止觀輔行傳弘決 3.2

3.2

大章第二釋名者，夫立名不同，如《大經》云「或有因緣如目連等，或無因緣如桃李等。」涅槃亦爾，無有因緣彊為立名。止觀亦爾，彊名止觀。即此無因名為有因，為眾生故隨機立稱。又依於世，名立出世名。是故眾聖先立世名，為出世名而作方便。而是世名本是出世，故《金光明》云「世間名字皆出佛經」。故知諸名法理而立，名既法理理亦因名，故假妙名以詮妙理。《莊子》云「而世貴言傳書，不足貴也。」莊既以言傳書，則莊自不足可貴。《老子》曰「知則不言，言則不知。」而老有言則同不知。意欲使於天下無言、獨揚己言，不意反以無言自斥世人。被此自斥之言，而潛斥之反以為得，謬之甚矣。今則不爾，因罤得兔，得已亡罤。罤何所亡？弗謂為兔。文字解脫，斯之謂歟。立止觀名，例之可見。前分別中名為廣略，亦云總別。總別二文互相映顯，故前文云生起五略顯於十廣。又前略後廣為解義故，前廣後略為攝持故。今演前略，令義易了。若為利鈍二人不同，如《大經》三十一「佛告舍利弗：『汝慎勿為利根之人而廣說法、鈍根之人而略說法。』舍利弗言：『我為憐愍故說，非為具足根力。』佛言：『廣略說法，非諸聲聞緣覺所知。』」經明逗機，故寄斥身子。今論解釋，兼為二人。況前略文且為生解，解猶未備，故此廣論。又此廣文，亦與五重玄義意同。五重則玄譚教旨，今此則依經起行。所以彼為釋經、此為成觀，是故次第稍異於彼。初釋名者，即標名也。次體相者，即顯體也，攝法秖明體所攝法。方便下三即是明宗，起教是用，偏圓判教。彼釋法華，理須分別一代教門，故教居後。分別前四，此為成觀。觀由解生，名體偏圓並屬於解。由解立行，故次解後方便正觀。行始為因、行終為果，故次正觀以明果報。宗是自行，用是益他，由自行滿故能起教，旨歸秖是自他所契，故彼《玄》文引〈神力品〉約教次第，故名用、體、宗；若引〈序品〉約行次第，故名體、宗、用。今文正當約行次第，但以教相在於宗前，前後之意如向所說。今解釋名。初結前生後，亦是來意次第。「大途」去，結前也。「復以」去，生後也。途，道也。未委論其蹊徑，故曰大途。「梗」，略也。「概」，平也。秖是粗略出其大綱。如前大意，自他因果行解略足，復以何義名為止觀？故今文中開為四門。若無此釋，將何以辨名體之功？是故四段：前三正明能詮之名、後一旁立以所顯能。待詮次第，絕詮不次。會異秖是絕待異名。初「相待」者，彼此互形曰相，以他望己為待。如長短大小互受其名。《莊子》云「人長七尺不以為大，螻蟻七寸而得大名。」《俱舍疏》云「待謂觀待。前觀於後名過，後觀於前名未。」父子兄弟更互得名，例此可見。判今《法華》唯具二妙，所謂待、絕。所言待者，唯有待麁成妙，更無待妙成麁。若以迹望本亦可互形，若以部望部一向唯妙。今約《法華》迹理復置互形，所以《玄》文待絕俱稱為妙。故以部教相望復有橫竪，望前四時名為竪待，圓望三教名為橫待。此文既依《法華經》意，而釋名等大概準彼。相待是麁，義當待麁論妙；絕待是妙，義當開麁論妙。此二亦名廢麁開麁，故《法華》中唯論二妙，更無非待非絕之名。彼為判教，故待之與絕同稱為妙。今此相待則判為麁，唯明絕觀。無部可待則無竪待，無教可望名無橫待，故唯一絕以為能詮。雖立相待以顯絕待，尚無於絕，何待之有？為詮三德故假名絕，借相待名判為思議。故唯絕待方稱為妙。所以思議境後佛界雖妙，居九界末通名為麁，故並判云非今所用。次與不次意亦如是，故次第意但云衍門，用通用別但云似通似別。雖云不用，正約思議明不思議，開於所待以成能絕，即是今文妙觀意也。釋名下去，諸義皆然。所以釋名論待論絕，體相唯論次與不次。攝法六義偏圓五門亦復如是。雖無部會可以對論，還借教味以顯圓妙。境境十觀秖應唯妙，尚寄橫竪顯非橫竪，故知一部之文共成圓乘開權妙觀，豈指一句別謂高深？若其然者，何殊體踏。此中四段，文四義二，意唯在一。待絕為二，意在於絕。又所一能三，亦名義一，以所顯能故云意一。三止者，雖開三名名猶通總，該括三諦未判淺深，至顯體中分方優劣。觀中三義亦復如是。「諸惡覺觀」等者，語似見思，意且通說，所引《淨名》亦且通證。若借體相文來此預辨者，謂止息見思停心真理，真理不當止與不止；若止息塵沙停心俗理，俗理不當止與不止；若止息無明停心中理，中理不當止與不止。此則三諦各有三止，觀亦如是，準說可知，故下文云「前三成次三，後一具前三。」次第既爾，一心例然。次停止中緣心諦理，及《仁王》入理般若，通而未別，意亦如前。故此中云理，但語能入之智，未云所入之理，觀中亦然。第三止中云「語通意殊」者，此中亦云「對於不止以明止」者，語似上文。上之二止，息對不息、停對不停，今以無明對於法性一往觀之，無明似不息不停、法性似息似停，故云「語通上也，意則不爾。」無明即法性、法性即無明，體同名異，相對立稱，是故永異上之二止。上二不可云相即，故今別約等者，正出第三止相。所言別者，以上二止但屬通途。言通途者，二止皆有一智一斷，斷邊有智且對生死，即約涅槃而立斷名；智邊有斷且對理外，即約般若而立智名。斷故名息、智故名停，智約能斷、斷約所斷，故云智斷通論二止。今則不爾，專約諦理，理非能所但由具惑，惑即法性。惑性相待非關智斷，是故第三不同前二。又第三止約理立名，而止非理；前之二止但依智斷，智斷是止，是故第三不同前二。又智斷依理而智斷非理，故前二止但以智斷而為親依，不同第三專以諦理而為親依，是故第三不同前二。又且順思議故有斯異，若不思議三體本一。「如經」下，引證。通引諸經未為別證，故無的指。無明法性皆非生滅，理雖俱非，若云法性須言寂滅，若云無明須言生滅，此則二名俱通三諦。名皆對立理並無差，故知釋名且在消釋止觀二字名息貫等，未暇委述能所淺深。故下文云「不可尋通名求於別體」。三止既爾，三觀例然。初觀中云「利钁」等者，大鉏曰钁，此琢治玉耳，非今意也。應作此「斲」，斵者破也。大石曰「磐」，粉石曰「砂」，小石曰「礫」。《大經》十八〈性品〉云「譬如有人善知伏藏，即以利钁斲地，磐石砂礫直過無難，唯至金剛不能穿徹。」今借彼譬總含三惑，準止可知。應置金剛但存穿徹，即此中意。次引《法華》穿鑿義邊以證貫穿，未分乾濕故亦通也。次釋觀達中引《瑞應》文，言雖有息，意存達邊。次不觀觀及引經等，準止可知。「是故」下結，如文。

Regarding the second major chapter, "Explaining the Name": now, the establishment of names is not uniform, as the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says, "Some have causes and conditions, like Maudgalyāyana and the like; some have no causes and conditions, like peaches, plums, and the like." Nirvāṇa is also like this: having no cause or condition, a name is forced upon it. Calming and contemplation are also like this: one arbitrarily designates them as "calming and contemplation." This absence of a cause is itself named as having a cause; for the sake of sentient beings, designations are established in accordance with their capacities. Furthermore, relying on worldly names, supramundane names are established. Therefore, all the noble ones first establish worldly names to serve as expedient means for supramundane names. Yet these worldly names originally derive from the supramundane; hence the Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra says, "Worldly names all issue from the Buddha's sūtras." Thus we know that all names are established in imitation of the principle. Since names imitate the principle, the principle is also made known through names; therefore, wondrous names are provisionally used to express the wondrous principle. Zhuangzi says, "Yet what the world values is words, passing down books; these are not worthy of value." Since Zhuang[zi] himself used words to pass down books, then Zhuang[zi] himself is not worthy of value. Laozi said, "One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know." Yet Lao[zi] had words, so he is identical to one who does not know. His intention was to make the world speechless while solely extolling his own words, unaware that he in turn used speechlessness to castigate worldly people. When people are subjected to these words of self-castigation, yet secretly castigate others while conversely taking themselves to have attained it—this is an extreme delusion! Now, here it is not so: by means of the snare one catches the hare, and having caught it, one forgets the snare. What does the snare forget? It is simply not spoken of as the hare. Is this not what is meant by "liberation through words and letters"? Establishing the names of calming and contemplation can be understood by this analogy.

In the previous differentiation, they were called "the extensive and the brief," and also called "the general and the specific." The two texts of the general and the specific mutually illumine each other; hence the preceding text says that the arising of the five brief sections illustrates the ten extensive chapters. Furthermore, the preceding is brief and the subsequent is extensive in order to bring about understanding of the meaning; the preceding is extensive and the subsequent is brief in order to encompass and preserve it. Now we elaborate on the previous brief exposition so that the meaning may be easily understood. If [distinguished] by the difference between sharp and dull faculties, as in fascicle thirty-one of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra: "The Buddha told Śāriputra: 'Take care not to preach the Dharma extensively to people of sharp faculties, nor preach the Dharma briefly to people of dull faculties.' Śāriputra said: 'I speak out of compassion, not because I am fully endowed with [the knowledge of] faculties and powers.' The Buddha said: 'Preaching the Dharma extensively or briefly is not something known by the voice-hearers or pratyekabuddhas.'" The sūtra clarifies adapting to capacities, and thus uses Śāriputra as a foil for rebuke. Here, the treatise explains them to benefit both types of people. Moreover, the previous brief text was merely to give rise to understanding, and since understanding was not yet complete, it is now treated extensively. Furthermore, the intention of this extensive text is also the same as the fivefold profound meaning. The fivefold profound meaning mysteriously discourses on the gist of the teaching, whereas here one arouses practice relying on the sūtra. Therefore, that one is for explaining the sūtra, while this one is for accomplishing contemplation; hence their sequence differs slightly from that one.

First, "Explaining the Name" means setting forth the name. Next, "Substance and Characteristics" means revealing the substance; "Encompassing the Dharmas" merely clarifies the dharmas encompassed by that substance. The three sections from "Expedient Means" onward clarify the core purpose; "Arousing the Teaching" is the function; and evaluating the teaching classifies it into the biased and the perfect. In that text's explanation of the Lotus Sūtra, it is necessary by principle to differentiate the teachings of [the Buddha's] entire lifetime, so the teaching is placed at the end. In differentiating the former four, this text aims at accomplishing contemplation. Contemplation arises from understanding; name, substance, and the biased versus the perfect all pertain to understanding. Because practice is established based on understanding, expedient means and correct contemplation follow after understanding. Practice at its inception is the cause, and practice at its culmination is the fruit; hence correct contemplation is followed by clarifying the karmic reward. The core purpose is one's own practice; the function is benefiting others. Because one's own practice is fulfilled, one is able to arouse the teaching; the ultimate intent is simply that which is realized by self and others. Therefore, that Profound Meaning text cites the "Spiritual Powers" chapter in accordance with the sequence of the teaching, and thus names function, substance, and core purpose; if it cites the "Introduction" chapter in accordance with the sequence of practice, it thus names substance, core purpose, and function. The present text properly corresponds to the sequence of practice, but because the characteristics of the teaching precede the core purpose, the intention of this order is as just explained.

Now we explain the name. First, it concludes what came before and introduces what follows, which is also the sequential order of the intent. From "the broad road" onward concludes what came before. From "furthermore, by what..." onward introduces what follows. "Road" (途) means path; because it has not yet examined the trails and paths in detail, it is called "the broad road." "Rough" (梗) means brief; "outline" (概) means level; it merely roughly puts forward its main guidelines. As in the preceding Great Intent, the cause and effect, practice and understanding, of self and others were briefly complete; furthermore, by what meaning is it named calming and contemplation? Therefore, within the present text it is opened into four gates. If there were not this explanation, how would one distinguish the efficacy of the name and substance? For this reason there are four sections: the first three directly clarify the names that are the expressive [means], while the latter one is established supplementarily to reveal the expressive [means] by means of the expressed [object]. Expressing in relative dependence is sequential; expressing in absolute transcendence is non-sequential. Harmonizing the differences is merely the different names for absolute transcendence.

First, regarding "relative dependence" (相待): mutually comparing this and that is called mutual (相); viewing oneself from the perspective of another is called dependence (待). It is like long and short, or large and small, mutually receiving their names. Zhuangzi says, "A person seven feet tall is not considered large, yet a mole cricket seven inches long obtains the name of large." The Abhidharmakośa Commentary says: "Dependence means comparative dependence. Viewing the earlier from the perspective of the later is called the past; viewing the later from the perspective of the earlier is called the not-yet." Fathers, sons, elder and younger brothers mutually obtain their names; this can be seen by analogy. In judging the present Lotus Sūtra, it possesses only two kinds of wonder: namely, relative dependence and absolute transcendence. What is called relative dependence is only the dependence on the crude to constitute the wondrous; there is never dependence on the wondrous to constitute the crude. If one looks from the trace toward the origin, they may also be mutually compared; but if one looks from one section of teachings toward another section, it is entirely and exclusively wondrous. Now, in terms of the Lotus Sūtra's principle of the trace, mutual comparison is set aside; therefore, the Profound Meaning text calls both relative dependence and absolute transcendence wondrous. Thus, looking at the divisions and teachings in mutual relation, there are also horizontal and vertical: viewing against the previous four periods is called vertical dependence; viewing the perfect against the three teachings is called horizontal dependence. Since this text relies on the intent of the Lotus Sūtra, the explanation of the name and so forth broadly conforms to it. Relative dependence is crude; its meaning corresponds to discussing the wondrous in dependence on the crude. Absolute transcendence is wondrous; its meaning corresponds to opening the crude to discuss the wondrous. These two are also called discarding the crude and opening the crude; therefore, within the Lotus Sūtra, only two wonders are discussed, and there is no name such as "neither dependent nor absolute." Because that text evaluates the teachings, both relative dependence and absolute transcendence are equally called wondrous. In the present text, relative dependence is judged as crude, and it clarifies only absolute contemplation. Since there is no division [of teachings] to depend upon, there is no vertical dependence; since there is no teaching to view against, this is called having no horizontal dependence; therefore, there is only the single absolute transcendence serving as that which expresses. Although relative dependence is established to reveal absolute transcendence, there is not even an absolute—what dependence could there be? In order to express the three virtues, it is provisionally named absolute; borrowing the name of relative dependence, it is judged as conceivable. Therefore, only absolute transcendence is called wondrous. Hence, although the Buddha-realm after the conceivable object is wondrous, because it sits at the end of the nine realms, it is collectively named crude; therefore, all are judged as not what is presently used. The sequential and non-sequential are also of this intent; therefore, the sequential intention only refers to the Mahāyāna gate, and applying the shared or applying the distinctive only refers to seeming shared or seeming distinctive. Although it is said not to be used, it directly relies on the conceivable to clarify the inconceivable, opening that which is depended upon to accomplish that which is absolute; this is precisely the intent of the wondrous contemplation in the present text. From "Explaining the Name" onward, all meanings are like this. Therefore, explaining the name discusses relative dependence and absolute transcendence, whereas substance and characteristics discuss only the sequential and non-sequential. The six meanings of encompassing dharmas and the five gates of the biased and the perfect are also like this. Although there is no assembly of divisions to be discussed in contrast, it still borrows the flavors of the teachings to reveal the perfect and wondrous. In every single object, the ten contemplations should only be wondrous; yet it still relies on the horizontal and vertical to reveal what is neither horizontal nor vertical. Thus we know that the entire text of this work collectively accomplishes the wondrous contemplation of opening the provisional in the perfect vehicle; how could it point to a single phrase and separately call it high and profound? If that were the case, how would it differ from mere nominal recitation? In these four sections, there are four texts and two meanings, but the intent rests solely on one. Relative dependence and absolute transcendence are two, but the intent lies in absolute transcendence. Furthermore, the expressed object is one and the expressive means are three, which is also called one meaning; because the expressed object reveals the expressive means, the intent is said to be one.

Regarding the "three types of calming": although three names are opened, the names are still general and collective, encompassing the three truths without yet distinguishing shallow from profound; only when arriving at revealing the substance are superiority and inferiority distinguished. The three meanings in contemplation are also like this. Regarding "all evil discursive thoughts and investigations," etc.: the wording seems like [the afflictions of] views and thoughts, but the intent is still general, and the cited Vimalakīrti is also general evidence. If we borrow the text of substance and characteristics to distinguish it beforehand here: it means that putting to rest views and thoughts brings the mind to rest in the true principle, yet the true principle does not admit of calming or non-calming; if putting to rest dust-and-sand brings the mind to rest in the provisional principle, the provisional principle does not admit of calming or non-calming; if putting to rest ignorance brings the mind to rest in the middle principle, the middle principle does not admit of calming or non-calming. Thus, each of the three truths has three kinds of calming, and contemplation is also like this; it can be understood by analogy. Hence the subsequent text says, "The first three accomplish the subsequent three, and the last one contains the first three." Since this is so for the sequential, the single mind is likewise. Next, in "stopping and resting," where the cognitive mind conditions the principle of truth, as well as the prajñā entering the principle in the Benevolent Kings [Sūtra], they are general and not yet distinct, and the intent is also as before. Therefore, the "principle" spoken of here refers only to the wisdom that can enter, and has not yet spoken of the principle that is entered; it is also like this in contemplation. In the third calming, it says "the words are shared but the intent is distinct"; and where it also says here "clarifying calming in contrast to non-calming," the words seem like the text above. In the above two kinds of calming, putting to rest is contrasted with not putting to rest, and stopping is contrasted with not stopping; now, taking ignorance in contrast to dharma-nature, viewing them provisionally: ignorance seems like neither putting to rest nor stopping, while dharma-nature seems like putting to rest and stopping. Hence it says: "The words are shared with the above, but the intent is not so." Ignorance is precisely dharma-nature, and dharma-nature is precisely ignorance; their substance is identical while their names differ, and designations are established in mutual opposition. Therefore, it is eternally distinct from the above two kinds of calming. The above two cannot be said to be mutually identical; hence "now specifically relying on..." directly sets forth the characteristics of the third calming. What is meant by "specifically": because the above two kinds of calming merely belong to the general path. What is meant by "the general path": both of the two kinds of calming have one wisdom and one severing. On the side of severing there is wisdom, provisionally contrasted with saṃsāra, so the name of severing is established in terms of nirvāṇa; on the side of wisdom there is severing, provisionally contrasted with that which is outside the principle, so the name of wisdom is established in terms of prajñā. Because of severing it is named putting to rest; because of wisdom it is named stopping. Wisdom is understood in terms of that which is able to sever, and severing is understood in terms of that which is severed; hence it says that wisdom and severing generally discuss the two types of calming. Now, it is not so: it relies exclusively on the principle of truth. The principle is neither the subject nor the object; it is merely that by possessing defilements, defilement is itself dharma-nature. Defilement and nature are mutually dependent and have nothing to do with wisdom and severing; therefore, the third is unlike the previous two. Furthermore, the third calming establishes its name in terms of principle, but calming is not the principle; the former two kinds of calming merely rely on wisdom and severing, and wisdom and severing are calming; therefore, the third is unlike the previous two. Furthermore, wisdom and severing rely on the principle, but wisdom and severing are not the principle; hence the former two kinds of calming merely take wisdom and severing as their direct reliance, unlike the third which exclusively takes the principle of truth as its direct reliance; therefore, the third is unlike the previous two. Furthermore, this difference exists merely in accordance with the conceivable; in terms of the inconceivable, the three substances are fundamentally one. From "as the sūtra says" onward, citations are provided as evidence. It cites various sūtras generally without providing a specific proof, so there is no specific pointing. Ignorance and dharma-nature are both neither arising nor perishing; although in principle both are neither, if one speaks of dharma-nature one must speak of quietude and cessation, and if one speaks of ignorance one must speak of arising and perishing. Thus, these two names both pervade the three truths. The names are all established in opposition, but in principle they are without discrepancy. Thus we know that explaining the name merely consists in explicating the two words "calming" and "contemplation" as putting to rest, penetrating, etc., without having the leisure to detail the depth or shallowness of subject and object. Hence the subsequent text says: "One must not seek the distinctive substance through the shared name." Since this is so for the three types of calming, the three types of contemplation are likewise. In the first contemplation, where it says "sharp mattock," etc.: a large hoe is called a mattock (钁); this [character in the text] refers to carving jade, which is not the present intent. It should be written as this "hew" (斲); hewing means breaking. A large rock is called a boulder (磐); powdered stone is called sand (砂); small stones are called gravel (礫). Fascicle eighteen of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, the "Nature" chapter, says: "It is like a person who knows well where a hidden treasure is; he then hews the earth with a sharp mattock, passing straight through boulders, sand, and gravel without difficulty, only failing to pierce through when reaching adamantine." Now, borrowing that analogy, it comprehensively contains the three defilements; it can be understood by analogy with calming. One should set aside adamantine and merely retain piercing through; this is the meaning here. Next, citing the meaning of digging through from the Lotus Sūtra to prove penetrating: since dry and moist are not yet distinguished, it is also general. Next, in explaining contemplation as penetration, the text of the Ruiying is cited; although it mentions putting to rest, the intent rests on the side of penetration. Next, non-contemplative contemplation, citing sūtras, etc., can be understood by analogy with calming. The conclusion from "therefore" onward is as in the text.