止觀輔行傳弘決 2.34

2.34

From "contemplating the four phases of movement" below, the four phases of movement of the two vehicles are clarified. In the text, he first adduces the contemplation of the four stations of mindfulness to reveal the Śrāvaka Vehicle: being impermanent, there is arising and ceasing; being impure, there is no abiding; being suffering, there are the three feelings; being without self, there is no mastery. Next, the single line on "causes and conditions" reveals the realm of pratyekabuddhas. From "having contemplated" below, within the realm of bodhisattvas three [types of] bodhisattvas are opened, just as in the text below the bodhisattvas of the various conceivable objects are also three. The first is the six perfections: out of self-pity one pities oneself, and out of pity for others one contemplates others. From "why is this?" below, the characteristics of the six perfections are explained. The line "giving cannot forget [the three aspects]" lodges a rebuke against the Tripiṭaka [teaching] and also clarifies the meaning of the shared [teaching]. Rebuking the Tripiṭaka [teaching] also encompasses ordinary persons, because ordinary persons also practice phenomenal perfections. Although they are not equal to the bodhisattvas of the Tripiṭaka [teaching], in terms of not being able to forget [the three aspects], their meaning is equal. From "now contemplating" below, the contemplation of the shared [teaching] is directly clarified. Regarding "the three matters are all empty": here the three matters arise in contemplation according to the object; it does not refer to the donor, the material goods, and so forth, but should be said to be the sense-organs, the sense-data, and the recipient. From "Vajra[cchedikā]" below, proof is cited. The sūtra says "not abiding," which precisely corresponds to practicing giving without abiding in the six sense-data. If one does not abide in sense-data, that is not abiding in sense-organs or the recipient. Giving being so, the remaining five [perfections] are also like this. Moreover, sense-data are precisely material goods; seeing that sense-data are empty, both giving and receiving are empty, so we know the three matters in both places are equal in meaning. From "like a person" below, an analogy is adduced. Abiding in marks is like darkness: the eye of wisdom does not open, and one cannot see that all things are without marks. Wisdom of emptiness is like the eye; non-abiding is like the sun. Because of the sun and the eye, one sees that the three matters are empty. Therefore we know that non-attachment and the wisdom of emptiness mutually require each other; only then can one see that the three matters are empty. Up to the sixty-two views, all are empty; hence it says "various kinds." From "simply saying" below, the sūtra's meaning is explained again. For those of sharp faculties, the sūtra simply says they do not see; because the words are brief, the characteristics remain difficult to understand. Therefore, he now further explains that not abiding in the four propositions is what is called "not abiding," up to not abiding in the sixty-two views, which is called giving without marks. Therefore, we know that the earlier text's absence of the four marks is simply being free from the sixty-two views, fulfilling the Vajra[cchedikā]'s being free from self, person, and so forth, which is named a bodhisattva, and is not merely the first fruit [of the śrāvaka] breaking views; hence we know this is only the marklessness of the true truth. Regarding the "sixty-two views," the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, fascicle 28, in explaining the eighth virtue, says: "It means being free from the five matters, which are the five views; based on these five views, the sixty-two are produced." Zhang'an said: "This has two meanings: First, there are fifty-six views of self, meaning that in the desire realm each of the five aggregates is calculated with four propositions, making twenty together; the form realm is also like this; the formless realm excludes form and has only sixteen; thus we know the three realms together have fifty-six. There are six extreme views, two in each of the three realms, namely the views of annihilation and permanence; adding these to the previous makes sixty-two views. Second, each of the five aggregates across the three times is calculated as annihilation or permanence, using the two views of existence and non-existence as the fundamental root." This is based on the text of fascicle 68 of the Dazhidulun, meaning the four propositions such as "form is tathāgata (gone as such)" and so on; the [other] four aggregates are also like this, making twenty propositions together, which is calculating the past time. Again, calculating the four propositions such as "form is permanent" and so on, the [other] four aggregates are also like this, making twenty propositions together, which is calculating the present time. Again, calculating the four propositions such as "form has an end" and so on, the [other] four aggregates are also like this, making twenty propositions together, which is calculating the future time. Under each proposition it says the soul and the world: the three times make sixty, together with the two of existence and non-existence. The treatise explains: "Ordinary persons grasp and calculate that there is a soul (ātman). If they calculate it as permanent, they cultivate merit and eliminate sin; if they calculate it as impermanent, they perform actions for the sake of worldly fame and profit; regarding both permanent and impermanent, this is merely calculating both the first and second propositions together, and so regarding the soul, calculating it as coarse or fine forms the third proposition. Calculating the soul as coarse: when the body dies, it is impermanent; calculating the soul as fine: when the body dies, it is not annihilated; calculating neither: seeing that calculating the third has faults in both. How so? If permanent, it does not change, just like empty space, unmoved by wind and rain; if impermanent, there is change and movement, like rain on skin causing rot and decay. Free from these two faults, due to the mind of self, they further say there is a soul, and that the soul is merely neither permanent nor impermanent. The Buddha said: all four are wrong views." This is calculating the soul. "World" is the lands; therefore, regarding the world, the soul also has four views. Regarding calculating permanence, question: If the land is originally non-existent, calculating [it as permanent] would be an error; but the world exists, so why is it a wrong view? Answer: Refuting the world means refuting the notions of permanence and the like, not refuting the world itself. It is like a blind person adorning himself with a snake; a person with eyes tells him that a snake is not a necklace. Refuting delusion is also like this: seeing impermanence directly, one cannot say it is permanent. The third and fourth propositions can be understood by analogy. Regarding "having an end" and so forth: non-Buddhists seeking the world cannot find its beginning and therefore say it has no end; lacking beginning, middle, and end is called endless, while calculating that it has these three is called having an end, as when one who attains dhyāna calculates eighty thousand kalpas. The third and fourth propositions can be understood by analogy to this. Some also say: for the third proposition, the eight directions have an end, while above and below have no end. Some say: above reaching the peak of existence and below reaching the hells [has an end], while the eight directions have no end. Calculating the soul as like a mustard seed and so on is also this. There are also those who calculate the land and the soul, mutually calculating existence and non-existence to form the third and fourth propositions, which can be understood by analogy to this. Regarding "gone as such" and so on: like a person coming from there and going to a future life, it is called "gone as such." Thinking that in a previous life there was no coming and at cessation there is also no going is called "not gone as such." If one thinks that the body dying is going while the soul does not go, this is called the third proposition. Seeing that both have faults and calculating [neither] is the fourth proposition. The treatise's text is very extensive; one should dwell there to seek it. In the *Vibhāṣā*, sixty-five views are also established, namely calculating the [other] four aggregates in relation to each of the five aggregates as belonging to the self, such as form being the self and feeling being the servant, necklace, or dwelling; the other three aggregates are also like this. Combining self and what belongs to self yields thirteen propositions each; the five aggregates together make sixty-five propositions. Thus, for each single aggregate, the first one is self and three are what belongs to self; therefore the Buddha taught being free from the sixty-five. Expounding the aids to the path for them completes the śrāvaka path up to bodhi; hence we know that breaking views and attaining the Dharma are not the same. Here, not yet possessing the Buddha-Dharmas numerous as the sands of the Ganges, yet able to benefit others, one becomes a bodhisattva of the shared [teaching], and only then crosses to the other shore of fragmented [samsāra]. Regarding "all dharmas tend toward": why in this shared teaching does it also say all dharmas tend toward? Because it only says "tend toward," and does not say "this tendency is unsurpassable" and "unobtainable," it belongs to the shared teaching. Therefore, the phrase "all dharmas tend toward" remains shared in name, as the Xuan[yi] says: "Pervading the realms of the ten directions, it is still the suchness of the place of the vase." Now, the text below cites "all dharmas tend toward" and so forth everywhere to verify the three truths, and its intention is perfect. Furthermore, using that treatise does not rely on a single passage alone; because it follows the meaning, one must not cling to the text. The Dapin says: "All dharmas tend toward one dharma." Two passages in the Dazhidulun together explain this sentence. The first says: "What is a bodhisattva? For the sake of the worldly tendencies, they arouse the aspiration for bodhi. For the sake of sentient beings, the bodhisattva explains that form tends toward emptiness, up to the knowledge of all aspects. For the sake of sentient beings, they explain that form neither tends nor does not tend, up to the knowledge of all aspects." The next passage says: "For the sake of sentient beings, they explain that all dharmas tend toward emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness, and this tendency is unsurpassable. Why? Because in this emptiness and signlessness, tending and not tending are unobtainable." The first passage takes that which tends as provisional, exhaustively traversing form and mind up to the knowledge of all aspects; hence we know that possessing all dharmas is precisely the provisional. That toward which it tends is emptiness; neither tending nor not tending is the middle. The second passage takes that which tends following that toward which it tends as emptiness; "this tendency is unsurpassable" is the provisional; "tending and not tending are unobtainable" is the middle. The texts below use slightly different phrasing because the two meanings of middle and provisional rely entirely on the treatise text, and next simply deduce by comparison; hence it says all dharmas tend toward form, and since form is still unobtainable, how could there be tending or not tending? Why? All dharmas tend toward form: both that which tends and that toward which it tends are provisional; form is unobtainable, and all dharmas are also unobtainable: both that which tends and that toward which it tends are empty; tending and not tending being unobtainable, namely not abiding in the two extremes, directly reveals the middle way. The words differ but the meaning is the same; thinking carefully, it can be seen. From "further contemplating" below is the four phases of movement of the Buddha of the shared teaching. Therefore, the names of the four virtues in meaning do not pertain to the distinctive [teaching]: the true truth is like space, unchanging, hence permanent; not receiving the three sufferings within the realms, hence blissful; not giving rise to karma for the six destinies, hence self; not defiled by view and thought [defilements], hence pure. Thus we know these are the four virtues of the shared Buddha. From "thus" below is emerging into the provisional four phases of movement. Although, as in the shared teaching, one contemplates being identical to emptiness, within emptiness one fully sees the four phases of movement of the ten realms; hence it says "various kinds." This belongs to the distinctive teaching, hence it says "provisional designation." If the preceding four virtues were taken as the realm of the Buddha of the perfect [teaching], in the bodhisattva text there would be no characteristics of the distinctive teaching numerous as the sands of the Ganges; therefore, the four virtues of the shared Buddha only speak of empty space, up to not defiled, etc., and only at this point does it speak of the four phases of movement of provisional designation. From "if empty" below is the four phases of movement of the middle way; hence we know that for the middle way, only when one must discern the middle right within the emptiness and provisionality of the ten realms is it named the perfect middle. The middle is precisely the Buddha realm; contrasting with the preceding, it completes ten. Therefore, the preceding nine in meaning correspond to the conceivable, and the Buddha realm corresponds to the inconceivable. Applying this to the remaining five sense-data in the middle, one simply awakens to and understands the three truths with the perfect mind (and so forth).