止觀輔行傳弘決 2.55

2.55

Fourth, regarding the contemplation of the indeterminate: first, the object of contemplation is shown and the characteristics of the indeterminate are brought out. *Hengmeng* (𧄼瞢) means dim and unenlightened, differing from the two characteristics of the various wholesome and unwholesome states described above. From "the reason why" onward, the intent of applying contemplation is explained. Because there is this capacity, one now recognizes that this indeterminate state is also fit to serve as an object, and therefore it can be contemplated. From "the *Dazhidulun* says" onward, proof is cited. The indeterminate mind resembles a state of unknowing, yet since the treatise says that prajñā is present, it must be contemplated. When it previously asked "what can be done?", it was because its nature is dark and inferior, unlike the wholesome and unwholesome which can be temporarily subdued, hence the question "what can be done?" Then the treatise is further cited to grant and permit it. Why? Contaminated dharmas are completely encompassed by the three natures; having already spoken of the wholesome and unwholesome, one must clarify the indeterminate, for otherwise the objects of contemplation would not be comprehensive. Furthermore, if one indulges in the wholesome and unwholesome, there is likewise no contemplative wisdom—why would it be only the indeterminate? If there is prajñā, contemplation can universally be cultivated—why solely in the wholesome and unwholesome? Moreover, taking a preliminary view, the wholesome and unwholesome are easily stirred while the indeterminate is difficult to uplift; although difficulty and ease differ, both require the application of contemplation. Furthermore, previously it was roughly categorized on the basis of retribution dharmas, but if discussed in detail, all minds apart from the obscurations and the perfections are called indeterminate; therefore, the indeterminate must not be left uncontemplated. From "contemplating this" onward, it is deduced to form an object of contemplation. When the mental characteristics are not evident, the object is difficult to focus upon; if its identity and difference are distinguished against the wholesome and unwholesome, the indeterminate can be recognized and thus becomes an object of contemplation; hence it says "if identical, it is not indeterminate." From "if different..." onward, it is deduced by means of the four propositions. "Determinate" refers to the wholesome and unwholesome, so it is deduced against them. Its nature being dim and unenlightened, the four phases of movement are not evident, so it is deduced only against the wholesome and unwholesome in four propositions. The present text contains only the method of deduction in four propositions, but if warding off shifting imputations, one should also fully employ sixteen propositions: namely, that the indeterminate does not arise, both arises and does not arise, and neither arises nor does not arise, each also having four propositions. Since there are no four phases of movement, it is not necessary to extend the deduction to sixty-four propositions. As for "seeking the determinate and finding it ungraspable": when seeking the wholesome and unwholesome, they are already ungraspable in themselves, so against what could the indeterminate be distinguished for identity and difference? Since there is neither identity nor difference, arising is simply non-arising, and hence it is ungraspable. If one has shifting imputations, they arise from this proposition; the present text is kept brief, so it merely restates "neither conjoined nor disjoined, and neither arising nor ceasing." Thus, the mind-nature of the indeterminate is not different from the mind-nature of the earlier wholesome and unwholesome; their substance is identical while their names differ, and therefore it is called "neither conjoined nor disjoined," and so forth. Since its nature is like this, the indeterminate is fit to be an object of contemplation. From "further traversing..." onward, the indeterminate is next traversed through the twelve matters, pointing to the twelve matters as "places." The indeterminate being reached can be known by analogy with the above. From "like this..." onward, the three contemplations are established. The first is the contemplation of emptiness, the ten realms are provisionality, and the dharma-nature is the middle. From "the dharma-nature is constantly quiescent" onward, it is concluded with the singular calming and contemplation. From "in the indeterminate..." onward, proofs are cited. The intent is also the same as before; texts such as the *Wuxing jing* should also be cited in full, because the indeterminate corresponds to the obscuration of ignorance. One should also apply the intent of *Vimalakīrti*, that the indeterminate is itself bodhi and nirvāṇa. Simply by deducing the identity and difference of the indeterminate and the determinate, one perceives the principle of the dharma-nature of the indeterminate. One should also speak to the overbearingly arrogant of severance and non-severance, as well as concluding and subsuming, which can be understood by analogy with the above; hence it says "by analogy with the above." From "furthermore..." onward, the previous three chapters are concluded with the three types of calming and contemplation. "The final wholesome" refers to the shared-characteristic wholesome and unwholesome at the beginning of the various unwholesome states; looking from one to the next in turn, only the perfect is wholesome, and since the perfect is placed at the end, it forms the gradual. Just as with the conceivable object, the final Buddha-realm first traverses the preceding nine, and thus forms the conceivable. Furthermore, the concluding text is not the mark of actual practice, so one need not raise further obstacles regarding the perfect and gradual. As for "both wholesome and unwholesome..." and so forth: the distinctive unwholesome and the wholesome of the six perfections are each nothing other than the three contemplations and the dharma-dhātu; hence it is called "sudden," fully as explained above. As for the "folded wholesome": it is neither encompassed by nor departs from the previous two; when emptiness arises, it pertains to emptiness; when existence arises, it pertains to existence; and the middle way and compassion are likewise so. Therefore, "folded" is called variable. Compared with the four folded propositions in fascicle five below, the text differs but the meaning is the same; that [passage] was merely to establish the four propositions.