirvāṇa? If you say so, was the Śrīmālādevī's tathāgatagarbha really after forty years? The error has already been shown above.
As for the inequality in benefits described: the Hīnayāna speaks of the existent dharmas of conditioned arising as the initial foundation for myriad practices. Thus the Daśacakra-sūtra says: ‘One who does not study the Hīnayāna has no way to study the Mahāyāna.’ This means relying on the teaching of existence to accumulate wholesome roots, not that one first develops the lesser mind and only afterward studies the great. This claim is incorrect: in terms of the indeterminate gotra, they are initially made to study the lesser, which is the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka's promise of three carts outside the gate, and realizing the lesser fruit in the Deer Park. But in terms of sudden enlightenment, he immediately gave Trapuṣa the prediction and preached sūtras like the Avataṃsaka, none of which were Hīnayāna. Furthermore, could it be that one cannot accumulate wholesome roots by relying on the great teaching, so one must rely on the lesser? Relying on the great brings merit exceeding the Hīnayāna; why must one rely on the lesser? Moreover, in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka's study of the great, one does not even accept a single verse of other sūtras, nor may one be close to scholars of the Hīnayāna Tripiṭaka. Since you acknowledge it as definitive, why abandon this and not rely on it? Furthermore, the Yogācāra and others state: ‘First study one's own vehicle, and only then study other teachings.’ Unless one is of indeterminate gotra, there is no such sequence of lesser to greater or three to one. If one is suddenly enlightened, one does not first study the lesser. On what is this judgment based? The intent of the Daśacakra-sūtra is not to first preach the lesser to plant wholesome roots, nor is it that all are originally without gotra and later separated into five natures, as shown to be false above.
As for distinction in times described: this is agreeing that the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and Saṃdhinirmocana are earlier and later; accepting this is harmless. Yet saying Saṃdhinirmocana teaches the triyāna while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka retains only the one real—this principle is unacceptable. The second chapter of Saṃdhinirmocana states: ‘I teach the one pure path of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas, which accomplishes the paramārtha. There is only one pure path, no second. With this intention, I teach the ekayāna.’ How can one say it is a triyāna teaching? If you say it allows the indeterminate to convert while the determinate do not convert, thereby retaining two cessations, differing from the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka—this too is incorrect. Allowing the indeterminate to turn and advance refutes two cessations; while in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the three grasses and one ground remain permanently different, and the determinate are not given prediction, still retaining two cessations. If you say the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka allows those of determinate gotra to advance to the great, that contradicts the commentaries explaining the sūtra. Moreover, the śrāvakas predicted in the sūtra text are all indeterminate and transformed ones, as is fully clear in the text. It was precisely for these two kinds of śrāvakas in this assembly that it stated not one fails to become a buddha. Otherwise, why would the commentary explain that it was only for the benefit of these two persons and to prevent alarm and fear, and not for the determinate, that two parables were spoken to let them know the distinction of vehicles? Did Vasubandhu Bodhisattva fail to understand the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, while ordinary worldlings of the degenerate age grasp the sūtra's intent deeply?
If it is argued: Although Saṃdhinirmocana speaks of the ekayāna, it admits differences in gotra, so saying ‘only one’ is an intentional statement; this reconciles what came before, not what came after, for since the later was not yet spoken, how could it be reconciled beforehand? The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka also says: ‘Among those already spoken, now spoken, and to be spoken, this Saddharmapuṇḍarīka is foremost.’ How could it be said to be superior to sūtras not yet spoken? If an unspoken sūtra can be said to be surpassed, what fault is there in allowing that an unspoken sūtra was reconciled beforehand? Furthermore, the Buddha's three knowledges are ever brilliant and his four wisdoms eternally luminous; what fault is there in reconciling sūtras yet to be spoken? If you stubbornly disallow this, yet yourself cite: ‘Certain earlier sūtras implicitly teach later meanings, as in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa.’ If you believe an earlier text implicitly teaches a later meaning, why refuse to accept that an earlier text explicitly reconciles a later one?
Furthermore, ten arguments are adduced to prove the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka came after Saṃdhinirmocana. The first says: Saṃdhinirmocana teaches two cessations, while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka teaches none. This error was shown above. Up to the tenth: Saṃdhinirmocana allows a portion of the indeterminate gotra to attain buddhahood, while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka completely lacks two cessations. This error is just as above. As for the claim that the Laṅkāvatāra says even the agotraka icchantika will attain nirvāṇa: this also mistakenly takes the sūtra's intent. Why? The Laṅkāvatāra's lack of gotra is provisional for that time, not ultimate, because later, upon meeting a buddha, they are allowed to become buddhas. If you say that teaching agotraka means completely lacking the cause, when a bodhisattva gives rise to great compassion, does that lack all gotra just because he is also called agotraka? It is also said: The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says all will become buddhas. This too is incorrect. At first it says icchantikas lack buddhadhātu based on gotra as practice; later it says all have it based on gotra as principle. Otherwise, how could there be two statements, before and after? It is also said: Srotāpannas up to arhats all become buddhas, yet you do not understand my meaning. Also, among the seven persons in the Ganges, the anāgāmin fruit is said to include intermediate-birth nirvāṇa, etc. This Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra is an explicit teaching; how could it be completely without two cessations?
It is also claimed: This buddhadhātu teaching was spoken near nirvāṇa because the primary cause and distant fruit, the deep cause and distant fruit, are extremely difficult to believe, which is why it was spoken later. Saying the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra's cause is deep and fruit distant and hard to believe is generally accepted. But saying it was spoken last because it is hard to believe—this judgment is an error. Why? When the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra converts Subhadra, is he a superior person? The Bequeathed Teaching Sūtra says: ‘Lastly teaching the Dharma, he converted Subhadra; those who should be delivered have all been delivered.’ Only then was the Bequeathed Teaching spoken; could its cause be even deeper and its fruit more distant and harder to believe? Furthermore, in the Dayan Jing, rising after nirvāṇa to preach the Dharma for his mother, could that be even harder to believe and more explicit? Moreover, since it clarifies the Buddha repaying his mother's kindness by rising again after nirvāṇa, when Ānanda asked for the title, he answered: ‘It is named the Sūtra of Mother and Son Meeting, to be proclaimed to future generations,’ etc. This expressive and expressed teaching on repaying kindness differs from the earlier teachings and should be a sixth period. If that does not establish a period, how could yours do so? Taking the beginning to encompass the end, the remaining errors can all be known.
1.10
Refuting the fixing of the provisional and real [teachings], part three.
1.11
An opinion states: There are differing accounts across the sūtras and treatises, and there can never be two ultimate realities; one must certainly be provisional. Yet with respect to distinctions of principle, it is not utterly false. The Saṃdhinirmocana retains the two extinguishments and teaches the ekayāna, and some sūtras state that the icchantika utterly lacks the principle of nirvāṇa and so forth; these are provisional teachings. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka removes the two extinguishments and teaches the ekayāna, and the Nirvāṇa teaches that icchantikas all possess the buddhadhātu; these are real teachings. Therefore, the principles and models of provisional and real have six aspects: first, the difference in magnitude regarding the transgressions and merits of faith and slander; second, the difference in superiority and inferiority of the persons for whom it was spoken; third, the difference in shallowness and profundity between being difficult to understand and easy to understand; fourth, the difference between whether the Buddha himself harmonises and explains them or not; fifth, the difference in sequence between provisional and real facing each other; and sixth, the difference between the half and full, as in the difference between Great and Small. The two accounts—triyāna versus ekayāna, and five gotras versus buddhadhātu—also possess six characteristics when juxtaposed against each other; hence we know that the ekayāna and buddhadhātu are real, whereas the triyāna and five gotras are provisional.
That assertion is not correct; all six have faults.
First, as for the assertion that the distinctions among the five gotras originate from the Hīnayāna, that the sole one Buddha-vehicle is taught in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and so forth, where it is distinct and manifest that all shall become Buddhas, and that it is only within the two sūtras of the Nirvāṇa [and Saddharmapuṇḍarīka] where the comparison of transgressions and merits from faith and slander is extensively set forth, whereas there is no such discussion for the actual extinguishment of the dviyāna or the portion devoid of gotra—hence knowing that the teaching of the ekayāna and buddhadhātu is manifest and real, while the teaching of the triyāna and five gotras is provisional and hidden: If one speaks of the merits and transgressions of faith and slander regarding definitive and non-definitive sūtras having real distinctions, the Saṃdhinirmocana's comparison is indeed an established exposition; hence one knows that the Saṃdhinirmocana is not a non-definitive teaching. In judging it to be provisional, would that not contradict the sūtra? Furthermore, countless Mahāyāna sūtras do not extensively compare merits; could they all be provisional and esoteric? If so, then since the Śrīmālādevī, the Anuttarāśraya, and the Laṅkāvatāra do not compare [such merits], they ought to be provisional and non-definitive. Furthermore, the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra says: 'Just as an unmanageable and stubborn elephant or horse must have severe flogging inflicted until it penetrates to the bone before it is subdued,' and so forth, up to: 'With such harsh words and diligent admonition, they are then subdued and enter the true Dharma.' The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, for the sake of transforming dull-rooted śrāvakas, initiates the indeterminate to turn toward nirvāṇa, and to remove the four inverted views of the śrāvakas—who thought that the Buddha truly enters parinirvāṇa—it speaks of the Buddha's nature of reality, constantly maintaining urgent admonition to subdue those inferior people. Were it not so, could it be that before parinirvāṇa there were no sharp-rooted beings like Mañjuśrī for whom nirvāṇa could be taught, and only when arriving at nirvāṇa were there sharp-rooted beings like Kāśyapa for whom the real was finally spoken? Furthermore, even if one were to determine the provisional and the real based on the order of comparisons, this is also difficult to rely upon. Why? The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Nirvāṇa both extensively make comparisons, and are thereby determined to be real and definitive; yet the text of the Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā exceedingly compares the merit of faithful acceptance and so forth; the Suvikrāntavikrāmi-prajñāpāramitā states: 'One who slanders this sūtra slanders the mother of all Buddhas; though the great Avīci hells of the ten directions are destroyed, the retribution for his sin will not have ended'; and the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra everywhere makes comparisons, saying: 'By means of this sūtra, one swiftly attains Buddhahood and all merits,' and so forth, which are too numerous to cite in full. If one were to rely on these, they would be determined to be real and definitive, which not only contradicts one's own tenets, but also contradicts the scriptures. Now, we do not deny that sūtras like the Nirvāṇa are definitive and real, but one must not cling to comparisons as a definitive standard. Neither the Saṃdhinirmocana nor the Prajñāpāramitā permits the dviyāna of determinate nature to turn their minds toward the Great, and their comparisons are similar to that of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka; therefore, to judge the Saṃdhinirmocana and so forth as provisional and non-definitive on account of comparisons becomes an error. Moreover, the Saṃdhinirmocana itself uses definitive sūtras to compare against non-definitive ones; this was the Buddha's own teaching of them as definitive. If ordinary mortals of later generations judge them to be non-definitive, their wisdom would have to surpass that of the Buddha.
As for the fault regarding the superiority and inferiority of the persons for whom it was spoken: If one says that the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka says: 'During the confusion of the kalpa-defilement...' up to: '...because they have developed all unwholesome roots, he expediently teaches three for the one Buddha-vehicle,' and also says: 'The reason I did not teach it before is that the time to teach it had not yet arrived,' and also says: 'Among the bodhisattvas, I uprightly discard expedients'; and the Nirvāṇa-sūtra says: 'Because there were no sharp-rooted beings like Kāśyapa, I expediently revealed the triyāna according to capacity,' and also says: 'Such a great matter cannot be heard by these lowly and small persons. What is the great matter? It refers to the profound, secret treasury of all Buddhas, which is the buddhadhātu'—hence knowing that the ekayāna and buddhadhātu of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Nirvāṇa are definitive and real, whereas the triyāna and the portion devoid of gotra in the Saṃdhinirmocana and such sūtras are provisional and esoteric—this is unreasonable.
If one claims that the provisional or real, explicit or esoteric nature of a sūtra is determined by the superiority or inferiority of the persons for whom it was spoken, this might be admissible to a small degree; but to deduce that because sūtras like the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka were spoken later, they were for superior persons and are therefore real and definitive, and to judge that because the Saṃdhinirmocana and so forth were spoken earlier, they are provisional and esoteric, is exceedingly reckless. As the Avataṃsaka-sūtra, the Ratnagotravibhāga, and other texts all state: 'Just as when the sun rises, it first shines upon the high mountains, and next upon the streams and marshes; the Tathāgata is also like this: first for the bodhisattvas, and later for the dviyāna and others.' Seven days after attaining enlightenment, he preached the Daśabhūmika-sūtra; and the thirty-first fascicle of the Nirvāṇa-sūtra speaks of 'three sons, three fields, and three vessels' and so on; all of these place the superior first and the inferior later. Could it be that because the Dharma had not been preached for long earlier, it was later entirely for inferior persons with shallow teachings? Furthermore, at the verge of nirvāṇa, he spoke the Bequeathed Teachings (Yijiao jing) and so forth; could they both be profound teachings for superior persons? Moreover, countless Mahāyāna scriptures were spoken for bodhisattvas before the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, and were not shallow teachings for inferior persons. As for the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, the treatise says: 'For the sake of what was done for the śrāvakas, he addressed Śāriputra.' The second fascicle says: 'I now also wish to cause you to remember the path practiced according to your original vow; therefore, for the sake of the śrāvakas, I preach this Mahāyāna sūtra called the Lotus of the Wonderful Dharma.' This was for śrāvakas; how could they be superior to bodhisattvas? Again, the second fascicle says: 'Śāriputra! When that Buddha appeared, although it was not an evil age, because of his original vow he spoke the Dharma of the triyāna... up to... in that land, bodhisattvas were regarded as the great treasure.' Hence it was for inferior persons that he spoke the shallow, provisional teaching of the triyāna. Furthermore, the Saṃdhinirmocana and other sūtras were spoken for Maitreya and others; how could they be inferior to śrāvakas? If one says: 'I rely on the distinction of persons at one time, where the later are superior and the former inferior, the former provisional and the later real, which applies to Śāriputra and others turning their minds toward the Great,' then what is to prevent the distinction of persons at different times, where the former are superior and the later inferior, the former real and the later provisional? For Paramārthasamudgata and others, he spoke of determinate gotras and the portion devoid of gotra that does not sit at the bodhimaṇḍa; how can one one-sidedly cling to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Nirvāṇa as alone being explicit and real?
As for the fault regarding difficulty, ease, shallowness, and profundity: If one says that according to the second fascicle of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, which says: 'For those who had not planted roots of goodness, had not purified obstacles, etc., he spoke the Hīnayāna teaching, causing them to cultivate the five things without the supreme grade; the five things withdraw from great wisdom; possessing these supreme five things, upon hearing the Mahāyāna they do not slander it.' According to this, the Hīnayāna is easy to understand, while the Mahāyāna is difficult to understand. The twenty-seventh fascicle of the Nirvāṇa says: 'Bodhisattvas of the tenth abode do not know that all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu.' The second fascicle of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka says: 'There is only the one Buddha-vehicle. Even you, Śāriputra, entered this sūtra through faith.' The ninety-third fascicle of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'The attainment of Buddhahood by arhats is not known by the authors of treatises; only the Buddha can comprehend it.' For the actual extinguishment of the dviyāna and the portion devoid of gotra, there is no such statement. Therefore, the provisional is shallow and the real is profound; this principle is definite. This is also not so. Since the Saṃdhinirmocana was spoken for bodhisattvas such as Paramārthasamudgata, Avalokiteśvara, Dharmodgata, and Maitreya, they were endowed with the supreme five things. Hearing the Mahāyāna, they do not slander it, and make no other exposition; hence we definitely know it is profound and real. That it says the indeterminate gotra attains Buddhahood while the determinate gotra does not is something fully comprehended, because the Buddha himself spoke it. To cling to it as provisional and shallow—how is that not contradictory? Hence it is an error. The Anuttarāśraya-sūtra speaks of three grades of sentient beings: The first are those attached to existence. Attachment to existence has two types: the first turns its back on the path of nirvāṇa, lacks the nature of nirvāṇa, does not seek nirvāṇa, and rejoices in saṃsāra; the second, within my Dharma, does not generate thirst and longing, and slanders the Mahāyāna. These two kinds are distinct: the former is devoid of gotra; the latter possesses gotra, but slanders the Mahāyāna. The Buddhagotraśāstra and the Ratnagotravibhāga both harmonise the statement that they do not attain Buddhahood as being spoken with reference to slanderers; they do not harmonise away those lacking the cause. Those who are deluded do not understand, saying they are one. If they were one, why would the Buddha make two statements? Hence we know that the teaching of a portion lacking gotra is real and explicit, like the 'ever-drowned' in the river in the Nirvāṇa-sūtra; the ever-drowned are also two, and there is one for each of the seven persons. Furthermore, the ninth fascicle states: 'Even if all immeasurable sentient beings simultaneously attain bodhi, these Tathāgatas will still not see that icchantika attain bodhi.' It also says: 'Like dead wood, like scorched seeds,' and so forth. These are the explicit and esoteric teachings of the Nirvāṇa. Yet saying that the teaching of a portion lacking gotra is a provisional and esoteric teaching is a great error.
As for the fault regarding whether harmonising explanations exist or not: If one says that the Saṃdhinirmocana harmonises the previous two periods, while the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and Nirvāṇa harmonise the earlier Saṃdhinirmocana, and there is no text harmonising the ekayāna of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka as an expedient; furthermore, the Nirvāṇa says: 'The icchantika obstructs the future, hence is called devoid of gotra,' and the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka says: 'Because it was spoken as an expedient'—these are cases where the sūtras and treatises themselves harmonise the five gotras and the triyāna, while there is no text that harmonises and explains the ekayāna and buddhadhātu—this statement is incorrect. The Śrīmālādevī-sūtra says: 'Bearing the four heavy burdens: Sentient beings who have not heard the Dharma are matured by means of the wholesome roots of humans and devas,' and so forth, thus teaching four vehicles. It also says: 'If the Tathāgata expediently speaks according to their desires, that is the Mahāyāna; there are no two vehicles. The two vehicles enter into the ekayāna, and the ekayāna is the vehicle of supreme meaning.' Since it states that the Tathāgata expediently speaks according to their desires, that is the Mahāyāna. Furthermore, the thirty-first fascicle of the Nirvāṇa says: 'One path, one taste,' and so on. The Nirvāṇa says: 'My disciples do not understand my intention and proclaim: The Tathāgata says that srotāpannas up to arhats all attain the Buddha path.' It has already harmonised this itself, agreeing with the Saṃdhinirmocana, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, and others which say: 'Only the one vehicle is the Buddha's esoteric intention,' which also harmonises the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. The treatise texts are clear; the Nirvāṇa has no text explicitly stating that the gotra of practice is all-pervading. The statement that 'obstructing the future is called devoid of gotra' is because it is temporary. The thirty-second fascicle of the Nirvāṇa says: 'Although I say that all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu, sentient beings do not understand such words of the Buddha.' Such words even bodhisattvas in their final rebirth cannot understand. And it says: 'If it is said that sentient beings all possess the buddhadhātu, this is called the Tathāgata speaking according to his own intention. When the Tathāgata speaks according to his own intention like this, how can sentient beings understand it exclusively in one way?' According to the meaning of this passage, if all sentient beings have the buddhadhātu, the Buddha explicitly taught that it exists; why would a bodhisattva in his final rebirth fail to understand it? Why could one not understand it exclusively in one way? From this we know: regarding the presence or absence of the gotra of practice, the principle of tathatā is all-pervading, so he speaks of all possessing it. This agrees with accepting the five meanings of the Buddhagotraśāstra, which is why it speaks of the buddhadhātu; the Ratnagotravibhāga speaks of pervasiveness according to three meanings, on account of the principle of tathatā. Furthermore, it says: 'If this contemplation could be accomplished without causes and conditions, an icchantika should possess this contemplation.' According to this, it accepts that there is no gotra of practice. How much more so since they themselves accept that, like the mind, it is originally existent, yet anāsrava is absent. Since it is originally absent, the anāsrava lacks a cause; how could it arise later? Hence we know that the single gotra and ekayāna are both harmonised by the sūtras and treatises themselves. To say that there is no harmonising explanation is therefore an error.
As for the fault regarding the sequence of provisional and real: If one says that when the provisional and real are juxtaposed, the provisional comes first and the real later, for which there are texts everywhere, whereas the real coming first and the provisional later has no sūtra teaching—this is also incorrect, for the principle is not fixed. In terms of the indeterminate gotra, where one category of śrāvakas arises from the small toward the great, first three and later one, it is acceptable that the provisional comes first and the real later. But in terms of the sudden awakening of the Great [Vehicle], it is Great from beginning to end; how could the provisional come first, and only the later be real? The classification in the Saṃdhinirmocana was spoken with reference to the indeterminate gotra and the gotra of gradual awakening. Furthermore, it does not determinately judge all Mahāyāna sūtras before the Saṃdhinirmocana to be hidden and esoteric. The four Āgamas and so forth esoterically teach the existence of dharmas to eliminate the external clinging to self. The Prajñāpāramitās and so forth esoterically teach that all is empty to eliminate the attachment to dharmas of the Hīnayāna. Only when non-emptiness and non-existence are both set forth does it become an explicit teaching. Thus, although the Avataṃsaka was spoken earlier, it belongs to the third period. Although the Bequeathed Teachings was delivered later, it can belong to the first period, because it does not distinctly teach emptiness and existence, but only speaks of the four truths, definitely without divergence. According to their classification, the Avataṃsaka ought to be provisional because it was spoken earlier, and the Bequeathed Teachings ought to be real because it was spoken later. Furthermore, with respect to the indeterminate, he also first taught the real; as with the śrāvakas saved in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, all of them first heard the Great and later generated small aspirations. Evaluating the present by the past, for the nature of a śrāvaka, the real comes first and the provisional later. How can one determinately judge the provisional to come first and the real later? 'After a long time, the Buddhas must preach the true reality.' Relying on indeterminate persons, the Vinaya first permits and the Nirvāṇa later prohibits, distinguishing the Great and Small. Since the Saṃdhinirmocana is not a Hīnayāna teaching and was not spoken exclusively for śrāvakas, how can it be erroneously judged as provisional or real? Furthermore, during the first seven days he spoke the Daśabhūmika, and after three seven-day periods he spoke the teaching of the four truths; could the earlier teaching be provisional and the later be real? Hence we know this is a great error.
As for the fault regarding the Great and Small, half and full: If one judges the Small to be half, being a provisional, esoteric teaching, this is acceptable when speaking of one category. But to include treatises like the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Yogācārabhūmi as being provisional and esoteric teachings conforming [to capacities] is a profound error. Why? The Buddha himself declared it to be a definitive teaching, yet they now judge it to be provisional and esoteric. Furthermore, they say that a portion lacking gotra is a Hīnayāna doctrine. According to the 'Chapter on Refuting the Hīnayāna' in the Buddhagotraśāstra: 'If one relies on the Vibhajyavāda, all ordinary beings, noble beings, and sentient beings have emptiness as their root, because all emerge from emptiness. Emptiness is the buddhadhātu, and the buddhadhātu is great nirvāṇa.' Relying on the Sarvāstivādins and others, all sentient beings have no innately acquired buddhadhātu, but only cultivate-acquired buddhadhātu. The reason the Yogācārabhumī explains its absence is that it relies on the teaching of the Sarvāstivāda, which the Buddhagotraśāstra refutes. If so, then when the Buddhagotraśāstra and the Nirvāṇa speak of possessing the buddhadhātu, they must also rely on the Vibhajyavāda, because the Nirvāṇa also speaks of the ultimate emptiness as the buddhadhātu, which is refuted by the Yogācārabhūmi. If that is accepted, how can one determinately cling to the statement in the Buddhagotraśāstra that there is buddhadhātu as being explicit and real, belonging to the fifth period? If one says that although the Buddhagotraśāstra refutes non-existence, it does not share the Vibhajyavāda's clinging to existence, and thus is not refuted by the Yogācārabhūmi, then likewise, although the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of a portion lacking it, it does not share the Sarvāstivāda's clinging to non-existence, and is not refuted by the Buddhagotraśāstra. Furthermore, the Buddhagotraśāstra clearly states itself that the Vibhajyavādins and others assert existence, while the Sarvāstivādins and others assert non-existence, thereby clarifying the buddhadhātu. Questioning those who cling to the absence of gotra, one immediately knows that it does not rely on the Great to refute that Small [Vehicle]. In the Yogācārabhūmi, there is no long debate on this; by what principle can one know that it establishes non-existence relying on the Small, or refutes the Small to assert existence? Moreover, the Sarvāstivāda establishes that there is no innately acquired [buddhadhātu], whereas the Buddhagotraśāstra and Yogācārabhūmi hold that where there is gotra, it is innately present, and where it is absent, it is innately absent; how could they agree with the Sarvāstivāda's claim that all require the Small? Hence this is a great error. Furthermore, they judge the Yogācārabhūmi and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha as merely interpreting provisional teachings. On what basis is this determined? The Jñānaprasthāna and the six pādas interpret Hīnayāna sūtras; the Madhyamakaśāstra, Śataśāstra, and so forth interpret the Prajñāpāramitā; these are all explicit texts of treatises, known to all. The Yogācārabhūmi, the Prakaraṇāryavācā, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, the Bodhisambhāraśāstra, and so forth do not permit the determinate nature to turn their minds, and state that a portion of sentient beings lacks the practice-buddhadhātu; to judge them as interpreting provisional teachings and not as Mahāyāna scriptures—relying on Devānāmpriya to understand this is not accepted by the wise. Furthermore, the Buddhagotraśāstra and the Ratnagotravibhāga are largely the same in intent and principle. The first chapter of the Ratnagotravibhāga explicitly interprets the Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra. The fourth fascicle of the Buddhagotraśāstra cites the Saṃdhinirmocana and the Vimokṣa, and explains that its essence is none other than the three natures. Relying on the Saṃdhinirmocana, there are no words explicitly interpreting the Nirvāṇa; could it be that only the Nirvāṇa alone clarifies the buddhadhātu, while the Tathāgatagarbha and others are not the buddhadhātu? Do treatises such as the Buddhagotraśāstra interpret the teaching of the fifth period? Alas, how lamentable! The great Dharma-generals have all entered nirvāṇa, and ordinary mortals recklessly insult and transgress against the sacred teachings.
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