能顯中邊慧日論 1.20

1.20

One position holds: The essence of buddhadhātu is of two kinds: first, principle; second, phenomena. As for the causal gotra of principle, it is the emptiness of the ultimate truth; the emptiness of the ultimate truth is the pradhāna-hetu for the dharmakāya, and is also the pratyaya-hetu for the saṃbhogakāya. If essence produces marks, it is also the pradhāna-hetu for the saṃbhogakāya, because the fundamental essence of the saṃbhogakāya is the emptiness of the ultimate truth. This is not reasonable. If the emptiness of the ultimate truth were the pradhāna-hetu of the dharmakāya, would it be a janaka-hetu or a jñāpaka-hetu? If it were a janaka-hetu, the dharmakāya is eternal, and what is eternal is not produced by a cause. The Nirvāṇa[sūtra], fascicle 13, states: "If there are dharmas produced from conditions, one knows they are impermanent. Among these non-Buddhists, there is no dharma that is not produced from conditions. Good son! The buddhadhātu has neither production nor cessation," down to: "It is not subsumed or retained by the aggregates, realms, or sense fields; therefore it is called eternal." Fascicle 9 also states: "Such radiance is called wisdom; wisdom is eternal and abiding, and an eternal and abiding dharma has no causes or conditions." It also states: "The essence of nirvāṇa is not something that was previously absent and now exists. If the essence of nirvāṇa were previously absent and now exists, it would not be an anāsrava, eternal, and abiding dharma." Since nirvāṇa is not something previously absent and now existing, how could it be produced by a cause? Furthermore, Bodhisattva Superior and Noble King of Virtue asked: "Whatever is achieved through the adornment of causes is called impermanent; nirvāṇa should be likewise." The Tathāgata answered by stating that causes are of five kinds: "first, the pradhāna-hetu; second, the concordant cause; third, the sustaining cause; fourth, the augmenting cause; fifth, the separating cause. The essence of nirvāṇa is not accomplished by these five causes." The dharmakāya is precisely nirvāṇa; how could it be said to have a cause? Moreover, the stages of cause and result are distinct and their designations differ, but their essence is eternally without difference and without increase or decrease; how could tathatā in turn serve as a cause for tathatā? The Tathāgatagarbhasūtra extensively uses parables to illuminate that it is fundamentally complete, and that because it is covered by hindrances, the teaching of the Dharma is spoken of as a cause to bring about awakening; neither is it a jñāpaka-hetu. The Nirvāṇa[sūtra], fascicle 19, states: "Furthermore, there are two causes: first, the productive cause; second, the revelatory cause. The thirty-seven factors of awakening, the pāramitās, and so forth, in relation to nirvāṇa, are termed revelatory causes." Fascicle 33 also states: "The result of separation is precisely nirvāṇa. The separation from all defilements and all wholesome karmas are the causes of nirvāṇa. Causes are of two kinds: first, proximate; second, remote. Proximate refers to the three liberations; remote refers to the wholesome dharmas cultivated over immeasurable lifetimes," down to: "Therefore, nirvāṇa has only a jñāpaka-hetu and has no janaka-hetu." This is explained in terms of principle and phenomena, and the different approaches of bodhi and nirvāṇa, wisdom and abandonment. Fascicle 2 of the Nirvāṇa[sūtra] [states] that "Great Parinirvāṇa encompasses both wisdom and abandonment, because both are called Great Nirvāṇa." Furthermore, with respect to the principle of tathatā in relation to the stage of the dharmakāya, which of the ten causes and four conditions subsumes it so that it could be taken as a pradhāna-hetu? Moreover, [that position] cites on its own the Ghanavyūhasūtra: "The pure garbha of the Tathāgata is also named immaculate wisdom"; and the Avataṃsakasūtra: "Markless wisdom and unhindered wisdom are fully present within the bodies of sentient beings"; and the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra: "Within the body of defilements there is a tathāgatagarbha, eternally unpolluted, fully endowed with virtues and marks, no different from myself." Since it says it is fully endowed with virtues and marks and is no different from myself, how could it be a cause? It can only be that verbal teaching and cultivation serve as the cause. Hence the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra says: "The Buddha, having seen the tathāgatagarbha of sentient beings, desires to cause it to unfold, and preaches the scriptures and Dharma for them, eliminating defilements and manifesting the buddhadhātu." Thus Vasubandhu's Prajñā[-pāramitopadeśa]-śāstra states: "With respect to phenomena, it is a jñāpaka-hetu, and it is also a janaka-hetu for the rest." The sūtra states: "All Buddhas emerge from this sūtra; all Buddhas are born from this sūtra." Some say: Tathatā is precisely the essence of the dharmakāya; no one says that tathatā is the cause of tathatā, and so it becomes a false assertion. As for those who claim that tathatā is a jñāpaka-hetu, the name of the cause is spoken of within the result; it is not that tathatā is itself the jñāpaka-hetu. If tathatā could reveal itself, it ought to emerge from defilement by itself; why would it depend on other conditions? However, the Buddhagotraśāstra states: "The cause of what ought to be attained is because tathatā exists. When wisdom arises and cuts off delusion, tathatā is then revealed." This is the reason for what ought to be attained; it is not a janaka-hetu or jñāpaka-hetu. If it is termed a sākṣāt-hetupratyaya, where among the ten causes, four conditions, janaka-hetu, and jñāpaka-hetu would it be subsumed? Furthermore, the Buddhagotraśāstra says: "'What ought to be attained' means that it must certainly be manifestable, hence it is termed 'what ought to be attained.' How could it reveal itself? Its manifestation depends on wisdom." It was also stated: "If essence produces marks, it is also the pradhāna-hetu for the saṃbhogakāya, because the fundamental essence of the saṃbhogakāya is the emptiness of the ultimate truth." This is not so; this speaks of its essence. Although tathatā is spoken of as the dharmadhātu, dhātu has the meaning of cause and also the meaning of svabhāva. Being a cause does not mean producing; it is merely a support-cause; therefore, tathatā is said to be the support for delusion and awakening. The Buddhagotraśāstra says: "It is the support for the arising of the Path; because tathatā exists, conventional phenomena can exist, as stated in texts throughout." Furthermore, the Buddhagotraśāstra says: "One existent essence can produce an existent essence, and one existent essence can produce a non-existent essence; this is reality. If it were the pradhāna-hetu for the saṃbhogabuddha, then two existent essences would produce an existent essence; why would it say 'one'?" This also agrees with the Yogācāra[bhūmi] that the pariniṣpanna does not produce dharmas. Moreover, if tathatā were taken as the pradhāna-hetu, why does the Buddhagotraśāstra merely say: "Due to preparatory application, the treatise discusses the perfection of the cause and the perfection of the result. As for the perfection of the cause, it refers to the practice of merit and wisdom." It also says: "The cause of perfection is precisely the cause of preparatory application." It does not say that the cause of preparatory application is the cause of what ought to be attained; therefore, the pradhāna-hetu is precisely merit and wisdom. If this were not so, the emptiness of the ultimate truth would also be said to be the essence of defiled dharmas; could one allow that tathatā is the pradhāna-hetu for defilements? If one were to allow this, it would contradict the Nirvāṇasūtra. Fascicle 33 says: "If someone says: 'All sentient beings definitely possess buddhadhātu, which is eternal, blissful, self, and pure; it does not make or produce the causes and conditions of defilements, and therefore it cannot be seen'—know that this person slanders the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha." It clearly states that tathatā does not make or produce the causes and conditions of defilements, and [saying so] is not slandering the Three Jewels. Since you allow that if essence produces marks, tathatā should be the pradhāna-hetu for the saṃbhogakāya, then since essence produces marks, it should produce all dharmas and be their pradhāna-hetu; how could it discriminate between defiled and pure? If that were so, it would be a great slander of the Three Jewels. If it is said that in saying it is the pradhāna-hetu for the saṃbhogakāya, it does not directly produce the saṃbhogakāya: since it does not directly produce it, how can it be called a pradhāna-hetu? It is like the analogy of the great earth. If the great earth did not exist, the hundreds of grasses would not grow. Although they exist depending on the earth, the great earth is not said to be the pradhāna-hetu for the hundreds of plants. Tathatā should be understood in the same way.