止觀輔行傳弘決 3.21

Next, explaining the skillful crossing over: first listing [them], that is, the three successive contemplations are generally called "skillful," acquiring their name in contrast to the "clumsy." If, as in the Dazhidulun, citing Xigen (Rocana/Prasannendriya) and others is called the skillful crossing over, that refers to the three teachings. Thus both the gradual and the non-gradual are called skillful. Here it is spoken from the beginning [of the three], hence it is also called skillful. Next, the direct explanation. First, in the gradual [presentation], calming comes first and contemplation after. First, in explaining calming: first, calming by embodying the real. Commenting on the text to explain it, the text is still brief; fully developed, one should investigate and examine by means of the four natures. Only after destroying the conceptual imputation of intrinsic nature, so that the two kinds of emptiness are fully present, is it termed attaining emptiness. Next, regarding the second calming: first, it speaks generally of what is realized by the three vehicles, which is largely identical with minor differences. From "If the two vehicles" onward, it explains why expedient means are not needed. Next, quoting the sūtra that "In movement and stillness the mind is constantly unified": stillness is emptiness, and movement is entering provisionality; with an empty mind one enters provisionality, hence it says "constantly unified." Next, in the third calming, saying "one-sided practice" and so forth rebukes the preceding two calmings. Where the intention tends is called practice; that on which the intention relies is called function. The first, calming by embodying the real, contemplates both truths, but tends one-sidedly toward the real, initiating practice based on the real. The next, calming by expedient means, also contemplates both truths, but tends one-sidedly toward the conventional. Although it initiates practice based on the conventional, it has not yet contemplated the Middle Way; hence both are called one-sided. Therefore it is now rebuked as "not according with the Middle Way." Furthermore, abiding in emptiness in nirvāṇa is called one-sided practice, and emerging into provisionality and drifting in movement is called one-sided function. Moreover, knowing that the conventional is not conventional applies broadly to two kinds: the conventional of conditioned origination and the conventional of emerging [from emptiness] into provisionality. Both conventionals are quiescent, hence it says "quiescent." As for "The names of these three calmings," and so forth, it resolves doubts; these are the Great Master's words of modesty and deference. Next, from "The treatise explains" onward, it provides scriptural verification for the intention behind the three calmings. How could it merely be to match the three contemplations to provide a basis for the names? The Dazhidulun also allows establishing names according to meaning. As for saying "establishing the three calmings based on the three contemplations": in both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sūtras, the two terms "calming" and "contemplation" are always juxtaposed; moreover, calming and contemplation are simply different names for concentration and wisdom. Since the names concentration and wisdom are juxtaposed everywhere, calming is now named with reference to contemplation. This is why the three contemplations of the Yingluo sūtra necessarily encompass calming. Hence the Chengweishilun (or Harivarman's Tattvasiddhi) contains a "Chapter on Calming and Contemplation." In the four Āgamas, wherever the Buddha teaches the practice of two dharmas, they are precisely calming and contemplation. Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā, fascicle seventeen, states: "Bhikṣus asked the elder, 'Beneath the trees in an empty chamber, what dharmas should be cultivated?' The elder replied, 'Two dharmas should be cultivated, namely calming and contemplation.' They asked again, 'By frequently cultivating calming and contemplation, what is attained?' He replied, 'One attains the first fruit up to the fruit of arhatship.' Asking five hundred bhikṣus in this manner in turn, all said to cultivate the two dharmas of calming and contemplation. Ānanda addressed the Buddha, and the Buddha also said to cultivate the two dharmas of calming and contemplation. Ānanda praised, 'Excellent, excellent! What the Tathāgata and the disciples say is identical, with the same phrases, meanings, and flavor.'" Furthermore, Vimalakīrti says, "The Dharma-body is born from calming and contemplation." The Benye yingluo says, "If one wishes to learn all dharmas and deeply enter the roots of goodness, one should see the power of bodhisattvas in cultivating calming and contemplation." All Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sūtras and treatises are like this. Next, from "Scrutinizing this" onward, [the text] compares the identities and differences with the explanation of the names. As for "roughly resembling" (fangfu): the upper character is pronounced fang, the lower fu; it does not mean complete identity, hence the expression. What is meant by "identity": previously it said "stopping and resting" with reference to the resting of defilements; now it says "embodying the real" by embodying delusion as precisely the real. Previously it said "halting," referring to the mind proceeding toward principle; now it says "following conditions," with the mind following conventional principle. Previously "non-stopping stopping" referred to principle not admitting of stopping or non-stopping; now "resting the two extremes" treats the extreme of emptiness as like stopping and provisionality as like non-stopping, while the Middle Way does not admit of the two extremes of emptiness and provisionality, resembling non-stopping stopping. As for "their characteristics being different": the previous three calmings jointly constitute one truth, whereas the present three calmings each constitute one truth. As for "the previous three form the subsequent three" and so forth: both "subsequent" and "latter" point to the substance and characteristics; the alternating phrasing expresses this mutually, hence the difference. The three in the previous explanation of the names form the three of the substance and characteristics; thus each of the three of substance and characteristics depends on the three in the explanation of the names to be formed. How so? For instance, calming by embodying the real necessarily rests view and thought [defilements], halts the mind in the truth of the real, and perceives that the real principle is neither stopping nor non-stopping. Since embodying the real is like this, the other two follow suit; therefore each fully possesses the previous three. The subsequent sentence saying "the latter one possesses the previous three" repeats and clarifies the preceding sentence, meaning that each one among the substance and characteristics possesses the three from the explanation of the names. Next, regarding the explanation of the three contemplations: first, listing them according to the sūtra. In that Benye yingluo there are two passages explaining these three contemplations: in the lower fascicle the Buddha speaks to seven bodhisattvas including Samantabhadra and Mañjuśrī, as cited fully in the first fascicle. In the upper fascicle, in explaining the ten dedications of merit, each dedication has ten objective realms; the tenth contemplation in the tenth dedication is named the contemplation of the signless supreme truth, by which one enters the first bhūmi; from the first bhūmi upward, the three contemplations are in a single mind. As for the three contemplations: entering emptiness from provisionality is called the contemplation of the two truths; entering provisionality from emptiness is called the contemplation of equality. These two contemplations serve as expedients; relying on these two contemplations of emptiness, one can enter the contemplation of the supreme truth of the Middle Way, illuminating both truths simultaneously, with mind after mind quiescent and extinguished, spontaneously entering into the Dharma-flow water of the first bhūmi, named a mahāsattva. The present text follows that, merely omitting three to five words. From "What is meant by" onward, it explains the sūtra's meaning. First, explaining why entering emptiness is also named the two truths, the text has five layers. First, generally discussing both the expressive and the expressed together: how so? The conventional is that which expresses, and emptiness is that which is expressed; if there were no expressive, there would be no way to recognize what is expressed; therefore the name of the two truths must be established. From "Furthermore, when realizing emptiness" onward is the second: speaking of cultivation by comparison to realization, first the doctrine, next the metaphor, and then the application. First, in the doctrine, it says that on the day of realizing emptiness one should only see emptiness, yet one still sees both emptiness and provisionality; how much more so when viewing the real by contemplating the provisional—could it not be called the contemplation of the two truths? Therefore one must establish the two truths. "As when clouds are cleared away" and so forth: next, adducing the metaphor. Clouds are precisely obstacles; the clearing away of obstacles is called "unfolding" (fa), unfolding being opening up. Just as when clouds are cleared away, the single color of the sky above is revealed, and the myriad phenomena below are necessarily clarified. The revelation above is a metaphor for seeing the real, and the clarification below is a metaphor for seeing the conventional; clouds are a metaphor for the delusions of view and thought. The revelation above necessarily entails the clarification below; therefore the two truths are necessary. From "Due to the real" onward, the application of the metaphor: "due to the real" matches the revelation above, and "provisionality being revealed" matches the clarification below. Because of seeing the real, provisionality is even more apparent. From "Now, due to" onward is the comparative explanation: explaining that even when realizing the real one still sees the two truths; now when initially cultivating the real, it is obtained by contemplating the provisional—why would it not be called the contemplation of the two truths? Hence it says "Now, due to..." and so on.

From “Moreover, the conventional…” onward is the third explanation, in terms of refutation and application. If there is that which is refuted, there must be that which can refute; that which can refute is precisely the real truth that is applied, and since the active and passive are not isolated, both are therefore established. From “Moreover, discrimination…” onward is the fourth explanation, in terms of emotional disposition and wisdom. When our school explains the truths, across both the Great and Lesser Vehicles, the principle is exhausted only by contrasting emotional disposition with wisdom; therefore, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra is used to explain the text of the Yingluo jing. Fascicle thirty-two of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: “As for following one's own mind, it is like the five hundred bhikṣus who each stated the cause of the body. All five hundred asked Śāriputra, ‘The Buddha spoke of the cause of the body; what is it?’ Śāriputra said, ‘You have each also attained correct liberation and should know it yourselves; on what account do you now ask such a question again?’ One bhikṣu said, ‘When we had not yet attained correct liberation, our thought took ignorance to be the cause of the body; when making this contemplation, we attained arhatship.’ One spoke of craving, one spoke of karmic formations, one spoke of food and drink and the five desires, and so on. After the five hundred had each spoken in this way, they went together to the Buddha's place, circumambulated him to the right and sat back, each recounting their own explanation. Śāriputra said to the Buddha, ‘Who has spoken correctly?’ The Buddha said, ‘None among the five hundred bhikṣus has spoken incorrectly.’” Each speaking of their own realization is called “following one's own mind,” and is also called “following wisdom.” Just like the elder Ciṭa, who called the Buddha an illusory man: because of this, the Buddha broadly expounded all illusory dharmas in their diverse differences; according with the emotional disposition of beings is called “following the minds of others,” and is also called “following emotional disposition.” As it is said, that which is seen by the minds of worldly people is called the worldly truth, and that which is seen by the minds of transworldly people is called the supreme-truth truth. The worldly truth belongs to emotional disposition, and the supreme truth belongs to wisdom; emotional disposition and wisdom joined together receive the name of the two truths, which is called “following both one's own and others' minds,” and is also called “following both emotional disposition and wisdom.” This is said in terms of the two truths of the Tripiṭaka and shared teachings, and its meaning corresponds to the intent of the first contemplation in the present text. For the latter two teachings, it can be known by applying this standard. For example, when expounding the three virtues, it says: the Tathāgata has one hundred thousand diverse names; a single dharma of prajñā is spoken of under various names, and liberation is likewise. Having manifold names is called “following emotional disposition.” Settling the various sons while dwelling in it oneself is called “following wisdom.” Cultivated virtue and inherent virtue are called “following both emotional disposition and wisdom.” Now, taking the first contemplation as the standard, it still possesses all three types of two truths such as emotional disposition—how much more so a single one? Question: Since one has not yet tallied with the real, one should only follow emotional disposition; how could one have the other two? Answer: Because it encompasses the beginning and the end, it must therefore be explained comprehensively. The present text specifically uses the two kinds, teaching and practice, to reveal the meaning of accomplishing the two truths in the initial cultivation. Next, from “Question” onward, is the critical analysis, consisting of eight tiers of questions and answers. In the first question, the meaning of the third explanation of the preceding first contemplation is used to challenge the second contemplation: The first contemplation refutes the conventional and applies the real; the next contemplation refutes the real and applies the conventional. Since both contemplations refute one and apply one, both should also receive the name “contemplation of the two truths.” Why is the second named “equality”? The meaning of the answer is: both being named “contemplation of the two truths” is indeed tenable in principle, but if the names before and after were the same, their superiority and inferiority would be confused; therefore, the second takes its name from what is superior. That which is called superior is: previously one only applied the real, but now one can apply the conventional. The real is solely for self-benefit; the conventional benefits others. Benefiting oneself while also assisting others is therefore called superior. In the next question, the third contemplation is used to challenge the second contemplation: The second receives its name from what is superior in view of the first; why does the third not take its name from what is superior in view of the first? The second, which applies [only] one side, is still called equality; the third, whose application is equal, should be named equality—yet why is it only called the “contemplation of the middle path”? The meaning of the answer is: both of the preceding two contemplations involve refutation and application, and considered within their own contemplations, neither is equal. In the second, viewed in contrast to the first, the beginning and end are spoken of together; therefore, only when reaching the second is it called equality—this is named “equal” relative to refutation and application. Now, this third contemplation, considered within its own contemplation, is already inherently equal; viewed in contrast to the preceding two contemplations, it conversely becomes the subsequent equality; therefore, it merely constitutes further refuting and further applying. Now, this [third contemplation] illuminates both and is not contrasted with refutation and application; therefore, it takes its designation solely from that which can be applied. Thus, in this third contemplation, there is no stagnation in either of the two; even if one is at the pre-stage levels and has not yet entered the middle path, stagnation in the extremes has already been broken, and one only applies [oneself] to the middle. Furthermore, the contemplation of the middle path is not unequal; if it were again named “equality,” this would again result in confusion. The next question challenges both preceding ones together: both contemplate the two truths, so both should also enter both. Why does the first only enter the real, while the next only enters the conventional? The meaning in the answer is: it only answers regarding the first contemplation, from which the second can be known by extension. Since the first contemplates both yet does not enter both, the second likewise refutes emptiness and applies provisionality; because refutation and application are not equal, their entries are also not the same. In the next question: previously, the refutation and application of the real and conventional were challenged; now, the real and the middle are used to challenge the conventional truth. Among the three truths, why are only the real and the middle raised to challenge the single conventional truth? Since both [types of conventional truth] are called conventional, why need they be challenged separately? The real and middle are precisely the real within and beyond the realms, and thus are that which refutes the conventional within and beyond the realms. The real and middle are principle, so they may well be called truths; that which is refuted is not principle, so how can it be called a truth? The meaning of the answer is: dharma-nature is principle, and principle is truth; since both are dharma-nature, both are therefore called truths. In the next question: being a truth, there is no delusion and therefore no birth-and-death; since both are called truths, are both nirvāṇa? The meaning of the answer is: although the real and conventional differ, both may be called truths; although worldly and transworldly differ, both are called nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is transworldly peace and joy, and therefore worldly peace and joy is also called nirvāṇa. In the next question: nirvāṇa is precisely uncontaminated and unconditioned; if both truths can be called nirvāṇa, they should also both be called uncontaminated. The meaning of the answer is: entering the uncontaminated necessarily requires right view; since it is granted that the worldly also has right view, it is then named worldly without contamination or loss. In the next question: because of being uncontaminated, it is precisely unarisen; since it is granted that both the real and conventional are called uncontaminated, both the real and conventional should also be called unarisen. The meaning of the answer is: the designation “unarisen” also applies across the two truths; therefore, the text from fascicle thirty-two of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra on the non-Buddhist assertions is borrowed in answer. It is like the world having four kinds of non-existence: first, not yet arisen is called non-existent, like clay having no vase; second, having ceased is called non-existent, like a vase already broken; third, mutual non-existence of different phenomena, like ox and horse mutually lacking each other; fourth, ultimate non-existence, like turtle hair and rabbit horns. Now, the third, mutual non-existence, is borrowed as an answer: that is, the transworldly lacks worldly arising, and the worldly also lacks transworldly arising. That which is called “borrowed”: although not the primary meaning, nevertheless, in terms of the worldly truth, the four kinds of non-existence are not erroneous; it is provisionally borrowed as an expedient answer suited to the occasion. The rest below follow this pattern. In the next question: as for the phrase “from the provisional,” does it refute or not refute? In the answer, it is opened into thirty-six propositions, fully detailed below in [the chapter on] the object of afflictions.

Now, first, to match the four phrases in the text: 'Refuting' refers to refuting provisionality; 'entering' refers to entering emptiness. Not refuting and entering is the learner who embodies phenomena [to realise emptiness]; refuting and entering is the learner who analyzes phenomena [to realise emptiness]; refuting without entering refers to non-Buddhists who have attained dhyāna; neither refuting nor entering refers to all ordinary people. Both refuting and not refuting are called 'proceeding from the provisional' and both 'enter emptiness'—these are the first two phrases, meaning that both refuting and not refuting are called 'proceeding from the provisional', while not entering emptiness constitutes the latter two phrases. Next, in interpreting the second contemplation alone, regarding 'looking across different times, it is called equal': the reason this second contemplation receives the name 'equal' does not derive from this second contemplation alone. The first contemplation employs the true and refutes the conventional, while this one again employs the conventional and refutes the true. Combining it with the preceding one then forms a dual employment and dual refutation; looking across before and after is called 'different times', and only upon arriving at this second contemplation is it named 'equal'. Next, under 'Now we shall…', there are two sets of analogies and applications. The first analogises entering emptiness; next, it clarifies entering provisionality. The ordinary person, born blind, is obscure to both the true and conventional; once the wisdom eye opens, one sees the emptiness of the true truth and also sees the forms of the conventional. Under 'From the provisional…', it applies the analogy of entering emptiness. Although one sees the two truths, one can only employ the true, unable yet to discriminate and unable to employ the conventional; hence the analogy says, 'unable to discriminate the various…' and so forth. The four kinds of four truths are called 'various'. 'Herbs' (hui) is a general name for grass, generally designating the three grasses. 'Trees' (mu) is a collective term for trees, collectively indicating the two trees. Roots, stalks, branches, and leaves: in the commentary, they are analogised to faith, precepts, concentration, and wisdom, because each of the four teachings possesses these four dharmas. The four kinds of path and cessation are termed 'medicine'; the four kinds of suffering and origin are termed 'poison'; since the four teachings are distinguished, their kinds and varieties are each different. Thus, when first entering emptiness, one cannot yet discriminate; for this reason, it is called being unable to employ the provisional. Next, regarding the second analogy: after the wisdom eye opens, precisely at the time of entering the provisional, one also sees the two truths, which is called seeing emptiness and form. Discriminating the forms previously refuted, clearly perceiving that the roots and other parts of all dharmas are different, and comprehending the four kinds of four truths is called 'recognising the kinds and varieties'. Penetrating the different arisings of the causes of medicines and illnesses is called 'understanding cause and condition'. Interdependently looking across, they mutually discuss the coarse and subtle. Healing the aspect of suffering and origin is termed 'medicine'; medicine assisting the dharma-body is therefore called 'food'. Recognising medicine and recognising illness is termed 'recognising all'; being skilled in administering medicine is termed 'employing all'. Because it pervades the four kinds of four truths, it repeatedly says 'all'. Benefiting the nine realms is termed 'benefiting others'. Under 'This analogy…', it applies it. Both the preceding and subsequent contemplations contemplate the true and conventional; because this one is able to discriminate, when looked at in relation to the former, they are equal. Next, in interpreting the middle way: first, it directly links the text of the Yingluo jing. In the sūtra, after finishing explaining the preceding two contemplations, it states: 'Relying on these two emptiness contemplations as the path of expedients, one is able to enter the middle way and doubly illuminate the two truths. Mind after mind is tranquil and ceased, naturally advancing into the first stage.' Now, in first explaining the expedients, there are two kinds: first, doubly extinguishing; second, doubly illuminating. First, regarding the 'two emptinesses', it means emptiness of the provisional and emptiness of emptiness. Emptiness is precisely negation; negation is precisely extinguishing. Due to the preceding expedient of doubly extinguishing at different times, now entering the middle way, they are naturally doubly extinguished. Extinction is precisely the middle; hence it says 'mind after mind is tranquil and ceased'. Under 'Also in the first contemplation…', it next explains double illumination. During the first two contemplations, one employed emptiness and employed provisionality; due to the preceding expedient of doubly employing them at different times, employment is precisely illumination, and illumination is precisely the middle; therefore it cites the sūtra saying: 'If the mind is in concentration…' and so forth. Arising is precisely the conventional; ceasing is precisely the true; therefore, abiding in the middle way, one is able to know arising and ceasing. Knowing is merely illuminating; the intention lies here. Because all are the middle, one attains spontaneity. This spontaneity is due to the previous deliberate cultivation—alternating extinction and illumination as an expedient—so that upon entering the middle way, one can be thus. Next, the question cites sūtras to resolve difficulties in order to verify the present text. Only upon entering the first stage is it called equal; therefore, it first asks what the characteristic of bias is like. The meaning in the reply is: saying that bias is prevalent and one does not see the nature is said according to the graduated meaning. Next, the question challenges the previous reply. The previous reply said that both contemplations belong to biased concentration and wisdom and therefore do not see the nature; it again cites the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra to challenge the previous reply: The wisdom eye precedes the dharma eye, yet it can still be said to see, only saying it is unclear; why then say that both do not see at all? This text is from the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, where the Buddha replied to Siṃhanāda: 'Because one sees with the wisdom eye, it is not clear; when the Buddha sees with the Buddha eye, it is completely clear. Because bodhisattvas engage in practice, their seeing is not clear; if there is no practice, seeing is completely clear. Because they abide in the ten abodes, their seeing is not clear; neither abiding nor departing, seeing is completely clear.' Why say that stages such as the practices and dedications also do not see? The meaning of the reply is: saying that neither eye sees is spoken according to the graduated meaning. Since both contemplations belong to biased provisionality and biased emptiness, both the wisdom eye and dharma eye do not see the nature. Regarding what was cited by you from the sūtra about the wisdom eye seeing: although the wisdom eye is the stage of the ten abodes, borrowing the distinctive to name the perfect, it therefore says the ten abodes and the wisdom eye see. Speaking in accordance with the perfect, from the initial abode onward it is truly the Buddha eye. Therefore, know that this borrows the abodes of the perfect teaching to name them the wisdom eye; it does not mean that the wisdom eye of the ten abodes [of the distinctive teaching] can see. Next, it cites the Lotus Sūtra to verify the wisdom eye. Even the World-Honoured One's culmination is still called the wisdom eye; how much more so could the ten abodes not be called wisdom? The Buddha's wisdom eye sees ultimate emptiness; emptiness is precisely the middle, because the wisdom eye is precisely the Buddha eye. 'Being like this' refers to the wisdom eye in the preceding abodes being unclear, falling short of the World-Honoured One's ultimate wisdom eye. Just as seeing the forms of the middle way in the night of ignorance, because remaining ignorance exists, one's seeing is not clear. Wild geese in the sky are also like this: remaining ignorance acts as an obstacle to the eye, thus causing one's seeing of the geese in the sky to be unclear. Therefore, fascicle eight of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra states: 'For example, looking from afar at wild geese in the sky: is it empty sky? Or is it wild geese? Looking closely without pause, one sees them faintly. The bodhisattvas of the ten abodes having partial knowledge and vision of the Tathāgata-nature is also like this. Emptiness is like ignorance, and the geese and so forth are like the nature.' The word 'unclear' resides in the bodhisattvas of the wisdom eye in those ten abodes; how does it concern the wisdom eye of biased emptiness of the two vehicles? Thus, prior to the bhūmis of the distinctive teaching, none see it, let alone the bodhisattvas of the shared teaching and the two vehicles. It further cites the Lotus Sūtra's analogy of drilling and digging to prove that only in the abodes of the perfect teaching in the third contemplation does one see it. In the Commentary on the Lotus Sūtra, in order to link the sūtra text, contemplation is according to the four teachings, and teachings are according to the five periods; one should know that both teachings and contemplations are framed according to the teachings, only then manifesting that this text is called uniquely wonderful.

Where that [commentary] relies on the four teachings to explain contemplation: first, in the Tripiṭaka teaching, it takes sentient beings as the high plateau, the practice of contemplation as digging, and the realization of principle as clear water. In the shared contemplation, it takes the stage of dry wisdom as dry earth, the stage of nature as moist earth, and seeing the truth as clear water. In the distinctive contemplation, it takes the contemplation of emptiness as dry earth, the contemplation of provisionality as moist earth, and seeing the middle as clear water. In the perfect contemplation, it takes the five grades as dry earth, the six sense-faculties as moist [earth], and the initial abode as clear water. In its [discussion] regarding the teachings, it generally draws on the gradual teachings of the four periods: the Tripiṭaka is dry earth; the Vaipulya and Prajñā are moist earth; the Lotus is mud; and seeing the middle is water. Both senses take the initial abode as water. This causes one, in practicing contemplation, to cultivate only the sudden contemplation. In the perfect teaching, the initial mind is already called clear water, which differs from that commentary's strict determination that it is called clear water only upon reaching the initial abode. Although the determination of stages differs, the beginning and the end are non-dual; hence, one is caused right here to generate contemplation on the basis of the sūtra. From "the two teachings" onward, it concludes the preceding [discussion] regarding the teachings. The "two teachings" are the Tripiṭaka and the shared [teachings]. Therefore, those two teachings are like dry and moist earth, completely lacking water. The distinctive teaching is like mud: because the doctrinal path is mixed, it is not called clear water. The initial mind knows the middle; therefore, it merely says: "The two teachings do not expound it, and the two practices do not reach it." "Practice" is contemplation; concluding the preceding [discussion] regarding contemplation, these are the two contemplations of emptiness and provisionality. That is, the two vehicles of both [teachings] enter into emptiness through the shared and distinctive [ways], which are subsumed under the practice of emptiness. The bodhisattvas of the Tripiṭaka [teaching] emerge into provisionality through the shared and distinctive [ways], which are subsumed under the practice of provisionality. Therefore, it states generally: "The two contemplations do not reach it." In the gradual contemplation, although the middle way is not what the present text employs, because the path of realization is identical, it merely says: "The two practices do not reach it." If even the provisional teachings are like this, how much more so for the rest? Therefore it says: "[Even] universally [seeking] throughout space... there is no such place." Next, from "these three contemplations" onward, it distinguishes the differences from the three contemplations in the earlier explanation of names. By following the explanation of the three calms, the meaning may also be known. In the passage "These rely on the Mahāyāna...", it judges the earlier skillful gradual three contemplations: although they contain emptiness and provisionality, both belong to the Mahāyāna gate; hence, these three contemplations use the relative names and meanings from the past teachings as the general exposition, the gradual doctrinal characteristics as that which reveals, and the gradual three truths as that which is revealed. For this reason, they are not the characteristics of the perfect and sudden. Although they are not the perfect and sudden, fundamentally they serve to reveal the perfect; nor are they merely the distinctive teaching, but are simply said to rely on the Mahāyāna. Therefore, the conclusion below concerning persons and stages extends across both the great and the small. In the passage "According to the meaning...", it explains the characteristics of the three contemplations based on the Mahāyāna gate of the Dapin: since they have not yet been unified, they merely form a gradual progression; because the gradual meaning accords with gradual characteristics, the three contemplations are distinct and separate from one another. This generally marks the distinct characteristics. From "If we discuss..." onward, it explains the distinct characteristics in terms of contemplation, wisdom, and persons. "Meaning" is the teaching. The teaching accords with distinct characteristics to reveal that the essence is not identical; hence, contemplation and the like cannot yet be harmoniously integrated: the first two contemplations are provisional, while the contemplation of the middle way is real, and the three contemplations turn progressively shallower or deeper. Contemplation is the cause and wisdom is the fruit. Since the causes are differentiated, the fruits are likewise; hence, the three wisdoms progressively differ in superiority and inferiority, with an earlier and a later. Although the method of contemplation is broad, the practitioners are distinct; hence, the three contemplations encompass both the great and the small, and all the various stages are included within them. Because it broadly contains the two teachings, it says "various stages." Because it incidentally embraces the śrāvakas, it extends to the small [vehicle]. Therefore, if we speak of the gradual progression, it resides solely in the great; if we discuss the persons, it broadly gathers both the great and the small. Thus, after contemplation and wisdom, it further discusses persons. Hence we know that the contemplation of emptiness for the two vehicles is solely of the small; for the bodhisattvas of the shared teaching, the meaning extends to the great; although the distinctive [teaching] enters into emptiness, it belongs purely to the great. Both the shared and distinctive [teachings] have bodhisattvas who enter into provisionality, which also belongs purely to the great. Those of sharp faculties in the shared teaching have a share in the final mind—namely, those who are received [into the higher teachings]. For persons of the distinctive [teaching], it becomes manifest only at the initial bhūmi. Therefore, among the various stages, the great and the small differ. If we discuss the provisional gates, only the Tripiṭaka should be set aside; but proceeding for the moment from the gradual progression, the perfect is also set aside. Next, to clarify the perfect and sudden, it uses non-relative names as that which expounds, and the single truth [which is] the three truths as that which is revealed; the correspondence between the earlier and later passages is quite clear. Therein, first is calm, next is contemplation, and finally it clarifies their simultaneity. In the first part clarifying calm, there are the doctrinal statement, the simile, and the application. In the initial doctrinal statement, calm is that which observes, and the truth is that which is focused upon; therefore the sūtra says: "Focus the mind on the dharma-dhātu; the dharma-dhātu is not different," because that which observes and that which is focused upon are one. Next, in the simile, it uses a twofold simile for the non-duality of the threefold and the single in calm and truth. From "Calm and truth" onward is the application. In the initial doctrinal exposition, both calm and truth are three precisely as one; in the simile, it broadly illustrates that the threefold and the single are non-dual; in the application, truth is three precisely as one, while calm is one precisely as three. The texts seem different, but the intent is to show that calm and truth are non-dual in their threefold and single nature, non-dual and yet twofold. From "Through contemplation" onward, it clarifies contemplation. Although contemplation and the object mutually assume the names of contemplating and manifesting—because of contemplation, there is manifestation, and because of manifestation, there is contemplation—they are simultaneously pervasive in essence, and both that which observes and that which is observed are three precisely as one. Next, in the simile, it also illustrates that the threefold and the single are non-dual. Applying calm with respect to truth, it is three precisely as one; contemplation and its object are likewise three precisely as one. That which is contemplated is the object, and that which is manifested is contemplation; that the texts of application for contemplation and calm are inverted merely clarifies that the essence of the threefold and the single is identical. Furthermore, since calm and contemplation are one, observing and illuminating do not differ. Although the truth and the object have different names, fundamentally they are a single dharma. It renders the dharma without distinction in calm and contemplation, yet divides into that which observes and that which is observed, being both one and three; therefore, one must not rigidly cling to before and after. When the simile mentions "Maheśvara," this is the sovereign of the summit of the form realm, who with one face and three eyes adorns that heavenly visage and illuminates the great trichiliocosm. Adorning the heavenly visage illustrates the full endowment of all virtues. Illuminating the great trichiliocosm illustrates pervasive vision. From "Neither provisional nor real" onward, it reveals the subtle and reproves the coarse. "Neither provisional nor real" reproves the provisional, real, shallow, and deep of the previous three contemplations; "neither superior nor inferior" reproves the superior, inferior, earlier, and later of the previous three wisdoms; "neither combined nor separate" relies on the simile of the letter i to generally reprove contemplation and wisdom; "neither great nor small" reproves the greatness and smallness of the various stages of the previous three types of persons. Next, citing the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā verifies that the three contemplations and three calms are mutually identical and interfused. Next, citing the Vajracchedikā illustrates that calm, contemplation, and the object are non-dual in essence. From "The eye illustrates..." onward is the application of the simile, which can be understood. However, calm, contemplation, the truth, and the object are non-dual and yet twofold; though their meaning and intent seem identical, they are not without difference. Although the two dharmas of calm and contemplation are non-dual, quiescence and illumination are fully apparent; although the two dharmas of truth and object are divided into two names in contrast to calm and contemplation, in reality there is no difference of two essences. Therefore, this text of the simile divides calm and contemplation to illustrate the sun and the eye, while the single name of truth-and-object together illustrates the single form; eye, sun, and form are three without earlier or later. From "If one sees..." onward, it concludes with an exhortation, urging the understanding of the text's purport.