止觀輔行傳弘決 2.50

2.50

Although this prior lust has temporarily paused and is called 'past lust', in relation to other objects it is again called 'not-yet'. Although 'past' and 'not-yet' are both equally non-arising, because their times of confronting objects are distinct, their mutual relativity renders them different. The initial cessation is called 'past', and after cessation it is called 'not-yet'; hence this mind of 'not-yet' pertains generally to the ten realms. If it later arises specifically, this 'not-yet' belongs to the specific; out of concern that it might belong to the specific, one must also contemplate it in relation to what has already arisen. One should say: Is it that when the mind of past lust ceases, the mind of not-yet lust arises? When the mind of past lust does not cease, does the mind of not-yet lust arise? When the mind of past lust both ceases and does not cease, does the mind of not-yet lust arise? When the mind of past lust neither ceases nor does not cease, does the mind of not-yet lust arise? ...and so forth, up to the mind of not-yet lust neither arising nor not arising, forming sixteen propositions.

Question: 'Past' is merely called cessation, and 'not-yet' is called non-arising; how can both fully possess the four propositions of arising and so forth?

Answer: Now, contemplating thought-moment by thought-moment, every [moment] is an instance of arising; it is only with respect to an object having temporarily paused and [another] having not yet arisen that they obtain the names 'past' and 'not-yet'. Fearing that one might cling to arising and so forth regarding these 'past' and 'not-yet' [states], one must again examine them through the four propositions. If one says that the past mind is merely called cessation, the actual mind should also merely be called arising; why would it also possess the three propositions of non-[arising] and so forth? Therefore, one should know that the four propositions are used in all cases. Furthermore, examining the 'not-yet' mind from the 'past' mind: first, guards against future arising; second, [addresses] the fact that one has not yet tallied with the real. It is to prevent error and enter the principle that one must examine [them]. Combining this sixteen makes a total of four sets of sixteen propositions.

If one awakens upon the very first contemplation, a single proposition is sufficient; why labor painfully through sixty-four? It is because dull-rooted individuals successively give rise to attachments that all sixty-four propositions are thoroughly refuted. If one were to fully present the characteristics of shifted attachments, they are fully expounded in the fifth fascicle under the three provisionalities and four propositions. As for the intent of the treatise's text, one should instantly examine each and every one so that they constitute the inconceivable object. The present text temporarily relies on sequential, separate exposition; hence the sixty-four propositions are merely termed 'entering emptiness'. Furthermore, having previously known the inconceivable principle, as soon as the lustful mind is broken, the wonderful object appears distinctly. When even auxiliary practical [deeds] must be practiced together with the primary, how could this thorough investigation not immediately be the principle? It is precisely when it is identical to the principle that one first sees the four movements of mind-nature to be suchness.

From 'Contemplating lust' downward concludes the contemplation of emptiness. 'Illuminating both' means: lust is provisionality, and its refutation through investigation is emptiness. Emptiness has no mark of emptiness, for emptiness is provisionality; provisionality has no mark of provisionality, for provisionality is emptiness. Both extinguished and both illuminated, such emptiness and provisionality—who would not say that this is the three contemplations in a single mind? One should carefully examine and reflect: the words are the same, but their meanings differ; hence this is merely the contemplation of entering emptiness. 'All as explained above' means: these shifted propositions are all like the initial text on contemplating the proposition of arising. If it were the three contemplations, the statement regarding 'the one' would truly have no justification; therefore, the perfect contemplation necessarily speaks of the hundred realms as immediately empty, provisional, and middle. If one says that although this emptiness is called 'the one', the contemplations of provisionality and the middle are already contained within emptiness, then the same should apply by analogy to the two contemplations of provisionality and the middle; why, then, in the text of the contemplation of provisionality, does it merely list the ten realms and nothing more?

From 'If the obstruction constantly arises' downward treats the manifestation of contemplative realization. Regarding 'constantly arises' and so forth, Question: When lust is obliterated through the examination of the four propositions, there is only the wonderful contemplation and no more lust; how can it again be said 'both arises and illuminates'? Answer: 'Arising and illuminating' specifically clarifies that whenever there is arising, there is no time it does not illuminate; when it illuminates, how could it require arising? Now it clarifies that this contemplation has the power to destroy obstruction; hence it must say 'both arises and illuminates'. Furthermore, to guard against arising obstructing illumination, it again says 'both arises and illuminates'. In principle, both arising and non-arising must be illuminated; illumination and non-illumination must both be extinguished; extinction and non-extinction must both be obliterated; obliteration and non-obliteration must be completely serene. Only in this way is the path of entering emptiness accomplished. Therefore, it now says: 'One does not see arising and illuminating, yet arising and illuminating appear distinctly.'