止觀輔行傳弘決 2.44

2.44

From "How" downward specifically explains the application of contemplation. First, it addresses lustful desire; among the six hindrances, this belongs to the first hindrance. Lustful desire is of the same category as stinginess; among the three poisons, it is precisely the first poison. This means that the three contemplations correspond to these three. Within the first, the contemplation of emptiness, the initial passage presents the four phases of mental activity, which are the methods of applying contemplation. / From "Is it that" downward directly applies contemplation to investigate. Now, the first is the first phase of mental activity, which investigates using the four propositions in relation to the second phase: first, it lists the four propositions. / From "If before" downward, it investigates and checks in reverse. "Existing upon ceasing, cessation and arising are mutually contradictory": cessation and arising are opposites; if arising exists upon ceasing, they would be mutually contradictory. It is like calling the place where a lamp is extinguished brightness; this cannot be so. "If separated from cessation, then it is without cause": if, separated from this place of cessation, it arises isolatedly on its own, it would be without cause, like a flame spontaneously arising away from the place where a lamp was extinguished. "Moreover, if one admits that there is arising without cause": then there should also be arising in all causeless places, just as there should be curds where there is no milk, and even wood and stone should have minds arise. / Next, "from before desire arises to causelessness": although desire has not yet arisen, its essential nature is arising. The initial formulation of the propositions is concluded. / Next, "is it identical or is it separate?": first, it specifies them. / From "If identical" downward, it next challenges them, first challenging the proposition of identity. If it arises without ceasing, then on the basis of this non-cessation it further gives rise to lustful desire; thus, before-desire and lustful desire would coexist. If one permits the two to coexist, then arising would further arise alongside arising, and thus it says "without end." / From "If separate" downward, it challenges the proposition of separation. Being causeless is the same as before, hence it says "also." / From "If it also ceases" downward, it challenges the third proposition: if both are maintained, it would be like contradictory causes giving rise to an effect, but this principle is incorrect. Two mutually contradictory dharmas cannot coexist; how could they jointly act as a cause and produce an effect? Therefore, cross-examining them, it says "they do not require one another." It is also that it is both cessation and non-cessation, hence it says "indeterminate." How could this indeterminate cause produce the determinate effect of the arising of desire? / From "If its" downward, it again cross-examines its cause through identity and difference. If one says their substance is one, the substances of contradictory dharmas should not be one; if one says their substances are different, cessation and non-cessation would have no connection with each other. How could two dharmas jointly act as a single cause and give rise to an effect? It is like saying that milk produces curds by both ceasing and not ceasing; this cannot be so. / From "If it is neither" downward, it challenges the fourth proposition. In general, the proposition of double negation fundamentally refutes the double affirmation; the double affirmation is precisely the third proposition. Because the third is refuted, it proceeds to the fourth, and thus it also cross-examines: "Is it existent or is it non-existent?" If it is existent or non-existent, it is the same as the third; if it is solely existent or solely non-existent, it is the same as the first two. If so, the double negation is no different from the preceding three, so why establish it again? Therefore it concludes, saying: "What is meant by double negation?" Taking milk as an analogy, one can understand it by analogy to the preceding. This marvelous contemplation gate posits an imaginary guest and host to scrutinize thought by thought, leaving no place of escape in a single instant; only when nature and characteristics are both obliterated is it called identical to emptiness, and because it is empty, one does not see lustful desire or the arising of desire. / Next, from "Reversing" downward, according to the principle there should be sixty-four propositions, but the present text has only sixteen propositions. The preceding four propositions concluded the cross-examination showing that lustful desire and the arising of desire cannot be apprehended. Reversing the preceding four propositions to investigate the subsequent three propositions, it should merely say "non-arising, up to neither arising nor non-arising." The present text saying "arising up to neither arising nor non-arising" is either a restatement or a textual redundancy. / Question: Why investigate the subsequent three propositions again? / Answer: Previously, although it investigated lustful desire and the arising of desire, since arising was not seen, one might fear clinging to non-arising, or further clinging to neither arising nor non-arising, etc.; therefore, one must still further investigate the subsequent three. If investigating non-arising, one should say: Is it that when before-desire ceases, lustful desire does not arise? Is it that when before-desire does not cease, lustful desire does not arise? Is it that when before-desire both ceases and does not cease, lustful desire does not arise? Is it that when before-desire neither ceases nor does not cease, lustful desire does not arise? One must also repeatedly investigate each one, cross-examining existence, non-existence, identity, difference, nature, and so forth, completely as in the first proposition, differing only in using "non-arising" in place of "arising." Furthermore, one should pair before-desire ceasing, etc., against lustful desire both arising and not arising, and likewise for neither arising nor non-arising. This is called investigating the characteristics of the complete four propositions. / Therefore, it further investigates active desire, as well as the already and not-yet arising, making three sets of sixteen propositions; thus know that the present text only investigates the first proposition. Since the first proposition is like this, the remaining three can be known by analogy: all place the four propositions of before-desire first, and place one proposition of lustful desire after, pairing the four lustful desires of arising and so forth against the preceding four before-desires, thus forming sixteen propositions. Now, I will fully chart three sets of sixteen propositions to make the text visible, so that comparing already-arisen to not-yet-arisen can be known by analogy. The first sixteen propositions have already been explained above; I chart them once more. Is it that: