止觀輔行傳弘決 2.34

2.34

「觀四運」下，明二乘四運。文中先舉四念處觀，顯聲聞乘。無常故生滅，不淨故不住，苦故三受，無我故不自在。次「因緣」一句，顯支佛界。「觀已」下，菩薩界中開三菩薩，例如下文諸思議境菩薩亦三。初是六度，自愍故傷己，愍彼故觀他。「所以者何」下，釋六度相。「捨不能亡」一句，寄斥三藏兼明通意。斥三藏者亦兼凡夫，以諸凡夫亦行事度。雖即不及三藏菩薩，約不能亡，其義等故。「今觀」下，正明通觀。「三事皆空」者，此中三事隨境起觀，非謂施者及財物等，應云根塵及以受者。「金剛」下，引證也。經云「不住」，正當不住六塵行施。若不住塵，即是不住根及受者。布施既爾，餘五亦然。又塵即財物，見塵空故施受俱空，故知兩處三事義等。「如人」下，舉譬也。住相如暗則智眼不開，不能見於一切無相。空智如眼、不住如日，有日眼故見三事空。故知無著與空慧二義相須，方能見於三事空也。乃至六十二見一切皆空，故云「種種」。「直言」下，重消經意。經被利根直言不見，以語略故相猶難解，故今更釋不住四句方名不住，乃至不住六十二見，名無相檀。故知前文無四相者，秖是離於六十二見，成於《金剛》離我人等名為菩薩，非獨初果破見而已，故知但是真諦無相。言「六十二見」者，《大經》二十八釋第八功德中云「謂離五事即五見也，因是五見生六十二。」章安云：「此有二意：一者我見有五十六，謂欲界五陰各計四句合為二十，色界亦爾，無色除色但有十六，故知三界合五十六。邊見有六，三界各二謂斷常見，添前合成六十二見。二者三世五陰各計斷常，用有無二見而為根本。」此准《大論》六十八文，謂色如去等四句，四陰亦然，合二十句，此即計過去世也。又計色常等四句，四陰亦然，合二十句，此即計現在也。又計色有邊等四句，四陰亦然，合二十句，即計未來也。一一句下皆云神及世間，三世六十并有無二。論釋云「凡夫取著計有神我，若計常者，修福滅罪；若計無常者，為世名利故有所作；亦常亦無常者，秖是雙計初二二句，故於神我以計麁細為第三句。計神麁者，身死無常；計神細者，身死不滅；計雙非者，見計第三二俱有過。何者？常則不變猶如虛空，風雨不動；若無常者則有變動，如雨在皮則有爛壞。離此二過，以我心故復說有神，神但非常非無常耳。佛言：四皆邪見。」此即計神也，世間即是國土，是故神於世間亦有四見。言計常者，問言：土若本無，計應有錯。世間是有，何故邪見？答：破世間者，破常等想，不破世間。如無目人以蛇莊嚴，有目語言蛇非瓔珞。破倒亦爾，現見無常不得言常。三四二句准說可知。有邊等者，外人求土不得其始即謂無終，無始中終則名無邊，計有此三即名有邊，如得禪者計八萬劫。三四二句准此可知。亦有人云：第三句者，八方有邊，上下無邊。有云：上至有頂下至地獄，而八方無邊。計神或如芥子等是。亦有計土及以神我，互計有無成三四二句，准此可知。如去等者，如人彼來去至後世，名為如去。謂先世無來滅亦無去，名不如去。若謂身死為去而神不去，名第三句。見俱有過計第四句。論文甚廣，須住彼尋。若《婆沙》中亦立六十五見，即於五陰各計四陰以為我所，謂色是我，受是僕僮。《瓔珞》窟宅，三陰亦然。合我及我所各十三句，五陰合為六十五句。故一一陰，初一是我，三是我所，所以佛說離六十五。為說道品成聲聞道乃至菩提，故知破見得法不同。今此未具恒沙佛法，復能利他成通菩薩，方始度於分段彼岸。言「一切法趣」者，此中通教何故亦云一切法趣？然但云趣，不云是趣不過及不可得，故屬通教。所以一切法趣之言其名猶通，如《玄》文云「周行十方界，還是瓶處如。」今下文處處引一切法趣等以證三諦，其意則圓。又用彼論非專一文，以從義故不可執文。《大品》云「一切法趣一法」，《大論》兩文共釋此句。初云「云何菩薩？為世間趣故發菩提心。菩薩為眾生說色趣空，乃至種智。為眾生故，說色非趣非不趣，乃至種智。」次文云「為眾生故，說一切法趣空無相願，是趣不過。何以故？是空無相中趣不趣不可得故。」初文以能趣為假，具歷色心乃至種智，故知具一切法即是假也。所趣為空，非趣非不趣為中。次文以能從所為空，是趣不過為假，趣不趣不可得為中。此下諸文用語稍異者，中假二意全依論文，次但況出，故云一切法趣色，色尚不可得，云何當有趣非趣等。何以故？一切法趣色，能所皆假，色不可得，一切法亦不可得，能所皆空，趣不趣不可得，即不住二邊正顯中道。言異意同，細思可見。「又觀」下，即通教佛四運也。故四德之名，義不關別。真諦如空不變故常，不受界內三苦故樂，不為六道起業故我，不為見思所污故淨，故知即是通佛四德。「如是」下，出假四運。雖如通教觀於即空，空中具見十界四運，故云「種種」。此屬別教，故云假名。若以向四德為圓佛界，菩薩文中全無恒沙別教相狀，故通佛四德但云虛空乃至不染等，至此方云假名四運。「若空」下，中道四運，故知中道必須即於十界空假而辨中者方名圓中。中即佛界，對前成十，所以前九義當思議，佛界即當不可思議。例中餘之五塵，但以圓心覺了三諦（云云）。

From "contemplating the four phases of movement" below, the four phases of movement of the two vehicles are clarified. In the text, he first adduces the contemplation of the four stations of mindfulness to reveal the Śrāvaka Vehicle: being impermanent, there is arising and ceasing; being impure, there is no abiding; being suffering, there are the three feelings; being without self, there is no mastery. Next, the single line on "causes and conditions" reveals the realm of pratyekabuddhas. From "having contemplated" below, within the realm of bodhisattvas three [types of] bodhisattvas are opened, just as in the text below the bodhisattvas of the various conceivable objects are also three. The first is the six perfections: out of self-pity one pities oneself, and out of pity for others one contemplates others. From "why is this?" below, the characteristics of the six perfections are explained. The line "giving cannot forget [the three aspects]" lodges a rebuke against the Tripiṭaka [teaching] and also clarifies the meaning of the shared [teaching]. Rebuking the Tripiṭaka [teaching] also encompasses ordinary persons, because ordinary persons also practice phenomenal perfections. Although they are not equal to the bodhisattvas of the Tripiṭaka [teaching], in terms of not being able to forget [the three aspects], their meaning is equal. From "now contemplating" below, the contemplation of the shared [teaching] is directly clarified. Regarding "the three matters are all empty": here the three matters arise in contemplation according to the object; it does not refer to the donor, the material goods, and so forth, but should be said to be the sense-organs, the sense-data, and the recipient. From "Vajra[cchedikā]" below, proof is cited. The sūtra says "not abiding," which precisely corresponds to practicing giving without abiding in the six sense-data. If one does not abide in sense-data, that is not abiding in sense-organs or the recipient. Giving being so, the remaining five [perfections] are also like this. Moreover, sense-data are precisely material goods; seeing that sense-data are empty, both giving and receiving are empty, so we know the three matters in both places are equal in meaning. From "like a person" below, an analogy is adduced. Abiding in marks is like darkness: the eye of wisdom does not open, and one cannot see that all things are without marks. Wisdom of emptiness is like the eye; non-abiding is like the sun. Because of the sun and the eye, one sees that the three matters are empty. Therefore we know that non-attachment and the wisdom of emptiness mutually require each other; only then can one see that the three matters are empty. Up to the sixty-two views, all are empty; hence it says "various kinds." From "simply saying" below, the sūtra's meaning is explained again. For those of sharp faculties, the sūtra simply says they do not see; because the words are brief, the characteristics remain difficult to understand. Therefore, he now further explains that not abiding in the four propositions is what is called "not abiding," up to not abiding in the sixty-two views, which is called giving without marks. Therefore, we know that the earlier text's absence of the four marks is simply being free from the sixty-two views, fulfilling the Vajra[cchedikā]'s being free from self, person, and so forth, which is named a bodhisattva, and is not merely the first fruit [of the śrāvaka] breaking views; hence we know this is only the marklessness of the true truth. Regarding the "sixty-two views," the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, fascicle 28, in explaining the eighth virtue, says: "It means being free from the five matters, which are the five views; based on these five views, the sixty-two are produced." Zhang'an said: "This has two meanings: First, there are fifty-six views of self, meaning that in the desire realm each of the five aggregates is calculated with four propositions, making twenty together; the form realm is also like this; the formless realm excludes form and has only sixteen; thus we know the three realms together have fifty-six. There are six extreme views, two in each of the three realms, namely the views of annihilation and permanence; adding these to the previous makes sixty-two views. Second, each of the five aggregates across the three times is calculated as annihilation or permanence, using the two views of existence and non-existence as the fundamental root." This is based on the text of fascicle 68 of the Dazhidulun, meaning the four propositions such as "form is tathāgata (gone as such)" and so on; the [other] four aggregates are also like this, making twenty propositions together, which is calculating the past time. Again, calculating the four propositions such as "form is permanent" and so on, the [other] four aggregates are also like this, making twenty propositions together, which is calculating the present time. Again, calculating the four propositions such as "form has an end" and so on, the [other] four aggregates are also like this, making twenty propositions together, which is calculating the future time. Under each proposition it says the soul and the world: the three times make sixty, together with the two of existence and non-existence. The treatise explains: "Ordinary persons grasp and calculate that there is a soul (ātman). If they calculate it as permanent, they cultivate merit and eliminate sin; if they calculate it as impermanent, they perform actions for the sake of worldly fame and profit; regarding both permanent and impermanent, this is merely calculating both the first and second propositions together, and so regarding the soul, calculating it as coarse or fine forms the third proposition. Calculating the soul as coarse: when the body dies, it is impermanent; calculating the soul as fine: when the body dies, it is not annihilated; calculating neither: seeing that calculating the third has faults in both. How so? If permanent, it does not change, just like empty space, unmoved by wind and rain; if impermanent, there is change and movement, like rain on skin causing rot and decay. Free from these two faults, due to the mind of self, they further say there is a soul, and that the soul is merely neither permanent nor impermanent. The Buddha said: all four are wrong views." This is calculating the soul. "World" is the lands; therefore, regarding the world, the soul also has four views. Regarding calculating permanence, question: If the land is originally non-existent, calculating [it as permanent] would be an error; but the world exists, so why is it a wrong view? Answer: Refuting the world means refuting the notions of permanence and the like, not refuting the world itself. It is like a blind person adorning himself with a snake; a person with eyes tells him that a snake is not a necklace. Refuting delusion is also like this: seeing impermanence directly, one cannot say it is permanent. The third and fourth propositions can be understood by analogy. Regarding "having an end" and so forth: non-Buddhists seeking the world cannot find its beginning and therefore say it has no end; lacking beginning, middle, and end is called endless, while calculating that it has these three is called having an end, as when one who attains dhyāna calculates eighty thousand kalpas. The third and fourth propositions can be understood by analogy to this. Some also say: for the third proposition, the eight directions have an end, while above and below have no end. Some say: above reaching the peak of existence and below reaching the hells [has an end], while the eight directions have no end. Calculating the soul as like a mustard seed and so on is also this. There are also those who calculate the land and the soul, mutually calculating existence and non-existence to form the third and fourth propositions, which can be understood by analogy to this. Regarding "gone as such" and so on: like a person coming from there and going to a future life, it is called "gone as such." Thinking that in a previous life there was no coming and at cessation there is also no going is called "not gone as such." If one thinks that the body dying is going while the soul does not go, this is called the third proposition. Seeing that both have faults and calculating [neither] is the fourth proposition. The treatise's text is very extensive; one should dwell there to seek it. In the *Vibhāṣā*, sixty-five views are also established, namely calculating the [other] four aggregates in relation to each of the five aggregates as belonging to the self, such as form being the self and feeling being the servant, necklace, or dwelling; the other three aggregates are also like this. Combining self and what belongs to self yields thirteen propositions each; the five aggregates together make sixty-five propositions. Thus, for each single aggregate, the first one is self and three are what belongs to self; therefore the Buddha taught being free from the sixty-five. Expounding the aids to the path for them completes the śrāvaka path up to bodhi; hence we know that breaking views and attaining the Dharma are not the same. Here, not yet possessing the Buddha-Dharmas numerous as the sands of the Ganges, yet able to benefit others, one becomes a bodhisattva of the shared [teaching], and only then crosses to the other shore of fragmented [samsāra]. Regarding "all dharmas tend toward": why in this shared teaching does it also say all dharmas tend toward? Because it only says "tend toward," and does not say "this tendency is unsurpassable" and "unobtainable," it belongs to the shared teaching. Therefore, the phrase "all dharmas tend toward" remains shared in name, as the Xuan[yi] says: "Pervading the realms of the ten directions, it is still the suchness of the place of the vase." Now, the text below cites "all dharmas tend toward" and so forth everywhere to verify the three truths, and its intention is perfect. Furthermore, using that treatise does not rely on a single passage alone; because it follows the meaning, one must not cling to the text. The Dapin says: "All dharmas tend toward one dharma." Two passages in the Dazhidulun together explain this sentence. The first says: "What is a bodhisattva? For the sake of the worldly tendencies, they arouse the aspiration for bodhi. For the sake of sentient beings, the bodhisattva explains that form tends toward emptiness, up to the knowledge of all aspects. For the sake of sentient beings, they explain that form neither tends nor does not tend, up to the knowledge of all aspects." The next passage says: "For the sake of sentient beings, they explain that all dharmas tend toward emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness, and this tendency is unsurpassable. Why? Because in this emptiness and signlessness, tending and not tending are unobtainable." The first passage takes that which tends as provisional, exhaustively traversing form and mind up to the knowledge of all aspects; hence we know that possessing all dharmas is precisely the provisional. That toward which it tends is emptiness; neither tending nor not tending is the middle. The second passage takes that which tends following that toward which it tends as emptiness; "this tendency is unsurpassable" is the provisional; "tending and not tending are unobtainable" is the middle. The texts below use slightly different phrasing because the two meanings of middle and provisional rely entirely on the treatise text, and next simply deduce by comparison; hence it says all dharmas tend toward form, and since form is still unobtainable, how could there be tending or not tending? Why? All dharmas tend toward form: both that which tends and that toward which it tends are provisional; form is unobtainable, and all dharmas are also unobtainable: both that which tends and that toward which it tends are empty; tending and not tending being unobtainable, namely not abiding in the two extremes, directly reveals the middle way. The words differ but the meaning is the same; thinking carefully, it can be seen. From "further contemplating" below is the four phases of movement of the Buddha of the shared teaching. Therefore, the names of the four virtues in meaning do not pertain to the distinctive [teaching]: the true truth is like space, unchanging, hence permanent; not receiving the three sufferings within the realms, hence blissful; not giving rise to karma for the six destinies, hence self; not defiled by view and thought [defilements], hence pure. Thus we know these are the four virtues of the shared Buddha. From "thus" below is emerging into the provisional four phases of movement. Although, as in the shared teaching, one contemplates being identical to emptiness, within emptiness one fully sees the four phases of movement of the ten realms; hence it says "various kinds." This belongs to the distinctive teaching, hence it says "provisional designation." If the preceding four virtues were taken as the realm of the Buddha of the perfect [teaching], in the bodhisattva text there would be no characteristics of the distinctive teaching numerous as the sands of the Ganges; therefore, the four virtues of the shared Buddha only speak of empty space, up to not defiled, etc., and only at this point does it speak of the four phases of movement of provisional designation. From "if empty" below is the four phases of movement of the middle way; hence we know that for the middle way, only when one must discern the middle right within the emptiness and provisionality of the ten realms is it named the perfect middle. The middle is precisely the Buddha realm; contrasting with the preceding, it completes ten. Therefore, the preceding nine in meaning correspond to the conceivable, and the Buddha realm corresponds to the inconceivable. Applying this to the remaining five sense-data in the middle, one simply awakens to and understands the three truths with the perfect mind (and so forth).