能顯中邊慧日論 1.7

1.7

Some say: 'Within the sūtras and treatises, there are instances where terms are identical but the meanings differ. For instance, the Saṃdhinirmocana and other texts speak of the ekayāna, and the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and other texts speak of the ekayāna; although these share the same name, the Saṃdhinirmocana preserves the three while clarifying the one, whereas the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka refutes the two while clarifying the one, and thus their meanings differ. Why so? The Saṃdhinirmocana preserves the two nirvāṇas, stating that those of the niyata-gotra in the dviyāna do not sit at the bodhimaṇḍa. The verse says, "Therefore within it the ekayāna is established, / It is not that there is no distinction among the natures of sentient beings." This preserves the three while clarifying the one. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and other texts say, "Whether śrāvakas or bodhisattvas, / Hearing the Dharma I have preached, / Even down to a single verse, / All will attain buddhahood without doubt. / Only this one fact is real, / The other two are not true." Abandoning the goat and deer carts to extinguish the conjured city, refuting the two nirvāṇas to return to the jewel repository; therefore their meanings differ.'

This explanation is unreasonable. Why so? In all teachings on the ekayāna, name and meaning do not differ. We may briefly point out the agreement between the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Saṃdhinirmocana. Furthermore, concerning the ekayāna of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and that of the Saṃdhinirmocana and other texts, since the Mahāyānasaṃgraha cites the prediction given to Śāriputra in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka assembly as being among the ten meanings, how could one say that the teachings of the ekayāna prior to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka were different? [If one claims that] the Mahāyānasaṃgraha only explains the ekayāna prior to it and does not explain the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, since what is explained is the same, one clearly knows they are not different.

Moreover, there are no persons of fixed nature who are revealed and taught as attaining buddhahood. When Mahāmati asked in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, the Buddha answered, "Those who formerly made the vow for bodhi are not determinate," and so forth. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra-śāstra states: "Because the faculties of the determinate persons are not yet mature, the Bodhisattva confers predictions on them to cause them to generate the aspiration." Since the wording is general, it also refers to past matters. If one says that by refuting the two nirvāṇas the ekayāna is explicitly revealed, then one must definitively state that all [followers of] the dviyāna will attain buddhahood; why then exclude the determinate? Moreover, the third parable is for those who exclusively seek the Mahāyāna, thinking that apart from the Mahāyāna there are no distinct dviyānas, so that they may know the diversity of the distinct yānas; therefore the rain parable was spoken. Thus it accords with the Saṃdhinirmocana that those of the śamāyana-gotra do not sit at the bodhimaṇḍa. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka only preaches the ekayāna across three cycles for those who retrogressed from the bodhicitta and for transformation-śrāvakas; all the śrāvakas to whom predictions were conferred are solely these two. The sūtras and treatises agree that there are entirely none of the śamāyana [who receive predictions]; this is fully revealed in the texts. Thus it accords with the Saṃdhinirmocana that those of the aniyata-gotra can advance to right enlightenment. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra says, "Desiring to reveal the Buddha's knowledge and vision to sentient beings"; the treatise commentary explains this same meaning, saying: "What is identical is that the dharmakāyas of the triyāna are equal. As for the dharmakāyas of the triyāna being equal, it is because there is no distinction between the buddhadhātu and the dharmakāya." This accords with the Saṃdhinirmocana's reliance on the ultimate naturelessness among the three kinds of naturelessness, and so forth. It is also like the Liang translation of the [Mahāyānasaṃgraha-]śāstra stating that the ekayāna is taught based on the equality of phenomena as tathatā. In the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra, the four great śrāvakas themselves speak the parable: at first being a vile hired laborer removing dung; midway being entrusted with the wealth while having no hope of taking it oneself; and at the end, having assembled the multitude and announced it, only then conceiving comprehension. This accords with the third-period teaching of the Saṃdhinirmocana, and also accords with the single category of the selflessness of phenomena subsumed by the various treatises. Both the Liang and Tang translations of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha fully reveal this, and say that they do not fail to explain the ekayāna of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. Therefore, assertions of identity or difference are mere deluded conceptualisations.

Again, some say: 'Or there are instances where the names differ but the substance is the same. The substance of the buddhadhātu in the Nirvāṇa[sūtra] is precisely tathatā. In the Buddhagotraśāstra it is named "attainable" (prāpya). Since it is acknowledged that the nature of principle pervades sentient beings, not believing that the attainable will definitively attain buddhahood is also unreasonable.' This too is unreasonable. Although there are the causes and conditions of what is attainable, yet because it is acknowledged that the great compassionate bodhisattvas together with [sentient beings] possess the causes of preparatory practice, because sentient beings' realm is exhausted, they constantly do not attain buddhahood. What prevents sentient beings, though possessing the cause of what is attainable, from constantly not attaining buddhahood because they lack the cause of preparatory practice? If you say, 'I acknowledge they will attain it,' that directly contradicts the sūtras. The presence or absence of preparatory practice will be extensively distinguished below in the section 'Revealing the Correct.'

There is another view: 'Causes consist of the auxiliary and the primary; fruits consist of the near and the far. The auxiliary refers to associated wholesome factors and so forth; the primary refers to the tathāgatagarbha nature of the eight consciousnesses. When the eight consciousnesses are equally perfected and tathatā is pervasive, even if one lacks the auxiliary cause, it will come to exist through cultivation. Not believing in the primary cause—how could that not be delusion?' That adherence is not so. Now, regarding tathatā being taken as the primary cause: is it called primary with respect to generating the fruit, or is it primary on the basis of being the support for delusion and awakening? If being able to generate the fruit is called the primary cause, this universally contradicts the sūtras and treatises, for the permanent is never a generating cause. The fourth chapter of the Bodhisattvabhūmisūtra, fascicle 38 of the Yogācārabhūmi, and fascicle 30 of the Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra speak of permanent phenomena among the causes that lack the four conditions. If permanent phenomena were the direct causes and conditions, the meaning of seeds in the Yogācārabhūmi and Mahāyānasaṃgraha would also be entirely contradicted. If you say that it combines with the auxiliary cause and does not directly produce the fruit, this contradicts various sūtras and treatises, leading to a great error. Moreover, do you not acknowledge that the saṃbhogabuddha's body is endowed with the five skandhas? If it is endowed with the five skandhas, while the cause is not even subsumed under the skandhas, how could it be the cause of the skandhas? Furthermore, the Buddhagotraśāstra does not acknowledge that the real can generate existence; therefore, although the eight consciousnesses are the primary cause, this is not spoken with reference to beginningless manifest consciousnesses. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: "Endowed with the perfumed dharma of the anāsrava, it is therefore called the non-empty tathāgatagarbha." If one takes the beginningless manifest consciousness as the primary cause of buddhahood, then the primary cause of buddhahood—the anāsrava—would be constantly manifest; how then could there be ordinary beings? If you say it is sāsrava, how then could it be the primary cause? That would contradict the Mahāyānasaṃgraha's statement that poison is taken as amṛta. Moreover, how could the mind and mental factors not be the primary cause of the saṃbhogabuddha? If they are not the primary cause of the saṃbhogabuddha, this contradicts the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, and so forth, which state that the state of mind associated with the four wisdoms is called the saṃbhogakāya, acknowledging it to be the saṃbhogabuddha. To say that associated wholesome factors and so forth are auxiliary causes—how excessively rash! If one takes tathatā as the primary cause of the dharmakāya, it does not exceed two, namely the generative (janaka) and the revelatory (jñāpaka). With respect to the dharmakāya, tathatā is not subsumed under either the generative or revelatory cause; how then can it be called the primary cause? One can only acknowledge that the stages of cause and fruit differ: the causal stage is named tathāgatagarbha, and the fruitional stage is named dharmakāya. Tathatā does not generate tathatā, nor does it manifest itself. Since it is neither generative nor revelatory, we do not know by what principle it could be the primary cause. Because its substance does not change across the two stages, distinguishing cause and fruit, auxiliary and primary, is falsely applied. The primary causes of the three bodies will be extensively distinguished below in the section 'Revealing the Correct.'

There is another view: 'Those who have long cultivated bodhisattva practices become competent to uphold them, abide in the nature of their own yāna, and will definitively attain buddhahood. Before reaching this stage, they are said not to attain buddhahood. Those who are deluded about not being competent in the bodhisattva's own yāna-gotra, because their initial generation of the aspiration is not yet competent to uphold it, call it "having no gotra," and thereupon claim that they are ultimately without gotra and cannot attain buddhahood.' That too is unreasonable. Why so? The Bodhisattvabhūmisūtra says, "By virtue of the initial generation of the aspiration, one definitively attains anuttarā bodhi." The Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra says: "What is called upholding? The bodhisattva's own gotra, the initial generation of the aspiration, and all dharmas conducive to bodhi are called upholding. Why so? Because relying on the gotra, the bodhisattva is definitively competent for anuttarā bodhi; therefore the gotra is called definitive upholding." Down to saying: "Therefore the initial generation of the aspiration is called the expedient upholding of the bodhisattva's practice; relying on the practice's expedients, the bodhisattva fulfills anuttarā bodhi." Since it states that therefore the initial generation of the aspiration is called the expedient upholding of the bodhisattva's practice, and that relying on the practice's expedients one fulfills bodhi, how could one say that it is only through long cultivation that it is named upholding, or named having the gotra? Furthermore, the Bodhisattvabhūmisūtra says: "If one lacks the bodhisattva gotra, although one may generate the aspiration and diligently cultivate vigorous practice, in the end one cannot attain anuttarā bodhi. Therefore one should know that it is not because of generating the aspiration and diligently cultivating vigorous practice that one has the bodhisattva gotra." If long cultivation reaching competence in upholding were called having the gotra, why would the sūtra state that it is not because of generating the aspiration that one has the bodhisattva gotra? Furthermore, the Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra-śāstra states: "Because a person without gotra lacks the gotra, even though they generate the aspiration and diligently cultivate vigorous practice, they will definitively not culminate in anuttarā bodhi. Therefore one should know that even if one does not generate the aspiration and does not cultivate practice and expedients, one is still called upholding the gotra." Since it states that even without generating the aspiration one is called upholding the gotra, why trouble oneself to falsely divide the beginning and the end?

Some say: 'Seeing the text on the five gotras in the Hīnayāna, one immediately claims that the triyāna is an innate (dharmatā) distinction. Or, seeing [texts on] lacking the cause of nirvāṇa and being ultimately without gotra, one claims that the atyantika lacks the innate seed; not knowing that although one ultimately lacks the gotra and lacks the cause for generating the aspiration, later on there are still the distinctions of the five yānas, and all gotras are newly perfumed into existence, while the text of the Śrāvakabhūmi is not definitive proof.' This statement is entirely wrong. Why so? The Yogācārabhūmi was composed by Maitreya Bodhisattva, yet they say it is not definitive proof. The Śrīmālādevī[siṃhanādasūtra] and the Śīlasaṃyuktasūtra were proclaimed by Śākyamuni the World-Honoured One, yet they regard them as Hīnayāna teachings. Such outrageous defiance—who would dare speak with them! Now, regarding the claim that one who is ultimately without gotra and lacks the cause for generating the aspiration will later on still come to have them, we now ask them: does the later cause for generating the aspiration arise from a seed, or is it produced without a cause? If originally without a cause the mind arises naturally, one is not a son of Śākya. Therefore, the first fascicle of the four-fascicle Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: "Mahāmati, if one further asserts that without seeds there are three kinds of consciousness produced by the combination of three conditions, then turtles should grow hair and sand should yield oil. Your doctrine would be destroyed, contradicting definitive tenets." Moreover, if one does not acknowledge that the five yānas are distinguished by beginningless innate natures, but [claims] that all are identical in the one tathatā and all will attain buddhahood, and that the five gotras are newly perfumed and not fundamentally existent, why did the World-Honoured One cause them to perfume the five gotras instead of exclusively preaching the Mahāyāna to cause them to equally perfume the buddha-seed? The Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra says, "They have no wound of their own; do not wound them," and so forth. How could the Great Master, the Tamer of Men, not have known that there is the primary attainable cause, such that he would wound them with the Hīnayāna? If you say it is due to differences in faculties and natures, then the five gotras are fundamentally existent; how could they only be newly perfumed? Furthermore, the Bodhisattvabhūmisūtra says, "It is not because of generating the aspiration and diligently cultivating vigorous practice that one has the bodhisattva gotra." Therefore, we know that the five gotras are all fundamentally existent. From the fundamentally existent seeds, manifest activities repeatedly arise, and the perfumed seeds are called the acquired gotra (samudānīta-gotra). Furthermore, the Śīlasaṃyuktasūtra and other texts explain the causes of definitive distinction, saying: "Possessing the śrāvaka gotra, through the śrāvaka-yāna one enters parinirvāṇa," and so forth. Therefore, we know that distinction of gotra is not due to new perfuming. If it only began to exist through new perfuming, then one should say: "Previously lacking the śrāvaka gotra, one is caused to give rise to the śrāvaka-yāna gotra and rely on the śrāvaka-yāna," and so forth. Since it does not state this, it is clear that they are neither newly produced nor Hīnayāna teachings. Therefore, to hold that they are solely newly arisen contradicts both reason and doctrine. However, where the Mahāsaṃnipāta and other sūtras speak of being perfumed into existence, this is spoken with reference to the acquired gotra, not the natural gotra (prakṛtistha-gotra). If one speaks of the natural gotra, it is the principle of tathatā. That it is not the active gotra will be revealed below. Having briefly dispelled four delusions, the rest may be inferred by analogy.