能顯中邊慧日論 1.15

1.15

Some hold that the buddhadhātu of principle and of practice is possessed by all alike. As in scriptures such as the Mahāmeghasūtra, their thesis is that the Tathāgata is eternal, the two [vehicles] also do not perish, and all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu. This does not fully accord with reason. One who believes that the nature of principle is all-pervading is a true disciple; as for claiming that the nature of phenomenal practice is all-pervading, the scriptures contain no authoritative text for it. Although it is said that they attain the bodhicitta, being able to have faith is also [so called]; one need not be able to attain the bodhi of the fruit of buddhahood for it to be called attaining the mind. According to the texts cited, there are no words saying that all living beings become buddhas. As for the substance of the eighth [consciousness], it is defiled in nature and an indeterminate (avyākṛta) dharma; it is not an anāsrava cause, which Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha and others do not permit at all. If it is said that there is no extinction of the dviyāna, this is traditionally accepted only with respect to the aniyata-gotra; if one speaks of the niyata-gotra, this is not established by consensus. The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra states: "If one says that all four fruits attain buddhahood, he does not understand my intention." As for fascicle twenty-seven of the Nirvāṇa stating: "All possess a mind; all that have a mind become buddhas," this is like speaking of the ekayāna: it is spoken in terms of having the same substance, or in terms of the intention regarding that same substance. As for fascicle thirty-six stating: "All wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate dharmas are entirely called buddhadhātu," "unwholesome" refers to the afflictions and the like. If it means that the tathatā on which the unwholesome relies is called buddhadhātu, this is admissible; but if one takes the unwholesome itself to be buddhadhātu, this contradicts the Introduction to the Mahāyāna (Madhyamāntavibhāga), which states: "You are foolish and devoid of wisdom, regarding afflictions as the cause," and so forth. As cited in the Manifestation [Treatise], if afflictions were the cause of bodhi, how could an unwholesome dharma be the cause of wholesome dharmas? Therefore, it is called buddhadhātu [only by metaphor], not the direct buddhadhātu, and cannot serve as proof. If one says: "The seven persons in the Ganges do not leave the water of buddhadhātu; how is this not the nature of practice?" It is not so: this is in the water of the buddhadhātu of principle. If the nature of practice were all-pervading, all would emerge; why would the seven persons each be distinct? As for the statement that all dharmas and all paths, whether causes or fruits, are buddhadhātu, this is spoken with reference to a single person possessing all seven. Because the first person, not lacking the gotra yet seeking existence, is also called "ever-drowned," as explained in the Buddhagotraśāstra. That the icchantika is not without the gotra is also, according to this text, [said because] although called ever-drowned, it is allowed that they have a time of emergence, and it is said that all beings possess the buddhadhātu; it is not definitely all [without exception], because practice and realization are not all-pervading. Again, it is said: fascicle thirty-seven says: "For the sake of what is not buddhadhātu, buddhadhātu is spoken of. What is not buddhadhātu refers to walls, tiles, stones, and insentient things. That which is free from such insentient things is called buddhadhātu." This too is not so. How could greed, anger, delusion, and so forth be called buddhadhātu? If greed and the like can cover the buddhadhātu and therefore one knows there is no [practice] nature, then afflictions covering the real being called buddhadhātu is not necessarily the nature of practice; how can this demonstrate that the nature of practice is also all-pervading like the nature of tathatā? If one says: "Without the nature of practice, how could it be called buddhadhātu?" This too is not so. Tiles and stones are wholly not [the nature]; therefore they are distinguished in contrast to living beings. As for sentient beings who lack it, the skandhas are temporarily set aside without discussion. If one says: "It is called buddhadhātu because it covers the real, and tiles and stones are also like this, so why need they be excluded?" This sense is not analogous: greed and the like are obstacles, whereas tiles and stones are not obstacles. Hence the sūtra states: "Wondrous form abides in the world according to its fundamental nature; the wise attain liberation therein." Furthermore, the sūtra states: "Just as when wealth is in another land, one can say that there is wealth." This is spoken with respect to those who possess the gotra. Fascicle thirty-three says: "It is not existent like empty space, nor non-existent like a rabbit's horn." This bids one observe the buddhadhātu of practice: although it now has a cause, it has not yet attained the fruit; because it can increase and is not eternal, it is not like empty space; because it can serve as a cause and its fruit will certainly be attained, it is not like a rabbit's horn. Yet they say: "Speaking of the icchantika lacking the gotra refutes the eternal existence of empty space; speaking of the icchantika possessing the gotra refutes the eternal non-existence of a rabbit's horn. If one says that one part exists previously by dharmatā, this is identical to the eternal existence of empty space; if one part is completely non-existent, this is identical to the eternal non-existence of a rabbit's horn. Speaking in this way slanders the Three Jewels." It is not so. If you take tathatā and mind to be an equal nature, eternally existing in all, that is precisely the fault of being like empty space. If one says: "It is viewed in terms of an adventitious nature that what is non-existent will come to exist," this too is incorrect: arising without a cause does not belong to a son of Śākya. Moreover, the sāsrava is not the cause of the anāsrava; this fault has already been stated several times. Observing the intent of this scripture, it is because in the causal stage the fruit is not determinately existent like the eternal existence of empty space, nor determinately non-existent like the eternal non-existence of a rabbit's horn; because the fruit will certainly exist, because it is not previously existent, because it can serve as a cause, and because it is not attained as an explicit manifestation as verbal expressions denote. Again, they say: fascicle thirty-three states: "The dwelling place of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas for eighty thousand, sixty thousand, forty thousand, twenty thousand, and ten thousand kalpas is called nirvāṇa; the dwelling place of the unsurpassed Lord of the Dharma, the Noble Lord, is called the Great Nirvāṇa." Inferring from this, the dviyāna have no real nirvāṇa. This too is not so. The sūtra says: "It is called nirvāṇa, not called the Great Nirvāṇa." How can you say it is non-existent? Furthermore, such a statement is made in terms of the indeterminate who later turn their minds, not those of determinate gotra. Again, they say: "If in stages such as the stream-enterer they retain their bodies through determinate vows for eighty thousand kalpas and the like, as well as the remainder of fragmentary [samsāra], this does not accord with reason. Why is that? In the 'Practices regarding Illness' of Nirvāṇa eleven, it says: 'There are five kinds of persons. The first person, because of severing the three fetters, attains srotāpanna, does not fall into the hells, beasts, or hungry ghosts, and after seven returns among humans and devas, eternally exhausts all suffering and enters nirvāṇa. Even up to this person passing eighty thousand kalpas in the future, he attains anuttarā bodhi,' and so on. Inferring from this, one knows that this is not the remainder of fragmentary [samsāra] in the stream-enterer stage, because it is based on seven returns among humans and devas to eternally exhaust all suffering, after which are the eighty thousand kalpas. Nor is it retaining the body and personally calling it nirvāṇa. Therefore, it is because stages such as the stream-enterer eternally exhaust all suffering and enter nirvāṇa." This too is not so. This discusses that fruit possessing this merit; it is not necessary that only the non-learner (aśaikṣa) first begins to leap beyond to the Great [Vehicle]. If you cling to the scripture's statement that with seven returns among humans and devas one eternally exhausts all suffering and enters nirvāṇa, do you not concede that they attain the extinction of the seven rebirths and eternally exhaust all suffering? Moreover, if attaining nirvāṇa eternally exhausts all suffering, then when a non-learner attains nirvāṇa, they should not undergo transformation [birth], because the transformational body also entails suffering of conditioned existence (saṃskāra-duḥkhatā). Although entering nirvāṇa is spoken of as exhausting all suffering, this does not preclude the non-learner from undergoing a transformational body. Although it is said that the stream-enterer has at most seven returns of birth, it is also permitted that upon extinguishing the seven, they attain the fruit of a non-learner. Therefore, one knows that this text speaks in terms of efficacy, or in terms of a class that grasps the non-learner [attainment]. In truth of principle, the first fruit can also turn their mind and immediately undergo transformation, because there is an explicit statement in the Buddhabhūmiśāstra, and because the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka includes learners who also turn their minds. Since you accept the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka as an explicit teaching (nītārtha), why do you not faithfully accept that learners turn their minds? Furthermore, Nirvāṇa fascicle nineteen directly states: "The srotāpanna person [takes] eighty thousand kalpas, up to the pratyekabuddha [taking] ten thousand kalpas." Fascicle twenty also directly states: "The srotāpanna person after eighty thousand kalpas and so on attains the bodhicitta, up to the pratyekabuddha after ten thousand kalpas attaining the bodhicitta." How is it that when the scripture speaks of arhats and pratyekabuddhas, you immediately accept it according to the text, but when it speaks of the previous three fruits, you cling and do not accept it? Bringing forth liking and aversion even to what is taught in a single scripture, your selections and rejections among the various texts are truly full of errors! Citing the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa stating "there is only one buddha vehicle" and that śrāvakas all rely on the Buddha, and also the Buddhagotraśāstra saying "having entered the noble path, they give rise to the mind of finality"—that this was to destroy such arrogance, and therefore one knows the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka is the real Dharma teaching, and Bodhisattva Vasubandhu regarded it as real—[you ask] who would entirely take it as non-final? It is not so. Why? The Śrīmālāsūtra says: "If the Tathāgata speaks expediently in accordance with what they desire"; the Saṃdhinirmocana says: "If one does not know this esoteric intention (saṃdhi) of the Buddha"; the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says: "At one time I taught one practice, one condition, one vehicle, one path, and so forth, but my disciples did not understand my intention, and said that the four fruits and others all attain buddhahood." In the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Asaṅga himself says it is "to attract and guide a certain class," and Vasubandhu and Asabhāva both say it is "cryptic." Śākyamuni and Asaṅga are the universal teachers of Vasubandhu, and they judged it to be non-final; who is Vasubandhu that he could take it as final? Moreover, if Vasubandhu judged it to be final, how could others properly take it as non-final? If so, then in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra the Buddha himself spoke of it as final; who are the others that they should judge it to be expedient and esoteric? Again, they say: the lower fascicle of the Ghanavyūhasūtra says: "If upon liberation the realm of sentient beings were extinguished, that would destroy the omniscience of the Tathāgata, and the dharmas known by the past, future, and present buddhas would not be equal. Moreover, if in nirvāṇa sentient beings are extinguished, who is free from suffering, having remainder or without remainder? Deeds such as subduing Māra would all be false speech. Therefore one should know that when all contemplative practitioners realize liberation, their bodies are eternal, free from the aggregates of existence, and their propensities (vāsanā) extinguished. Just as when hot iron is cast into cold water, though the heat is removed, the iron is not destroyed." The intention of this passage is different. The opening words—that if the realm of sentient beings were extinguished, that would destroy the omniscience of the Tathāgata—are spoken in terms of tathatā, because it is called the realm of sentient beings. The Ratnagotravibhāga cites the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśasūtra: "Śāriputra! Apart from the realm of sentient beings, there is no dharmakāya; apart from the dharmakāya, there is no realm of sentient beings. The realm of sentient beings is itself the dharmakāya; the dharmakāya is itself the realm of sentient beings. These two dharmas are one in meaning and different in name." There are passages everywhere in the various Mahāyāna scriptures, so this cannot be used as proof that the dviyāna are not extinguished in the remainderless [nirvāṇa]. If one says: "The scripture says: 'Realizing liberation, their bodies are eternal, free from the aggregates of existence, and their propensities extinguished,' and so forth, which is taken as proof"—this too is not so. This speaks of the Tathāgata. If one allows that when the dviyāna enter the remainderless element they are also like this, how would they differ from a buddha, that they should further need to proceed to the Great [Vehicle]? If one says: "Allowing that the body and wisdom of the dviyāna are completely extinguished in the remainderless contradicts the upper fascicle of the Ghanavyūha: 'If that nirvāṇa were extinction and destruction, sentient beings would have a final end. If sentient beings had an end, they would also have a beginning point. Originally there were non-living dharmas, which only then began to rely on sentient beings. There would be nothing that is not a sentient being, yet still born into the realm of sentient beings.'" This too is not so; this is spoken in terms of the nature of principle, or spoken of the Tathāgata. If one argues from the scripture's statement that sentient beings having an end means they should have a beginning point, and debates the extinction of sentient beings, the afflictions are also like this: afflictions are sentient beings. Both causes and fruits are beginningless; how could the exhaustion of afflictions be analogized to afflictions having a beginning? If one does not allow that afflictions have an end, then all buddhas would have afflictions. Although one allows that afflictions are severed, yet one says afflictions have no beginning. Though the body has an end, what prevents it from having no beginning? Therefore the intent of that scripture is discussed in terms of the nature of principle. Furthermore, the Mahābherīhārakasūtra states: "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha, saying: 'World-Honoured One! When sentient beings enter parinirvāṇa, is there an exhaustion, or is there no exhaustion?' The Buddha told Kāśyapa: 'Sentient beings have no exhaustion.' He addressed the Buddha: 'How are they not exhausted?' The Buddha said: 'If sentient beings were exhausted, there would be decrease, and this sūtra would be meaningless. Therefore, Kāśyapa! When all Buddha World-Honoured Ones enter parinirvāṇa, they are all eternal.'" For this reason, when all Buddha World-Honoured Ones enter parinirvāṇa, they are never extinguished. It does not say that when the dviyāna enter parinirvāṇa they are also eternally indestructible; or [it means] the tathatā of the realm of sentient beings is inexhaustible. Again, fascicle one of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra states: "Because the wholesome roots of other persons do not benefit others, and because the wholesome roots of other persons are exhausted at the time of nirvāṇa. The wholesome roots of a bodhisattva are not like this; by this as the cause, their gotra is supreme." If when persons of the dviyāna enter the remainderless element wholesome roots remain, how could it say they are extinguished? Asaṅga and Vasubandhu served Maitreya and personally ascended to the supreme [stages]; they joyfully said that wholesome roots are extinguished. How could you not believe it? Again, they say: in the second fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra, in the chapter on the "Five Gotras," it states: "Mahāmati! Speaking of the three vehicles is to initiate the differences of the gotras on the grounds of practice, not the ultimate ground." It also says: "Those three kinds of persons—śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas—ultimately are said to attain the dharmakāya of the Tathāgata." The scripture speaks of three persons, which are the determinate dviyāna and the indeterminate [gotra]. This too is not so. That scripture initially takes the determinate and indeterminate gotras as three vehicles, and further speaks of a fourth vehicle of the indeterminate gotra, following and taking the indeterminate. Like the great-compassion bodhisattva among those without gotra, who although also of the Mahāyāna gotra, due to the difference of compassionate vows, is separately spoken of as three; saying it is non-ultimate is spoken in terms of the indeterminate. If you judge that speaking of the three refers to the determinate dviyāna and the indeterminate, and that the determinate also give rise to the Great [Vehicle], why would one need to speak separately of a fourth vehicle? The later explanation of the four-fascicle Laṅkāvatāra will show the error accordingly. Passages such as the Śrīmālāsūtra, Ratnagotravibhāga, Buddhagotraśāstra, and so forth are all to be understood following the preceding. Vasubandhu's stage was that of suppressing forbearance (kṣānti); he received praise as uniquely a guiding compass. Maitreya's person abides in the Cloud of Dharma (dharmameghā); why do you not exclusively proclaim him as the supreme guide? To praise exclusively a bodhisattva of ordinary stage as teaching the true doctrine, while demoting Maitreya, the next buddha to succeed, as speaking non-final teachings—is this not a grave error?