華嚴一乘教義分齊章 2.19

2.19

問：「若依終教，一切眾生皆當作佛，即眾生雖多，亦有終盡。若如是者，最後成佛即無所化，所化無故利他行闕，利他行闕成佛不應道理，又令諸佛利他功德有斷盡故。如其一切盡當作佛，而言眾生終無盡者，即有自語相違過失，以無終盡者永不成佛故。又如一佛度無量人，於眾生界有損已不？若有漸損，必有終盡，有損無盡不應理故；若無損者，即無滅度，有滅無損不應理故。依如是等道理，《佛地論》等由此建立無性有情，離上諸過失。此義云何？」答：「若謂眾生由有性故，並令成佛，說有盡者，是即便於眾生界中起於減見。眾生界既減，佛界必增，故於佛界便起增見。如是增減非是正見，是故不增減。經云『舍利弗！大邪見者，所謂見眾生界增，見眾生界減』，乃至廣說。設避此見故，立此一分無性有情為不增減者，彼終不能離增減見。何以故？以彼見於諸有性者並成佛故，即便起於斷見減見；諸無性者不成佛故，即便起於常見增見。以彼不了眾生界故。是故經云『一切愚癡凡夫不如實知一法界故，不能實見一法界故，起邪見心，謂眾生界增、眾生界減。』又《文殊般若經》云『假使一佛住世若一劫、若過一劫。如一佛世界，復有無量無邊恒河沙諸佛，如是一一佛若一劫、若過一劫，晝夜說法，心無暫息，各各度於無量河沙眾生皆入涅槃，而眾生界亦不增減，乃至十方諸佛世界亦復如是。一一諸佛說法教化，各度無量河沙眾生皆入涅槃，於眾生界亦不增不減。何以故？眾生定相不可得故。』義言說眾生界猶如虛空，假使無量勝神通之者，各無量劫飛行虛空，求空邊際，終不可盡。非以不盡不名遊行，非以遊行令其得際。當知此中道理亦爾，非以當得令其有終，非以無終說有無得，是故諸難無不通也。又為成諸佛利他功德無斷盡故，立一分無性眾生者，是即令彼諸佛但有變化利他功德，亦即斷彼隨他受用諸功德也，以無菩薩證諸地故。又化他中，亦但有麁斷滅彼細，以無一人得二乘無漏故。又今已後諸佛，無有一佛得說三乘等教，以無得聖機故，即斷諸佛同體大悲也。又若定意，謂悉有性故必皆有盡，恐最後佛闕利他行故立一分定無性者，然彼後佛終於利他行不圓滿，以其所化無一有情得聖果故。但佛菩薩二利之中利他為最，何有不令一人得聖果而於自身得成佛耶？又本皆發弘誓願云：令諸眾生悉得菩提。是故令得，故本願不虛。而眾生界不可盡，故本願不斷。若不爾者，違本願故，行願虛故，虛行成佛不應理故。是故雖欲避上諸失，建立無性，不謂彼過，還墮此宗，是故無性非為究竟了義也。」

Question: "If according to the final teaching all sentient beings will attain buddhahood, then although sentient beings are numerous, there must also be an end to them. If it is so, then the one who is the last to attain buddhahood would have no one to convert; because there is no one to convert, their practice of benefiting others would be lacking; if their practice of benefiting others is lacking, it is unreasonable for them to attain buddhahood, and it would also cause the buddhas' merits of benefiting others to be cut off and come to an end. If all will attain buddhahood without remainder, but one says that sentient beings will never end, there is then the fault of self-contradiction, because those who never end would never attain buddhahood. Furthermore, if a single buddha saves immeasurable people, does this diminish the realm of sentient beings or not? If it gradually diminishes, it must have an end, for having diminution without an end is unreasonable; if there is no diminution, then there is no nirvanic liberation, for having liberation without diminution is unreasonable. Based on such principles, texts like the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra have on this account established [the category of] sentient beings who lack the nature, thereby avoiding the above faults. What is the meaning of this?"
Answer: "If one maintains that because sentient beings possess the nature, all are made to attain buddhahood, and thus says there is an end, this immediately gives rise to the view of decrease regarding the realm of sentient beings. When the realm of sentient beings decreases, the realm of buddhas must increase; thus one immediately gives rise to the view of increase regarding the realm of buddhas. Such increase and decrease are not right view, and therefore there is neither increase nor decrease. The sūtra says: 'Śāriputra! What is called a great wrong view is to see the realm of sentient beings increase and to see the realm of sentient beings decrease,' and so on at length. Even if, to avoid this view, one posits this portion of sentient beings lacking the nature so that there is neither increase nor decrease, one still cannot escape the views of increase and decrease. Why is this? Because seeing those who possess the nature all attain buddhahood, one immediately gives rise to the view of annihilation and the view of decrease; and seeing those lacking the nature never attain buddhahood, one immediately gives rise to the view of permanence and the view of increase. This is because they do not comprehend the realm of sentient beings. Therefore the sūtra says: 'All foolish common mortals, because they do not truly know the single dharma realm and cannot truly see the single dharma realm, give rise to wrong views, thinking that the realm of sentient beings increases or that the realm of sentient beings decreases.'
Furthermore, the Mañjuśrī-prajñā-sūtra says: 'Suppose a single buddha were to abide in the world for an eon, or more than an eon. Just as in a single buddha-world, there are further immeasurable and boundless buddhas as numerous as the sands of the Ganges; if each and every such buddha, for an eon or more than an eon, were to preach the Dharma day and night without ceasing for an instant, each delivering immeasurable Ganges-sands of sentient beings into nirvāṇa, the realm of sentient beings would nevertheless neither increase nor decrease; and this is also true throughout the buddha-worlds of the ten directions. Each and every buddha preaches the Dharma and transforms them, each delivering immeasurable Ganges-sands of sentient beings into nirvāṇa, yet the realm of sentient beings neither increases nor decreases. Why is this? Because a determinate mark of sentient beings cannot be found.'
This means that the realm of sentient beings is like empty space: suppose beings of immeasurable, superior supernormal powers were each to fly through empty space for immeasurable eons seeking the boundary of space—it could never be reached. It is not that because it cannot be reached, one cannot be said to travel; nor is it that by traveling, one causes it to have a boundary. One should know that the principle here is also like this: it is not that because they will attain it, they are caused to have an end; nor is it that because there is no end, one says there are those who do not attain it. Therefore, all these objections are fully resolved.
Furthermore, if to establish that the buddhas' merits of benefiting others are never cut off, one posits a portion of sentient beings lacking the nature, this would cause those buddhas to have only the merits of benefiting others through transformation, and it would also cut off their merits of enjoying [the Dharma] for the sake of others, because there would be no bodhisattvas realizing the stages. Moreover, in transforming others, there would also only be coarse [elimination], cutting off the subtle, because not a single person would attain the untaintedness of the Two Vehicles. Furthermore, from now on, not a single one among all buddhas would be able to teach doctrines such as the Three Vehicles, because there would be no capacity to attain the holy [fruition], which would cut off the buddhas' great compassion of identical substance. Moreover, if one resolutely thinks that because all possess the nature, all must come to an end, and fearing that the last buddha would lack the practice of benefiting others, one posits a portion that determinately lacks the nature, then that latter buddha would ultimately be unfulfilled in the practice of benefiting others, because among those he transforms, not a single sentient being would attain a holy fruit. Between the two benefits of buddhas and bodhisattvas, benefiting others is supreme; how could it be that one causes not a single person to attain a holy fruit, yet attains buddhahood in one's own person? Furthermore, all originally made the universal vow: 'May all sentient beings attain bodhi.' Therefore, causing them to attain it ensures that the original vow is not in vain. And because the realm of sentient beings cannot be exhausted, the original vow is never cut off. If it were not so, it would contravene the original vow, the practice and vow would be in vain, and attaining buddhahood through vain practice is unreasonable. Therefore, although they wish to avoid the above faults by establishing the lack of nature, without realizing it, those faults fall right back upon their own position. Hence, the lack of nature is not the definitive, ultimate meaning."