能顯中邊慧日論 3
English (machine translation) 3
- Language
- English
3.1
Composed by the monk Huizhao of Dayun Monastery in Zizhou
3.2
Eighth Error: Contradictions Regarding Preceding and Subsequent Teachings
3.3
There is an opinion that states: In the earlier sūtras of the gradual teaching, it is taught solely that the four entrenchments are the cause of the three realms of existence; in the later sūtras of explicit exposition, it is universally taught that the five entrenchments are the root of birth-and-death, such that because the four entrenchments are not severed one undergoes the body of demarcated [birth-and-death], and because the entrenchment of ignorance remains one attains the embodiment of transformation. Due to the differences between what was taught by the Buddha earlier and later regarding severing, the treatises' interpretations of the Buddha's sūtras do not contradict the temporal teachings. For example, what was spoken before the Saṃdhinirmocana is considered the earlier teaching, whereas what was spoken after the assembly of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka is considered the later teaching. The incomplete [teachings] only speak of the indeterminate [gotra] turning their minds toward [the Mahāyāna], while those directed toward quiescence still possess actual extinction, do not abandon the bodies of the three realms, and do not separately speak of undergoing transformative death, but merely speak of retaining the karmic formations and retaining the demarcated body—namely, the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, Yogācārabhūmi, and so forth. In the sūtras after the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, both determinate and indeterminate gotras all turn their minds, there is no actual extinction of the dviyāna, and abandoning the bodies of the three realms, they then undergo transformation, which is not of the three realms—such as the Laṅkāvatāra, Śrīmālādevī, Anuttarāśraya, and Buddhagotraśāstra, etc.
This assertion is not so. Why is this? The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka has explicit text [dating it] after forty years; on what sacred teaching is it based that sūtras such as the Laṅkāvatāra are not prior to it? Furthermore, the Anuttarāśrayasūtra is not subsequent to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. How is this known? King Ajātaśatru had not yet usurped the throne of the state, so Bimbisāra could still be present; within the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra, Ajātaśatru is already listed [among the assembly], so if the kings are thus listed, how could the Anuttarāśrayasūtra still state that Bimbisāra was in the assembly? Why so? In listing the assembly, the Anuttarāśrayasūtra states: "Bimbisāra was the foremost"; based on this, one can know that it is not subsequent to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka.
Moreover, the Śrīmālādevīsūtra is also not after the forty years. How is this known? The sūtra states: "King Prasenajit and Queen Mallikā have not believed in the Dharma for long." Within the Benevolent Kings Prajñā Sūtra, it states: "The eighth day of the month of the first year"—namely, the beginning of the thirtieth year. How is this known? Based on the Candraprabha Sūtra, it states: "The Tathāgata has already spoken the Mahāprajñā for twenty-nine years for our sake." Therefore, we know that by the time the Benevolent Kings Sūtra was spoken, Candraprabha had already believed in the Buddha for a long time. The Śrīmālādevīsūtra states: "Having believed in the Buddha not long ago"; it is clear that it was before the Benevolent Kings Prajñā. If this were not so, having already heard the sūtras for twenty-nine years, how could it be said in the Śrīmālādevīsūtra, "having believed in the Buddha not long ago"? Based on this, one knows that it is not subsequent to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka.
Moreover, regarding the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, according to Tripiṭaka Master Bodhiruci: Based also on the compilation [records], in the first year were spoken the Mahāsaṃnipāta, Ratnaketudhāraṇī, Laṅkāvatāra, and Sāgaranāgarāja; in the ninth year was spoken the Aṅgulimāla; in the tenth year was spoken the Tathāgatagarbha. It also states: The Avataṃsaka, Nirvāṇa, Pratyutpanna, Aṅgulimāla, Tathāgatagarbha, and others all state their own years and months. Based on this, the Laṅkāvatāra is not after the forty years. Although the latter portion holds: "I have already caused the cessation of meat eating in sūtras such as the Hastikakṣya, Nirvāṇa, and Mahāmegha," the Laṅkāvatāra is not necessarily subsequent to the Nirvāṇasūtra. Why is this? Based on the text itself, it says: "Having spent seven days in the Dragon Palace, upon first entering Laṅkā, this teaching was then spoken"; could it be that having already taught the Nirvāṇa and passed into extinction at the Twin Trees, [the Buddha] again dwelt in the Dragon Palace and the like? The Nirvāṇasūtra referred to is not necessarily the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra. If one says that what was seen and heard differed, what prevents it from not being after the teaching of the Nirvāṇa? If so, what prevents there being differences in what was seen and heard, and that based on the compilation records it was indeed in the first year?
Furthermore, as for saying that the Mahāprajñāpāramitā was prior to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, this is according to Bodhiruci. In the fifth year, the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra was spoken; yet based on the text of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, it was actually spoken after the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. How is this known? Based on the 'Definite Chapter' therein, it asks: "Are all bodhisattvas definite or not?" The treatise explains: Why is this asked? Because seeing in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka that children heaping sand all achieve the Buddha Path, and clarifying that the dviyāna become buddhas, this question was therefore asked. Based on this, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā was actually spoken after the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. Relying on what is it definitively judged to be prior to forty years?
Moreover, the Buddhagotraśāstra and the Ratnagotravibhāga do not merely comment on sūtras subsequent to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka; neither treatise cites the Nirvāṇa or the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, but mostly relies on the Anuttarāśraya, Laṅkāvatāra, Saṃdhinirmocana, Tathāgatagarbha, and Śrīmālādevīsūtras. Based on the examination of these sūtras, the two treatises actually comment on the teachings prior to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. Since their establishing of the earlier and later is completely baseless, many errors further arise from the chapters they establish. What are these errors?
First, they say: Although the earlier sūtras speak of the dviyāna actually entering nirvāṇa, the later sūtras explain it as 'like the conjured city and the sheep and deer carts'; in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, the śrāvaka-gotra falls into transformative death, and the dviyāna have no extinction, which is not only true for the indeterminate gotra. This is not so. The Laṅkāvatāra states that those who fall into transformation and are able to advance toward the Great [Vehicle] are of the indeterminate gotra. How is this known? Based on the seventh fascicle, it states: 'Bodhisattva Mahāmati addressed the Buddha: "World-Honoured One! The World-Honoured One says that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas enter the gate of the joy of extinction of the eighth bodhisattva bhūmi, and so forth, down to saying that they are not yet able to realize the dharma of the first bhūmi, how much less the gate of the joy of extinction of the eighth bhūmi." The Buddha told Mahāmati: "There are three kinds of śrāvakas. As for saying that they enter the gate of the joy of extinction of the eighth bhūmi, these are those who previously cultivated bodhisattva practices, fell into the stage of the śrāvaka, and returning to rely on their original mind, cultivate bodhisattva practices, entering together the gate of the joy of extinction of the eighth bhūmi; they are not the excessively arrogant śrāvakas of quiescence. For they are unable to enter bodhisattva practices, have never awakened to the fact that the three realms are mind-only, have never cultivated the various bodhisattva dharmas, and have never cultivated the practices of the pāramitās and the ten bhūmis. Therefore, the śrāvakas of determinate quiescence cannot realize that gate of the joy of extinction practiced by the bodhisattvas."' Moreover, the verse states: 'Determinate śrāvakas / Do not practice bodhisattva practices. / Those who enter the eighth bhūmi together / Are originally bodhisattvas.' Based on this, they belong to the indeterminate yāna among the pañcayāna. The intent of both the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Yogācārabhūmi is the same.
Furthermore, the eighth fascicle states: 'How does the Buddha, the World-Honoured One, confer prediction upon the great arhats, etc.?' The Buddha answered, saying: 'Mahāmati! For the sake of those śrāvakas who had previously practiced bodhisattva conduct, I confer prediction on them based on nirvāṇa without remainder. Mahāmati! My conferring prediction upon śrāvakas is in order to give rise to a courageous mind in timid sentient beings. Mahāmati! In this world and in other buddha-lands, there are sentient beings who practice bodhisattva conduct, yet further delight in the dharma of the śrāvakayāna; the Buddha turns them so that they take up great bodhi.' The verse states: 'The three yānas and the non-yāna, / The immeasurable yānas of the buddhas; / All are predicted to the Buddha stage, / Taught through the severance of all afflictions. / Realizing noble wisdom in one's own body, / And nirvāṇa without remainder, / To encourage timid sentient beings, / Therefore it is taught with hidden intent.' Based on this, it precisely agrees with the Saṃdhinirmocana's exposition of the three manomayakāyas: those above the first bhūmi are definitely directed toward quiescence. Since they do not realize the gate of the joy of extinction practiced by the bodhisattvas, it is clear that they cannot attain the manomayakāya and are unable to know it; thus it is an error.
Moreover, they say: The Amoghapāśasūtra and the Saṃghāṭasūtra state that all Śuddhāvāsa devas resolve to advance toward the Great [Vehicle], so they classify them as teachings subsequent to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. It is not known what they rely on to know this. If there is a teaching, it should correspond; when explicit words have no proof, how can one arbitrarily judge? Furthermore, they say: What the two masters of Vijñāptimātratā state both do not accord with reason; therefore, we know that before the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka assembly, no noble persons resolved their minds, whereas after the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka assembly, even those in the Śuddhāvāsa resolved. That the Vijñāptimātratā treatise masters established theses contrary to the sūtras is not just in one or two instances. This is not so. Why is the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra admitted by themselves to have been spoken before the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka? Yet the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra is spoken in the Pure Land; its exposition of the Pure Land's marks and its listing of the assembly and praising of their virtues are identical to the Buddhabhūmi. The Buddhabhūmiśāstra explains that those of true reality are all śrāvakas of indeterminate gotra who, having attained the lesser fruition, advance toward great bodhi, and are therefore called 'great'. If they had not turned their minds, they would not perceive the Pure Land. Furthermore, the ten meanings of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts explain the ekayāna as being for the indeterminate gotra, universally allowing both śaikṣa and aśaikṣa noble ones to turn their minds. Moreover, the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, in commenting on the two teachings of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, states: 'For three kinds of persons, there is a sublime Pure Land transcending the three realms, down to where there is not even the name of affliction; in this realm, from the Buddha, they hear the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra and complete the Buddha Path.' How could one say that in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra all noble persons had not yet resolved their minds?
Moreover, they say: The Laṅkāvatārasūtra clearly explains that those of determinate quiescence have transformative death; the teaching and reason are evident, so how can one cling to propagating the earlier teaching and not what is spoken in the later sūtras? This is also not so. Based on the fourth fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra, it states: 'Mahāmati! Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have not realized the selflessness of dharmas, and have not attained inconceivable transformative birth; therefore, for the sake of the śrāvakas, I teach the path of the ekayāna.' Here it says 'have not attained'; based on what further text do they say it clearly states that persons of determinate [nature] attain transformation? According to the meaning of this text, persons of indeterminate nature who have not heard the Mahāyāna do not attain transformation; how could it be allowed that those of determinate nature who cannot turn their minds attain transformation? Also, in this sūtra's text, it sometimes says 'have not escaped inconceivable transformative death', sometimes says 'cannot escape inconceivable transformative death', and sometimes says 'have not attained escape from inconceivable transformative death'; there is no explicit text definitively stating that persons of determinate nature attain transformation. Also, where it states in the second fascicle 'because of falling into inconceivable transformative death', this speaks of the indeterminate falling into inconceivable transformative birth-and-death after turning their minds; there is no text saying that the determinate nature attains transformation. If, moreover, they were allowed to undergo transformative birth and body, how could it say: 'Such ones attain entry into personal selflessness, down to giving rise to the thought that it is nirvāṇa'? When ordinary beings undergo demarcated [existence], they themselves know it is a body of birth-and-death; when noble ones undergo transformation, could they cling to it as nirvāṇa, claiming to have attained [nirvāṇa] with remainder? That is not knowledge-obscuration knowing remainder if it exists; thus they themselves do not accept it, claiming that those who turn their minds to the Great [Vehicle] with remainder must abandon demarcated [existence] and separately undergo transformation, attaining the joy of samādhi and taking it to be without remainder. This is also like someone of little learning who, attaining the fourth dhyāna, takes it to be the ultimate fruition; upon death, seeing the signs of what lies ahead, they even give rise to a slanderous mind. How much more so could a noble one, seeing that they undergo transformation, consider it to be without remainder?
Furthermore, according to the text of the pañcayāna, among the first two yānas there is no expression of entering the Mahāyāna; only in the fourth, the indeterminate yāna, does it state: 'Mahāmati! Those three kinds of persons are separated from the vāsanā of the affliction-obscuration and attain purity, therefore seeing selflessness; because of attaining the gate of samādhi joy, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas ultimately realize the Tathāgata's dharmakāya.' When it says 'those three kinds of persons', it refers to the three kinds of persons within the indeterminate yāna, not pointing to the former first three yānas. If that were so, then the former must be separately spoken of as the fourth yāna. Or perhaps the former three yānas collectively speak of both the determinate and indeterminate gotras, while the fourth person exclusively takes the indeterminate gotra, saying 'those three kinds', which means the indeterminate persons among the former three. If it were not like this, claiming that the determinate and indeterminate gotras of the former three are all allowed to enter the Great [Vehicle], it would contradict what is taught below in the seventh and eighth fascicles, as cited before. There is no text explicitly stating that those of determinate quiescence undergo transformative death; to falsely say that the teaching and reason are evident is therefore an error.
Moreover, in a question and answer, it is said: Why are the two expositions different? The answer states: For example, in the sūtras, it was not yet taught that [the Buddha in] the royal palace was a transformation buddha. When propagating this temporal teaching, it was taught that buddhahood is attained with thirty-four minds, and the ālayavijñāna was not yet spoken of. When propagating this temporal teaching, it was taught that the cessation attainment exists only in the desire and form realms, and that seeds rely on form and mind. When propagating the later temporal teaching, its meaning was changed; the Yogācārabhūmi propagates the earlier teaching. After forty years, the two extinctions are not real, there is the ālayavijñāna, and one falls into inconceivable transformative birth-and-death. When propagating the sūtras of this period, the treatises also followed the teaching. This is also not so. You yourself accept that the Avataṃsaka is an earlier teaching; did it only teach that the transformation body in the royal palace was the true Buddha? Both the Yogācārabhūmi and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha state that the royal palace [embodiment] is not the true Buddha. Attaining buddhahood with thirty-four [minds/bodies] is a thesis of Hīnayāna treatises. That the cessation attainment relies on the body of the desire and form realms is a thesis of the Sarvāstivāda. That seeds rely on mind and form is the tenet of the Sautrāntika masters. The Yogācārabhūmi reformed the former tenets so that seeds rely on the eighth consciousness and so forth, and like the Laṅkāvatāra and others, it also teaches that the indeterminate have no real [nirvāṇa]. The Nirvāṇa, *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, Prakaraṇāryavācā, and Buddhabhūmi all speak of transformative birth-and-death; what meaning differs, that one should classify the Yogācārabhūmi, Buddhabhūmiśāstra, and others as teachings prior to the forty years? As cited before, the judging of earlier and later is incorrect; regarding what is identical, they do not understand that identity is not difference, and forcibly see difference; therefore it is an error.
Moreover, they say: The eightieth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of two nirvāṇas: because the vipākavijñāna has no appropriating, it cannot be produced again relying on the pravṛttivijñānas, etc., and only the pure, unconditioned, stainless true dharmadhātu remains. This corresponds to the Laṅkāvatārasūtra's extinguishing of all marks, not apprehending future realms being the joy of samādhi, which the dviyāna consider to be nirvāṇa. This is also not so. What is taught in that sūtra is again different earlier and later. The second fascicle explains that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, fearing the suffering of the false discrimination of birth-and-death, seek nirvāṇa; not knowing that the worldly and nirvāṇa have no distinction, they discriminate all dharmas and non-dharmas, extinguish the sense organs, and do not apprehend; falsely grasping future realms to be nirvāṇa refers to śaikṣa and ordinary persons of the dviyāna who, clinging to the extinction of the sense organs by the aśaikṣa, take what is attained without remainder to be ultimate, not knowing that the ālayavijñāna transforms into the superior [nirvāṇa] without remainder. Next it states: 'Therefore, those foolish people say that there are three yāna dharmas, yet they cannot know that when mental conceptions are extinguished, one attains the dharma of quiescence. If they were noble ones, it would not be so.' Next it states: 'Therefore, Mahāmati! Those foolish people constantly revolve without stopping in the wheel of worldly birth-and-death.' According to the actual meaning, when persons of determinate gotra extinguish the sense organs and so forth, both body and wisdom are extinguished, and only tathatā remains. The Laṅkāvatāra states: 'Only when mental conceptions are extinguished does one attain the dharma of quiescence; the dharma of quiescence is not the joy of samādhi.' The joy of samādhi is the text in the seventh fascicle, which states that 'the indeterminate gotra, turning their minds toward the Great [Vehicle], attain entry into the bhūmis', spoken of under its original designation. It is like the suddenly awakening bodhisattvas attaining the cessation attainment in the bhūmis, termed 'falling into the dharma-gate of the joy of samādhi'. How is this known? Its own question and answer states: 'The Buddha told Mahāmati: "I shall now analyze and expound it for you. Mahāmati! There are three kinds of śrāvakas. As for saying that they enter the gate of quiescence of the eighth bhūmi, these are those who previously cultivated bodhisattva practices, fell into the stage of the śrāvaka, and returning to rely on their original mind, cultivate bodhisattva practices, entering together the gate of the joy of extinction of the eighth bhūmi. They are not the excessively arrogant śrāvakas of quiescence."' If the dviyāna, having abandoned the demarcated body, dwell in samādhi and this is termed attaining nirvāṇa, why does the fourth fascicle state that 'srotāpannas have three grades', all of which are said to enter nirvāṇa? The sūtra speaks of the second fruition: 'Because of cultivating the marks of the dhyāna of good vision, returning once to the world, they then exhaust suffering completely and enter nirvāṇa.' Why is this? Since undergoing a transformative body alters the suffering of conditioned existence, how could it be said that they then exhaust suffering completely and enter nirvāṇa? Furthermore, this is the definite direction toward quiescence. How is this known? Immediately below, Mahāmati asked the Buddha: 'Do you speak for the arhats who attain determinate quiescence, or for the arhats who produce the bodhi vow, having wholesome roots or false wholesome roots, or for the transformationally manifested arhats?' The Buddha told Mahāmati: 'I speak for the śrāvaka arhats who attain determinate quiescence, not for the other arhats.' Therefore, we know that the determinate gotra enters nirvāṇa without remainder, where only tathatā remains. In agreement with the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, extinguishing the sense organs and mental conceptions is called entering nirvāṇa. If one dwells in the joy of samādhi and gives rise to the conception of nirvāṇa, that is regression from bodhi. As for the indeterminate gotra, failing to understand the explicit text is likewise an error.
3.4
It also says: 'Between the earlier and later teachings there are briefly thirteen differences. First, it is said that according to the Anuttarāśrayasūtra, transformational death occurs due to the ground of ignorance-dwelling, while according to the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts, it occurs due to retention through meditative absorption and vow.' This is also not so. Concealing the sūtra's anāsrava karma and setting up the treatise's cognitive obscurations (jñeyāvaraṇa), [the author] considers them to be different. He does not say that cognitive obscurations correspond to the ground of ignorance-dwelling, and that giving rise to anāsrava meditative absorptions and vows corresponds to anāsrava karma. Therefore, this is also an error. 'Second, it is said that according to the Laṅkāvatāra, one takes on transformational [existence] only after extinguishing all sense faculties, whereas the Yogācā[rabhūmi] speaks of retaining a body with faculties.' This is also not so. One who extinguishes all faculties definitely enters [nirvāṇa] without remainder (anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa), and does not take on transformational [existence]. If it were not so, how could transformational [existence] lack the faculties? The treatise's retention of a body with faculties refers to the aniyata of the Laṅkāvatāra; hence one retains a body with faculties to undergo transformational [existence]. Not knowing the rationale, he falsely claims they are different. The third difference will have its fallacy identified when refuting the attachment to transformational [existence]. 'Fourth, it is said that sūtras such as the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka speak of going to other Buddha-lands, whereas the Yogācā[rabhūmi] and other texts speak of retaining the body in this continent.' This is also not so. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka's going to other Buddha-lands is based on the period after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, when there is no Buddha in this realm and no one capable of awakening them to arouse the great mind, so that through the Buddha's expedient means they are made to go to other lands. Treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi refer to presently encountering a Buddha: having already been able to turn toward the Great [Vehicle] and undergo transformational rebirth, they retain their bodies in this land. This is precisely the three cycles of prediction in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka: those in training (śaikṣa) and beyond training (aśaikṣa) are all in this continent and do not go to other lands, only then being able to turn toward the Great [Vehicle]. Not realizing this, it is also an error. 'Fifth, it is said that according to the Nirvāṇasūtra, this person remains [in meditative absorption] through eighty thousand kalpas into the future, and so on, whereas the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts state that one retains this body for one kalpa or more.' This is also not so. When the Yogācārabhūmi says 'for one kalpa or more', the Buddhabhūmiśāstra explains: '"For one kalpa or more" means here exceeding one kalpa. Accordingly, eighty thousand kalpas is also exceeding one kalpa, because the expression "exceeding one kalpa" has no fixed limit.' 'Sixth, it is said that according to the Śrīmālādevī and other texts, both the dviyāna and great-power bodhisattvas alike receive mind-made bodies (manomayakāya); whereas in the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts, the dviyāna is not like the great-power bodhisattvas, for great-power bodhisattvas are born as they wish because they constantly vow to be born, while the dviyāna dwell in isolation so that all sentient beings cannot see them.' This is also not correct. Moreover, the Nirvāṇasūtra says: 'A srotaāpanna remains for eighty thousand kalpas, up to a pratyekabuddha who remains for ten thousand kalpas.' Does this mean taking on transformational [existence]? Or does it mean abiding in [nirvāṇa] without remainder? If they do not take on transformational [existence], having abandoned the portioned [body] (pariccheda-kāya) and abiding for eighty thousand kalpas, on the basis of what phenomenon would they further turn toward the Great [Vehicle]? If they take on transformational [existence] and abide for eighty thousand kalpas, how could they always be apparitionally born? Furthermore, the fourth chapter of the Laṅkāvatāra says: 'Mahāmati! If śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are free from all faults, their vāsanā attains the realization of the selflessness of phenomena; at that time they are free from the samādhi of all faults. Having awakened from the intoxication of anāsrava dharmas, they cultivate all merits within the lokottara-anāsrava-dhātu.' The verse says: 'There is no ultimate destination, / nor do they turn back; / having attained bodies of samādhi, / they remain unawakened for immeasurable kalpas. / Just as a drunk person / awakens after the wine has worn off, / attaining the Buddha's unsurpassed body, / which is my true dharmakāya.' The seventh chapter also says: 'Mahāmati! Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, in the eighth bodhisattvabhūmi, delight in and are attached to the gate of the bliss of cessation-samādhi; being intoxicated, they cannot properly understand what is only seen by their own mind. … Up to: Mahāmati! Bodhisattvas, having seen the gate of the bliss of cessation-samādhi, recall their fundamental vow and the mind of great compassion to deliver sentient beings, and knowing the ten inexhaustible [vows] and the knowledge of practicing according to reality, therefore do not immediately enter nirvāṇa.' In both these cases, although the dviyāna undergo transformational [existence], their benefiting of beings and cultivation are not the same as bodhisattvas; how could one claim that the Yogācā[rabhūmi] alone is different? The seventh difference will be distinguished in the refutation of transformational [existence]. The eighth and ninth differences are refuted following the preceding. 'Tenth, it is said that the Yogācā[rabhūmi] states that "retaining the body applies also to those in training (śaikṣa)", whereas the Śrīmālādevī and other sūtras say it applies only to those beyond training (aśaikṣa).' This is also not so. If those in training do not turn their minds, they are not allowed to undergo transformational [existence]. Since it is accepted that they turn their minds, why should they not undergo transformational [existence]? If it is claimed that afflictions still remain, this is also true of bodhisattvas. If it is said that although bodhisattvas have afflictions, their anāsrava power is superior—what prevents those in training, having turned and directed toward the Great [Vehicle], from already possessing superior capability? Furthermore, he himself classified the teachings prior to the Saṃdhinirmocana as holding that only aniyata individuals turn their minds before the path of seeing to head toward the Great [Vehicle], not speaking of āryas turning their minds toward the Great [Vehicle], so that it is not definitive; and held that the teachings after the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka are definitive because they allow even āryas in training to turn their minds. Now, the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts also speak of [āryas], and speak of those in training turning their minds and allowing them to undergo transformational [existence]—what flaw is there in this? The Śrīmālādevī speaks according to those who definitely undergo transformational rebirth, while the Buddhabhūmi[śāstra] discusses it in terms of those who potentially undergo it. Otherwise, clinging to the letter to say that those beyond training undergo it while not allowing those in training to do so, one should also hold that because the Laṅkāvatāra speaks of mind-made bodies above the third bhūmi and does not speak of the dviyāna beyond training undergoing transformational bodies, could it be that the dviyāna and the first two bhūmis altogether do not undergo transformational [existence]? Claiming a fault where there is none, this is an error. The eleventh difference is also refuted following the preceding. The twelfth difference will be fully distinguished below in the refutation of the attachment to transformational [existence]. 'Thirteenth, it is said that according to the Nirvāṇa and other texts, they first enter cessation and later arouse the great mind, whereas according to the Yogācā[rabhūmi], they first arouse the great mind and afterwards retain the body.' This is also not so. In the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, both those in training and those beyond training turn their minds; how could all those beyond training dwell in the concentration of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti), suppose it to be cessation without remainder, and only after passing many kalpas begin to turn toward the Great [Vehicle]? Furthermore, the Nirvāṇasūtra says: 'After eighty thousand kalpas they arrive at the anuttarabodhicitta', and so on; it does not say that only after eighty thousand kalpas do they first arouse the great mind. Things that are different he falsely claims to be identical; things that are genuinely identical he makes out to be different. According to what he argues, what is identical was never identical, and what is different truly has no difference. The varieties are difficult to conceive: eyes with cataracts are allowed to produce sky-flowers; such disparate investigations are merely false discriminations.
3.5
Error Nine: Prolonging Life is Not Definitive
3.6
An opinion states: "The former sūtras speak of preserving the life-span, and treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi explain this as 'increasing the life-span until great bodhi.' However, anāsrava karma is not the direct cause of transformed [birth-and-death]. Without abandoning the body with its sense-faculties, one undergoes the birth-and-death of transformation. In the later teachings, having attained the fruit of an aśaikṣa, one abandons the apportioned body; taking the cognitive obstacles as condition, newly initiated erroneous anāsrava karma directly produces transformed birth-and-death outside the three realms. Resting in the bliss of samādhi, one regards it as non-remainder nirvāṇa, not the cessation attainment. Awakening from this, one begins to generate the great aspiration. Although the eighth [consciousness] is sāsrava, because afflictions are exhausted it does not belong to the bound realms and is called 'outside the three realms.' It is not that apart from the three realms there are separate sentient beings. However, although the gotra of the dviyāna has the distinction of niyata and aniyata, both undergo transformation. Having undergone transformation, they no longer abandon the body, continuing thus until the vajra[-like samādhi], at which point they first abandon it. Thus the Buddhagotraśāstra says: 'There is only a single rebirth, which is termed existent existence.' If, as in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and other works, one undergoes transformation without abandoning apportioned [birth-and-death], how could it be called birth-and-death? If one means moment-by-moment, it contradicts the Buddhagotraśāstra's statement that there is only a single rebirth. If one means from the beginning to the end of a lifespan, it contradicts the Yogācārabhūmi's 'increasing all activities of life-span.' Moreover, if it is said to increase the life-span, how can it be called death? Since there is no death, how can there be birth? Furthermore, since they do not abandon the apportioned [existence], the Yogācārabhūmi also contains no mention of a female arhat transforming faculties and increasing life-span. Even if a female body endures, if it is for the sake of attaining Buddhahood, one can only rely on the sūtras to give rise to understanding; ordinary people must not make arbitrary conjectures." This statement is incorrect. When the holy fruits of the dviyāna turn their minds toward the Mahāyāna, it is permissible in all cases that they undergo transformed birth-and-death. In the Śrīmālādevīsūtra, it is explained with reference to the determined [case]: those of aniyata-gotra who attain the fruit of an aśaikṣa definitively turn their minds and are no longer reborn [in the apportioned realm], definitively undergoing transformation. Although the śaikṣa of aniyata[-gotra] also turns the mind and undergoes transformed rebirth, because it is not definitive, it is not spoken of in the sūtra. Can one, because the Śrīmālādevī does not speak of the śaikṣa turning the mind, thereby disallow that śaikṣas in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka assembly advance to the Great [Vehicle]? Therefore, treatises such as the Buddhagotraśāstra agree with the Śrīmālādevīsūtra, tentatively relying on those who definitively undergo [transformation]. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra speaks of three mind-made bodies with reference to those of sudden awakening who fear afflictions. The Yogācārabhūmi and the Buddhabhūmi[vyākhyāna] agree with the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and others in all allowing the turning of the mind. Since they speak of turning the mind, it is permissible for them to undergo transformed birth-and-death. Since there is no text preventing it, that the śaikṣa who turns the mind clearly attains transformed [rebirth] is also the correct explanation. Their [view] lacks textual support, whereas ours has textual statements. The Nirvāṇa and Saddharmapuṇḍarīka both allow turning the mind, and the Yogācārabhūmi and Buddhabhūmi allow undergoing transformation. When they themselves say, "One can only rely on the sūtras to give rise to understanding; ordinary people must not make arbitrary conjectures," are they themselves great sages, such that these works like the Yogācārabhūmi are completely refuted by them? Furthermore, to summarize their textual meaning, there are briefly eleven errors: Regarding their claim that abandoning the apportioned body to separately receive transformed [rebirth], from which holy teaching does this come? Neither the Śrīmālādevīsūtra nor other works contain the words "abandoning the apportioned [body]"; treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi and Buddhabhūmi all state that "anāsrava concentration and vows nourish past karma, causing the body so produced to gradually become superior and endure longer." Chapter sixteen of the Prakaraṇāryavācā states: "Relying on the transformation-body, one is able to arrive at the Buddha-stage," and it also does not speak of abandoning the apportioned [body]. The Mahāyānāvatāra also speaks of sustaining the life-span. Not relying on sūtras and treatises, they arbitrarily decide it by their own minds. Furthermore, their claim that "taking cognitive obstacles as condition, newly initiated erroneous anāsrava karma separately produces transformed birth-and-death outside the realms" should not be so. If newly created karma were the direct productive cause, why does the Buddhagotraśāstra say: "As for causal birth-and-death, it is like those above the srotāpanna, who only use past karma and do not generate new karma"? If one were to newly incur birth-and-death by means of anāsrava [karma], this analogy would not hold. Moreover, in the Pratītyasamutpādasūtra and other texts, holy ones do not create karma producing future existence. If it were not existence, sūtras and treatises would not speak of "existent existence birth-and-death"; if it were existence, how could a holy one create karma producing future existence? Furthermore, if one allows the creation of karma producing future existence, an anāgāmin should not, by commingled practice of dhyāna, nourish past lower karma to take birth in the five pure abodes. If they say the power between the great and the small is different, this too is not so: if there is a difference between superior and inferior bodies, why could it not be created? Moreover, if the powers are different, only bodhisattvas should create new karma to induce [birth], while the dviyāna, having inferior power, could not create it to induce [birth]. Furthermore, if bodhisattvas are permitted to newly create karma that induces transformed rebirth, that would be the fruition-rebirth karma of the transformed body in the palace of Maheśvara; why does the Daśabhūmika-śāstra say: "Fruition-benefit afterwards is produced by the wisdom of Maheśvara"? Therefore the Buddhagotraśāstra says: "Just as those above the srotāpanna only use past karma and do not produce new karma." From this it is known that the statements in the Yogācārabhūmi and Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi about "nourishing past karma" are the correct explanation. If it were newly induced by anāsrava [karma], it would be subsumed under the truth of origin. Although established and unestablished truths differ, they do not deviate from the four truths. Nowhere is it said that origin is non-abandonable, capable of being anāsrava, or something to be cultivated; it is only said that the truth of origin is to be abandoned, is sāsrava, and is not to be cultivated. Contradicting reason while seeking textual [support] is therefore untenable. Furthermore, if abandoning the body and separately taking rebirth were transformed death, this would contradict the four declarations: 'One without afflictions dies and is not reborn.' If they say this is based on apportioned [existence], this is also not so: is their transformed [existence] not subsumed under rebirth? Furthermore, if abandoning the apportioned is termed 'death and not being reborn,' this is a conceptual differentiation; why need it say 'one without afflictions dies and is not reborn'? For just as entering the path of vision abandons various hardships and the like, this can also be called not being reborn. If one says that being identical to apportioned rebirth is not termed abandonment, then being identical to the sāsrava eighth [consciousness] should also not be termed abandonment. Since there is no 'death and not being reborn,' this would cause the Great Master to speak falsely. Furthermore, the Mahāyānāvatāra states: 'Question: How does one sustain the life-span? Answer: Arhats have no afflictions; like bodhisattvas of the eighth stage, because they cultivate the bases of psychic power well, they can abide in the world according to their will, even until the end of birth-and-death.' Rāhula, Piṇḍola, and others all abide in the world; if they had abandoned the apportioned [body], how could they abide in the world according to their will? Distrusting the Great Master's daily records, they claim that a separate body is received. Contradicting the texts to establish a doctrine is therefore also an error. Furthermore, their claim that 'anāsrava directly producing rebirth outside the three realms is termed transformed rebirth' is also not so. Newly created anāsrava karma may indeed not fall into the realms, but why would the sāsrava eighth [consciousness] not be of the realms? If they say that because it is free from bondage it is called 'not of the realms,' this is identical to the old explanation; why need it be repeated? Moreover, just as afflictions can produce rebirth, so they should be able to bind. They admit that cognitive [obstacles] are truly like afflictions, capable of initiating karma to produce the sāsrava eighth [consciousness] and serving as obstacles to bodhi. Why are they not binding? Because they say anāsrava birth is like grasping as condition and sāsrava karma as cause giving rise to the three existences, they cling to transformation as being separately born in that way. Since they say it is 'like grasping,' cognitive [obstacles] should bind, and anāsrava would be subsumed under origin. This statement is not accepted; therefore one should not cling to transformation as separate rebirth. If, as in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and other texts, it is called severing cognitive [obstacles], although the body is preserved to abide, anāsrava concentration and vows nourish its past karma, then there is no such error. The sūtra's statement 'like grasping as condition and sāsrava karma as cause giving rise to the three existences' is merely a partial metaphor. Furthermore, the Mahāyānāvatāra states: 'If you say there are no afflictions, I am also thus. If there is affection and you take refuge in me with faith, I shall explain it for you. Question: How does one sustain the life-span? Answer: Arhats have no afflictions; like bodhisattvas of the eighth stage, because they cultivate the bases of psychic power fully, they can abide in the world according to their will.' Since it says 'abide according to their will,' it is clear that there is no separate reception of rebirth; nor can one say this interprets the teaching from forty years prior. The text of the treatise itself cites cases like Rāhula; thus we know it also explains teachings such as the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. Therefore the explanation of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi does not contradict sūtras and treatises, whereas their contradiction is an error. Furthermore, their claim that 'having undergone transformed death, one abides in the bliss of samādhi, regarding it as non-remainder nirvāṇa, not the cessation attainment; awakening from this, one begins to generate the great aspiration' is based on the aniyata-gotra. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi does not contradict this. If one claims it applies to the niyata-gotra, this too is not so, as it contradicts the Laṅkāvatārasūtra and other texts, as cited earlier. Failing to understand that there are differences in faculties and gotra, they universally speak of turning the mind, contradicting sūtras and treatises. Furthermore, the second fascicle of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka states: 'We now abide in the remainder nirvāṇa of our final body,' not speaking of non-remainder; the Śrīmālādevī is also the same. Furthermore, they themselves say that when an aśaikṣa turns the mind, they must abide in the cessation attainment, regarding it as non-remainder, and only after arising from this can they advance to the Great [Vehicle]. Now they say it is not the cessation attainment, which is internally contradictory. Establishing a doctrine by turning one's back on the sūtras is the greatest of errors. Furthermore, regarding their claim: 'If the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi holds that one receives transformation without abandoning the apportioned [body], how is it called birth-and-death? If one means moment-by-moment, it contradicts the Buddhagotraśāstra's statement that there is only a single rebirth; if one means from the beginning to the end of a lifespan, it contradicts the Yogācārabhūmi's increasing all activities of life-span, for if all activities of life-span are increased, there is no death; since there is no death, how can there be birth?' This too is not so, for the name 'birth-and-death' is general. Moreover, as in the Anuttarāśrayasūtra and Buddhagotraśāstra, the four kinds of birth-and-death are simply called birth-and-death; it is not based on separately taking rebirth after each respective death that it is called birth-and-death. If it is said to be called birth-and-death because it is the dharma of birth-and-death of the transformed body, it is also called birth-and-death because the dharma of apportioned birth-and-death is transformed to become transformed [birth-and-death]—what fault is there in accepting this? If one abandons the apportioned to undergo birth-and-death, why is it called 'transformation'? Furthermore, if you allow that anāsrava can be new karma directly incurring birth-and-death, and the Laṅkāvatārasūtra speaks of three mind-made bodies whose stages are distinct, then one should undergo them repeatedly; why call it a single rebirth? Therefore, the objection raised is in vain, which is the fifth error. Furthermore, regarding the claim: 'Since they do not abandon the apportioned [body], and the Yogācārabhūmi also lacks any text on transforming faculties, how could a female arhat attain Buddhahood?' This too is not so. If, because the Yogācārabhūmi lacks a text on transforming faculties, one allows that a female body attains Buddhahood, the Śrīmālādevīsūtra, Buddhagotraśāstra, and Anuttarāśrayasūtra also lack words on transforming faculties. Even supposing they abandoned the body, how could the dull faculties of the dviyāna attain Buddhahood? The Yogācārabhūmi and Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi hold that the nourishment by anāsrava and so forth is uniquely called 'transformation,' and transformation precisely has the meaning of transforming faculties. Failing to understand this is an extreme error. Furthermore, regarding the claim: 'Just as the path of an upper stage, destroying the [afflictions of] the upper stage, produces the path of the upper stage, and destroying the lower stage, induces the retribution of the upper stage; when the anāsrava of the dviyāna shatters the apportioned to induce transformed rebirth, what logical flaw is there?' This too is not so. The sāsrava path of an upper stage suppresses the lower but does not suppress the upper; being sāsrava, it can induce retribution. The path of anāsrava completely severs both upper and lower, not being identical to sāsrava; how could it induce [retribution]? Furthermore, regarding the claim: 'The Yogācārabhūmi speaks of preserving the faculties to increase the life-span, abiding in this continent in remote solitude, unseen by others. Following this treatise text, this is preserving the activities of life-span, not transformed birth-and-death. Later treatise masters added arbitrary elaborations that were not the intent of the Yogācārabhūmi.' This too is not so. Later treatise masters conformed to the text to establish the principle, unlike their claim which contradicts the Yogācārabhūmi. If the Yogācārabhūmi allowed abandoning the apportioned body to separately receive transformation, the later treatise masters' statement of 'nourishing past karma' could indeed be considered an addition. In the Yogācārabhūmi, increasing the life-span without abandoning the body with its faculties is precisely transformation; it is not like the activities of increasing the life-span through the sāsrava concentration and vows of the dviyāna, because it is not for many kalpas and because others of the human and deva realm can all see it. Furthermore, in Asaṅga's Prakaraṇāryavācā, it is described as a transformation-body, and in Bandhuprabha's Buddhabhūmivyākhyāna, it is called transformed death. Furthermore, the Mahāyānāvatāra states: 'Answer: Arhats have no afflictions; like bodhisattvas of the eighth stage, because they cultivate the bases of psychic power well, they can abide in the world according to their will, even until the end of birth-and-death.' It also states: 'As explained in the Mahāsāṃghika[-vinaya], the Tathāgata Nīlanetra, in order to transform bodhisattvas, resided in the Ābhāsvara heaven with an assembly of śrāvakas for immeasurable hundreds of thousands of myriads of koṭis of nayutas of kalpas. Just as in that heaven the śrāvakas sustained their life-span for many kalpas, one should know that in this world there are also śrāvakas who can abide thus.' If they had to abandon the life-span and receive a body elsewhere, how could it be called 'abiding in the world'? 'In this world there are also...' and so on. It also asks: 'Do they abide in the world with this body, or is there another body with which they abide?' Answer: 'To abide in the world with a real body is without basis; if it is a transformation-body sustaining life for many kalpas, there is such a possibility.' If they separately received a body, that would be a real body; how could it be called a transformation? Hence we know that increasing the life-span and transforming the defiled original form is called transformation. If it is so, grasping the meaning in accordance with the term and applying it to the past involves no contradiction. If one had to abandon the body before receiving transformation, not only would the name be discordant, it would also contradict the holy teachings. Their intention not only rejects the masters of Vijñaptimātrata, but also bodhisattvas such as Asaṅga and Dhiramati, whom they also question with brevity: having insufficient reverence for ordinary persons, they have more than enough contempt for sages. Furthermore, regarding the claim: 'Just as in the three realms afflictions are the condition and sāsrava karma is the cause for birth in the three realms; if there is karma and affliction not yet subdued, one is definitively born in the three realms. Thus we know that if there is erroneous anāsrava karma not yet severed, because of the ground of ignorance one undergoes transformation.' This too is not so, as in the case of a srotāpanna. Moreover, although they have karma and afflictions of the three realms not yet severed, it is not determined that they must undergo rebirth in the three realms before attaining the state of an aśaikṣa, for it is permitted that they attain it in the present body. Thus we know that bodhisattvas on the stages are also like this, because in the present body they can attain the fruit. If you say that the śaikṣa of the dviyāna can suppress the delusions of cultivation and thus may not be reborn, bodhisattvas can also suppress cognitive obstacles; why would they need a separate rebirth before they can attain the fruit? Furthermore, from the eighth stage onward, there is anāsrava karma and the ground of ignorance is not yet severed; why do they not undergo further [rebirth]? Are the three mind-made bodies only a single rebirth? Furthermore, among the thirteen differences, the seventh states: 'According to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, it is not subsumed under the three realms, because the cause and condition are not the karma of the three existences and the afflictions of the three realms cannot bind it.' This is not so. Where does the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka speak of the transformed body as not being subsumed under the realms? If speaking of the apportioned body whose delusions are exhausted, it is also said to be outside the realms. Thus a later passage in the sūtra states: 'Through the Buddha's teaching, they escape the suffering of the three realms, traversing three hundred yojanas,' and so forth. If one considers the present body, the eighth, seventh, and five consciousnesses, as well as the five faculties and so forth, are all sāsrava; how could they not be of the realms? One should know that stating transformation is 'transcending the three realms' is also identical in meaning to this. Moreover, in terms of causal birth-and-death it is said not to be bound by the realms, but if considered in terms of the five [consciousnesses], the eighth [consciousness], and so forth, it still belongs to the realms. Although not bound by delusion, its substance follows the realms. If it were not subsumed under the realms, it should be supramundane. If it were supramundane, how would it differ from a Buddha? If you say: 'Because it is sāsrava, it differs from a Buddha,' then since you say it is sāsrava, how could it not be of the realms? Furthermore, the Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises in various places define the substance of the realms and destinies solely based on the eighth [consciousness]; now failing to understand this, they have also committed an error. Among the differences, the twelfth states: 'The Anuttarāśrayasūtra and Buddhagotraśāstra hold that erroneous anāsrava karma constitutes birth-and-death, which serves as an adversarial obstacle to great bodhi. Treatises such as the Yogācārabhūmi hold that through anāsrava concentration, the body and life-span are nourished to abide in order to attain bodhi.' This too is not so. If it were not for attaining unsurpassed bodhi, why would they preserve the body to abide for a long time to perform these practices? Why would the transformed body received by a bodhisattva on the ten stages be an obstacle to bodhi? Furthermore, the seventh fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra states: 'Mahāmati! Because bodhisattvas see the gate of the bliss of tranquil samādhi, they remember their original vows and great compassion to cross sentient beings over. Knowing the ten inexhaustible wisdoms of true practice, they therefore do not immediately enter nirvāṇa. Bodhisattvas of great compassion are far removed from the mind of false discrimination,' and so on. Since it says that out of compassion for sentient beings they know the ten inexhaustible wisdoms of true practice, how could they not know and still initiate erroneous anāsrava karma to undergo transformed rebirth that serves as an obstacle to bodhi? If, through not knowing, they initiated erroneous anāsrava to induce transformed rebirth, it should be like ordinary persons creating karma to incur fruit, which is not merely a single rebirth, due to the power of karma. If you say they intentionally receive a transformed body, how is it an obstacle? It is merely because there is cognitive obstacle obstructing great bodhi that, in order to attain bodhi, they preserve the body to abide for a long time to sever this cognitive obstacle. If it were not so, they would immediately enter nirvāṇa. However, when sūtras speak of it as a difficulty and treatises call it an adversarial obstacle, it is because it obstructs great bodhi. The reason they must undergo it is that they wish to eradicate it. Just as a brave person has an enemy and seeks out the enemy for that reason, not because he is unable to avoid him, so being struck and harmed upon encountering the enemy is an adversarial obstacle; undergoing a transformed body should be understood in the same way. Furthermore, they say: 'The teachings of the second and third periods hold only that the body and wisdom of the dviyāna of niyata-gotra are severed and extinguished; the teachings of the fourth and fifth periods hold that the dviyāna has no real nirvāṇa, and all five gotras will become Buddhas without being severed and extinguished.' This too is not so. You yourselves accept the Laṅkāvatārasūtra as the teaching of the fifth period, yet it only speaks of those who regress from the bodhicitta turning toward the Great [Vehicle]. The Śrīmālādevī is considered definitive in teaching the Ekayāna, yet it also says it is an expedient teaching given according to their inclinations. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīkā-upadeśa explains that it does not benefit the determined śrāvaka. In the parable of the medicinal herbs, the treatise states: 'It causes them to know the difference of the vehicles. The Nirvāṇasūtra was stated last of all; in saying that all attain Buddhahood, it did not understand my intention.' From this it can be inferred that the definitive Mahāyāna of the Yogācārabhūmi and the Saṃdhinirmocana corresponds completely with the Laṅkāvatāra and Nirvāṇa. To say that the teaching is divided into five periods, that all those of determined nature attain Buddhahood, and that only after an aśaikṣa enters non-remainder do they turn their minds, abandoning the apportioned body to separately receive transformation—since this has no basis in the holy teachings and is merely their own assertion, who other than a gullible person could accept it? If there are contradictions, they will be harmonized and explained later.
First 6 of 12 passages. Read on
Linked texts (1)
- 能顯中邊慧日論 — Classical Chinese