華嚴一乘教義分齊章 2.19

2.19

Question: "If according to the final teaching all sentient beings will attain buddhahood, then although sentient beings are numerous, there must also be an end to them. If it is so, then the one who is the last to attain buddhahood would have no one to convert; because there is no one to convert, their practice of benefiting others would be lacking; if their practice of benefiting others is lacking, it is unreasonable for them to attain buddhahood, and it would also cause the buddhas' merits of benefiting others to be cut off and come to an end. If all will attain buddhahood without remainder, but one says that sentient beings will never end, there is then the fault of self-contradiction, because those who never end would never attain buddhahood. Furthermore, if a single buddha saves immeasurable people, does this diminish the realm of sentient beings or not? If it gradually diminishes, it must have an end, for having diminution without an end is unreasonable; if there is no diminution, then there is no nirvanic liberation, for having liberation without diminution is unreasonable. Based on such principles, texts like the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra have on this account established [the category of] sentient beings who lack the nature, thereby avoiding the above faults. What is the meaning of this?"
Answer: "If one maintains that because sentient beings possess the nature, all are made to attain buddhahood, and thus says there is an end, this immediately gives rise to the view of decrease regarding the realm of sentient beings. When the realm of sentient beings decreases, the realm of buddhas must increase; thus one immediately gives rise to the view of increase regarding the realm of buddhas. Such increase and decrease are not right view, and therefore there is neither increase nor decrease. The sūtra says: 'Śāriputra! What is called a great wrong view is to see the realm of sentient beings increase and to see the realm of sentient beings decrease,' and so on at length. Even if, to avoid this view, one posits this portion of sentient beings lacking the nature so that there is neither increase nor decrease, one still cannot escape the views of increase and decrease. Why is this? Because seeing those who possess the nature all attain buddhahood, one immediately gives rise to the view of annihilation and the view of decrease; and seeing those lacking the nature never attain buddhahood, one immediately gives rise to the view of permanence and the view of increase. This is because they do not comprehend the realm of sentient beings. Therefore the sūtra says: 'All foolish common mortals, because they do not truly know the single dharma realm and cannot truly see the single dharma realm, give rise to wrong views, thinking that the realm of sentient beings increases or that the realm of sentient beings decreases.'
Furthermore, the Mañjuśrī-prajñā-sūtra says: 'Suppose a single buddha were to abide in the world for an eon, or more than an eon. Just as in a single buddha-world, there are further immeasurable and boundless buddhas as numerous as the sands of the Ganges; if each and every such buddha, for an eon or more than an eon, were to preach the Dharma day and night without ceasing for an instant, each delivering immeasurable Ganges-sands of sentient beings into nirvāṇa, the realm of sentient beings would nevertheless neither increase nor decrease; and this is also true throughout the buddha-worlds of the ten directions. Each and every buddha preaches the Dharma and transforms them, each delivering immeasurable Ganges-sands of sentient beings into nirvāṇa, yet the realm of sentient beings neither increases nor decreases. Why is this? Because a determinate mark of sentient beings cannot be found.'
This means that the realm of sentient beings is like empty space: suppose beings of immeasurable, superior supernormal powers were each to fly through empty space for immeasurable eons seeking the boundary of space—it could never be reached. It is not that because it cannot be reached, one cannot be said to travel; nor is it that by traveling, one causes it to have a boundary. One should know that the principle here is also like this: it is not that because they will attain it, they are caused to have an end; nor is it that because there is no end, one says there are those who do not attain it. Therefore, all these objections are fully resolved.
Furthermore, if to establish that the buddhas' merits of benefiting others are never cut off, one posits a portion of sentient beings lacking the nature, this would cause those buddhas to have only the merits of benefiting others through transformation, and it would also cut off their merits of enjoying [the Dharma] for the sake of others, because there would be no bodhisattvas realizing the stages. Moreover, in transforming others, there would also only be coarse [elimination], cutting off the subtle, because not a single person would attain the untaintedness of the Two Vehicles. Furthermore, from now on, not a single one among all buddhas would be able to teach doctrines such as the Three Vehicles, because there would be no capacity to attain the holy [fruition], which would cut off the buddhas' great compassion of identical substance. Moreover, if one resolutely thinks that because all possess the nature, all must come to an end, and fearing that the last buddha would lack the practice of benefiting others, one posits a portion that determinately lacks the nature, then that latter buddha would ultimately be unfulfilled in the practice of benefiting others, because among those he transforms, not a single sentient being would attain a holy fruit. Between the two benefits of buddhas and bodhisattvas, benefiting others is supreme; how could it be that one causes not a single person to attain a holy fruit, yet attains buddhahood in one's own person? Furthermore, all originally made the universal vow: 'May all sentient beings attain bodhi.' Therefore, causing them to attain it ensures that the original vow is not in vain. And because the realm of sentient beings cannot be exhausted, the original vow is never cut off. If it were not so, it would contravene the original vow, the practice and vow would be in vain, and attaining buddhahood through vain practice is unreasonable. Therefore, although they wish to avoid the above faults by establishing the lack of nature, without realizing it, those faults fall right back upon their own position. Hence, the lack of nature is not the definitive, ultimate meaning."