華嚴一乘教義分齊章 4.17

4.17

二、若執無者亦有二失，若謂依他是無法者，即緣無所起，無所起故不得有法，即是斷也。問：「若說緣生為空無，故即墮斷者，何故《中論》等內廣說緣生為畢竟空耶？」答：「聖說緣生以為空者，此即不異有之空也。何以故？以法從緣生，方說無性，是故緣生有者方得為空。若不爾者，無緣生因，以何所以而得言空？是故不異有之空名緣生空，此即聖者不動緣生說實相法也。若謂緣生如言空者，即無緣生，無緣生故即無空理，無空理者良由執空，是故汝意恐墮有見，猛勵立空，不謂不達無性緣生故，即失性空。失性空故還墮情中，惡趣空也。」問：「若由依他有二義故，是則前代諸論師各述一義，融攝依他不相違者，何故後代論師，如清辯等，各執一義互相破耶？」答：「此乃相成，非相破也。何者？為末代有情根機漸鈍，聞說依他是其有義，不達彼是不異空之有故，即執以為如，謂之有也。是故清辯等破依他有令至於無，至畢竟無方乃得彼依他之有。若不至此徹底性空，即不得成依他之有，是故為成有故破於有也。又彼有情聞說依他畢竟性空，不達彼是不異有之空故，即執以為如，謂之空。是故護法等破彼謂空，以存幻有，幻有立故方乃得彼不異有之空。以若有滅，非真空故，是故為成空故破於空也。以色即是空，清辯義立；空即是色，護法義存。二義鎔融，舉體全攝。若無後代論師以二理交徹、全體相奪，無由得顯甚深緣起依他性法，是故相破反相成也，是故如情執無即是斷過。又若說無法為依他者，無法非緣，非緣之法即墮常也。」

Second, if one clings to nonexistence, there are also two faults: if one asserts that the other-dependent is a nonexistent phenomenon, then conditions have nothing to originate; because there is nothing to originate, phenomena cannot exist, which is precisely annihilation. Question: "If stating that conditioned arising is empty and nonexistent thereby falls into annihilation, why do the Madhyamakaśāstra and other texts broadly explain conditioned arising as ultimate emptiness?" Answer: "When the noble ones speak of conditioned arising as empty, this is precisely the emptiness that is not distinct from existence. Why is that? Because only when phenomena arise from conditions does one speak of the lack of nature; therefore, only when there is conditioned arising can it be empty. If it were not so, there would be no cause for conditioned arising; on what basis could one speak of emptiness? Therefore, the emptiness that is not distinct from existence is called the emptiness of conditioned arising. This is the noble ones speaking of the phenomenon of true reality without moving from conditioned arising. If one asserts that conditioned arising is empty according to words, then there would be no conditioned arising; because there is no conditioned arising, there would be no principle of emptiness. The absence of the principle of emptiness is truly caused by clinging to emptiness. Therefore, your mind feared falling into the view of existence and vigorously established emptiness, not realizing that through failing to comprehend the conditioned arising of non-nature, one thereby loses nature-emptiness. Because one loses nature-emptiness, one falls back into sentiment, into pernicious emptiness." Question: "If the other-dependent possesses these two meanings, and former treatise masters each set forth one meaning, harmoniously integrating the other-dependent without mutual contradiction, why did later treatise masters, such as Bhāviveka and others, each cling to one meaning and refute each other?" Answer: "This is actually mutual completion, not mutual refutation. How so? Because the capacities of sentient beings in the final age gradually grew dull, upon hearing it said that the other-dependent has the meaning of existence, they did not comprehend that it is the existence not distinct from emptiness, and so clung to it as existence according to what is asserted. Therefore, Bhāviveka and others refuted the existence of the other-dependent to bring it to nonexistence; only when reaching ultimate nonexistence does one attain that other-dependent existence. If one does not reach this thorough nature-emptiness, then other-dependent existence cannot be established; therefore, in order to establish existence, they refuted existence. Furthermore, those sentient beings, hearing that the other-dependent is ultimately nature-empty, did not comprehend that it is the emptiness not distinct from existence, and so clung to it as emptiness according to what is asserted. Therefore, Dharmapāla and others refuted that asserted emptiness in order to preserve illusory existence; only when illusory existence is established does one attain that emptiness not distinct from existence. Because if existence is extinguished, it is not true emptiness; therefore, in order to establish emptiness, they refuted emptiness. Because form is emptiness, Bhāviveka's meaning is established; because emptiness is form, Dharmapāla's meaning is preserved. The two meanings fuse and dissolve, completely subsuming the entire substance. If later treatise masters had not had the two principles mutually penetrate and fully displace one another, there would be no way to reveal the profound phenomenon of the other-dependent nature of dependent origination; therefore, mutual refutation conversely brings about mutual completion. Hence, clinging to nonexistence according to subjective sentiment is the fault of annihilation. Furthermore, if one states that a nonexistent phenomenon is the other-dependent, a nonexistent phenomenon is not a condition; and a phenomenon that is not a condition falls into permanence."