止觀輔行傳弘決 2.44

2.44

「云何」下，別明用觀。初約貪欲，於六蔽中即屬初蔽。貪欲即是慳之流例，於三毒中正是初毒。即為三觀注其三者是也。初空觀中，初文四運，用觀方法。「為當」下，正用觀推。今初是初運，望第二運四句推法，先列四句。「若未」下，却覆推檢。「即滅而生生滅相違」者，滅與生反，若即滅生故成相違。如燈滅處即名為明，故無是處。「若離生則無因」者，離此滅處孤然自生，故成無因，如離燈滅處自然生焰。「又若許無因而有生」者，諸無因處亦應有生，如無乳處亦應有酪，乃至木石應有心生。次「未貪至無因」者，貪雖未起，體性是生。初立句竟。次「為即為離」者，先定之。「若即」下，次難，先難即也。不滅而生，即此不滅復生欲貪，故成未貪與欲貪並。若許二並，則應生邊復生於生，故云「無窮」。「若離」下，難離句也。無因同前，故云「亦」也。「若亦滅」下，難第三句者，若俱存者，如相違因而生果者，是義不然。相違之法二法不並，豈共為因而能生果？是故互責，云「不相須」。亦是於滅復是不滅，故云「不定」。此不定因，豈生欲生決定之果？「若其」下，復以一異重責其因。若言體一，相違之法體不應一；若言體異，滅與不滅復不相關。何得二法共為一因而生於果？如云乳亦滅亦不滅而生酪者，無有是處。「若非」下，難第四句。凡雙非句本破兩亦，兩亦即是第三句也。故第三被破更至第四，故亦責云「為有為無」。若是有是無還同第三，單有單無復同初二，是則雙非不異前三，何須更立？是故結云「何謂雙非」。以乳為譬，準前可知。此妙觀門，假設賓主念念研覈，使一剎那無逃避處，性相俱泯方名即空，空故不見欲貪欲生。次「還轉」下，準義應有六十四句，現文唯有一十六句。如向四句，即是責於欲貪欲生不可得竟。還轉向來四句之法推下三句，秖應合云不生乃至非生非不生。今文云「生乃至非生非不生」者，或是重舉，或是文剩。問：何故復推下之三句？答：前雖推於欲貪欲生，既不見生，恐計無生乃至轉計非生非無生等，是故還須更推下三。若推無生，應云為當未貪欲滅欲貪欲不生？為當未貪欲不滅欲貪欲不生？為當未貪欲亦滅亦不滅欲貪欲不生？為當未貪欲非滅非不滅欲貪欲不生。一一亦須複推重責有無即離及以性等，具如初句，但以不生用替於生為異耳。復應以未貪欲滅等，對推欲貪欲亦生亦不生，非生非不生亦如是。此名推於具足四句相。故復更推正貪欲及以已未更生三箇一十六句，故知今文但推初句。初句既爾，餘三準知，皆以未貪欲中四句著前，欲貪欲中一句在後，即以生等四欲貪欲對前四箇未貪欲故成十六句。今且具作三箇十六句，圖使文可見，則已望未比準可知。初十六句者如向已釋，更為圖之。為當：

From "How" downward specifically explains the application of contemplation. First, it addresses lustful desire; among the six hindrances, this belongs to the first hindrance. Lustful desire is of the same category as stinginess; among the three poisons, it is precisely the first poison. This means that the three contemplations correspond to these three. Within the first, the contemplation of emptiness, the initial passage presents the four phases of mental activity, which are the methods of applying contemplation. / From "Is it that" downward directly applies contemplation to investigate. Now, the first is the first phase of mental activity, which investigates using the four propositions in relation to the second phase: first, it lists the four propositions. / From "If before" downward, it investigates and checks in reverse. "Existing upon ceasing, cessation and arising are mutually contradictory": cessation and arising are opposites; if arising exists upon ceasing, they would be mutually contradictory. It is like calling the place where a lamp is extinguished brightness; this cannot be so. "If separated from cessation, then it is without cause": if, separated from this place of cessation, it arises isolatedly on its own, it would be without cause, like a flame spontaneously arising away from the place where a lamp was extinguished. "Moreover, if one admits that there is arising without cause": then there should also be arising in all causeless places, just as there should be curds where there is no milk, and even wood and stone should have minds arise. / Next, "from before desire arises to causelessness": although desire has not yet arisen, its essential nature is arising. The initial formulation of the propositions is concluded. / Next, "is it identical or is it separate?": first, it specifies them. / From "If identical" downward, it next challenges them, first challenging the proposition of identity. If it arises without ceasing, then on the basis of this non-cessation it further gives rise to lustful desire; thus, before-desire and lustful desire would coexist. If one permits the two to coexist, then arising would further arise alongside arising, and thus it says "without end." / From "If separate" downward, it challenges the proposition of separation. Being causeless is the same as before, hence it says "also." / From "If it also ceases" downward, it challenges the third proposition: if both are maintained, it would be like contradictory causes giving rise to an effect, but this principle is incorrect. Two mutually contradictory dharmas cannot coexist; how could they jointly act as a cause and produce an effect? Therefore, cross-examining them, it says "they do not require one another." It is also that it is both cessation and non-cessation, hence it says "indeterminate." How could this indeterminate cause produce the determinate effect of the arising of desire? / From "If its" downward, it again cross-examines its cause through identity and difference. If one says their substance is one, the substances of contradictory dharmas should not be one; if one says their substances are different, cessation and non-cessation would have no connection with each other. How could two dharmas jointly act as a single cause and give rise to an effect? It is like saying that milk produces curds by both ceasing and not ceasing; this cannot be so. / From "If it is neither" downward, it challenges the fourth proposition. In general, the proposition of double negation fundamentally refutes the double affirmation; the double affirmation is precisely the third proposition. Because the third is refuted, it proceeds to the fourth, and thus it also cross-examines: "Is it existent or is it non-existent?" If it is existent or non-existent, it is the same as the third; if it is solely existent or solely non-existent, it is the same as the first two. If so, the double negation is no different from the preceding three, so why establish it again? Therefore it concludes, saying: "What is meant by double negation?" Taking milk as an analogy, one can understand it by analogy to the preceding. This marvelous contemplation gate posits an imaginary guest and host to scrutinize thought by thought, leaving no place of escape in a single instant; only when nature and characteristics are both obliterated is it called identical to emptiness, and because it is empty, one does not see lustful desire or the arising of desire. / Next, from "Reversing" downward, according to the principle there should be sixty-four propositions, but the present text has only sixteen propositions. The preceding four propositions concluded the cross-examination showing that lustful desire and the arising of desire cannot be apprehended. Reversing the preceding four propositions to investigate the subsequent three propositions, it should merely say "non-arising, up to neither arising nor non-arising." The present text saying "arising up to neither arising nor non-arising" is either a restatement or a textual redundancy. / Question: Why investigate the subsequent three propositions again? / Answer: Previously, although it investigated lustful desire and the arising of desire, since arising was not seen, one might fear clinging to non-arising, or further clinging to neither arising nor non-arising, etc.; therefore, one must still further investigate the subsequent three. If investigating non-arising, one should say: Is it that when before-desire ceases, lustful desire does not arise? Is it that when before-desire does not cease, lustful desire does not arise? Is it that when before-desire both ceases and does not cease, lustful desire does not arise? Is it that when before-desire neither ceases nor does not cease, lustful desire does not arise? One must also repeatedly investigate each one, cross-examining existence, non-existence, identity, difference, nature, and so forth, completely as in the first proposition, differing only in using "non-arising" in place of "arising." Furthermore, one should pair before-desire ceasing, etc., against lustful desire both arising and not arising, and likewise for neither arising nor non-arising. This is called investigating the characteristics of the complete four propositions. / Therefore, it further investigates active desire, as well as the already and not-yet arising, making three sets of sixteen propositions; thus know that the present text only investigates the first proposition. Since the first proposition is like this, the remaining three can be known by analogy: all place the four propositions of before-desire first, and place one proposition of lustful desire after, pairing the four lustful desires of arising and so forth against the preceding four before-desires, thus forming sixteen propositions. Now, I will fully chart three sets of sixteen propositions to make the text visible, so that comparing already-arisen to not-yet-arisen can be known by analogy. The first sixteen propositions have already been explained above; I chart them once more. Is it that: