華嚴一乘教義分齊章 4.11
華嚴一乘教義分齊章 4.11
- Language
- Classical Chinese
4.11
一、常過,謂不隨緣故、在染非隱故、不待了因故,即墮常過。問:「諸聖教中並說真如為凝然常,既不隨緣,豈是過耶?」答:「聖說真如為凝然者,此是隨緣成染淨時,恒作染淨而不失自體,是即不異無常之常,名不思議常;非謂不作諸法如情所謂之凝然也。若謂不作諸法而凝然者,是情所計故,即失真常。以彼真常不異無常之常,不異無常之常出於情外,故名真常。是故經云『不染而染者,明常作無常也;染而不染者,明作無常時不失常也。』」問:「教中既就不異無常之常,故說真如為凝然常者,何故不就不異常之無常,故說真如為無常耶?」答:「教中亦說此義,故經云『如來藏受苦樂,與因俱,若生若滅。』論云『自性清淨心,因無明風動成染心』等。以此教理故知,真如不異常之無常,故隨緣隱體,是非有也。」問:「真如是不生滅法,既不異無常之常故說為常,不異常之無常故得說無常者,亦可依他是生滅法,亦應得有不異常之無常、不異無常之常義耶?」答:「亦得有也。何者?以諸緣起無常之法,即無自性,方成緣起,是故不異常性而得無常。故經云『不生不滅是無常義』,此則不異於常成無常也。又以諸緣起即無自性,非滅緣起方說無性,是則不異無常之常也。故經云『色即是空,非色滅空』故。又云『眾生即涅槃,不復更滅』等。此中二義與真中二義相配,可知。此即真俗雙融,二而無二,故《智論》云『智障極盲闇,謂真俗別執。』此之謂也。是故若執真如同情所謂而凝然常者,即不隨緣隱其自體,不假了因,即墮常過。又若不隨緣成於染淨,染淨等法即無所依,無所依有法又墮常也。以染淨法皆無自體,賴真立故。」
First, the fault of permanence: that is, because it would not accord with conditions, would not be hidden when in defilement, and would not depend on a revealing cause, one falls into the fault of permanence. Question: "The sacred teachings universally state that true suchness is quiescently permanent. Since it does not accord with conditions, how could this be a fault?" Answer: "When the noble ones speak of true suchness as quiescent, this means that when it accords with conditions to form the defiled and pure, it constantly acts as the defiled and pure without losing its own substance; this is precisely the permanence that is not distinct from impermanence, called inconceivable permanence. It does not mean that it does not produce phenomena as quiescent according to what subjective sentiment asserts. If one says that it is quiescent by not producing phenomena, this is grasped by subjective sentiment, and thus loses true permanence. Because that true permanence is the permanence that is not distinct from impermanence, and the permanence that is not distinct from impermanence transcends subjective sentiment, it is therefore called true permanence. Therefore the sūtra says: 'Being undefiled yet defiled explains that the permanent acts as the impermanent; being defiled yet undefiled explains that when acting as the impermanent it does not lose permanence.'" Question: "Since the teaching speaks of true suchness as quiescently permanent with respect to the permanence that is not distinct from impermanence, why does it not speak of true suchness as impermanent with respect to the impermanence that is not distinct from permanence?" Answer: "The teaching also states this meaning. Thus the sūtra says: 'The tathāgatagarbha undergoes suffering and pleasure, together with causes, whether arising or ceasing.' The treatise says: 'The mind pure by nature, stirred by the wind of ignorance, becomes a defiled mind,' and so forth. By these teachings and reasonings, one knows that true suchness is the impermanence that is not distinct from permanence, and therefore accords with conditions to conceal its substance, which is nonexistence." Question: "True suchness is an unproduced and unceasing phenomenon; since it is called permanent because it is not distinct from the permanence of impermanence, and can be called impermanent because it is not distinct from the impermanence of permanence, could it also be that the other-dependent, as an arising and ceasing phenomenon, should also possess the meaning of impermanence not distinct from permanence and permanence not distinct from impermanence?" Answer: "It also possesses them. How so? Because all dependently originated impermanent phenomena are precisely without self-nature, only then does dependent origination occur; therefore they attain impermanence without being distinct from the nature of permanence. Thus the sūtra says: 'Neither arising nor ceasing is the meaning of impermanence'—this is achieving impermanence without being distinct from permanence. Furthermore, because all dependent originations are precisely without self-nature, and it is not by extinguishing dependent origination that one speaks of lack of nature, this is then the permanence that is not distinct from impermanence. Therefore the sūtra says: 'Form is emptiness; it is not that the extinction of form is emptiness.' It also says: 'Sentient beings are nirvāṇa; they do not undergo further extinction,' and so forth. The two meanings here correspond to the two meanings in the true, as can be understood. This is the dual fusion of the ultimate and conventional, being two yet non-dual. Hence the Dazhidulun says: 'The cognitive obstacle is extremely blind and dark, meaning the separate grasping of the ultimate and conventional.' This is what it refers to. Therefore, if one clings to true suchness as quiescently permanent according to what subjective sentiment asserts, then it would not accord with conditions to conceal its own substance, and would not rely on a revealing cause, thus falling into the fault of permanence. Furthermore, if it does not accord with conditions to form the defiled and pure, then the phenomena of defilement and purity would have nothing to rely upon; and for phenomena to exist without reliance also falls into permanence, because defiled and pure phenomena are all without self-nature and depend on the true to be established."
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