能顯中邊慧日論 1.13

English (machine translation) 1.13

Language: English

1.13.1

Some say: “When texts such as the Bodhisattvasīla-sūtra, the Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra, and the Yogācārabhūmi speak of persons lacking gotra (agotraka), they are speaking with reference to adventitious gotra (āgantuka-gotra), not the original gotra (mūla-gotra). How is this known? The sūtra itself explains: ‘As for the bodhisattva-gotra, it refers to the initial generation of the thought [of awakening] (bodhicittotpāda) and the thirty-seven factors [of awakening]. Why so? When a bodhisattva generates the thought of awakening, that is the root of all wholesome dharmas; therefore it is called ‘generating’ (utpāda). Because of this generation of the thought, one attains anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi; therefore it is called ‘cause’ (hetu). Because by cause of the initial generation of the thought one is determined to certainly attain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, it is therefore called ‘gotra’.’ This explains the initial generation of the thought: distinguished by three meanings, there are three types, named the generation of the thought of the gotra acquired through practice (samudānīta-gotra). Having these three meanings, the generation of the thought in the prior stage possesses only the meaning of ‘cause’, lacking the remaining two meanings. Yet when the sūtra states, ‘If one lacks the bodhisattva-gotra, even though one generates the thought and vigorously cultivates energetic exertion, one will ultimately never be able to attain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi,’ it is speaking with reference to the prior stage: before reaching the gotra, although one has slight [virtue], lacking the capacity and endurance that determinedly and certainly attains [awakening] as well as the full upholding, this is termed ‘lacking gotra’; it is not that not serving as a cause for generating the thought is termed ‘lacking gotra’. This agrees with the Renwang and the Yingluo sūtras.”

This should not be so. If, because of not having reached the gotra and lacking the determined power and ultimate full upholding, one says ‘ultimately cannot attain’ and terms it ‘lacking gotra’, why does the sūtra state: ‘Because by cause of the initial generation of the thought, one is determined to certainly attain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, it is therefore called gotra’? Following this sūtra passage, it is precisely the initial generation of the thought that is termed gotra, and it is precisely by cause of the initial thought that one is able to attain awakening. Saying that not reaching the gotra is termed ‘lacking gotra’, and that not having reached capacity and full upholding means ‘ultimately cannot attain’—does this not contradict the sūtra text? The Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra states: ‘Relying on the initial generation of the thought to practice the six perfections is termed the bodhisattva’s upholding of expedient conduct. Relying on expedient conduct one fulfills bodhi; therefore expedient conduct is termed the upholding of great bodhi.’ The Yogācārabhūmi is also identical. Furthermore, since subsequent stages exist only because of the initial [stage], to say that one ‘ultimately cannot attain’—how is this not contradictory? Moreover, because of prior [stages], subsequent [stages] can exist. Why does the sūtra state: ‘Therefore, you should know that it is not because of generating the thought and vigorously cultivating energetic exertion that the bodhisattva-gotra exists’? Since this contradicts the meaning of the sūtra, it is an extreme error. Nor can one say that not lacking the generation of the thought is termed ‘lacking gotra’, for the sūtra states: ‘It is not because of generating the thought that the bodhisattva-gotra exists.’ The Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra-śāstra states: ‘Because a non-gotra person lacks gotra, even though they generate the thought and vigorously cultivate energetic exertion, they definitely do not consummate anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.’ Therefore, one should know that even if one has not generated the thought and does not practice expedient means, one can still be termed an upholder of gotra. The Yogācārabhūmi states: ‘A person abiding in agotraka, because of lacking gotra, even though having the generation of the thought and the practice of preparatory application (prayoga) as a basis, is definitely incapable of enduring the fulfillment of anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.’ By this principle, even if one has not yet generated the thought and not yet cultivated the preparatory applications practiced by bodhisattvas, if one possesses the gotra, one should know that in relation to that it can be termed ‘upholding’. Moreover, if one possesses the gotra, if one has not yet generated the thought, one cannot attain it swiftly; one cannot say that one ‘ultimately cannot attain’. Hence the Yogācārabhūmi immediately continues: ‘Furthermore, a person abiding in gotra, if they do not generate the thought and do not cultivate what is practiced by bodhisattvas, though possessing capacity, will not swiftly realize unsurpassable bodhi.’ Now, to explain ‘lacking gotra’ in terms of stage-divisions is therefore known to be mistaken.

It is also claimed: “When the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts speak of lacking gotra, they are speaking with reference to adventitious gotra (āgantuka-gotra).” They establish this doctrine themselves: the mind is the original gotra (mūla-gotra), while practicing untainted seeds is adventitious gotra. They themselves concede that adventitious gotra is initially non-existent; when the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts say it is non-existent, that is the definitive meaning (nītārtha). How could it be judged as non-definitive? This arises from failing to know the two kinds of gotra: the first is the prakṛtistha-gotra, which exists dharmatā-wise; the second is the samudānīta-gotra, which is the dharmatā seed. That which, arising in manifestation according to conditions, perfumed into new seeds, is termed the gotra acquired through practice (samudānīta-gotra). The Bodhisattvasīla-sūtra states: ‘There are two kinds of gotra: the first is the original gotra, and the second is the adventitious gotra. As for the original gotra: the aggregates, realms, and six sense-spheres continue in succession; beginningless and endless, dharmatā is naturally so; this is called the original gotra.’ This is precisely what was stated earlier: ‘Therefore you should know that it is not because of generating the thought that the bodhisattva-gotra exists.’ The Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra states: ‘Even if one does not generate the thought and does not cultivate preparatory expedients, one can still be termed an upholder of gotra.’ ‘All wholesome dharmas cultivated are precisely the adventitious gotra.’ The Yogācārabhūmi states: ‘That which is obtained dharmatā-wise, transmitted successively from beginningless time, is termed prakṛtistha-gotra. If it is obtained from previously cultivating wholesome [qualities], this is termed samudānīta-gotra.’ Because dharmatā being naturally so is precisely the original gotra, the Bodhisattvasīla-sūtra says ‘it is not because of generating the thought that the bodhisattva-gotra exists’; because it is originally existent, it is spoken of as primary; the seeds of practice are newly arisen, and therefore called adventitious. The Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra-śāstra is identical. That [opponent], narrating a divergent interpretation and composing extensive sequences of objections, labored in vain. Furthermore, due to failing to understand the words ‘dharmatā is naturally so’, they take them to mean the tathatā-buddhadhātu. If it were tathatā, speaking of ‘beginningless and endless’ would indeed be reasonable. But how could the Bodhisattvasīla-sūtra speak of ‘successive continuity’, the Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra speak of ‘continuous transmission in succession’, and the Yogācārabhūmi speak of ‘transmitted successively’? Extensively citing texts and treatises [to prove that] this is the nature of tathatā wastes its effort, as will be demonstrated below.

It is also claimed: “The second fascicle of the Saṃdhinirmocana says, ‘Those who are solely inclined toward tranquility (śamāyana) do not sit at the place of awakening (bodhimaṇḍa); in the residue-less realm, all sensations are forever extinguished.’ And the Yogācārabhūmi says, ‘In the residue-less realm, there is only tathatā and no activities.’ These are spoken in accordance with the Hīnayāna, because forty years earlier it had not yet been spoken that the two vehicles lack a real nirvāṇa, and that relinquishing the body of delimited portions (pariccheda-kāya) there is separately a body of transformation (pariṇāmikakāya) whereby sentient beings are without interruption. Since the Saṃdhinirmocana came before this, it conceded that the two vehicles’ inclination toward tranquility is real extinction.”

This is also unreasonable. The Saṃdhinirmocana itself determines that sūtras such as the Prajñāpāramitā are still non-definitive (neyārtha), while this present third period is truly definitive (nītārtha). How could it then still follow the Hīnayāna teaching to say that the two vehicles have real extinction, such that Paramārthasamudgata praised it as truly definitive? Moreover, if it were not true, when Maitreya Bodhisattva in the Yogācārabhūmi cited it for decisive determination (viniścaya), could he have failed to understand and harmonize it? For later generations to only now understand how to harmonize the sūtras, judging that Maitreya discarded the real to propagate the provisional, is exceedingly improper.

They also say: “First it was taught that the Buddha becomes extinguished, and later that he is unextinguished; one believes the later [teaching of] non-extinction to be definitive. First it was taught they are determined (niyata), and now they turn their minds. Why disbelieve only the statement that they are determined?” This is not of the same order. It is only the Hīnayāna teaching that definitively states the Buddha is extinguished; Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises all concede that this is not real. Those who are determined definitely do not turn their minds. Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises uniformly state that those who are determined do not turn their minds, and that transformation (pariṇāmikī) is not the receiving of a separate body.

1.13.2

A portion of [those of] the dviyāna genuinely undergo cessation, which will be extensively distinguished below in the [chapter] 'Revealing the Correct.' [An opponent] also says: Fascicle five of the Mahā-bodhisattva-piṭaka Sūtra states: 'Because sentient beings of the group of false certainty are not vessels of the Dharma, whether the Tathāgata expounds the Dharma for them or does not expound it, they will ultimately be incapable of realizing liberation. Having truly known that those sentient beings are not vessels of the Dharma, the Tathāgata then abandons them.' Vasubandhu explains: 'Destinies of rebirth in evil realms are called false nature; being destined to enter evil realms is called false certainty. Nirvāṇa is called right nature; being destined to attain nirvāṇa is called right certainty of nirvāṇa. Since, having fallen back into evil realms, one is later certain to emerge, once one has emerged from the evil realms, one is no longer in the group of false certainty. When they are in the group of false certainty, the Tathāgata abandons them; when they are not in [the group of] false certainty, the bodhisattvas convert them.' Therefore we know that this is not a matter of being definitively agotraka. Fascicle ten of the Mahāsaṃnipāta [Sūtra] states: 'For those of false certainty, he expediently expounds [the Dharma] to cause them to shatter false certainty; for those without good seeds, he causes them to plant good seeds; for those who are not vessels of the Dharma, he causes them to become vessels of the Dharma; for those who are vessels of the Dharma, he expounds bodhi.' This is also unreasonable. The purport of the two statements in the Bodhisattvapiṭaka and the Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra differs. When the Bodhisattvapiṭaka states, 'Whether the Tathāgata expounds the Dharma for them or does not expound it, they will ultimately be incapable of realizing liberation. Knowing they are not vessels of the Dharma, he then abandons them,' this is based on the agotraka. They cannot attain nirvāṇa. When it says 'knowing they are not vessels of the Dharma, he then abandons them,' it does not mean complete abandonment, for he also causes them to obtain the bliss of humans and devas. If an evil realm were called 'false certainty' and the Buddha abandoned them, why would bodhisattvas manifest their forms in the six destinies? How could one grant that the compassion of bodhisattvas surpasses that of the Buddha? Furthermore, if one says that when they are in the false certainty of evil realms the Buddha abandons them, and once they have emerged from evil realms and are no longer in false certainty, buddhas and bodhisattvas convert them—does this not annul and eliminate the compassionate vows of all the noble ones? The Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra states: 'For those of false certainty, he expediently expounds [the Dharma] to cause them to shatter false certainty; for those without good seeds, he causes them to plant good seeds; for those who are not vessels of the Dharma, he causes them to become vessels of the Dharma; for those who are vessels of the Dharma, he expounds bodhi.' This is based on those who have the gotra and obtain the prediction of nirvāṇa. It is on account of committing the five inexpiable offenses and the like that they are named the 'group of false certainty.' Even if one possesses the gotra, one who cuts off the roots of good is also named the 'group of false certainty.' Because they have severed the good of wrong views and committed the five inexpiable offenses, not yet having an abundance of newly-perfumed good seeds, it says 'without good seeds.' Because they have not yet reached fulfillment, it says 'not vessels of the Dharma.' Otherwise, how could the Bodhisattvapiṭaka Sūtra say that those of false certainty are abandoned, while the Mahāsaṃnipāta immediately says he expediently expounds [the Dharma] for them? Nor can one say that the Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra is speaking based on emerging from false certainty, for if emerging from false certainty meant one was no longer in false certainty, [the sūtra would not] say that he expediently expounds [the Dharma] 'for those of false certainty.' It is because [the opponent] does not understand that the three groups spoken of in the sūtras and treatises are distinct that he fabricates this reconciliation of the sūtras, which will be extensively elucidated below in 'Revealing the Correct.' [The opponent] also says: Fascicle two of the Aṅgulimālīya Sūtra states: 'What is called false certainty? It is that which all buddhas cannot convert.' And further down it states: 'The so-called false certainty refers to the icchantika; right certainty refers to the dviyāna and bodhisattvas. Those who cut off roots of good are named icchantika; once the roots of good have reconnected, they are no longer icchantika. At the time of severance they are called incurable; once reconnected they are curable.' Fascicle thirty-three of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] states: 'An icchantika being unable to be saved from the suffering of hell is called incurable. Insofar as a seed is made for future lives, they are still called curable. Therefore all sentient beings have the buddhadhātu.' Therefore 'incurable' is spoken of the immediate, not the remote. This also should not be so. The Aṅgulimālīya Sūtra states that 'the group of false certainty cannot be converted by buddhas; these are the agotraka.' This is distinct from fascicle thirty-three of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. In the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], because a cause is made for future lives, that is precisely being able to convert them. Furthermore, fascicle ten [of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra] speaks of 'like a white ram's horn' and so forth; its icchantika is identical to that of the Aṅgulimālīya Sūtra. Moreover, an icchantika is not solely one who has severed the roots of good; merely taking the reconnection of good to mean 'curable' is an incomplete explanation. Furthermore, although an icchantika has future good, they cannot be saved from the suffering of hell; while they can be saved in the future, nothing can be done in the present life, which is called 'unsavable'—this is spoken based on determined retribution. If it were not determined, the suffering of hell could be averted. Otherwise, how could there be distinctions between the present, or the state of saṃsāra, and reconnecting roots of good in future lives? Moreover, as with the five inexpiable offenses being named anantarya karma, once committed one is determined to go and receive retribution in the evil realms. Sūtras and treatises also state: 'If the five inexpiable offenses and the four grave offenses are purified and eliminated through repentance, one does not go to the evil realms, but is born among humans, devas, and the like.' This is because karmic fruits have determined and undetermined [aspects]. Even within what is determined, there are further distinctions in time and retribution. The sūtra speaks categorically, and the [opponent's] interpretation is also incomplete; to prove that [all] have the buddhadhātu through this is therefore also inadmissible. Because he does not understand the many kinds of icchantika, he erroneously reconciles the sūtras. This will be revealed below in 'Revealing the Correct.' [The opponent] also says: Fascicle three of the Shan-jie jing states: 'Sentient beings under discipline are of four kinds: first, having the gotra of the śrāvaka vehicle, they attain the śrāvaka path. Second, having the gotra of the pratyekabuddha vehicle, they attain the pratyekabuddha path. Third, having the buddhadhātu, they attain the Buddha path. Fourth, having the gotra of humans and devas, they attain the bliss of humans and devas.' Fascicle two of the Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra and fascicle thirty-seven of the Yogācārabhūmi state the same. However, discipline has six [aspects]: first, discipline of nature; second, discipline of persons. Discipline of nature speaks of the original nature, up to the stage of generating the mind [for bodhi]; discipline of persons speaks of the four adventitious natures. The original nature speaks of the remote, that all desire bodhi. The adventitious natures speak of the immediate, having four distinct kinds. Thus the sūtra states: 'As for discipline of nature, because they have good seeds they cultivate good dharmas; because they cultivate good dharmas they shatter the two obscurations; because they cultivate good dharmas their body and mind become pure. Because their body and mind are pure, whether they encounter a good friend or do not meet one, they can shatter the two obscurations. Just as an ulcer that has ripened will be completely cured upon meeting a physician, etc., all sentient beings are likewise: when upon cultivating practice they ultimately attain bodhi, this is called ripening, and this is called discipline of nature.' Since it has already spoken of the discipline of original nature, it speaks with hidden intent (saṃdhi) that all sentient beings will attain Buddhahood. This is the same as the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-śāstra and the Daśadharmaka Sūtra predicting that those of determined gotra among the śrāvakas will attain Buddhahood by virtue of the cause of the buddhadhātu. As for the second, discipline of persons, it is of four kinds as stated above; therefore we know that discipline of persons is an immediate cause. Having or lacking persons, having or lacking gotra, and so forth, are all because of the immediate. Since one originally lacks the gotra of humans and devas and later has the gotra of humans and devas, we know that one previously lacks the gotra of the triyāna and later attains the gotra of the triyāna. This explanation is also incorrect. The term 'discipline of nature' generally clarifies the originally innate (dharmatā) intrinsic nature. The second, 'discipline of sentient beings', clarifies the ones to be disciplined. Therefore the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'The pudgalas to be matured are briefly of four kinds; explaining nature in terms of beings, existence and non-existence differ, and the natures of the great and small differ.'

1.13.3

The third, discipline through practices, clarifies all the differences in the practices cultivated by bodhisattvas, namely cultivating an exalted body, the faculties, wisdom, and so forth. The fourth, discipline through expedient means, clarifies that bodhisattvas cultivate thirty-two expedient means. The fifth, discipline through maturation, clarifies those capable of maturing and those to be matured. The sixth, discipline through the seal of maturity, clarifies all the marks and characteristics of those to be matured and those already matured. As is clear in the sūtras and treatises, citing them would be too cumbersome. Therefore, discipline according to gotra and discipline according to persons are not concerned with distance or proximity. If one says that discipline according to gotra clarifies the distant gotra, that is the original nature of sentient beings, while discipline according to the two births is the proximate gotra, that is the adventitious nature of sentient beings—if all sentient beings possess the original nature, all ought to be made to become buddhas; why then mature them proximately through the three vehicles? Why place foul food into a jewelled vessel? When wishing to travel the great road, why show instead a narrow path? When they themselves have no wound, why injure them? Furthermore, regarding what you call the proximate gotra, does it exist on account of others, or is it fundamentally self-established? If it exists on account of others, why does the Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra state: 'Those who have the gotra of the śrāvaka are matured by means of the śrāvakayāna,' and so forth, and why does it not say that those who lack the gotra of the śrāvaka are matured through the gotra of the śrāvaka, and so forth? If you say that it is in terms of what one already possesses that one is matured through the śrāvakayāna, then if so, why does it further state that those who are agotraka are matured through the good destinies, and does not say that they are matured through the gotra of the śrāvakayāna and so forth? If you say that since they do not yet possess the gotra, how could they be matured? If so, since it is not spoken for those who lack it, when will they come to possess it? Furthermore, if you say that since there was originally no human or divine gotra and later there is a human or divine gotra, one therefore knows that previously lacking the gotra of the three vehicles, one later attains the gotra of the three vehicles—this analogy is falsely constructed; there is never any text stating that previously one lacked the human and divine gotra and later was made to possess the human and divine gotra. If one allows that what was originally absent is present now, then the human and divine destinies would exist only after the buddhas, and would consequently have a beginning. Furthermore, the human and divine gotra is brought about by innate wholesomeness; as for innate wholesomeness, one attains it as soon as one is born; how could it be previously absent and later caused to exist by another? When the kalpa is destroyed and beings are born in the human and divine realms, is that through the Buddha's teaching? If you say: the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'As for those who do not abide in nirvāṇa, one places them within human and divine bliss and merit, making for them a cause of nirvāṇa,' and therefore one knows that being without a cause, later they still come to have the gotra—this too is not so. When the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa speaks of making for them a cause of nirvāṇa, it speaks in terms of the absence of the manifest, not the absence of seeds. Because an effect arising without a seed does not accord with reason. Furthermore, if you say that although it speaks of giving human and divine bliss, there is a distinction between having the gotra and lacking the gotra, so the cited text about maturing through human and divine wholesomeness is not a definitive authority—this too is not so; the treatise is a definitive authority. Why is that? The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'As for those who do not abide in nirvāṇa, one places them within the human and divine nature, making for them a cause of nirvāṇa'; it does not say they are agotraka. Maturing them through human and divine roots of wholesomeness and making a cause of nirvāṇa is because one matures them as causes of the three vehicles. Furthermore, if you say that one does not allow an effect to arise without a seed, why does the Laṅkāvatārasūtra say: 'Those who have severed the roots of wholesomeness are agotraka, but later attain nirvāṇa,' and therefore one knows that being without a cause, later they still come to have the gotra? This too is not so. The bodhisattvas of great compassion are also included among them; could it be that lacking buddhadhātu is termed agotraka? Therefore one knows that when the [bodhisattvas] of great compassion see that they have not yet attained buddhahood, it is said to be absent. Regarding the view of severing wholesomeness, it is called [agotraka] due to severing, not due to an absence of seeds. Nor can one object: If they have the cause of nirvāṇa, why place them within human and divine bliss to make a cause of nirvāṇa? Because the Bodhisattvabhūmi speaks of having the gotra of the three vehicles and discipline through the three vehicles. This too is not so. Could it be that all who possess the cause of nirvāṇa can immediately become noble ones? Being without leisure, they do not become noble ones, and therefore are placed among humans and gods. Hence Asaṅga's commentary on the Prajñāpāramitā states: 'As for those born in places of hardship, it is because they await the right time.' This means that for those born in places of hardship at present, one awaits their birth among humans and gods, and once they have left the places of hardship, one matures them. Erroneous interpretations of the Śrīmālādevīsūtra may be understood by analogy with this. Furthermore, it is said: Yogācārabhūmi fascicle fifty-two names those without the dharma of nirvāṇa, and fascicle sixty-seven and the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra chapter one speak of those without the dharma of nirvāṇa; this is stated in terms of the adventitious nature, not the original pradhāna-hetu. Since the original pradhāna[-hetu] is held in common, one cannot divide persons [by it]. The presence and absence of the adventitious nature are not the same, and the distinction in gotra is based on this. Hence the Upāsakaśīlasūtra fascicle one states: 'Because bodhi has superior, middling, and inferior, bodhi is not fundamentally existent.' This meaning is also untenable. This states that its fruit is attained only on account of the cause, hence it is said to be not fundamentally existent. Even if one says that the cause is stated in terms of newly perfumed arising, it does not impede the fundamental existence of superior, middling, and inferior gotras. Otherwise, how could beings equally possess the original great cause, yet only then be made to become three grades? The fault is as stated before. Furthermore, it is said: A bodhisattva attains the name on account of generating the mind, not on account of the original gotra. Therefore, by analogy one knows that attaining the gotra of the three vehicles is named not on account of the original gotra. This meaning is not so. Names are provisional designations without real intrinsic nature; hence it is said not to be on account of gotra. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Names and referents are adventitious to each other; one should contemplate their phenomena.' It is not that their gotra and the substance of the dharma are not distinct. Nor is it that, lacking an original nature, it is only through generating the mind that one first attains it, for this contradicts the Bodhisattvabhūmi's statement that it is not on account of generating the mind that there is the gotra of the bodhisattva. If one interprets this in terms of stages, it has already been refuted above. Next, citing discipline according to persons is also refuted as before. Furthermore, citing the Mahāyānasaṃgraha which says: 'Possessing obstacles yet lacking the cause, the buddhas are without mastery'—the Yogācārabhūmi explains this either in terms of obstacles or in terms of the cause; the two explanations are different. If both are not the original nature, on what basis are they spoken? Even if not the original nature, both would be empty words, yet they are able to reveal certainty. Furthermore, it is said regarding the icchantika who is ultimately [without gotra]: According to the Ratnagotravibhāga, it states: 'Because of immeasurable time, it is called ultimately lacking the dharma of nirvāṇa.' The Nirvāṇasūtra and Buddhagotraśāstra also say the same. When it is said that later they will definitely generate the mind and all attain buddhahood, these are all spoken in terms of a temporal limit, not those who are ultimately [without gotra]. How is this known? The Anuttarāśrayasūtra states: 'There are three grades of sentient beings: The first are those attached to existence, who further have two types: First, those who turn their backs on the path of nirvāṇa and lack the gotra of nirvāṇa, who do not seek nirvāṇa and delight in saṃsāra. Second, those who do not generate yearning within my Dharma and slander the Mahāyāna. Ānanda! Such sentient beings are not my disciples, and the Buddha is not their teacher.' And it continues up to: 'Operating through saṃsāra, they fall into the net of the icchantika in the subsequent limit, unable to extricate themselves.' The former are those without gotra; the latter, although having gotra, are of dull faculties and for a long time slander the Dharma and lack faith. In the Ratnagotravibhāga it harmonizes this second [type], not the first person.

1.13.4

It states: 'For the sake of turning around those who slander the Dharma, it is said to be an immeasurable time.' Therefore it is not the first. If it were not so, why divide them into two? Furthermore, the treatise itself says: 'If without causes and conditions such a mind arises, then the icchantika and others who lack the nature of nirvāṇa should generate the bodhicitta.' Otherwise, the sūtras and treatises should not both make two statements. If you say: the treatise itself having harmonized it, takes this as definitive; yet the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra and Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra also clearly state that persons without gotra ultimately do not become buddhas; why are they not definitive? Therefore one knows that the two explanations are each based on the difference of gotra, and there is no contradiction between sūtras and treatises. If you say: in the Nirvāṇasūtra the Buddha also personally harmonizes this, stating that because of obstructing the future it is named lacking the gotra, but because they will definitely attain it, it is named having the gotra—this too does not accord with reason. This is spoken in terms of a temporal limit, stating that they will definitely attain it, not those who are ultimately [without gotra]. If it were not so, why does fascicle ten state: 'Even if all immeasurable sentient beings were simultaneously matured in anuttarabodhi, these Tathāgatas still would not see that icchantika attain bodhi'? If the buddhas had a time of final cessation, one could say that because this person's time is so long, they do not see the Buddha. Since there is no time of nirvāṇa [for the buddhas], how could one say they do not see? From this one knows that there are those who are ultimately agotraka; to construct other extensive interpretations of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra is merely wasted effort. Furthermore, citing the Mahāyānasaṃgraha which says: 'The noble disciples say: "This one is completely devoid of even a minor root of wholesomeness and abandon him," but the Buddha sees and knows that it exists and delivers him'—knowing that there is a subtle, incomplete cause; the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says an incomplete cause is precisely a subtle root of wholesomeness from other lives. If one lacks this subtle one, it is called ultimately agotraka. This too is not so. If one who lacks subtle wholesomeness is allowed to become a buddha later, that is still a temporal limit; how could it be called ultimate? One who has never been able to give rise to subtle wholesomeness is one who purely practices evil conduct, which is subsumed under a temporal limit, not an ultimate agotraka. If you say: If they ultimately do not become buddhas later, why does it state immediately below: 'Having explained the lack of gotra, next it explains causing them to enter'? This too is not so. Speaking of causing them to enter is because that treatise text previously spoke of having gotra and later spoke of lacking gotra, speaking of presence and absence in opposition to each other. When it next speaks of causing them to enter, it speaks of causing those who have the gotra to enter. Otherwise, how could it say: 'If there were no difference in gotra, then there would be no difference in vehicles,' and so forth? Furthermore, it is said: Regarding the Mahāyānasaṃgraha's statement, 'Possessing obstacles yet lacking the cause, the buddhas do not attain mastery,' Asamāhita (Wuxing) explains: '"Possessing obstacles" refers to the afflictive karma being different, and maturation lacking the cause. As for those who lack the cause of nirvāṇa and possess obstacles, although the previous buddhas lacked mastery, later buddhas will have mastery.' By analogy with lacking the cause, one should know it is also like this. His explanation is unreasonable. Although afflictions producing retribution are both definite, there is a time when the retribution is exhausted. When retribution is exhausted, the buddhas attain mastery and cause them to attain nirvāṇa. But as for those who lack the cause, even in this stage the buddhas lack mastery and cannot cause them to have it. Could there naturally be a time when the cause exists, such that only at each of their stages do the buddhas then teach and transform them? If, originally lacking the cause, later it naturally exists, then also, originally being ordinary beings, they would definitely and naturally become noble ones; why rely on good friends, buddhas, and so forth as conditions? One should deeply contemplate this ultimate principle; if you are unable to awaken to it, I have no mastery over it.

Linked texts (1)

能顯中邊慧日論 — Classical Chinese