止觀輔行傳弘決 2.50

2.50

此前貪欲雖復暫息名貪欲已，對餘境時復名為未。已未雖即同是不起，對境時別，相待成異。初息名已，息已名未，故此未心通對十界。後若別起，此未屬別，恐屬別故，故亦須對起已觀之。應云為當貪欲已心滅，未貪欲心生？為貪欲已心不滅，未貪欲心生？貪欲已心亦滅亦不滅，未貪欲心生？貪欲已心非滅非不滅，未貪欲心生？乃至未貪欲心非生非不生，成十六句。問：已但名滅，未名不生，云何俱具生等四句？答：今觀念念皆是於生，但望境暫息及以未起，得已未名。於此已未恐計生等，故須復以四句推之。若言已心但名滅者，正心亦應但名為生。何等亦具無等三句？是故當知皆用四句。又於已心推未心者，一防當起、二未契真，防過入理是故須檢。并此十六，合成四箇一十六句。若纔觀便悟，一句即足，何須苦至六十四耶？為鈍根者展轉生計，是故具破六十四句。若是具出轉計之相，至第五卷三假四句具足說之。若論文意，即應頓推一一令成不思議境。今文且寄次第別說，故六十四句但名入空。況復先知不思議理，欲心纔破，妙境宛然。事助尚須正助合行，況此推窮寧不即理？即理之時，方見四運心性真如。「觀貪欲」下，結成空觀。言「雙照」者，貪欲是假，推破是空。空無空相，空即假故；假無假相，假即空故。雙亡雙照如是空假，誰不謂是三觀一心？應善推思言同意異，故今但是入空觀耳。「皆如上說」者，此還轉句皆如初文觀於生句。若是三觀，其一之言誠無所以，是故圓觀必云百界即空假中。若言此空雖云其一，空中已具假中觀者，假中二觀例亦應然，假觀文中何故直列十界而已？「若蔽恒起」下，觀成氣分。「恒起」等者，問：四句推檢貪欲泯然，但有妙觀無復貪欲，何得復云而起而照？答：言起照者，正明有起無時不照，照時豈可必須於起？今明此觀有破蔽功，是故須云而起而照。又為防於起時妨照，是故復云而起而照。理須起不起俱照、照不照俱亡，亡不亡咸泯、泯不泯湛然，如是方成入空之道。是故今云「不見起照起照宛然」。

Although this prior lust has temporarily paused and is called 'past lust', in relation to other objects it is again called 'not-yet'. Although 'past' and 'not-yet' are both equally non-arising, because their times of confronting objects are distinct, their mutual relativity renders them different. The initial cessation is called 'past', and after cessation it is called 'not-yet'; hence this mind of 'not-yet' pertains generally to the ten realms. If it later arises specifically, this 'not-yet' belongs to the specific; out of concern that it might belong to the specific, one must also contemplate it in relation to what has already arisen. One should say: Is it that when the mind of past lust ceases, the mind of not-yet lust arises? When the mind of past lust does not cease, does the mind of not-yet lust arise? When the mind of past lust both ceases and does not cease, does the mind of not-yet lust arise? When the mind of past lust neither ceases nor does not cease, does the mind of not-yet lust arise? ...and so forth, up to the mind of not-yet lust neither arising nor not arising, forming sixteen propositions.

Question: 'Past' is merely called cessation, and 'not-yet' is called non-arising; how can both fully possess the four propositions of arising and so forth?

Answer: Now, contemplating thought-moment by thought-moment, every [moment] is an instance of arising; it is only with respect to an object having temporarily paused and [another] having not yet arisen that they obtain the names 'past' and 'not-yet'. Fearing that one might cling to arising and so forth regarding these 'past' and 'not-yet' [states], one must again examine them through the four propositions. If one says that the past mind is merely called cessation, the actual mind should also merely be called arising; why would it also possess the three propositions of non-[arising] and so forth? Therefore, one should know that the four propositions are used in all cases. Furthermore, examining the 'not-yet' mind from the 'past' mind: first, guards against future arising; second, [addresses] the fact that one has not yet tallied with the real. It is to prevent error and enter the principle that one must examine [them]. Combining this sixteen makes a total of four sets of sixteen propositions.

If one awakens upon the very first contemplation, a single proposition is sufficient; why labor painfully through sixty-four? It is because dull-rooted individuals successively give rise to attachments that all sixty-four propositions are thoroughly refuted. If one were to fully present the characteristics of shifted attachments, they are fully expounded in the fifth fascicle under the three provisionalities and four propositions. As for the intent of the treatise's text, one should instantly examine each and every one so that they constitute the inconceivable object. The present text temporarily relies on sequential, separate exposition; hence the sixty-four propositions are merely termed 'entering emptiness'. Furthermore, having previously known the inconceivable principle, as soon as the lustful mind is broken, the wonderful object appears distinctly. When even auxiliary practical [deeds] must be practiced together with the primary, how could this thorough investigation not immediately be the principle? It is precisely when it is identical to the principle that one first sees the four movements of mind-nature to be suchness.

From 'Contemplating lust' downward concludes the contemplation of emptiness. 'Illuminating both' means: lust is provisionality, and its refutation through investigation is emptiness. Emptiness has no mark of emptiness, for emptiness is provisionality; provisionality has no mark of provisionality, for provisionality is emptiness. Both extinguished and both illuminated, such emptiness and provisionality—who would not say that this is the three contemplations in a single mind? One should carefully examine and reflect: the words are the same, but their meanings differ; hence this is merely the contemplation of entering emptiness. 'All as explained above' means: these shifted propositions are all like the initial text on contemplating the proposition of arising. If it were the three contemplations, the statement regarding 'the one' would truly have no justification; therefore, the perfect contemplation necessarily speaks of the hundred realms as immediately empty, provisional, and middle. If one says that although this emptiness is called 'the one', the contemplations of provisionality and the middle are already contained within emptiness, then the same should apply by analogy to the two contemplations of provisionality and the middle; why, then, in the text of the contemplation of provisionality, does it merely list the ten realms and nothing more?

From 'If the obstruction constantly arises' downward treats the manifestation of contemplative realization. Regarding 'constantly arises' and so forth, Question: When lust is obliterated through the examination of the four propositions, there is only the wonderful contemplation and no more lust; how can it again be said 'both arises and illuminates'? Answer: 'Arising and illuminating' specifically clarifies that whenever there is arising, there is no time it does not illuminate; when it illuminates, how could it require arising? Now it clarifies that this contemplation has the power to destroy obstruction; hence it must say 'both arises and illuminates'. Furthermore, to guard against arising obstructing illumination, it again says 'both arises and illuminates'. In principle, both arising and non-arising must be illuminated; illumination and non-illumination must both be extinguished; extinction and non-extinction must both be obliterated; obliteration and non-obliteration must be completely serene. Only in this way is the path of entering emptiness accomplished. Therefore, it now says: 'One does not see arising and illuminating, yet arising and illuminating appear distinctly.'