能顯中邊慧日論 1.13.3

1.13.3

The third, discipline through practices, clarifies all the differences in the practices cultivated by bodhisattvas, namely cultivating an exalted body, the faculties, wisdom, and so forth. The fourth, discipline through expedient means, clarifies that bodhisattvas cultivate thirty-two expedient means. The fifth, discipline through maturation, clarifies those capable of maturing and those to be matured. The sixth, discipline through the seal of maturity, clarifies all the marks and characteristics of those to be matured and those already matured. As is clear in the sūtras and treatises, citing them would be too cumbersome. Therefore, discipline according to gotra and discipline according to persons are not concerned with distance or proximity. If one says that discipline according to gotra clarifies the distant gotra, that is the original nature of sentient beings, while discipline according to the two births is the proximate gotra, that is the adventitious nature of sentient beings—if all sentient beings possess the original nature, all ought to be made to become buddhas; why then mature them proximately through the three vehicles? Why place foul food into a jewelled vessel? When wishing to travel the great road, why show instead a narrow path? When they themselves have no wound, why injure them? Furthermore, regarding what you call the proximate gotra, does it exist on account of others, or is it fundamentally self-established? If it exists on account of others, why does the Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra state: 'Those who have the gotra of the śrāvaka are matured by means of the śrāvakayāna,' and so forth, and why does it not say that those who lack the gotra of the śrāvaka are matured through the gotra of the śrāvaka, and so forth? If you say that it is in terms of what one already possesses that one is matured through the śrāvakayāna, then if so, why does it further state that those who are agotraka are matured through the good destinies, and does not say that they are matured through the gotra of the śrāvakayāna and so forth? If you say that since they do not yet possess the gotra, how could they be matured? If so, since it is not spoken for those who lack it, when will they come to possess it? Furthermore, if you say that since there was originally no human or divine gotra and later there is a human or divine gotra, one therefore knows that previously lacking the gotra of the three vehicles, one later attains the gotra of the three vehicles—this analogy is falsely constructed; there is never any text stating that previously one lacked the human and divine gotra and later was made to possess the human and divine gotra. If one allows that what was originally absent is present now, then the human and divine destinies would exist only after the buddhas, and would consequently have a beginning. Furthermore, the human and divine gotra is brought about by innate wholesomeness; as for innate wholesomeness, one attains it as soon as one is born; how could it be previously absent and later caused to exist by another? When the kalpa is destroyed and beings are born in the human and divine realms, is that through the Buddha's teaching? If you say: the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'As for those who do not abide in nirvāṇa, one places them within human and divine bliss and merit, making for them a cause of nirvāṇa,' and therefore one knows that being without a cause, later they still come to have the gotra—this too is not so. When the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa speaks of making for them a cause of nirvāṇa, it speaks in terms of the absence of the manifest, not the absence of seeds. Because an effect arising without a seed does not accord with reason. Furthermore, if you say that although it speaks of giving human and divine bliss, there is a distinction between having the gotra and lacking the gotra, so the cited text about maturing through human and divine wholesomeness is not a definitive authority—this too is not so; the treatise is a definitive authority. Why is that? The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'As for those who do not abide in nirvāṇa, one places them within the human and divine nature, making for them a cause of nirvāṇa'; it does not say they are agotraka. Maturing them through human and divine roots of wholesomeness and making a cause of nirvāṇa is because one matures them as causes of the three vehicles. Furthermore, if you say that one does not allow an effect to arise without a seed, why does the Laṅkāvatārasūtra say: 'Those who have severed the roots of wholesomeness are agotraka, but later attain nirvāṇa,' and therefore one knows that being without a cause, later they still come to have the gotra? This too is not so. The bodhisattvas of great compassion are also included among them; could it be that lacking buddhadhātu is termed agotraka? Therefore one knows that when the [bodhisattvas] of great compassion see that they have not yet attained buddhahood, it is said to be absent. Regarding the view of severing wholesomeness, it is called [agotraka] due to severing, not due to an absence of seeds. Nor can one object: If they have the cause of nirvāṇa, why place them within human and divine bliss to make a cause of nirvāṇa? Because the Bodhisattvabhūmi speaks of having the gotra of the three vehicles and discipline through the three vehicles. This too is not so. Could it be that all who possess the cause of nirvāṇa can immediately become noble ones? Being without leisure, they do not become noble ones, and therefore are placed among humans and gods. Hence Asaṅga's commentary on the Prajñāpāramitā states: 'As for those born in places of hardship, it is because they await the right time.' This means that for those born in places of hardship at present, one awaits their birth among humans and gods, and once they have left the places of hardship, one matures them. Erroneous interpretations of the Śrīmālādevīsūtra may be understood by analogy with this. Furthermore, it is said: Yogācārabhūmi fascicle fifty-two names those without the dharma of nirvāṇa, and fascicle sixty-seven and the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra chapter one speak of those without the dharma of nirvāṇa; this is stated in terms of the adventitious nature, not the original pradhāna-hetu. Since the original pradhāna[-hetu] is held in common, one cannot divide persons [by it]. The presence and absence of the adventitious nature are not the same, and the distinction in gotra is based on this. Hence the Upāsakaśīlasūtra fascicle one states: 'Because bodhi has superior, middling, and inferior, bodhi is not fundamentally existent.' This meaning is also untenable. This states that its fruit is attained only on account of the cause, hence it is said to be not fundamentally existent. Even if one says that the cause is stated in terms of newly perfumed arising, it does not impede the fundamental existence of superior, middling, and inferior gotras. Otherwise, how could beings equally possess the original great cause, yet only then be made to become three grades? The fault is as stated before. Furthermore, it is said: A bodhisattva attains the name on account of generating the mind, not on account of the original gotra. Therefore, by analogy one knows that attaining the gotra of the three vehicles is named not on account of the original gotra. This meaning is not so. Names are provisional designations without real intrinsic nature; hence it is said not to be on account of gotra. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Names and referents are adventitious to each other; one should contemplate their phenomena.' It is not that their gotra and the substance of the dharma are not distinct. Nor is it that, lacking an original nature, it is only through generating the mind that one first attains it, for this contradicts the Bodhisattvabhūmi's statement that it is not on account of generating the mind that there is the gotra of the bodhisattva. If one interprets this in terms of stages, it has already been refuted above. Next, citing discipline according to persons is also refuted as before. Furthermore, citing the Mahāyānasaṃgraha which says: 'Possessing obstacles yet lacking the cause, the buddhas are without mastery'—the Yogācārabhūmi explains this either in terms of obstacles or in terms of the cause; the two explanations are different. If both are not the original nature, on what basis are they spoken? Even if not the original nature, both would be empty words, yet they are able to reveal certainty. Furthermore, it is said regarding the icchantika who is ultimately [without gotra]: According to the Ratnagotravibhāga, it states: 'Because of immeasurable time, it is called ultimately lacking the dharma of nirvāṇa.' The Nirvāṇasūtra and Buddhagotraśāstra also say the same. When it is said that later they will definitely generate the mind and all attain buddhahood, these are all spoken in terms of a temporal limit, not those who are ultimately [without gotra]. How is this known? The Anuttarāśrayasūtra states: 'There are three grades of sentient beings: The first are those attached to existence, who further have two types: First, those who turn their backs on the path of nirvāṇa and lack the gotra of nirvāṇa, who do not seek nirvāṇa and delight in saṃsāra. Second, those who do not generate yearning within my Dharma and slander the Mahāyāna. Ānanda! Such sentient beings are not my disciples, and the Buddha is not their teacher.' And it continues up to: 'Operating through saṃsāra, they fall into the net of the icchantika in the subsequent limit, unable to extricate themselves.' The former are those without gotra; the latter, although having gotra, are of dull faculties and for a long time slander the Dharma and lack faith. In the Ratnagotravibhāga it harmonizes this second [type], not the first person.