止觀輔行傳弘決 2.55

2.55

四觀無記者，初示觀境出無記相。「𧄼瞢」者，無所明也，異前諸善諸惡二相。「所以」下，用觀意也。有此一機，是故今識此之無記復堪為境，是故得觀。「大論云」下，引證也。無記之心似無知相，論中既云有般若故，是故須觀。向云「奈何」者，其性昧劣，不同善惡且折伏之，故云奈何。復更引論而開許之。何者？有漏之法三性收盡，已說善惡須辨無記，若不爾者觀境不周。又若任善惡亦無觀慧，何但無記？若有般若通得修觀，何獨善惡。且據一往善惡易動、無記難擡，難易雖殊，咸須用觀。又向從報法大概判之，若委論者，蔽度之外餘一切心俱名無記，是故無記不可不觀。「觀此」下，推成觀境。心相不顯其境難緣，若與善惡對辨同異，則無記可識便成觀境，故云「同則非無記」。「異者」下，以四句推。記即善惡，故對推之。其性𧄼瞢四運不顯，故但對善惡四句推之。現文但有四句推法，若防轉計，亦應具用一十六句。謂無記不生、亦生亦不生、非生非不生，亦各四句。既無四運，不須轉推至六十四句。「求記不可得」者，求於善惡尚自叵得，無記與誰對辨同異？既無同異，生即無生，故不可得。若轉計者從此句生，今文存略，故但複云非合非散及非生滅。是則無記心性與前善惡心性不殊，體同名異，是故名為非合散等。性既若是，是故無記堪為觀境。「又歷」下，次將無記歷十二事，即指十二事名之為處。無記及者，例前可知。「如此」下，結成三觀。初是空觀，十界是假，法性是中。「法性常寂」下，一止觀結。「於無記」下，引證也。意亦同前，亦應具引《無行》等經，無記即當癡蔽故也。亦應用於《淨名》中意，無記即是菩提涅槃。但推無記與記同異，即見無記法性之理。亦應對於增上慢者說斷無斷，及結攝等，準前可知，故云「例上」。「復次」下，以三止觀結前三章。「最後善」者，指諸惡初通相善惡，展轉相望唯圓為善，圓居最後是故成漸。如思議境，最後佛界先歷前九，故成思議。況復結文非修行相，不須更以圓漸為妨。「善惡俱」等者，別相之惡、六度之善，一一無非三觀法界，故即名「頓」，具如前說。「襵揲善」者，非前兩收、不出前兩，起空屬空、起有屬有，中道慈悲亦復如是。是故襵揲名為不定。與下第五卷襵揲四句，文異義同，彼但為成四句故也。

Fourth, regarding the contemplation of the indeterminate: first, the object of contemplation is shown and the characteristics of the indeterminate are brought out. *Hengmeng* (𧄼瞢) means dim and unenlightened, differing from the two characteristics of the various wholesome and unwholesome states described above. From "the reason why" onward, the intent of applying contemplation is explained. Because there is this capacity, one now recognizes that this indeterminate state is also fit to serve as an object, and therefore it can be contemplated. From "the *Dazhidulun* says" onward, proof is cited. The indeterminate mind resembles a state of unknowing, yet since the treatise says that prajñā is present, it must be contemplated. When it previously asked "what can be done?", it was because its nature is dark and inferior, unlike the wholesome and unwholesome which can be temporarily subdued, hence the question "what can be done?" Then the treatise is further cited to grant and permit it. Why? Contaminated dharmas are completely encompassed by the three natures; having already spoken of the wholesome and unwholesome, one must clarify the indeterminate, for otherwise the objects of contemplation would not be comprehensive. Furthermore, if one indulges in the wholesome and unwholesome, there is likewise no contemplative wisdom—why would it be only the indeterminate? If there is prajñā, contemplation can universally be cultivated—why solely in the wholesome and unwholesome? Moreover, taking a preliminary view, the wholesome and unwholesome are easily stirred while the indeterminate is difficult to uplift; although difficulty and ease differ, both require the application of contemplation. Furthermore, previously it was roughly categorized on the basis of retribution dharmas, but if discussed in detail, all minds apart from the obscurations and the perfections are called indeterminate; therefore, the indeterminate must not be left uncontemplated. From "contemplating this" onward, it is deduced to form an object of contemplation. When the mental characteristics are not evident, the object is difficult to focus upon; if its identity and difference are distinguished against the wholesome and unwholesome, the indeterminate can be recognized and thus becomes an object of contemplation; hence it says "if identical, it is not indeterminate." From "if different..." onward, it is deduced by means of the four propositions. "Determinate" refers to the wholesome and unwholesome, so it is deduced against them. Its nature being dim and unenlightened, the four phases of movement are not evident, so it is deduced only against the wholesome and unwholesome in four propositions. The present text contains only the method of deduction in four propositions, but if warding off shifting imputations, one should also fully employ sixteen propositions: namely, that the indeterminate does not arise, both arises and does not arise, and neither arises nor does not arise, each also having four propositions. Since there are no four phases of movement, it is not necessary to extend the deduction to sixty-four propositions. As for "seeking the determinate and finding it ungraspable": when seeking the wholesome and unwholesome, they are already ungraspable in themselves, so against what could the indeterminate be distinguished for identity and difference? Since there is neither identity nor difference, arising is simply non-arising, and hence it is ungraspable. If one has shifting imputations, they arise from this proposition; the present text is kept brief, so it merely restates "neither conjoined nor disjoined, and neither arising nor ceasing." Thus, the mind-nature of the indeterminate is not different from the mind-nature of the earlier wholesome and unwholesome; their substance is identical while their names differ, and therefore it is called "neither conjoined nor disjoined," and so forth. Since its nature is like this, the indeterminate is fit to be an object of contemplation. From "further traversing..." onward, the indeterminate is next traversed through the twelve matters, pointing to the twelve matters as "places." The indeterminate being reached can be known by analogy with the above. From "like this..." onward, the three contemplations are established. The first is the contemplation of emptiness, the ten realms are provisionality, and the dharma-nature is the middle. From "the dharma-nature is constantly quiescent" onward, it is concluded with the singular calming and contemplation. From "in the indeterminate..." onward, proofs are cited. The intent is also the same as before; texts such as the *Wuxing jing* should also be cited in full, because the indeterminate corresponds to the obscuration of ignorance. One should also apply the intent of *Vimalakīrti*, that the indeterminate is itself bodhi and nirvāṇa. Simply by deducing the identity and difference of the indeterminate and the determinate, one perceives the principle of the dharma-nature of the indeterminate. One should also speak to the overbearingly arrogant of severance and non-severance, as well as concluding and subsuming, which can be understood by analogy with the above; hence it says "by analogy with the above." From "furthermore..." onward, the previous three chapters are concluded with the three types of calming and contemplation. "The final wholesome" refers to the shared-characteristic wholesome and unwholesome at the beginning of the various unwholesome states; looking from one to the next in turn, only the perfect is wholesome, and since the perfect is placed at the end, it forms the gradual. Just as with the conceivable object, the final Buddha-realm first traverses the preceding nine, and thus forms the conceivable. Furthermore, the concluding text is not the mark of actual practice, so one need not raise further obstacles regarding the perfect and gradual. As for "both wholesome and unwholesome..." and so forth: the distinctive unwholesome and the wholesome of the six perfections are each nothing other than the three contemplations and the dharma-dhātu; hence it is called "sudden," fully as explained above. As for the "folded wholesome": it is neither encompassed by nor departs from the previous two; when emptiness arises, it pertains to emptiness; when existence arises, it pertains to existence; and the middle way and compassion are likewise so. Therefore, "folded" is called variable. Compared with the four folded propositions in fascicle five below, the text differs but the meaning is the same; that [passage] was merely to establish the four propositions.