止觀輔行傳弘決 3.2

3.2

Regarding the second major chapter, "Explaining the Name": now, the establishment of names is not uniform, as the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says, "Some have causes and conditions, like Maudgalyāyana and the like; some have no causes and conditions, like peaches, plums, and the like." Nirvāṇa is also like this: having no cause or condition, a name is forced upon it. Calming and contemplation are also like this: one arbitrarily designates them as "calming and contemplation." This absence of a cause is itself named as having a cause; for the sake of sentient beings, designations are established in accordance with their capacities. Furthermore, relying on worldly names, supramundane names are established. Therefore, all the noble ones first establish worldly names to serve as expedient means for supramundane names. Yet these worldly names originally derive from the supramundane; hence the Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra says, "Worldly names all issue from the Buddha's sūtras." Thus we know that all names are established in imitation of the principle. Since names imitate the principle, the principle is also made known through names; therefore, wondrous names are provisionally used to express the wondrous principle. Zhuangzi says, "Yet what the world values is words, passing down books; these are not worthy of value." Since Zhuang[zi] himself used words to pass down books, then Zhuang[zi] himself is not worthy of value. Laozi said, "One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know." Yet Lao[zi] had words, so he is identical to one who does not know. His intention was to make the world speechless while solely extolling his own words, unaware that he in turn used speechlessness to castigate worldly people. When people are subjected to these words of self-castigation, yet secretly castigate others while conversely taking themselves to have attained it—this is an extreme delusion! Now, here it is not so: by means of the snare one catches the hare, and having caught it, one forgets the snare. What does the snare forget? It is simply not spoken of as the hare. Is this not what is meant by "liberation through words and letters"? Establishing the names of calming and contemplation can be understood by this analogy.

In the previous differentiation, they were called "the extensive and the brief," and also called "the general and the specific." The two texts of the general and the specific mutually illumine each other; hence the preceding text says that the arising of the five brief sections illustrates the ten extensive chapters. Furthermore, the preceding is brief and the subsequent is extensive in order to bring about understanding of the meaning; the preceding is extensive and the subsequent is brief in order to encompass and preserve it. Now we elaborate on the previous brief exposition so that the meaning may be easily understood. If [distinguished] by the difference between sharp and dull faculties, as in fascicle thirty-one of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra: "The Buddha told Śāriputra: 'Take care not to preach the Dharma extensively to people of sharp faculties, nor preach the Dharma briefly to people of dull faculties.' Śāriputra said: 'I speak out of compassion, not because I am fully endowed with [the knowledge of] faculties and powers.' The Buddha said: 'Preaching the Dharma extensively or briefly is not something known by the voice-hearers or pratyekabuddhas.'" The sūtra clarifies adapting to capacities, and thus uses Śāriputra as a foil for rebuke. Here, the treatise explains them to benefit both types of people. Moreover, the previous brief text was merely to give rise to understanding, and since understanding was not yet complete, it is now treated extensively. Furthermore, the intention of this extensive text is also the same as the fivefold profound meaning. The fivefold profound meaning mysteriously discourses on the gist of the teaching, whereas here one arouses practice relying on the sūtra. Therefore, that one is for explaining the sūtra, while this one is for accomplishing contemplation; hence their sequence differs slightly from that one.

First, "Explaining the Name" means setting forth the name. Next, "Substance and Characteristics" means revealing the substance; "Encompassing the Dharmas" merely clarifies the dharmas encompassed by that substance. The three sections from "Expedient Means" onward clarify the core purpose; "Arousing the Teaching" is the function; and evaluating the teaching classifies it into the biased and the perfect. In that text's explanation of the Lotus Sūtra, it is necessary by principle to differentiate the teachings of [the Buddha's] entire lifetime, so the teaching is placed at the end. In differentiating the former four, this text aims at accomplishing contemplation. Contemplation arises from understanding; name, substance, and the biased versus the perfect all pertain to understanding. Because practice is established based on understanding, expedient means and correct contemplation follow after understanding. Practice at its inception is the cause, and practice at its culmination is the fruit; hence correct contemplation is followed by clarifying the karmic reward. The core purpose is one's own practice; the function is benefiting others. Because one's own practice is fulfilled, one is able to arouse the teaching; the ultimate intent is simply that which is realized by self and others. Therefore, that Profound Meaning text cites the "Spiritual Powers" chapter in accordance with the sequence of the teaching, and thus names function, substance, and core purpose; if it cites the "Introduction" chapter in accordance with the sequence of practice, it thus names substance, core purpose, and function. The present text properly corresponds to the sequence of practice, but because the characteristics of the teaching precede the core purpose, the intention of this order is as just explained.

Now we explain the name. First, it concludes what came before and introduces what follows, which is also the sequential order of the intent. From "the broad road" onward concludes what came before. From "furthermore, by what..." onward introduces what follows. "Road" (途) means path; because it has not yet examined the trails and paths in detail, it is called "the broad road." "Rough" (梗) means brief; "outline" (概) means level; it merely roughly puts forward its main guidelines. As in the preceding Great Intent, the cause and effect, practice and understanding, of self and others were briefly complete; furthermore, by what meaning is it named calming and contemplation? Therefore, within the present text it is opened into four gates. If there were not this explanation, how would one distinguish the efficacy of the name and substance? For this reason there are four sections: the first three directly clarify the names that are the expressive [means], while the latter one is established supplementarily to reveal the expressive [means] by means of the expressed [object]. Expressing in relative dependence is sequential; expressing in absolute transcendence is non-sequential. Harmonizing the differences is merely the different names for absolute transcendence.

First, regarding "relative dependence" (相待): mutually comparing this and that is called mutual (相); viewing oneself from the perspective of another is called dependence (待). It is like long and short, or large and small, mutually receiving their names. Zhuangzi says, "A person seven feet tall is not considered large, yet a mole cricket seven inches long obtains the name of large." The Abhidharmakośa Commentary says: "Dependence means comparative dependence. Viewing the earlier from the perspective of the later is called the past; viewing the later from the perspective of the earlier is called the not-yet." Fathers, sons, elder and younger brothers mutually obtain their names; this can be seen by analogy. In judging the present Lotus Sūtra, it possesses only two kinds of wonder: namely, relative dependence and absolute transcendence. What is called relative dependence is only the dependence on the crude to constitute the wondrous; there is never dependence on the wondrous to constitute the crude. If one looks from the trace toward the origin, they may also be mutually compared; but if one looks from one section of teachings toward another section, it is entirely and exclusively wondrous. Now, in terms of the Lotus Sūtra's principle of the trace, mutual comparison is set aside; therefore, the Profound Meaning text calls both relative dependence and absolute transcendence wondrous. Thus, looking at the divisions and teachings in mutual relation, there are also horizontal and vertical: viewing against the previous four periods is called vertical dependence; viewing the perfect against the three teachings is called horizontal dependence. Since this text relies on the intent of the Lotus Sūtra, the explanation of the name and so forth broadly conforms to it. Relative dependence is crude; its meaning corresponds to discussing the wondrous in dependence on the crude. Absolute transcendence is wondrous; its meaning corresponds to opening the crude to discuss the wondrous. These two are also called discarding the crude and opening the crude; therefore, within the Lotus Sūtra, only two wonders are discussed, and there is no name such as "neither dependent nor absolute." Because that text evaluates the teachings, both relative dependence and absolute transcendence are equally called wondrous. In the present text, relative dependence is judged as crude, and it clarifies only absolute contemplation. Since there is no division [of teachings] to depend upon, there is no vertical dependence; since there is no teaching to view against, this is called having no horizontal dependence; therefore, there is only the single absolute transcendence serving as that which expresses. Although relative dependence is established to reveal absolute transcendence, there is not even an absolute—what dependence could there be? In order to express the three virtues, it is provisionally named absolute; borrowing the name of relative dependence, it is judged as conceivable. Therefore, only absolute transcendence is called wondrous. Hence, although the Buddha-realm after the conceivable object is wondrous, because it sits at the end of the nine realms, it is collectively named crude; therefore, all are judged as not what is presently used. The sequential and non-sequential are also of this intent; therefore, the sequential intention only refers to the Mahāyāna gate, and applying the shared or applying the distinctive only refers to seeming shared or seeming distinctive. Although it is said not to be used, it directly relies on the conceivable to clarify the inconceivable, opening that which is depended upon to accomplish that which is absolute; this is precisely the intent of the wondrous contemplation in the present text. From "Explaining the Name" onward, all meanings are like this. Therefore, explaining the name discusses relative dependence and absolute transcendence, whereas substance and characteristics discuss only the sequential and non-sequential. The six meanings of encompassing dharmas and the five gates of the biased and the perfect are also like this. Although there is no assembly of divisions to be discussed in contrast, it still borrows the flavors of the teachings to reveal the perfect and wondrous. In every single object, the ten contemplations should only be wondrous; yet it still relies on the horizontal and vertical to reveal what is neither horizontal nor vertical. Thus we know that the entire text of this work collectively accomplishes the wondrous contemplation of opening the provisional in the perfect vehicle; how could it point to a single phrase and separately call it high and profound? If that were the case, how would it differ from mere nominal recitation? In these four sections, there are four texts and two meanings, but the intent rests solely on one. Relative dependence and absolute transcendence are two, but the intent lies in absolute transcendence. Furthermore, the expressed object is one and the expressive means are three, which is also called one meaning; because the expressed object reveals the expressive means, the intent is said to be one.

Regarding the "three types of calming": although three names are opened, the names are still general and collective, encompassing the three truths without yet distinguishing shallow from profound; only when arriving at revealing the substance are superiority and inferiority distinguished. The three meanings in contemplation are also like this. Regarding "all evil discursive thoughts and investigations," etc.: the wording seems like [the afflictions of] views and thoughts, but the intent is still general, and the cited Vimalakīrti is also general evidence. If we borrow the text of substance and characteristics to distinguish it beforehand here: it means that putting to rest views and thoughts brings the mind to rest in the true principle, yet the true principle does not admit of calming or non-calming; if putting to rest dust-and-sand brings the mind to rest in the provisional principle, the provisional principle does not admit of calming or non-calming; if putting to rest ignorance brings the mind to rest in the middle principle, the middle principle does not admit of calming or non-calming. Thus, each of the three truths has three kinds of calming, and contemplation is also like this; it can be understood by analogy. Hence the subsequent text says, "The first three accomplish the subsequent three, and the last one contains the first three." Since this is so for the sequential, the single mind is likewise. Next, in "stopping and resting," where the cognitive mind conditions the principle of truth, as well as the prajñā entering the principle in the Benevolent Kings [Sūtra], they are general and not yet distinct, and the intent is also as before. Therefore, the "principle" spoken of here refers only to the wisdom that can enter, and has not yet spoken of the principle that is entered; it is also like this in contemplation. In the third calming, it says "the words are shared but the intent is distinct"; and where it also says here "clarifying calming in contrast to non-calming," the words seem like the text above. In the above two kinds of calming, putting to rest is contrasted with not putting to rest, and stopping is contrasted with not stopping; now, taking ignorance in contrast to dharma-nature, viewing them provisionally: ignorance seems like neither putting to rest nor stopping, while dharma-nature seems like putting to rest and stopping. Hence it says: "The words are shared with the above, but the intent is not so." Ignorance is precisely dharma-nature, and dharma-nature is precisely ignorance; their substance is identical while their names differ, and designations are established in mutual opposition. Therefore, it is eternally distinct from the above two kinds of calming. The above two cannot be said to be mutually identical; hence "now specifically relying on..." directly sets forth the characteristics of the third calming. What is meant by "specifically": because the above two kinds of calming merely belong to the general path. What is meant by "the general path": both of the two kinds of calming have one wisdom and one severing. On the side of severing there is wisdom, provisionally contrasted with saṃsāra, so the name of severing is established in terms of nirvāṇa; on the side of wisdom there is severing, provisionally contrasted with that which is outside the principle, so the name of wisdom is established in terms of prajñā. Because of severing it is named putting to rest; because of wisdom it is named stopping. Wisdom is understood in terms of that which is able to sever, and severing is understood in terms of that which is severed; hence it says that wisdom and severing generally discuss the two types of calming. Now, it is not so: it relies exclusively on the principle of truth. The principle is neither the subject nor the object; it is merely that by possessing defilements, defilement is itself dharma-nature. Defilement and nature are mutually dependent and have nothing to do with wisdom and severing; therefore, the third is unlike the previous two. Furthermore, the third calming establishes its name in terms of principle, but calming is not the principle; the former two kinds of calming merely rely on wisdom and severing, and wisdom and severing are calming; therefore, the third is unlike the previous two. Furthermore, wisdom and severing rely on the principle, but wisdom and severing are not the principle; hence the former two kinds of calming merely take wisdom and severing as their direct reliance, unlike the third which exclusively takes the principle of truth as its direct reliance; therefore, the third is unlike the previous two. Furthermore, this difference exists merely in accordance with the conceivable; in terms of the inconceivable, the three substances are fundamentally one. From "as the sūtra says" onward, citations are provided as evidence. It cites various sūtras generally without providing a specific proof, so there is no specific pointing. Ignorance and dharma-nature are both neither arising nor perishing; although in principle both are neither, if one speaks of dharma-nature one must speak of quietude and cessation, and if one speaks of ignorance one must speak of arising and perishing. Thus, these two names both pervade the three truths. The names are all established in opposition, but in principle they are without discrepancy. Thus we know that explaining the name merely consists in explicating the two words "calming" and "contemplation" as putting to rest, penetrating, etc., without having the leisure to detail the depth or shallowness of subject and object. Hence the subsequent text says: "One must not seek the distinctive substance through the shared name." Since this is so for the three types of calming, the three types of contemplation are likewise. In the first contemplation, where it says "sharp mattock," etc.: a large hoe is called a mattock (钁); this [character in the text] refers to carving jade, which is not the present intent. It should be written as this "hew" (斲); hewing means breaking. A large rock is called a boulder (磐); powdered stone is called sand (砂); small stones are called gravel (礫). Fascicle eighteen of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, the "Nature" chapter, says: "It is like a person who knows well where a hidden treasure is; he then hews the earth with a sharp mattock, passing straight through boulders, sand, and gravel without difficulty, only failing to pierce through when reaching adamantine." Now, borrowing that analogy, it comprehensively contains the three defilements; it can be understood by analogy with calming. One should set aside adamantine and merely retain piercing through; this is the meaning here. Next, citing the meaning of digging through from the Lotus Sūtra to prove penetrating: since dry and moist are not yet distinguished, it is also general. Next, in explaining contemplation as penetration, the text of the Ruiying is cited; although it mentions putting to rest, the intent rests on the side of penetration. Next, non-contemplative contemplation, citing sūtras, etc., can be understood by analogy with calming. The conclusion from "therefore" onward is as in the text.