止觀輔行傳弘決 3.21.2

3.21.2

「又俗」下，第三約破用說也。 若有所破必有能破，能破即是所用真諦，能所不孤是故俱立。 「又分別」下，第四約情智說。 今家釋諦，凡大小乘皆對情智義方盡理，故以《大經》釋《瓔珞》文。 《大經》三十二云「隨自意者，如五百比丘各說身因。 五百皆問舍利弗言：『佛說身因，何者是耶？ 』舍利弗曰：『汝等亦各得正解脫，自應知之，何緣方更作如是問？ 』有比丘言：『我等未得正解脫時，意謂無明以為身因，作是觀時得阿羅漢。 』有說愛、有說行、有說飲食及五欲等，如是五百各各說已，共詣佛所。 右繞却坐，各述己說。 身子白佛：『誰為正說？ 』佛言：『五百比丘無非正說。 』」各說己證名隨自意，亦名隨智。 如已吒羅長者，稱佛為幻人。 佛因廣說一切幻法種種不同，隨順物情名隨他意，亦名隨情。 如云世人心之所見者名為世諦，出世人心之所見者名第一義諦。 世諦屬情、第一義屬智，情智共合得二諦名，名隨自他意，亦名隨情智。 此約藏通二教二諦，義當今文初觀意也。 後之二教，準說可知。 如說三德云：如來名號十萬不同，般若一法說種種名，解脫亦爾。 多諸名字，是名隨情。 安置諸子自亦住中，是名隨智。 修德性德，名隨情智。 今準初觀尚具情等三種二諦，何況一種？ 問：既未契真，只應隨情，何得餘二？ 答：通初後故，故須遍說。 今文正以教行二種，以顯初修成二諦義次「問」下，料簡，有八重問答。 初問者，以前初觀第三釋意難第二觀。 初觀破俗用真，次觀破真用俗，二觀既俱破一用一，亦應俱得名二諦觀。 何故第二名平等耶？ 答意者，俱名二諦觀於理實通，但前後名同、優劣混濫，是故第二從勝立名。 所言勝者，前但用真，今能用俗。 真唯自利，俗則益他。 自行兼人，故名為勝。 次問者，以第三觀難第二觀。 第二望初從勝受名，第三望初何不從勝？ 第二偏用尚名平等，第三用等應名平等，而但名為中道觀耶？ 答意者，前之二觀俱有破用，當觀而論俱不平等。 第二望初初後合說，故至第二方名平等，此從破用相對名等。 今第三觀，當觀而論已自平等，望前二觀翻為末等，是故但成更破更用。 今此俱照不對破用，是故但從能用立稱。 故此第三二俱無滯，縱在地前未入中道，邊滯已破但用於中。 又中道觀非不平等，更名平等，復成混濫。 次問，雙難前二俱觀二諦，亦應俱入。 何故初但入真、次但入俗？ 答中意者，但答初觀，準知第二。 初既俱觀而不俱入，第二亦為破空用假，破用不等入亦不同。 次問者，前已難於真俗破用，今以真中難於俗諦。 三諦之中但舉真中難一俗者，二俱名俗，何須別難？ 真中即是界內外真，即有所破界內外俗。 真中是理容可稱諦，所破非理何得稱諦？ 答意者，法性是理，理即是諦，既俱法性故俱稱諦。 次問者，諦故無惑故無生死，既俱稱諦，俱涅槃耶？ 答意者，真俗雖異俱得名諦，世出世異俱名涅槃。 涅槃即是出世安樂，故世安樂亦名涅槃。 次問者，涅槃即是無漏無為，二諦俱得名為涅槃，亦應俱得名為無漏。 答意者，夫入無漏必須正見，既許世間亦有正見，即名世間無所漏失。 次問者，以無漏故即是無生，既許真俗俱名無漏，亦應真俗俱名無生。 答意者，無生之名亦通二諦，故借《大經》三十二文外道計答。 猶如世間有四種無：一者未生名無，如泥無瓶。 二者滅已名無，如瓶破已。 三者異相互無，如牛馬互無。 四者畢竟名無，如龜毛兔角。 今借第三互無為答，即是出世無世間生，世間亦無出世之生。 所言借者雖非正義，然約世諦四無非謬，權借以為適時之答。 下去例爾。 次問者，從假之言為破不破？ 答中開為三十六句，具如下文煩惱境中。

From “Moreover, the conventional…” onward is the third explanation, in terms of refutation and application. If there is that which is refuted, there must be that which can refute; that which can refute is precisely the real truth that is applied, and since the active and passive are not isolated, both are therefore established. From “Moreover, discrimination…” onward is the fourth explanation, in terms of emotional disposition and wisdom. When our school explains the truths, across both the Great and Lesser Vehicles, the principle is exhausted only by contrasting emotional disposition with wisdom; therefore, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra is used to explain the text of the Yingluo jing. Fascicle thirty-two of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: “As for following one's own mind, it is like the five hundred bhikṣus who each stated the cause of the body. All five hundred asked Śāriputra, ‘The Buddha spoke of the cause of the body; what is it?’ Śāriputra said, ‘You have each also attained correct liberation and should know it yourselves; on what account do you now ask such a question again?’ One bhikṣu said, ‘When we had not yet attained correct liberation, our thought took ignorance to be the cause of the body; when making this contemplation, we attained arhatship.’ One spoke of craving, one spoke of karmic formations, one spoke of food and drink and the five desires, and so on. After the five hundred had each spoken in this way, they went together to the Buddha's place, circumambulated him to the right and sat back, each recounting their own explanation. Śāriputra said to the Buddha, ‘Who has spoken correctly?’ The Buddha said, ‘None among the five hundred bhikṣus has spoken incorrectly.’” Each speaking of their own realization is called “following one's own mind,” and is also called “following wisdom.” Just like the elder Ciṭa, who called the Buddha an illusory man: because of this, the Buddha broadly expounded all illusory dharmas in their diverse differences; according with the emotional disposition of beings is called “following the minds of others,” and is also called “following emotional disposition.” As it is said, that which is seen by the minds of worldly people is called the worldly truth, and that which is seen by the minds of transworldly people is called the supreme-truth truth. The worldly truth belongs to emotional disposition, and the supreme truth belongs to wisdom; emotional disposition and wisdom joined together receive the name of the two truths, which is called “following both one's own and others' minds,” and is also called “following both emotional disposition and wisdom.” This is said in terms of the two truths of the Tripiṭaka and shared teachings, and its meaning corresponds to the intent of the first contemplation in the present text. For the latter two teachings, it can be known by applying this standard. For example, when expounding the three virtues, it says: the Tathāgata has one hundred thousand diverse names; a single dharma of prajñā is spoken of under various names, and liberation is likewise. Having manifold names is called “following emotional disposition.” Settling the various sons while dwelling in it oneself is called “following wisdom.” Cultivated virtue and inherent virtue are called “following both emotional disposition and wisdom.” Now, taking the first contemplation as the standard, it still possesses all three types of two truths such as emotional disposition—how much more so a single one? Question: Since one has not yet tallied with the real, one should only follow emotional disposition; how could one have the other two? Answer: Because it encompasses the beginning and the end, it must therefore be explained comprehensively. The present text specifically uses the two kinds, teaching and practice, to reveal the meaning of accomplishing the two truths in the initial cultivation. Next, from “Question” onward, is the critical analysis, consisting of eight tiers of questions and answers. In the first question, the meaning of the third explanation of the preceding first contemplation is used to challenge the second contemplation: The first contemplation refutes the conventional and applies the real; the next contemplation refutes the real and applies the conventional. Since both contemplations refute one and apply one, both should also receive the name “contemplation of the two truths.” Why is the second named “equality”? The meaning of the answer is: both being named “contemplation of the two truths” is indeed tenable in principle, but if the names before and after were the same, their superiority and inferiority would be confused; therefore, the second takes its name from what is superior. That which is called superior is: previously one only applied the real, but now one can apply the conventional. The real is solely for self-benefit; the conventional benefits others. Benefiting oneself while also assisting others is therefore called superior. In the next question, the third contemplation is used to challenge the second contemplation: The second receives its name from what is superior in view of the first; why does the third not take its name from what is superior in view of the first? The second, which applies [only] one side, is still called equality; the third, whose application is equal, should be named equality—yet why is it only called the “contemplation of the middle path”? The meaning of the answer is: both of the preceding two contemplations involve refutation and application, and considered within their own contemplations, neither is equal. In the second, viewed in contrast to the first, the beginning and end are spoken of together; therefore, only when reaching the second is it called equality—this is named “equal” relative to refutation and application. Now, this third contemplation, considered within its own contemplation, is already inherently equal; viewed in contrast to the preceding two contemplations, it conversely becomes the subsequent equality; therefore, it merely constitutes further refuting and further applying. Now, this [third contemplation] illuminates both and is not contrasted with refutation and application; therefore, it takes its designation solely from that which can be applied. Thus, in this third contemplation, there is no stagnation in either of the two; even if one is at the pre-stage levels and has not yet entered the middle path, stagnation in the extremes has already been broken, and one only applies [oneself] to the middle. Furthermore, the contemplation of the middle path is not unequal; if it were again named “equality,” this would again result in confusion. The next question challenges both preceding ones together: both contemplate the two truths, so both should also enter both. Why does the first only enter the real, while the next only enters the conventional? The meaning in the answer is: it only answers regarding the first contemplation, from which the second can be known by extension. Since the first contemplates both yet does not enter both, the second likewise refutes emptiness and applies provisionality; because refutation and application are not equal, their entries are also not the same. In the next question: previously, the refutation and application of the real and conventional were challenged; now, the real and the middle are used to challenge the conventional truth. Among the three truths, why are only the real and the middle raised to challenge the single conventional truth? Since both [types of conventional truth] are called conventional, why need they be challenged separately? The real and middle are precisely the real within and beyond the realms, and thus are that which refutes the conventional within and beyond the realms. The real and middle are principle, so they may well be called truths; that which is refuted is not principle, so how can it be called a truth? The meaning of the answer is: dharma-nature is principle, and principle is truth; since both are dharma-nature, both are therefore called truths. In the next question: being a truth, there is no delusion and therefore no birth-and-death; since both are called truths, are both nirvāṇa? The meaning of the answer is: although the real and conventional differ, both may be called truths; although worldly and transworldly differ, both are called nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is transworldly peace and joy, and therefore worldly peace and joy is also called nirvāṇa. In the next question: nirvāṇa is precisely uncontaminated and unconditioned; if both truths can be called nirvāṇa, they should also both be called uncontaminated. The meaning of the answer is: entering the uncontaminated necessarily requires right view; since it is granted that the worldly also has right view, it is then named worldly without contamination or loss. In the next question: because of being uncontaminated, it is precisely unarisen; since it is granted that both the real and conventional are called uncontaminated, both the real and conventional should also be called unarisen. The meaning of the answer is: the designation “unarisen” also applies across the two truths; therefore, the text from fascicle thirty-two of the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra on the non-Buddhist assertions is borrowed in answer. It is like the world having four kinds of non-existence: first, not yet arisen is called non-existent, like clay having no vase; second, having ceased is called non-existent, like a vase already broken; third, mutual non-existence of different phenomena, like ox and horse mutually lacking each other; fourth, ultimate non-existence, like turtle hair and rabbit horns. Now, the third, mutual non-existence, is borrowed as an answer: that is, the transworldly lacks worldly arising, and the worldly also lacks transworldly arising. That which is called “borrowed”: although not the primary meaning, nevertheless, in terms of the worldly truth, the four kinds of non-existence are not erroneous; it is provisionally borrowed as an expedient answer suited to the occasion. The rest below follow this pattern. In the next question: as for the phrase “from the provisional,” does it refute or not refute? In the answer, it is opened into thirty-six propositions, fully detailed below in [the chapter on] the object of afflictions.